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Abstract 
This thesis charts British and American policy-making towards Burma between the 
country's independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 and the military coup that 
ended civilian government in 1962. In particular, it examines the role aid played in 
Burma's relations with the West and China and the Soviet Union: what it was offered, 
by whom, when and why, and how its leaders responded. Aid from the West began 
immediately after independence, when the British furnished the Burmese government 
with military aid against the communist insurgency that broke out in March 1948. 
Financial assistance was offered, but refused, in 1950. American help began under 
Harry Truman's administration, also in 1950, and continued under Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. Further proposals were developed by John F. Kennedy's administration, 
although these plans were thwarted by the military coup in 1962. 
In giving aid to Burma, British and American planners shared the same basic 
underlying aim 
- 
keeping the government in power and maintaining its independence 
from the communist bloc. Both believed that the provision of aid gave them some 
measure of influence over the government in Rangoon 
- 
that, in other words, their aid 
had some degree of coercive potential, somehow independent of the intentions or 
interests of the recipient state. However, rather than passive and appropriately grateful 
recipients of external aid, and the policy prescriptions that tended to come with it, the 
Burmese are revealed as surprisingly active and autonomous agents, prepared to 
manipulate their aid relationships to suit their own ends, rather than the objectives of 
their superpower partners in Washington and Moscow. 
i 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my supervisor at Nottingham, Professor Matthew Jones, for his 
encouragement, advice and support. Thanks too to the ever-helpful staff at the British 
Library, the Institute of Historical Research and the School of Oriental and African 
Studies in London, the UK National Archives in Kew and the US National Archives 
in College Park, MD. Finally, thanks to my wife Helen, who can have her husband 
back now. 
11 
Contents 
Glossary 
....................................................................................... 
vi 
Introduction 
................................................................................... 
1 
Context: Burma under the British 
......................................................... 
10 
Chapter 1 British policy and the crises of 1948 
.................................. 
19 
The outbreak of the communist insurgency 
.............................................. 
21 
The outbreak of the Karen insurgency 
.................................................... 
45 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................... 
57 
Chapter 2 Aid, conflict and the Commonwealth, 1949-1950 
.................. 
59 
Burma's financial crisis and the case for aid 
............................................. 
62 
Aid and Britain's regional planning 
....................................................... 
73 
Aid and the Commonwealth 
............................:.................................. 
81 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................. 
102 
Chapter 3 The decline of British influence, 1950-1954 
....................... 
105 
Military ties and the termination of the British military mission 
..................... 
106 
Commercial ties, rice and the debt settlement 
.......................................... 
115 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................. 
133 
iii 
Chapter 4 The China crisis and the beginnings of American aid, 
1948-1952 
................................................................ 
138 
The regional context: Britain and US planning in South-East Asia 
................. 
141 
Developing an aid programme for Burma 
.............................................. 
153 
US aid and British policy 
.................................................................. 
161 
The impact of the Korean war on American aid planning 
............................ 
170 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................. 
176 
Chapter 5 The Kuomintang crisis and the termination of American aid, 
1952-1954 
................................................................ 
178 
The KMT crisis and Burma's relations with the US and China 
..................... 
180 
The effects of the KMT crisis on US economic and military relations 
............. 
194 
A problem deferred 
........................................................................ 
204 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................. 
218 
Chapter 6 Communist intervention and the resumption of American aid, 
1955-1958 
................................................................ 
223 
Burma's evolving relations with China and the Soviet Union 
....................... 
226 
The communist `economic offensive' 
................................................... 
231 
Developing a response 
..................................................................... 
237 
The resumption of American aid to Burma 
............................................. 
249 
Conclusion 
.................................................................................. 
263 
iv 
Chapter 7 Britain, the United States and the end of civilian government, 
1958-1962 
................................................................ 
269 
The political crisis of 1958 
................................................................ 
271 
Ne Win's first govermnent 
................................................................ 
274 
U Nu's return to power 
.................................................................... 
288 
Kennedy, modernisation and the 1962 coup 
............................................ 
297 
Conclusion 
................................................................................. 
314 
Bibliography 
............................................................................... 
321 
V 
Glossary 
ABPO All Burma Peasants Organisation 
ABTUC All Burma Trade Union Congress 
AFO Anti-Fascist Organisation 
AFPFL Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League 
AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
BIA Burma Independence Army 
BNA Burma National Army 
BOC Burma Oil Company 
BSM British Services Mission 
BSP Burma Socialist Party 
BWPP Burma Workers and Peasants Party 
CAT Civil Air Transport 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CPB Communist Party of Burma 
EPC Economic Policy Committee 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICA International Cooperation Administration 
KMT Kuomintang 
KNU Karen National Union 
NIE National Intelligence Estimate 
NSC National Security Council 
NUF National United Front 
OPC Office of Policy Coordination 
vi 
PPS Policy Planning Staff 
PUSC Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee 
PVO People's Volunteer Organisation 
SAMB State Agricultural Marketing Board 
SOE Special Operations Executive 
TUC(B) Trades Union Congress (Burma) 
USAID US Agency for International Development 
YMBA Young Men's Buddhist Association 
vii 
Introduction 
A particular set of conflicts and crises have tended to dominate American and British 
histories of post-war Asia: the revolution in China in the 1940s, the conflicts in Korea 
and Malaya in the 1950s and, especially, the American war in Vietnam in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Together, these events constitute the `grand narrative' of Asia's recent 
international history, their significance derived largely from their relationship with the 
grandest narrative of all 
- 
the history of the global conflict between the West and 
communism. The concern is with centres of military, economic or ideological power, 
chief among them the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective allies. 
This interpretation tends to privilege Europe as the Cold War's geopolitical centre, 
and assigns to much of the rest of the world a subsidiary status as `the periphery'. 
Like a pebble tossed into a lake, the confrontation that began on the Elbe is construed 
as spreading outwards across the world in a series of concentric ripples, disturbing in 
turn Asia, Central America, the Caribbean and Africa 
- 
even, ultimately, reaching into 
space. In this way, a conflict over the economic and political organisation of advanced 
industrial societies is seen as progressively impinging upon a backward world deemed 
to lack the capacity to resist this encroachment or influence its course; in countries as 
diverse as Guatemala, the Congo and Cambodia, we imagine `the core' penetrating 
`the periphery', and through that encounter precipitating crisis by changing or 
disrupting its societies, economies or political structures to serve the Cold War 
objectives of Washington and Moscow. 
This model looks very like the way metropolitan historians used to portray encounters 
between Europeans and soon-to-be colonial societies: the ship arrives off the African 
1 
coast, the marines, merchants and missionaries wade ashore and Ashanti or Ibo 
society is forever changed. ' We now understand that the colonial process was far 
more complex and nuanced than this. The colonial encounter involved exchange, as 
well as imposition; colonial regimes relied on cooperation and participation, as well as 
coercion and exploitation, and colonialism changed metropolitan societies as well as 
colonial ones. Imagining colonial peoples merely as helpless victims not only strips 
them of their dignity; by taking away from them their capacity to act it also fails to 
capture the full range of interactions between coloniser and colonised. 
Over the past few years, historians have begun to see similar patterns in the 
relationship between the centre and the periphery in the Cold War. 3 Far from passive 
bystanders or unwitting pawns, robbed of agency by the exigencies of superpower 
confrontation, political leaders in capitals far removed from Washington and Moscow 
were in fact active and surprisingly independent authors of their own futures. Just as 
local elites sought to manage and exploit their encounters with colonial regimes, so 
' The parallels between the European colonial experience and the Cold War experiences of the United 
States and the Soviet Union are discussed in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 5. 
2 For an early discussion of the mechanisms and functions of colonial collaboration among elites in 
Asia and Africa, see Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch 
for a Theory of Collaboration', in Roger Owen and Robert Sutcliffe (eds), Studies in the Theory of 
Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972). Imperialism, Robinson argues, `was as much a function of its 
victims' collaboration or non-collaboration 
- 
of their indigenous politics, as it was of European 
expansion' (p. 118). 
3 See, for instance, Tony Smith, ` New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of 
the Cold War', Diplomatic History, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 567-91. 
4 Ibid., p. 570. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko made a similar point over 30 years ago: `To approach the 
history of the postwar world as if Soviet-American rivalry encompasses its major theme 
-a notion 
implicit in the term "Cold War" 
- 
is to leave most of the critical dimensions of our epoch off to the side 
of any picture in a bewildering, disconnected profusion'. The Limits of Power: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 7. 
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too leaders in the newly independent states of what was becoming known as the Third 
World tried to exploit the international conditions engendered by the Cold War, and to 
do so in ways that suited their own political, economic or strategic needs, not 
necessarily the needs or desires of the conflict's main players S In particular, rather 
than ally themselves with either power centre,, the great majority of the Third World's 
new, independent states chose neutralism and non-alignment. This they justified as a 
defensive response to international tension and domestic political demands. Equally, 
though, this strategy, and the contingent and flexible way in which it was often 
applied, can be seen as a positive form of engagement with the Cold War, creating 
what John Lewis Gaddis has called a `zone of autonomy' 
-a way of managing and 
negotiating relations with the large powers without explicitly associating with any. 6 
This thesis explores this idea of `zones of autonomy' through a focus on British and 
American relations with one periphery state, Burma, between the country's 
independence from the UK in 1948 and the military coup that ended civilian 
government in 1962. In particular, it examines the role aid played in Burma's relations 
with the West and China and the Soviet Union: what it was offered, by whom, when 
and why, - how its leaders responded, and what that response might suggest about 
structures of power in the early Cold War. Burma might at first sight seem an odd 
s The term `Third World' (Tiers monde) appears to have been coined by a French economist, Alfred 
Sauvy, in 1952. By evoking the Third Estate (Tiers dtat) of the French Revolution, Sauvy sought to 
convey the idea that nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America possessed a similarly revolutionary 
potential. Odd Arne Westad, `The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) 
Paradigms', Diplomatic History, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 561. The term has since come, 
problematically, to mean third-class. However, replacements such as `the under-developed world' and 
`the developing world' seem scarcely less patronising, so for want of a better alternative Third World is 
used here to describe countries outside of the West and the Soviet bloc. 
6 John Lewis Gaddis, `A NaYve Approach to Studying the Cold War', in Odd Arne Westad (ed. ), 
Reviewing the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 32. 
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choice of subject; the country has after all been virtually ignored by historians of 
British and American policy-making in Cold War Asia. Narrative histories exist from 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the revival of pro-democracy opposition in the 1980s 
focused outside attention on Burma once again, stimulating further work. 7 Significant 
documentary work has also been done on Burmese decolonisation. 8 However, the 
primary British and American records covering the country's early years of 
independence remain largely unknown. 9 
This lack of attention from historians reflects the level of contemporary interest 
Burma attracted from policy-makers in London and Washington: the country was not, 
nor could it ever be, a central concern for British and American planners confronting 
conflicts in China, Korea, Indochina and Malaya; conflicts in which their countries 
and armed forces were directly engaged. This junior position did not, however, mean 
that Burma was without significance; in fact, the country was the object of a 
surprisingly large amount of political and diplomatic energy. In part, this stemmed 
from its strategic value, derived from its geographical position on the borders of India 
and China, and its status as one of the world's major sources of rice, the staple food of 
millions of Asians. For the British specifically, Burma's welfare after independence 
7 See for instance John Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1958); Frank Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic: A Historical and Political Analysis (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1966); Dorothy Woodman, The Making of Burma (London: Cresset Press, 1962); and 
Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence (Oxford: OUP, 1957). 
More recent work includes Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: 
Zed Books, 1991); and Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review 
Publishing, 1989). 
8 See Hugh Tinker's two-volume Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944-1948 (London: HMSO, 
1983 and 1984). 
9A partial exception is Nicholas Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, 
1945-SO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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was important, both to justify their decision to decolonise when and how they did, and 
as an earnest of the UK's intentions in South-East Asia. Fruitful relations with 
independent Burma, officials hoped, would dramatise the possibilities for cooperation 
and mutuality inherent in the new Asia of free states. The fact that the Burmese 
government faced a serious communist insurgency also argued for political attention 
in London and Washington. More fundamentally, American planners in particular 
came to believe that newly independent countries like Burma were assuming 
significance, not so much on their own merits, but as objects of strategic competition 
with China and the Soviet Union. Given the inherently aggressive and expansionist 
nature of international communism, officials argued, Burma, with its long, 
unprotected border with China, its weak government and its repudiation of American 
collective security guarantees, had to be of Soviet and Chinese interest, and hence had 
to be of American interest too. In policy-making terms, Burma's actual relevance to 
the concerns of the United States was less important than its perceived relevance to 
the (usually assumed) concerns of the Soviet Union and China. 
That Burma was a target of aggressive communist intent seemed self-evident. When 
they were not actively fomenting rebellion in Burma, officials believed, Soviet and 
Chinese agents were seeking to subvert the country's political parties or secure 
control of its finances and economy through extensive trade deals and aid. These 
perceived threats presented policy-makers in London and Washington with the 
problem that lies at the heart of this thesis: how could relations with independent, 
neutralist Burma be managed in such a way that the country cleaved to the West, 
rather than to the Soviet Union? How could Burma be induced to recognise the threats 
it faced, and take action to meet them? What scope was there for British and 
5 
American diplomacy to influence policy-making in Rangoon? Both the British and 
American governments looked to aid for an answer to these questions. Through 
financial, technical, economic and military assistance and political and diplomatic 
support, the vulnerabilities that rendered Burma susceptible to communist 
encroachment 
- 
could be addressed, and Burma's loyalty to the West secured. 
Accordingly, the British, albeit at times against their better judgement, furnished the 
Burmese with military assistance and arranged financial aid in the late 1940s. Harry 
Truman's administration provided economic and technical assistance in the first half 
of the 1950s, and this continued under Dwight D. Eisenhower's government later in 
the decade. Further proposals, supported by a sophisticated academic critique of 
political and economic change in the post-colonial world, were developed by John F. 
Kennedy's administration, although these plans were forestalled by the military coup 
in 1962. 
All of these aid initiatives were in one way or another founded on the basic 
- 
and 
usually tacit 
- 
assumption that Burma both needed Western help, and would 
obligingly accept it. This assumption rested in turn on a neo-colonial belief in the 
value and power of Western technology, and Western, particularly American, ways of 
ordering the world. Western techniques across the whole domain of human life'- 
social and political organisation, warfare, health provision, agriculture, sanitation 
- 
were thought to be inherently superior, both to the indigenous methods in use in the 
Third World, and to the alternatives offered by Soviet communism. Thus, while aid 
planning in Burma was driven fundamentally by the desire to meet a perceived 
communist strategic challenge, the export of first British, and later American, 
expertise and capital was also designed to counter communism's ideological appeal. 
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In the nineteenth century, colonial governments had justified their possession of 
Africa and Asia in terms of a civilising mission to rescue their benighted subjects 
from savagery and paganism. A hundred years later, Burma and other nations of the 
emerging Third World were subject to very similar impulses to control and direct their 
affairs, only this time they were couched in terms of a developmental mission that 
sought to `save' these societies from the twin evils of communism and poverty. 10 
This thesis argues that the central problem facing American and British policy-making 
in Burma during this period was that it required the acquiescence of the Burmese, 
both in the actual policies officials developed, and in the assumptions of Western 
superiority that underlay them. This cooperation was, however, either withheld or 
only grudgingly and partially given, and British and American officials consistently 
underestimated the scope for autonomous action that existed in Rangoon. This 
autonomy was most obviously expressed in Burma's avid neutralism, and its rejection 
of American alliance-building in South-East Asia. It was also evident in the refusal of 
Burmese politicians to acknowledge American, and to a lesser extent British, 
assessments of the nature and scale of the communist threat, and their readiness to 
accept large amounts of Soviet and Chinese economic aid, as well as help from the 
West. In other words, Burmese politicians, unlike their American counterparts in 
particular, did not approach their world through the prism of Cold War confrontation. 
10 See, for instance, Arturo Escobar, `Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and 
Management of the Third World', Cultural Anthropology, vol. 3, no. 4, November 1998, pp. 428-43. 
Escobar (p. 432) quotes J. K. Galbraith on the emerging discipline of development economics in the 
1950s: `no economic subject more quickly captured the attention of so many as the rescue of the people 
of the poor countries from their poverty'. On development studies as a field of historical enquiry, see 
Nick Cullather, `Development? It's History', Diplomatic History, vol. 24, no. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 
641-53 
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Instead, they approached it with a very definite sense of their own political and 
economic interests, and a clear understanding of how to maximise those interests by 
manipulating the Cold War preoccupations of larger states. 
Two broad conclusions emerge from this. The first is that, for all the West's economic 
and military preponderance, the United States 
- 
and still less Britain 
- 
did not have a 
decisive influence over the policies and actions of an apparently weak and peripheral 
state such as Burma; indeed, Burma's very weakness, when translated into a 
perceived vulnerability to communist control, in fact enhanced Rangoon's leverage in 
its aid dealings with London and, later, Washington. In Burma's case at, least, the 
American superpower was perhaps not so `super' after all. ' The second, broader, 
conclusion concerns the limitations of the Cold War as an interpretive framework for 
understanding processes of change in Burma and elsewhere in the Third World. It is 
certainly true, as Odd Arne Westad has argued, that Burma's leaders, like their 
counterparts in other Third World countries, were powerfully influenced by the 
pressures placed upon them by Washington and Moscow, and frequently acted in 
conscious response to them. 12 America's ill-fated entanglement with remnants of the 
Nationalist Chinese army on Burma's north-eastern borders in the 1950s, for instance, 
serves as a graphic example of the damaging consequences of superpower 
intervention in a peripheral state, both for the intervening government and for its 
unwilling and unwitting host. Equally, however, local factors were often just as 
important in shaping events. Burmese politicians were deeply affected by their 
experiences under colonial rule, and the country's politics and policies were shaped as 
much by personality and factionalism as by the more highfalutin' questions of 
11 Gaddis, `A NaYve Approach to Studying the Cold War'. 
12 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 3. 
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political and economic organisation at stake in the Cold War. Put another way, the 
bundle of ideological, strategic, even moral conflicts denoted by the term `Cold War' 
did not mean the same thing in Rangoon as it did in Washington or London (or for 
that matter, probably, in Moscow or Beijing). From this lack of shared understanding 
flowed many of the conflicts and disagreements that shaped Burma's relations with 
Britain and the United States throughout this period. 
This thesis is concerned with the development and implementation of British and 
American policies towards Burma between 1948 and'1962, and Burmese responses to 
them. The first three chapters discuss British policy up to the mid-1950s, identifying 
the sources and main lines of British thinking, and situating it in the wider context of 
the UK's regional and Commonwealth planning. Broadly speaking, this section 
explores issues that might usefully be labelled `post-colonial', in the sense that they 
derived mainly from the particular circumstances of the colonial period, or from the 
arrangements of Burma's independence. The following three chapters focus more 
closely on US relations with Burma, and on the country's place in the evolving Cold 
War in Asia. Again, the aim is to set American policy within the wider regional 
context, in particular the after-effects of the communist victory in China in 1949. 
These chapters also highlight aspects of cooperation and competition in Anglo- 
American policy-making as British influence waned during the 1950s. The final 
chapter, which covers the period between 1958 and 1962, charts the extended political 
crisis in Rangoon leading up to the military coup that ended civilian government. It 
draws out the implications of domestic political upheaval for American and British 
policy-makers, with a particular focus on the work of aid planners and social scientists 
in Kennedy's administration. However, since many of the problems independent 
9 
Burma faced 
- 
and arguably still faces today 
- 
had their roots in the colonial period, 
the thesis begins with a short summary of the main political and economic 
developments in British Burma. 
Context: Burma under the British 
The British colonisation of Burma began in 1824, with the seizure of Arakan and the 
southern coastal strip of Tenasserim at the end of the First Anglo-Burman War. Lower 
Burma was added in a second campaign in 1852-53, and the process was completed 
in 1885, with the annexation of Upper Burma. 13 The country formally became a 
province of India in February 1886,800 years after the foundation of the first unified 
Burmese state. Opposition to British rule emerged almost immediately. Buddhist 
cultural societies were established in the 1890s, and in 1906 a group of European- 
educated Burmese founded the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA). 
Although initially set up as a forum for discussion of religious and cultural matters, 
the YMBA quickly assumed a political character. In 1917, it sent a delegation to 
Calcutta to press for the separation of Burma from India, and three years later it led a 
boycott of elections to the Indian Legislative Assembly. The YMBA was also 
instrumental in organising student opposition to controversial education reforms. '4 
Student unrest culminated in a strike at Rangoon University at the end of 1920, which 
by the early months of 1921 had spread to all government-run schools. '5 
Although the student strike was short-lived, growing political pressure prompted some 
concessions from the British. A parliamentary committee was dispatched to Burma in 
13 Smith, Burma, p. 40. 
14 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 216. 
13 Ibid., p. 218. 
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1921, and in 1923 the colonial government extended to Burma the political reforms 
implemented in India under the Government of India Act of 1919.16 In principle, this 
gave the Burmese a degree of self-rule under a British governor and Executive 
Council. In practice, however, this autonomy was severely circumscribed. Although 
Burmese ministers assumed responsibility for areas such as education, health and 
agriculture, the governor retained control of the colony's finances, security forces and 
judicial system. Likewise, while Burma was given its own Legislative Council, only 
58 of the 103' seats were elected by Burmese voters (the rest were either elected by 
communal and business groups or appointed directly by the governor, who in any case 
retained the power of veto over the council's decisions). 17 Direct gubernatorial rule 
also continued in the so-called `Scheduled Areas'. Accounting for some 40% of 
Burmese territory, these regions comprised the country's various non-Burman ethnic 
groups, the most important of which were the Karen, the Shan, the Chin and the Mon. 
Dissatisfied with these meagre gains, Burmese nationalists responded by boycotting 
elections to the Legislative Council in 1922,1925 and 1928. Fresh concessions were 
made in 1936, when a new constitution was introduced formally separating Burma 
from India and expanding Burmese representation in the colonial government. By this 
stage, however, the main force of Burmese nationalism was moving out of the council 
chamber and onto the streets, where a new generation of dissidents known as the 
Thakins were beginning to challenge the British, not for the greater autonomy 
promised by piecemeal constitutional change, but for outright independence. 
16 Trager, Burma: From Kingdom to Republic, p. 47. 
17 Ibid., p. 48. 
11 
The Thakin movement got its name from its members' habit of addressing each other 
with the title Thakin (`master'), a term of respect hitherto reserved for Europeans. '8 
The Thakins initially focused their efforts on student politics, securing control of 
Rangoon University's Student Union in 1935, and leading a student strike the 
following year. Many later national leaders began their political careers as student 
militants. Law student Thakin Nu, Burma's first post-independence prime minister, 
was president of the Student Union; Aung San, the country's most significant 
politician until his assassination on the eve of independence in 1947, was the Union's 
secretary. Other student activists who would later hold government posts included U 
Kyaw Nyein, U Kyaw Myint, U Ba Swe and M. A. Raschid. 19 All were young; Nu, 
the eldest of the group, was in his late twenties when he took part in the 1936 strike. 20 
Aung San, born in 1916, was barely out of his teens. Like nationalist movements 
elsewhere, the Thakins were deeply attracted to the colonial critiques developed by 
Marxism and communism. Nu set up the leftist Red Dragon book club in Rangoon in 
1937, and Aung San became secretary-general of the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB) when it was founded in 1939. Thakins were also instrumental in the 
establishment of the leftist All Burma Peasants Organisation (ABPO) and the All 
Burma Trade Union Congress (ABTUC), set up in January 1940. 
The outbreak of the Second World War in Europe in 1939 provided Burma's 
nationalists, as it did nationalist movements elsewhere, with a significant opportunity. 
Thakin politicians launched a violent campaign against the Allied war effort, and 
'8 Ibid., p. 55. 
19 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 6. 
20 In 1950, Nu dropped Thakin in favour of the prefix U, a form of address associated with elders or 
individuals otherwise deserving of respect. For simplicity's sake, the chapters that follow use the prefix 
U throughout. 
12 
mass independence demonstrations were held throughout the country. The British 
authorities responded by arresting leading Burmese figures, including Nu and Kyaw 
Nyein. Although a warrant was also issued for Aung San, he evaded arrest and 
escaped to Amoy in China, where he made contact with the Japanese. In November 
1940 Aung San was flown to Tokyo. While there, he won Japanese support for 
Burma's independence as part of the projected Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. In March 1941 he returned to Burma and began to recruit the nucleus of a 
Burmese army. This group, known as the Thirty Comrades, reached Japan in July 
1941. After six months' training, they were sent to Thailand to raise a force among 
expatriate Burmese there. Within a month, some 3,500 had volunteered. The Burma 
Independence Army (BIA) was formally inaugurated in Bangkok on 28 December 
194121 Three days later, the first BIA units entered Burma in the wake of the 
invading Japanese army. 
The Japanese advance was rapid, and by the end of May the conquest was virtually 
complete. 22 In Rangoon, a Burmese government was established under Ba Maw, an 
experienced politician and former premier under the British. Several prominent 
Thakins received cabinet posts, including Aung San, who became defence minister, 
and Nu, who was made foreign minister. A new constitution was drafted, and in 
August 1943 Burma was declared independent. The new government's powers were, 
however, closely circumscribed, and control of Burma's political and economic 
21 Smith, Burma, p. 59. 
22 For a first-hand account of the British retreat, see Leslie Glass, The Changing of Kings: Memories of 
Burma 1934-1949 (London: Peter Owen, 1985). Glass, an Assistant Commissioner in the colonial civil 
service, became a Burma specialist in the Foreign Office after independence. 
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affairs remained in Japanese hands. 23 As discontent with the limited political gains of 
collaboration increased, Burmese leaders began to organise resistance to the Japanese 
occupation. Emboldened by Japan's abortive invasion of India in February 1944 and 
the subsequent Allied counter-offensive, the leaders of Burma's main political and 
military groups formed a new underground coalition, the Anti-Fascist Organisation 
(AFO), in August 1944. Contacts were established between the AFO and the 
clandestine Special Operations Executive (SOE), known locally as Force 13624 Force 
136 officers were also active in the Karen areas of eastern Burma, where some 12,000 
Karen guerrillas had been mobilised to fight. 25 Open rebellion began at the end of 
March 1945, when the Burma National Army (BNA), the renamed BIA, turned on the 
Japanese. Confronted with Allied armies to the front and under pressure from BNA 
and Karen guerrillas in the rear, Japanese resistance crumbled. Japanese troops pulled 
out of Rangoon on 23 April, and by early May the city was in Allied hands. 
The returning British were largely unprepared for the physical, economic and political 
changes war and Japanese occupation had wrought. 26 Physically and economically, 
Burma was devastated. Its rice industry, the mainstay of the colonial economy, had 
collapsed; rice exports were less than a third of pre-war levels, and the area under rice 
cultivation had halved. 27 Rangoon's dockyards had been destroyed, along with two- 
thirds of its railway stock and at least half of its commercial river craft. In all, perhaps 
23 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 453. 
24 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 12. On the SOE's wartime activities in Burma and elsewhere in Asia, 
see Richard J. Aldrich, `Britain's Secret Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War', 
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 1,1998, pp. 179-217. 
25 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 14. 
26 Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 9. 
27 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 254. 
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half of the country's pre-war industrial capital was in ruins. 28 Politically, British 
administrators badly underestimated the vigour with which Aung San and his 
colleagues would press their demands, and the violent techniques they would use. In 
August 1945, the AFO was renamed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League 
(AFPFL) to make explicit its goal of Burmese independence. Meanwhile, Aung San 
began building up what amounted to a private army, the People's Volunteer 
Organisation (PVO), which by December 1945 numbered several thousand men. 29 In 
response, the British offered, not greater autonomy, but less. Although the main 
statement of post-war British planning in Burma, the White Paper of May 1945, held 
out the prospect of Dominion status at some unspecified future date, in the short term 
the country would revert to direct rule under the returning British governor, Sir 
Reginald Dorman-Smith. Further constitutional progress would be contingent on 
Burmese cooperation in the restoration of the country's economic and political life 30 
Meanwhile, Burmese participation in government would be limited to a 15-strong 
Executive Council, whose function was purely advisory. 
Political developments quickly outran these limited proposals. On 19 October 1945, 
Dorman-Smith met representatives of the AFPFL to discuss the make-up of his 
council. The AFPFL wanted 11 of the 15 seats, and insisted that its delegates 
remained responsible to the League, not to the governor. This was rejected, and the 
council was formed without AFPFL participation. The League responded with a series 
of pro-independence speeches and demonstrations, culminating in June 1946 with a 
mass rally north of Rangoon. Security deteriorated: PVO troops drilled openly in the 
28 Ibid., p. 285. 
29 Ibid., p. 19. 
30 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 506. 
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streets of Burma's main towns, dacoitry increased in the countryside and a dissident 
faction of the CPB, known as the Red Flag CPB, began an armed insurgency against 
the government. 31 
Matters came to a head with a general strike in September 1946. With the country at a 
standstill, and without the military means to contain an armed revolt, the British were 
forced to compromise. The Executive Council was dissolved and a new, AFPFL- 
dominated council formed, with Aung San as deputy chairman responsible for 
defence and external affairs. In November, Aung San presented a demand for full 
independence, prompting the British to invite an AFPFL delegation to London for 
talks. The party, led by Aung San, arrived on 9 January 1947, and by the end of the 
month an agreement was in place providing for full Burmese independence within a 
year. Elections to a Constituent Assembly were held the following April, and were 
comprehensively won by the AFPFL. The Assembly convened on 9 June 1947, and 
the constitution of an independent Burmese state 
- 
an odd mixture, the British 
thought, of Anglo-Saxon democracy and state socialism 
- 
was formally adopted on 24 
September 1947.32 Aung San, however, did not live to see its passage. On the morning 
of 19 July, four armed men burst into a cabinet meeting in the Secretariat building in 
Rangoon, killing him and six other ministers. 33 
Although U Saw, an Executive Council member and former prime minister in pre-war 
Burma, was later tried and executed for his alleged role in Aung San's assassination, 
31 Smith, Burma, p. 68. 
32 Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 208. 
33 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 27. 
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the circumstances of his murder remain unclear. 34 Nor is it clear what effect Aung 
San's death had, either on the shape of the independence settlement or on the 
trajectory of events in Burma after independence. One of the key constitutional 
decisions made by the Burmese 
- 
that the country would be a sovereign republic and 
would not join the Commonwealth at independence 
- 
was apparently taken before 
Aung San was killed. 35 Likewise, it is not certain that, had he lived, he would have 
been any better equipped than his successors to avert or moderate the political and 
economic crises that beset Burma after independence. 36 His murder was nonetheless a 
powerful shock. Aung San 
- 
Bogyoke (the `Great General') 
- 
was without question 
Burma's single most important politician, and the primary architect of its 
independence. As Hugh Tinker puts it: `The British Government at Westminster, 
Admiral Mountbatten, commander of massive armed forces, the British Government 
of Burma with its shrewd and experienced officers: Aung San outfaced them all'. 7 
In the wake of Aung San's assassination, the responsibility for leading Burma into 
independence fell to Nu, who was sworn in as the head of a reconstructed cabinet on 1 
August. A defence agreement with the UK was negotiated at the end of August, under 
which the Burmese agreed to the installation of a British military mission in Rangoon 
to help train Burma's armed forces. Other negotiations addressed financial and 
commercial matters. Finally, on 17 October 1947, Nu and British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee signed the treaty recognising Burma as an independent, sovereign 
state outside the Commonwealth. The Burma Independence Act followed on 10 
34 Smith, Burma, p. 70. 
35 S. R. Ashton, `Britain, Burma and the Commonwealth, 1946-56', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, vol. 29, no. 1, January 2001, p. 67. 
36 Smith, Burma, p. 70. 
37 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 28. 
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December, and British rule formally ended on 4 January 1948. Wisely, the expression 
of Britain's confidence in Burma's 'tranquillity and prosperity' was deleted from 
Attlee's independence message. 38 
38 Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, p. 209. 
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Chapter 1 
British policy and the crises of 1948 
Burma became an independent state at 4.20 on the morning of 4 January 1948, two 
days earlier than planned for reasons of auspicious cosmology. Given the gravity of 
the military and economic problems it faced, the country certainly needed all the good 
fortune it could get. The new government came to power with two insurgent groups, 
the Red Flag communists and the Muslim mujahid, already in the field; two more, the 
White Flag CPB and ethnic Karen separatists, would quickly follow, together with 
discontented government troops and members of the late Aung San's PVO. By the 
summer of 1948, an estimated 15,000 armed men were fighting government forces 
across Burma. ' Meanwhile, the economy had still to recover from the depredations of 
war and Japanese occupation. Rice production remained well below pre-war levels, 
and per capita income was about half what it had been in the late 1930s. Social 
indicators too tell of precipitate decline: in education, for example, more than half a 
million young people disappeared from the secondary school system between 1947 
and 1949. It has been estimated that a Burmese child aged five years in 1942 could 
expect just three years' schooling by the age of 15 2 By any measure, political, 
economic or social, independent Burma appeared on the point of collapse. Little 
wonder that U Nu likened his early experience of office to driving a derelict car `with 
leaks in its gas tank and radiator and punctures in front and rear tyres 
... 
over the 
worst road imaginable'. 3 
' This is the local British assessment; non-fighting sympathisers were thought to number up to 100,000. 
F0371/69485BSM(48)P/9,14 September 1948, UK National Archives (UKNA), Kew. 
2 These are all Burmese government figures. See Tinker, The Union of Burma. 
3U Nu, Saturday's Son (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 136. 
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This chapter examines the main military crises that beset the Burmese government in 
its first year or so of independence, and the implications of these crises for Burma's 
relations with the United Kingdom. During this short but decisive period, Britain 
enjoyed a predominant 
- 
though never wholly easy 
- 
position in Burma, as the 
country's key diplomatic interlocutor, its primary source of aid, its banker, the 
underwriter of its currency and the broker of its rice exports. Despite a wholesale 
indigenisation of the bureaucracy at independence, British financial advisors 
continued to work in Rangoon, and the UK's security interests were acknowledged 
and protected under the defence treaty of August 1947, which gave the British the 
right to maintain a military mission in the country. Britain's commercial presence, 
though not large relative to neighbouring India, still constituted an important element 
in the Burmese economy. One of the largest firms, the Burma Oil Company (BOC), 
had assets in Burma worth some £13.5 million (around £300 million in today's 
money). Other British firms ran the tungsten mines at Mawchi, once the largest in the 
world, the country's teak production, its tin mines, its electricity supplier and its 
inland water transport. In all, some 60 or so British companies remained in business in 
Burma after 1948. 
Important political interests also survived the transfer of power. While Burma's 
rejection of Commonwealth menibership theoretically severed any formal 
constitutional link, in practice the British could not escape an implicit shared 
responsibility for the fortunes of a regime so lately come to office. To be sure, the 
UK's loss of formal power and Burma's decision not to join the Commonwealth 
entailed some fundamental changes in the way the British sought to exert their 
4 Rangoon to the Foreign Office, 9 November 1949, F0371/76048/F17221, UKNA. 
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influence and defend their interests. But for all that, the assumption that Britain 
retained a special, privileged place in Burma formed the framework of British policy- 
making throughout this crucial early period. `Long-standing good feeling between the 
countries, the wide permeation of British political ideas and education, British 
economic interests, and the fact that so many Britons know and like the country and 
people, ' argued one official, `will all combine to keep the association a close one. '5 
As this chapter shows, however, these assumptions of continued influence were based 
on very insecure foundations. 
The outbreak of the communist insurgency 
Shortly after his arrival in Burma in November 1947, the country's first British 
ambassador, James Bowker, ventured his early impressions for the benefit of his 
colleagues in London. Everything depended, he thought, on `whether the present 
coalition can hold together, and the Government can cope with the' Communists. At 
first sight I should think the possibility of dangerous developments are more likely in 
connexion with the second of these two issues than the first'. In this he was right: the 
government's most pressing problem, both in domestic politics and in its relations 
with the outside world, was indeed its management of communism, and of left-wing 
politics more generally. Although all of Burma's main political actors were broadly 
leftist 
- 
Martin Smith calls Marxism `the lingua franca of the day' 
- 
there was 
precious little agreement about what kind of leftist state independent Burma should 
be, 'and what role communism should play in it. As a consequence, British officials 
Murray, minute, `Future British Interests and Representation in Burma', 14 October 1947, 
CO537/3362/XS14/79(1/47), UKNA. 
6 Bowker to Laithwaite, 25 November 1947, F0371/69468/F311/17/19, UKNA. 
7 Smith, Burma, p. 123. 
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never decided once and for all whether they should regard Burma, as a proto- 
communist state to be confronted, or a confused but fundamentally friendly country to 
be supported and encouraged. Although on balance they inclined towards the latter, 
the fear of defection was never fully removed, and the possibility that a formally 
communist Burma would emerge defined the landscape of British policy-making in 
the early independence period. 
As elsewhere in wartime Asia, Burma's communists had been a prominent component 
in the resistance to Japanese occupation, and CPB-controlled fighters accounted for a 
large proportion of all Japanese casualties inflicted by Burma's various resistance 
groups. Yet unlike their counterparts in Indochina, Burma's communists failed to 
convert their predominance within the wartime resistance into control of the 
nationalist opposition to the reinstated colonial regime once the fighting was over. 
The three years between the end of the war and independence in 1948 saw the 
progressive exclusion of the CPB from the political process leading to British 
withdrawal, and the concomitant transformation of the party from a leading 
component of the opposition to the British into a leading element in the opposition to 
the AFPFL. 
At the end of the war, the CPB was perhaps the most important constituent of the 
AFPFL coalition. Than Tun, the CPB's chairman, was AFPFL secretary-general, and 
CPB members held influential positions throughout Burma. This prominence rapidly 
eroded, however, as splits emerged within the CPB over the party's tactics towards 
the returning British. While the bulk of the party under Than Tun, known as the White 
Flag CPB, elected to remain part of the AFPFL and work within the constitutional 
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process, a dissident faction, the Red Flag CPB, broke away and began an insurrection 
against the government in July 1946. Meanwhile, Aung San moved to curtail the 
influence of Than Tun, forcing him to resign as AFPFL secretary-general, and then 
excluding him from the Executive Council formed in the wake of the strikes of 
September 1946. In response, Than Tun organised another wave of labour unrest, 
prompting the AFPFL to expel the CPB in November 1946. Marginalised politically 
and with virtually no representation in the Constituent Assembly, the CPB became 
increasingly militant, denouncing as a sham the military and political agreements the 
AFPFL reached with the British and reactivating its wartime bases in the jungle. 
The White Flag insurrection began in February 1948, when a wave of CPB-backed 
strikes paralysed the BOC's depot at Duneedaw, the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company's 
dockyards and sawmills run by the British firm Steel Brothers. By the third week of 
March, petrol supplies had dried up; the British thought the government's survival 
was `touch and go'. 8 Following the failure of a last-ditch effort at reconciliation, U Nu 
ordered the arrest of the CPB leadership on 28 March, but key figures disappeared 
underground before they could be apprehended. By the middle of April, British 
observers were reporting communist attacks around Pegu, just north of Rangoon, and 
near Myingyan, south of Mandalay. Police posts were seized, trains attacked and 
bridges destroyed. 9 
The Burmese government responded to the outbreak of communist violence by asking 
the British for military aid. On 1 April 1948, three days after the start of the rebellion, 
Foreign Minister U Kyaw Nyein approached Bowker for six aircraft, 30 armoured 
e Listowel, conversation with Grey, 9 April 1948, F0371/69471/F5326/17/79, UKNA. 
9 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 326,17 April 1948, F0371/69482/F5785/313/79, UKNA. 
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cars and a large quantity of small arms. 10 Two weeks later, the Burmese ambassador 
in London appealed directly to Bevin for assistance, and on 19 April the Burmese 
government advanced a firm request for 12 million rounds of small-arms ammunition. 
By the end of the year, requests included 23,000 rifles, 17 million rounds, other small 
arms, bren guns, mortars and grenades, along with two Spitfires, naval vessels and 
shells. These requests were accompanied by a series of complaints over the apparently 
poor quality of the military equipment that the British had left behind at 
independence, and alleged irregularities in the handover of supplies. " 
The British government's reaction to this fusillade of demands was mixed. Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin was initially persuaded of the importance of meeting Burmese 
requests as fully and promptly as possible; in May, for instance, he noted that Burma 
was one of the few countries actually fighting a communist insurgency, rather than 
potentially facing one, and as such `may rank second only to Greece in operational 
priority'. 12 By June, however, concerns over the longevity of the government and 
doubts about its commitment to fighting the communists had made him less certain of 
the wisdom of aid. Bevin's fears centred on a 15-point `Leftist Unity' programme, 
announced by the government on 26 May. In addition to existing constitutional 
commitments to nationalisation and a package of pro-poor tax and welfare reforms, 
the programme called for political and economic relations with the Soviet Union on a 
par with existing ties with Britain, the transfer of the country's currency board (still in 
London) to Burma, the rejection of any foreign aid `which will compromise the 
10 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 296,1 April 1948, FO371/69481/F5196/313/79, UKNA. 
11 These complaints were dismissed by the Ministry of Supply: F0371/69484/F11877/313/79,21 
September 1948, UKNA. 
12 Bevin, minute, 4 May 1948, F0371/69482/F6898/G, UKNA. 
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political, economic and strategic independence of Burma', and, most controversial of 
all, the establishment of a Marxist League `to agitate, to organize and to fight to bring 
the programme into fruition; to determine steps for the formation of a single party of 
leftists subscribing to the Marxist-Leninist creed; to draw up rules and to carry out all 
adjustments that may be necessary; to teach the Marxist-Leninist creed, to discuss 
doctrines and to propagate them'. 13 
The Leftist Unity programme was an attempt by the Burmese government to appease 
the CPB by downgrading Burma's ties with Britain, and putting forward a domestic 
policy prospectus more in line with communist demands. It was also designed to 
defuse the political tensions generated within the regime itself by the CPB's move 
into open conflict. As such, it failed: continued differences over tactics towards the 
communists finally propelled dissident elements of the PVO underground in July 
1948. The programme was also a disaster for the British. Publicly, Bevin maintained 
his government's position of friendship and support. On 17 June, he told parliament 
that the programme did not signal a change of policy in Rangoon, and reiterated the 
government's intention to maintain `close 
- 
relations with Burma in all fields'. 
Allowances had to be made: `When a country like Burma, having been controlled by 
another, seeks her independence and obtains it, I think that a little tolerance and care 
are essential to get matters working right, and I propose to exercise them 
... 
We must 
try to help them to keep on the rails'. 14 Privately, however, the programme, taken over 
virtually verbatim from a manifesto by a prominent communist leader, Thein Pe 
Myint, was viewed as `a complete reorientation of policy' aimed at `the early 
13 
`The Programme', in Thakin Nu, Towards Peace and Democracy (Rangoon: Ministry of 
Information, 1949), pp. 92-97. 
14 Hansard, 17 June 1948, vol. 452,1947-1948, col. 654-657. 
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transformation of Burma into what is to all intents and purposes a Communist state'. 
If it correctly reflected Burmese policy, Bevin told the cabinet, `the Government of 
Burma must now be considered to have thrown in their lot with Communism'. 15 
Bevin responded to the unwelcome news of the Leftist Unity programme by calling in 
the Burmese ambassador in London for a dressing down. 16 He also ordered a review 
of British military assistance to the Burmese, and the first consignment of equipment 
dispatched 
- 
three million rounds of small-arms ammunition - was duly delayed en 
route while ministers and officials discussed the merits and risks of aid. '7 The British 
government, Bevin warned, should `go very slow about supplying arms generally 
until we see more clearly whether [U Nu's] professed determination to stand up to the 
Communists is realised in fact'. 18 There were also practical arguments against 
assistance. Military resources, the Ministry of Defence reported, were in extremely 
short supply: `it is hard to name a country in the world which is not badgering us for 
arms and equipment'. Production was `heavily mortgaged' to countries claiming a 
higher priority than Burma. 19 Even supplying the three million rounds of ammunition 
then on their way to the Burmese was achieved only with great difficulty, and was 
claimed to be the most generous allocation that resources would permit. (This appears 
to have been true. According to the Ministry of Defence, other claimants, including 
15 Cabinet minute, 14 June 1948, CAB 121/684/CM(48), UKNA. 
16 Bevin to Bowker, no. 506,16 June 1948, F0371/69472/F8511/17/G. 
17 Bevin to Alexander, 7 June 1948, F0371/69482/F8161/313/G, UKNA. It was eventually decided 
that an `unobtrusive' delay as requested by Bevin would be impossible because the ship carrying the 
consignment stopped at no further ports before Rangoon, and the shipment was not in the end halted. 
18 Bevin to Alexander, undated draft, F0371/69483/F9307, UKNA. 
19 Ward to Grey, 21 April 1948, F0371/69482/F6287/G, UKNA. 
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Italy, India, Pakistan and Egypt, were getting nothing. )20 Nor was it obvious that any 
arms supplied would be put to good use. Bowker, though a staunch advocate of aid, 
regarded Burmese requests for help as `sudden and random', and a sign of near-panic 
among the Burmese leadership. 21 For some officials, the government was in any case 
beyond rescue; one wondered whether the Burmese would ever develop a defence ` on 
modern lines. Their fighting, like their politics, is essentially medieval'. 2 
The arguments in favour of continued assistance were therefore largely political. The 
embassy in Burma strongly disagreed with any change, arguing that it would be 
received in Rangoon as evidence that the British government had written off the new 
regime. There was, Bowker reported, `no alternative to the Government at present in 
sight which would be more desirable from our point of view and I think we should do 
what we can to assist 
... 
The only chance of moderate counsels prevailing lies in 
strengthening rather than weakening the internal position and confidence of the 
existing Government'. 23 U Nu was `genuinely friendly towards the United Kingdom; 
is genuinely in favour of methods of Western democracy; and is not disposed to 
negotiate with the leaders of the Communist insurrection'. While it made sound sense 
'to review various economic and political weapons we could marshal against a hostile 
Burmese Government and even discreetly hint of these possibilities to them', it would 
be unwise to do anything to suggest that the UK did not `fundamentally trust Burma's 
good intentions nor regard her as a friend'. 24 Suspending aid also presented potential 
20 Appendix A, Balance Sheet April 1948-March 1950,1 June 1948, F0371/69482/F8161/313/79/G, 
UKNA. 
21 Bowker to Bevin, 7 April 1948, F0371/69481/F5432/313/79, UKNA. 
22 Murray, minute, 10 March, F0371/69481/F3662/313/79, UKNA. 
23 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 475,14 June 1948, F0371/69482/F8326/G, UKNA. 
24 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 485,16 June 1948, F0371/69472/F8456/17/79, UKNA. 
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problems associated with the UK's treaty obligations with Burma, which stipulated 
that the British would provide `reasonable facilities' (a phrase never precisely 
defined) for the purchase of arms in the UK. Bevin himself noted the apparent 
inconsistency in refusing arms to a weak government, when doing so would weaken it 
further and make a communist takeover more likely. 25 
Suspicions that Burma's communist insurgency was part of a wider regional pattern 
reinforced arguments in favour of continued assistance to the government in 
Rangoon. 26 In addition to the outbreak of fighting in Burma in March, there were 
widespread communist-inspired ' disturbances in Bengal, and a separate communist 
party was founded in Pakistan. In Singapore, labour agitation fomented by the 
communist trade union federation appeared to be on the increase. Finally, on 16 June 
1948, just as British ministers ' were discussing their response to the Burmese 
government's new policy statement, three European rubber planters were shot dead by 
communist militants in Malaya. Two days later, on 18 June, the colonial authorities 
declared a state of emergency. 7 British officials traced the beginnings of this 
apparently, coordinated offensive to acommunist-sponsored youth conference in 
Calcutta in early March 194828 Analysts believed that the conference was used by 
Moscow to bring Asia's communist parties into line with a new militant strategy 
outlined at the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in Poland in September 1947. 
Henceforth, policy was to be `more directly supervised and coordinated by Moscow', 
and it would be `formulated with reference to the interests of world Communism as a 
25 Bevin to Alexander, 7 June 1948, F0371/69482/F8161/313/G, UKNA. 
26 'Review of Communism in South-East Asia', 23 April 1948, F0371/69694/F6914/G, UKNA. 
27 R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981: An Introductory Survey (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1985), p. 108. 
28 `New Communist Line in South East Asia', undated, F0371/69694/F6644/727/G, UKNA. 
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whole rather than the achievement of any merely regional advantage'. Communist 
developments in South-East Asia were both `an immediate problem in the defence of 
our vital interests', and part of `the general strategy of the Kremlin in the cold war 
against us'. 29 
The extent of Moscow's involvement as a coordinating factor in the general militant 
turn in South-East Asian communism at the end of the 1940s has been the subject of 
some historical debate. 30 Even at the time there was some doubt that the communist 
insurrections in Asia were anything more than local conflicts. In Burma's case, 
Bowker questioned the possibility of a link between the CPB and the wider 
communist movement, arguing instead that the decision to take up arms was made 
independently. 31 There was no Soviet diplomatic presence in Rangoon, no Burmese 
had been known ever to have been to Moscow or been educated in the Soviet Union, 
and few Soviet citizens had ever visited Burma. Burmese communists made their first 
overseas trips only in February 1947, when a delegation visited London for a 
conference of British Empire communist parties. 32 British intelligence reported 
numerous foreign contacts with communists as far afield as South Africa, but there 
was `no hint' of a direct link between the Soviet Union and the Burmese, and 
29 `Communist Strategy in South-East Asia', undated, F0371/69695/F15863/727/61/G, UKNA. 
30 On the conflicting historical interpretations, see Phillip Deery, `Malaya, 1948: Britain's Cold War? ', 
Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 29-54. The current consensus is that fears 
of a coordinated push from Moscow were at best overstated. See A. J. Stockwell, "`A Widespread and 
Long-Concocted Plot to Overthrow Government in Malaya"? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency', 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. 21, no. 3, September 1993; Ruth McVey, The 
Calcutta Conference and the South-East Asian Uprisings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University South-East 
Asia Program, 1958); and Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-60 (London: 
Frederick Muller, 1975). 
31 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 170,22 May 1948, FO371/69694/F7596/G, UKNA. 
32 Smith, Burma, p. 105. 
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certainly no evidence of any material support for the insurgency. 3 Indeed, the CPB 
was thought to be hazy as to its ideology: `Utopian Communists' rather than 
`Russian-tutored', and far from the communism of Eastern Europe or China. The CPB 
may accept Soviet aid, one observer judged, but would `nevertheless insist on going 
their own way'. 34 Burmese communists themselves, though clearly influenced by 
Cominform rhetoric, rejected the notion of external agency in their insurrection, and 
there is no reason to believe that, in the early stages of the insurgency at least, they 
were any less suspicious of outside influence than their opponents in the AFPFL. 35 
Whatever the actual extent of outside involvement, for present purposes the important 
point is that debates over the merits of British military aid to Burma were part of a 
wider reappraisal of the nature, structure and scale of the communist threat in South- 
East Asia. Under these circumstances, the arguments in favour of military help to the 
Burmese government in the end proved conclusive, and supplies continued. 
Meanwhile, U Nu backed away from the more contentious elements of the May 
proposals. A second, more moderate policy statement, issued in the middle of June, 
included a specific defence of the 1947 treaty and a declaration of hostility to 
communism, both of which had been conspicuously missing in the earlier 
pronouncement. The controversial proposal for a Marxist League was dropped, never 
to be mentioned again. Burma, Bowker was told, was not turning communist, valued 
Britain's friendship and fully intended to abide by the terms of the 1947 treaty. 36 
33 `Communist Organisations in Burma', 22 April 1948, F0371/69515/F6915/1371/79/G, UKNA. 
34 Pearn, `Communist Party of Burma', 5 January 1948, F0371/69514/F3350/1371/795, UKNA. 
35 Smith, Burma, p. 105. 
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Despite this conciliatory move, broader concerns about Burma's political trajectory 
remained, and the issue was taken to the Commonwealth Affairs Committee on 27 
July. Ahead of the meeting, Bevin's officials prepared a lengthy memorandum laying 
out the current state of relations, and mapping out the possible policy options 37 This 
did not make for encouraging reading, both for its analysis of the position inside 
Burma, and for its assessment of Britain's capacity to influence events there. Should 
matters stay essentially as they were (the preferred, if not the ideal, outcome), no 
policy change was in prospect: pressure would continue on the Burmese to `secure 
reasonable treatment for our interests', and support against the communists would be 
maintained `in the hope that we shall thereby be enabled to retain some part of our 
influence in the country'. At the other extreme, government collapse and the probable 
emergence of a full-blown communist administration would see the loss of remaining 
British interests, assets and strategic facilities in Burma. The 1947 treaty would be 
rendered void, recognition of the government would be withdrawn and little 
meaningful could be done beyond ensuring the physical protection and evacuation of 
British nationals in the country. 
The third possibility entertained in Bevin's paper saw a deterioration in the position 
that fell short of outright collapse, coupled with the adoption by the Burmese of an 
explicitly anti-British stance. This presented policy-makers with more complex 
challenges. In a bid for leverage, the UK could, Bevin thought, oppose Burma 
internationally, for example by blocking Rangoon's efforts to join the UN's Far 
Eastern Commission. British exports could be diverted elsewhere, arms supplies could 
be withheld, or neighbouring countries could be encouraged to pursue territorial 
37 Bevin, ` British Relations with Burma', 23 July 1948, CAB 134/55/CA(48)15, UKNA. 
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claims against Burma. Each of these courses would, however, amount to a breach with 
the country, and would constitute a `serious blow' to the UK's position in South-East 
Asia. `The conclusion seems to be, ' Bevin told the Committee, `that nearly all the 
measures open to us will damage our interests more than they will the Burmese. For 
the time being, therefore, we can only bear them in mind as possibilities. ' His cabinet 
colleagues agreed: hopefully U Nu and his government would somehow muddle 
through, and Britain should do what it could to help. 
In Burma, meanwhile, the fighting continued into the summer. In early August, two of 
the government's infantry battalions mutinied, depriving the regime of several 
hundred troops, while the doubtful reliability and low morale of the rest of the 
Burman military forced the government into ever-greater dependence on its minority 
Karen, Chin and Kachin regiments. Across the country, security was in crisis. Most of 
Arakan and large areas of central and lower Burma were in the hands of one rebel 
group or another. British officials-in Burma spoke for the first time of civil war, and 
Rangoon itself appeared briefly under threat. Several Europeans were deliberately 
targeted for attack, suggesting that Westerners were at specific risk. Two 
- 
an estate 
manager and his wife 
- 
were killed by a mixed band of army mutineers and 
communists in the Shan states in June, and a fortnight later another British national 
was attacked and injured near Rangoon, leading officials to wonder whether a 
Malaya-style assassination campaign had begun. The evacuation of the 2,500 or so 
Britons in the capital (and with it the effective end of British interests in the country) 
seemed a distinct possibility, and a British navy ship was stationed three days' sailing 
from Rangoon. 
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By the end of August, Bowker thought the situation sufficiently perilous to call for the 
deployment of British troops, provoking a flurry of discussion around Whitehall. The 
Ministry of Defence opposed any direct military intervention. Bowker's proposal for a 
battalion-level deployment would almost certainly be inadequate for the mission, and 
the British risked an open-ended commitment entailing the transfer of considerable 
troops from insurgent Malaya. 38 Politically, moving troops into what was after all an 
independent state would, thought the Foreign Office, `constitute a very serious step'. 
For all that the abandonment of British interests in Burma would damage British 
prestige and have `injurious reactions on the general situation in South East Asia', no 
deployment should be contemplated 39 However perilous the situation in Burma, in 
other words, British policy-makers had to accept the fact of Burmese independence, 
and tailor their plans accordingly. As the outgoing Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, Orme Sargent, put it: 
We really must try and accustom ourselves to the fact that Burma is 
an independent country and must be treated as such. Whatever the 
circumstances might be in which we sent British troops to Burma 
our action would be denounced as a piece of British imperialism. 
This would still be the case even if we were invited in by a panic- 
stricken Burmese Government. The fact is that however important 
and valuable British interests in Burma may be we have no right to 
protect them by military force. 40 
38 Waterfield to Murray, 7 September 1948, F0371/69519/F12970/1371/79, UKNA. 
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Bevin agreed = Bowker was to rest content with the navy ship off Rangoon, and the 
idea was not raised again. The worsening position did nonetheless encourage further 
thought in the Foreign Office, and in August Assistant Under-Secretary Esler Dening 
asked his officials to examine once again what, if anything, the UK might do to ease 
the crisis. 1 While unilateral military action `would offer too obvious a propaganda 
weapon to the insurgents, who would accuse Thakin Nu and his colleagues of 
contriving the return of British rule 
... 
I do not think that we can face a completely 
chaotic Burma with equanimity'. What action, Dening asked, could the UK take `to 
influence the situation before it deteriorates beyond remedy? '. 
Dening's query elicited a fresh policy paper on 19 August, but this just restated the 
essential elements of Bevin's argument in the Commonwealth Affairs Committee the 
previous month. 42 A collapse in Burma and the consequent emergence of some form 
of communist regime would have `the most unfortunate effects on British interests, 
not only in Burma itself, but in South East Asia generally'. Burma, even if 
incompletely communist, `will become an obvious centre for Communist intrigue 
which may spread into the surrounding countries 
- 
Pakistan, India, China, Siam and 
Malaya'. At the same time, however, the options for assistance to the regime 
remained limited, partly for reasons of domestic Burmese politics, and partly because 
of Britain's own resource constraints. Bevin, having recovered from the shock of the 
Leftist Unity programme, remained convinced of the need for continued military aid. 
Supplying arms, he told his colleagues in September, was `absolutely vital in the 
national interest', and one of the keys to preserving Britain's regional position: `it is 
41 Dening, minute, 16 August 1948, F0371/69475/F12721/17/79/G, UKNA. 
42 Murray, minute, 'British Policy Towards Burma', 19 August 1948, F0371/69475/F12721/17/79/G, 
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vital to us and to our whole position in South East Asia that the fight against the 
Communists in Burma should go on and the only way of ensuring this is to try to 
provide them as best we can with the arms to do it'. 3 The Burmese `are fighting the 
Communists actively, are assisting us and in return deserve our assistance'. The 
danger in Burma was `grave and imminent, with implications throughout South-East 
Asia, and requires urgent action'. Under the circumstances, `Burma should be given 
precedence over other countries whose claims on us may be stronger, but whose 
immediate needs may be less pressing' 44 
Criticism nonetheless continued to emanate from elsewhere in Whitehall and, while 
arms were still supplied, volumes fell far short of Burmese demands: in September 
1948, for example, the Burmese were sent another two million rounds of small-arms 
ammunition, against a request for nearly eight million, and 10,000 rifles, compared 
with the 23,000 they had asked for. 45 Although acquiescing in the September 
shipment, Defence Minister A. V. Alexander warned that `the Burmese ought not to 
assume that, simply because they ask for something, it must be available and within 
our power to give it to them if we choose'. 6 Burma's requests appeared far beyond 
what its armed forces could actually use, while general lawlessness, allied with 
mutinous troops' habit of taking their guns with them when they went into revolt, 
meant that the country was already awash with weapons in the wrong hands. 7 In 
effect, the ease with which equipment left government control implied the risk that the 
43 Bevin to Alexander, 19 September 1948, F0371/69485/F13428/313/G, UKNA. 
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UK was simply supplying communist insurgents by proxy. The Burmese, argued 
Alexander, had already lost a significant amount of equipment supplied from the UK; 
transferring any more was `throwing good money after bad'. 8 
The difficulties facing the British Services Mission (BSM) in Burma only exacerbated 
these concerns about the wisdom of continued military aid. 9 Initially, the BSM's 
prospects had appeared good. In his first preliminary report at the end of February 
1948, the mission's head, General Geoffrey Bourne, noted excellent cooperation 
between Burmese officers and his advisors 50 Relations between the two sides were, 
however, fragile. Burmese military leaders resented the presence of several hundred 
British personnel in Rangoon, and were convinced that British officers had had a hand 
in Aung San's assassination in July 1947.51 For their part, the British had not 
forgotten Burma's collaboration with the Japanese during the Second World War, and 
regarded many of their senior Burmese colleagues as little better than traitors. 2 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, these tensions rapidly led to difficulties. In April, Bourne 
reported that previously open officers were becoming more distant, that advice was 
48 Alexander to Bevin, 8 September 1948, F0371/69485/F13428/G, UKNA. 
49 The BSM was set up at independence under the terms of the defence agreement of August 1947. It 
was intended to provide advice and training to the Burmese armed forces, and to facilitate British arms 
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becoming more difficult to give and that information previously freely provided was 
being withheld. 53 In May, Bourne was compelled to replace his chief flying instructor 
when the head of the Burmese air force declared him unacceptable. Bowker suggested 
that the BSM would never work effectively, and wondered how long it would last; 54 
Bourne himself lasted barely a year before being transferred, having achieved little 
beyond a reorganisation of the Burmese government's War Office. As his departure 
was being arranged in October 1948, Dening noted ruefully that, while the BSM was 
a valuable British asset, running it would `drive many people to despair'. 55 
It is also important to consider the political and institutional context within which the 
British were making Burma policy in the late 1940s. This was a period of intense and 
rapid change, both in Britain and abroad. In the six months leading up to Burmese 
independence, the government ended British rule in India and weathered a currency 
crisis at home (in August); completed talks setting up the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (in September); negotiated a new framework for global trade 
(in October); hosted the fifth, abortive Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on 
Germany (in November-December); and confronted civil war in Greece (in 
December). In the six months after Burma's independence, there was a communist 
coup in Czechoslovakia (in February); the UK, France and the Benelux countries 
signed the Brussels Treaty on defence (in March); US President Harry Truman signed 
the Economic Cooperation Act into law, opening the way for Marshall Plan aid (in 
April); the British Mandate ended in Palestine (in May); and the Berlin airlift began 
(in June). Added to this was a domestic policy programme which, between January 
53 Bourne, first quarterly report of the BSM, 31 March 1948, F0371/69481/F5430/313/79, UKNA. 
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and early July, saw the nationalisation of the railways and the electricity industry, 
education reform and the inauguration of the National Health Service. 
The speed and nature of international change exerted physical demands on the policy- 
making bureaucracy within the Foreign Office. 56 Pressure of business increased 
exponentially: between 1939 and 1950, the number of incoming papers into the 
Foreign Office more than doubled, reaching over 630,000, most of them telegrams 
requiring urgent action rather than measured reflection. Meanwhile, reforms 
developed during the war saw the departure of nearly half of the Foreign Office's 150 
or so senior managers by 1947.57 According to the Foreign Office List, the annual 
directory of Foreign Office personnel, the office most directly concerned with Burma 
affairs, the South-East Asia Department, had a staff of just eight in 1950, covering a 
dozen countries and territories from Afghanistan to Indonesia. 58 At the same time, as 
the functions of the Foreign Office expanded into issues of economic diplomacy and 
anti-communist propaganda, so its departmental organisation became more complex 
and diffuse. By the end of the 1940s, six separate departments were in one way or 
another responsible for Britain's various east-of-Suez interests, creating new pressures 
for coordination and information management that the Foreign Office was ill- 
equipped to meet. 59 
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Equally, of course, the blizzard of papers blowing through the Foreign Office and 
other government departments concerned with the UK's overseas policy could be seen 
simply as the bureaucratic price of global power. Although badly weakened by the 
war, Britain in the late 1940s was still a nation with worldwide interests and 
responsibilities. Without question, the war had altered the distribution of international 
power, diminishing the states of Europe, Britain included, and hugely enhancing the 
reach of the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet the scope for the exercise of 
British influence still seemed comparatively wide. In some areas, India most notably, 
the pressures of war had forced concession and withdrawal, but Indian independence 
was in no way meant to mark the start of a wider retreat from Britain's colonial role, 
and vast swathes of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific remained in British 
hands. In traditional informal spheres of influence, such as the Middle East, Britain 
still thought of itself as the pre-eminent external power, while the defeats of Germany, 
France and Italy had removed Britain's traditional peer competitors in Western 
Europe and the Mediterranean. The British also still controlled an extensive network 
of strategic installations and outposts around the world, from the South Atlantic to 
Singapore. To be sure, Britain could not match the military or economic strength of 
the United States or the Soviet Union, but the country had retained enough of its 
former status that its leaders could still claim a share in the management of the post- 
war world, albeit, as Sargent put it, as `Lepidus in the triumvirate with Mark Antony 
and Augustus'. 60 
Maintaining this global role did not, however, come cheap. In Palestine alone, 80,000 
troops 
-a tenth of the British army - were required to keep what little peace there 
60 Sargent, quoted in Ritchie Ovendale, `Introduction', in Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the 
British Labour Governments, 1945-51 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), p. 4. 
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was, at a cost of £100 million. 1 Another 20 battalions and 50,000 police were 
eventually deployed to tackle the communist insurgency in Malaya. 62 These heavy 
military commitments were being undertaken at a time of continued austerity and 
recurrent economic and financial crises at home, in 1947,1949 and 1951. The British, 
in other words, were working at the very limits of their strength. According to one 
American observer, writing in January 1950: 
They are trying simultaneously to balance their trade, modernise 
their industry, balance their budget, fight off inflation and prevent a 
fall in their'standard of living. Since there are no margins, even 
trivial things, such as a battalion despatched to Eritrea; a million 
pounds expenditure on this or that item; a million gained or lost in 
overseas trade; a penny rise in the price of bread or a dime in the 
price of coal become critical problems of major dimensions that 
require Cabinet attention. 63 
With their own resources depleted by the war, Bevin and his colleagues were clear 
that American economic and military power was vital to the security of Europe, the 
region most directly threatened by Moscow. US economic assistance was secured in 
March 1948, when the US Congress approved Marshall Plan aid. Meanwhile, Bevin 
was laying the foundations for a US strategic commitment as part of a wider union of 
the Western democracies. To meet the Soviet challenge in Europe, Bevin believed, a 
61 F. S. Northedge, `Britain and the Middle East', in Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the British 
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`spiritual federation of the West' was required, an understanding `backed by power, 
money and resolute action 
... 
If such a powerful consolidation of the West could be 
achieved it would then be clear to the Soviet Union that having gone so far they could 
not advance any further'. 4 The first step; concluded in March 1947, was the Treaty of 
Dunkirk between Britain and France. A year later, in March 1948, the UK, France and 
the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty. Finally, in April 1949, America's 
participation in the defence of Europe was secured with the establishment of NATO. 
Through the three treaties concluded between 1947 and 1949, the British tied 
themselves to mainland European security to an extent that would have been 
unthinkable before the war. But no senior Labour politician was prepared to allow 
European commitments to interfere with Britain's colonial and Commonwealth 
responsibilities. Here, more than anywhere else, British planners saw the physical 
expression of far-flung global power: through the dominions, colonies and 
dependencies, Britain had a presence on every continent, from South America to 
Australasia. Without that unrivalled presence, Bevin and his colleagues knew, 
Britain's claim to great power status was baseless. Accordingly, a great deal of energy 
was expended on imperial and Commonwealth matters. Unlike past imperial practice, 
however, Britain could no longer rely in the last resort on recourse to military or 
economic force; as one official put it, the days were over `of thinking in Edwardian 
terms of the use of military and economic power we no longer possess'. 65 
64 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 499. 
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Britain's inability to enforce its will was felt most acutely in the most important 
possession, India. As the pressure for South Asian independence increased in the 
years immediately after the war, the British chose not to fight but to withdraw, with as 
much grace as they could muster and in the hope that magnanimity's reward would be 
friendly ties and a willingness to accommodate British needs. In Sri Lanka's case, 
these expectations were more or less realised, with the conclusion of a defence 
agreement assuring the UK access to air and naval bases on the island until 1956. As 
we have seen, a less comprehensive but still valuable deal was reached with Burma. 
India, larger and more obstreperous, proved less willing to tie itself to the old colonial 
power. Attempts to negotiate similar post-independence arrangements failed, and a 
fundamental change in the constitution of the Commonwealth was required to keep 
India in the family when it declared itself a republic in 1949. Nonetheless, the British 
believed, some measure of influence and goodwill had been preserved, and a 
foundation for future relations laid 66 
In South Asia, the Labour government liquidated Britain's imperial possessions and 
reframed the Commonwealth to accommodate the republican aspirations of India. But 
this was explicitly an exceptional policy, and no such far-reaching changes were 
envisaged elsewhere in the empire. Far from it, in fact: under Labour, British political 
and economic control became if anything more extensive than it had been before the 
war. Suddenly, after years of benign neglect and arm's-length control from London, 
the empire was exposed to unprecedented attempts to manage its economic and 
political life. A proliferation of conferences and summer schools of colonial officials 
66 D. K. Fieldhouse, `The Labour Government and the Empire-Commonwealth', in Ovendale (ed. ), The 
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sought to inject a greater degree of analytical rigour into the make-do-and-mend 
process of colonial administration, and annual surveys were established to measure 
and quantify colonial economies. A Cabinet Committee on colonial development was 
established in 1948, and two new organisations, the Colonial Development 
Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation, were set up to oversee the 
government's efforts. Politically, the British sought to create a process of gradual 
constitutional advance in a bid to `educate' local elites in the mechanics and 
responsibilities of democratic government. The `fundamental objectives' of British 
policy in colonial Africa, remarked one official in 1948, `are to foster the emergence 
of large-scale societies integrated for self-improvement by effective and democratic 
political and economic institutions' 67 Meanwhile, in Malaya, the hotchpotch structure 
of pre-war colonial government was swept away in January 1946, to be replaced by a 
centralised administration based in Singapore. This bold experiment did not survive 
strident opposition from the Malay sultans, whose powers it removed, and a less 
ambitious compromise was reached the following year. Nonetheless, the basic aim 
- 
to bring the disparate units of Malay society together under some sort of unified 
control 
- 
was preserved. 68 
The intention underpinning all of this activity was to contain and canalise local 
opposition to British rule, thereby hopefully prolonging it, while harnessing colonial 
economies in the service of recovery in the UK by developing the empire's productive 
capacity and its dollar-earning potential. The results were, however, disappointing. 
Colonial economic development was a disaster: one of the most ambitious projects 
undertaken in Africa, an attempt to promote the production of groundnuts in 
67 Hyam (ed. ), The Labour Government and the End of Empire, part 1, p. xxx. 
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Tanganyika to meet shortages of oil and fats, produced not a single exportable nut and 
had cost the government almost £39 million by the time it was wound up in 1950 69 
Another £5 million was wasted on efforts to make the Gambia an egg-producer. 70 
Likewise, the model of gradual constitutional advance introduced by Labour and 
pursued by its successors failed to control the pace of political change as the empire 
unravelled in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Labour government's enthusiasm for imperial and Commonwealth business 
partly explains the continued interest officials and ministers evinced in Burma's 
difficulties after independence in January 1948. Burma may well have elected to leave 
the Commonwealth, the British reasoned, but this did not end Britain's responsibility 
for its welfare, nor did it lessen the likelihood that state failure would damage British 
prestige and create difficult political problems at home. Looking after its affairs was 
nonetheless a difficult brief, and Burma was not an especially popular addition to the 
Foreign Office's portfolio. The country was an uncomfortable institutional fit: while 
its decision to leave the Commonwealth meant that responsibility for Britain's 
relations formally resided within the Foreign Office, its colonial past, its links with 
India, its vital rice supplies to Malaya and its membership of the Sterling Area placed 
it firmly within the ambit of the Commonwealth and colonial bureaucracy. Bevin 
complained of inheriting a problem not of his making, the outcome of a policy with 
which he disagreed; he was, he told his officials, `aghast when the sudden 
announcement of independence was made'. 71 Policy-makers at times seemed to 
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despair of making any progress. Burma was, complained one official in November 
1948, ` basically 
... 
a non-sensical county'. 2 
Reports on the military situation at the end of 1948 did not encourage the British to 
hope for any early improvements. Large swathes of territory between Henzada and 
Bassein were effectively closed to government troops and under PVO control. 
Twante, less than 15 miles south-west of Rangoon, was in communist hands, and 
communists had established `administrations' in towns as far apart as Pegu, outside 
Rangoon, and Mandalay in the north; the oilfields at Chauk and Yenangyaung in 
central Burma were `to all intents and purposes cut off ; the countryside around 
Allanmyo was reported `unsafe' and, west of Thayetmyo on the Irrawaddy, 
`Communists reign supreme'. Sabotage was endemic. By October, 30 rail bridges had 
been destroyed, and in mid-October Rangoon's continued vulnerability to insurgent 
attack was brought home when the city's water supply was cut. 73 Although the 
government's entire ready forces were in the field, British observers were 
unimpressed by their conduct of the war. `The impression, ' minuted one official in 
mid-November, `is of ignorance, apathy and incompetence. ' 74 
The outbreak of the Karen insurgency 
In the British view, Burma's minority groups, particularly the Karen, constituted the 
government's best defence against the communist insurgency. That the Karen were 
anti-communist was a given; indeed, the belief that the Karen were more reliably anti- 
communist than the AFPFL government was an abiding problem in British Burma 
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policy. Pressure from the minorities was thought crucial in keeping U Nu, a relative 
moderate, in his position, and the appointment of a Karen, Smith Dun, to head the 
armed forces was taken in British circles as a guarantee against compromise with the 
communist insurgents. More to the point, with the desertion and general unreliability 
of ethnic Burman units and the move into outright opposition of the PVO, the army's 
minority troops were of vital military importance. The possibility that the Karen might 
take up arms against the government in defence of their own communal interests was 
thus a concern in its own right, and a serious blow to British hopes for Burma's non- 
communist future. 
Although Burma's independent constitution made provision for a future Karen state 
within the Union of Burma, its precise extent was left open pending a referendum and 
the conclusions of a Special Commission, appointed by the government 75 In the 
meantime, Karen interests would be looked after by a Karen Affairs Council and a 
Minister for Karen Affairs. At first all seemed well. In February 1948, for example, 
Bowker reported that the government's official attitude was `correct and indeed 
sympathetic'. 76 There was, officials argued, no evidence that `the Burmese are not 
carrying out the provisions of the Constitution which relate to the Karen as effectively 
as they can'. 77 In May, the government established the Special Commission mandated 
by the constitution, and the following August the Karens' main political' grouping, the 
Karen National Union (KNU), publicly pledged itself to non-violence. This, Bowker 
thought, showed a `realistic and sensible attitude on the part of the Karen opposition 
75 The Constitution of Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1947), Part III, pp. 44- 
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leaders which is one of the few cheerful features I have been able to report in the last 
six months'. 78 The KNU had `evidently reached the same conclusion as ourselves 
- 
that, unsatisfactory as the present Burmese Government may be in many ways, it is 
better to support them lest they be replaced by an even more extreme set, or by the 
Communists (whom they like as little as we do)'. 79 
In fact, Bowker and his colleagues badly underestimated the extent of Karen 
disaffection. At the end of August 1948, following an attempt by government forces 
to disarm villagers in- Thaton district, local Karens occupied police stations in 
Moulmein; a day later, Thaton too was seized. In September, Bowker reported further 
Karen moves in Amherst, Thaton and towards Toungoo. 80 Following anti-Karen 
violence in Tenasserim in December and increasing tensions throughout January, 
government forces surrounded the Karen stronghold of Insein north of Rangoon. On 
29 January, Bowker reported clashes there, and Karen attacks on Toungoo and 
Bassein. 81 By early February, the ambassador had concluded that full-scale communal 
war was under way., 
A complex mix of moral obligation and emotional attachment meant that the outbreak 
of open conflict between the Burmese government and the Karen minority presented 
British policy-makers with a difficult and sensitive problem. The Karen had enjoyed a 
long-standing association with the British dating back to the earliest years of the 
European presence in Burma; in 1887, for instance, Indian civil servant Donald 
78 Bowker to Bevin, no. 277,4 August 1948, F0371/69509/F13526/1087/79, UKNA. 
79 Murray, minute, 2 July 1948, F0371/69509/F9038/1087/79, UKNA. 
80 Bowker to Bevin, no. 357,23 September 1948, F0371/69510/F12972/1087/79, UKNA. 
81 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 90,29 January 1949, F0371/75664/F1582/1018/79, UKNA. 
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Mackenzie Smeaton's Loyal Karens of Burma called them the `staunchest and bravest 
defenders of British rule'. 82 Karens acted as guides for British troops in the colonial 
wars of the 1820s and 1850s, and Karen troops were instrumental in suppressing 
rebellions against British control in the late nineteenth century, and again in the early 
1930s. 83 Karen recruits dominated the colonial security force to the extent that, in July 
1945, the British 
. 
Burma army had 33 Karen officers, compared with just three 
Burmans. 84 Karen loyalty during the Second World War contrasted sharply with the 
collaboration of the Thakins and the Burman-dominated, Japanese-backed BIA, while 
a series of wartime massacres of Karen at the hands of the BIA further poisoned 
already difficult relations between the two communities; in one particularly notorious 
incident in 1942, some 150 Karen, including women and children, were murdered in 
an attack on the Delta town of Myaungmya. 85 
Karen experiences during the war reinforced post-war demands for greater autonomy 
dating back to the 1920s. 86 Proposals for a Karen state were sent to the British 
government in September 1945 and April 1946 and, when no reply was forthcoming, 
a four-strong delegation travelled to London to press the Karen case. Although 
prepared to make reassurances of goodwill and concern, British officials sidestepped 
substantive discussion; according to Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of 
State for Burma, `we do not want to get entangled if we can avoid it in Karen political 
82 Donald Mackenzie Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of Burma (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 
1887), p. 1. 
83 Smith, Burma; Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 137. 
84 Record of a meeting of Civil Affairs Officers, Government House, Rangoon, 15 July 1945, 
WO/203/5239, in Hugh Tinker (ed. ), The Struggle for Independence: Volume I (London: HMSO, 
1983), document 224, p. 372. 
85 Tinker, The Union of Burma, p. 10. 
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demands which may not be at all easy to deal with'. 87 The main problem facing Karen 
separatism stemmed from the complex patterns of Burma's ethnic landscape. The 
1931 census, the last before independence and a document subject to some dispute, 
put the Karen population at 1.4 million, around 9% of the total, concentrated in the 
east and the south along and across the Thai border, and closely intermingled with 
Burmans in the Delta and around Rangoon. 88 This dispersed pattern made it difficult 
to identify the boundaries of any potential Karen political unit that could easily be 
separated from the rest of the country. In any case, the British believed, any future 
Karen state would amount to little more than `an immense inaccessible horseshoe of 
forests and poverty with no access to the sea'; such a territory was a `chimera as a 
political entity'. 89 
As independence approached, the British stepped up their efforts to settle the status of 
Burma's minority groups. A conference of representatives from the AFPFL and the 
minorities was convened at Panglong in the Shan states in February 1947, but there 
appears to have been little meaningful Karen representation, and the community's 
future status remained unresolved. Minority questions were addressed again by a 
committee of enquiry in March and April 1947, but the testimony the committee 
heard was `bewilderingly wide', and it made no firm proposals. 90 With independence 
just months away and the Karen question still undecided, direct intervention was 
deemed necessary, and Lord Listowel, Pethick-Lawrence's successor as secretary of 
87 Pethick-Lawrence to Knight, 19 July 1946, IOR: M/4/3023, in Tinker, The Struggle for 
Independence: Volume I, document 620, p. 903. 
88 Smith, Burma, p. 30. 
89 Knight to Pethick-Lawrence, 11 August 1946, IOR: M/4/2855, in Tinker, The Struggle for 
Independence: Volume I, document 654, p. 944. 
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state, travelled to Rangoon for a series of meetings with key Karen figures. These 
proved fruitless, and in a speech to the community's leaders on 8 September 1947 
Listowel admitted defeat: `I see nothing for it', he told them, `but that matters should 
remain as they were when I reached Rangoon'; once the transfer of power had taken 
place, he warned, `there can no longer be any question of any interference by His 
Majesty's Government in the affairs of what will then be a foreign State, nor will 
there be any question of further financial assistance to the Karens'. 91 
To sympathisers outside the government, Britain's handling of the Karen problem in 
the run-up to independence amounted to a betrayal of a loyal community's legitimate 
aspirations in favour of the collaborationist and anti-British politicians of the AFPFL. 
During the parliamentary debate on the Burma independence bill in November 1947, 
for example, Conservative leader Winston Churchill, a staunch opponent of Burma's 
independence, declared himself doubtful that ` there has been a fulfilment of our duties 
towards those who fought valiantly at our side 
... 
All loyalties have been discarded 
and rebuffed; all faithful service has been forgotten and brushed aside'. Meanwhile, 
Aung San, his hands `dyed with British blood and loyal Burmese blood', had been 
received as the `plenipotentiary of the Burmese Government' when he had led the 
Burmese delegation to London in January1947.92 According to the Conservative MP 
Sir Henry Raikes, the Karens, `our loyal friends through thick and thin', had been 
doomed to struggle for their position `without any support from this country'. `I am 
old-fashioned enough, ' he declared, `to believe that there are special ties and special 
needs to stand by those who stood by us. ' 
-According to The Times, in an editorial the 
91 Listowel, speech to Karen leaders, Rangoon, 8 September 1947, IOR: M/4/3023, in Tinker, The 
Struggle for Independence: Volume 11, document 515, p. 748. 
92 Hansard, vol. 443,5 November 1947, cols 1836-1959. 
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following day, Churchill's `robust and characteristic attack' on Labour policy gave 
expression to `the anxieties expressed in our correspondence columns'. 93 
The political difficulties surrounding the Karen issue were not eased with the transfer 
of power. Throughout 1948 and into 1949, as Karen restiveness turned into armed 
conflict, the dispute attracted difficult comment in parliament, and pro-Karen 
editorials appeared at regular intervals in the British press. 94 A Times leader in 
September 1948, for instance, argued that the root cause of what it called `Karen 
national assertiveness' lay with the Rangoon government's wrong-headed policies, 
suspicion of the UK and perceived communist sympathies: the Karens, it explained, 
`were willing to try the experiment of the Burma Union in the hope they could keep 
its policy along the sound lines of close cooperation with Britain. They are now 
alarmed at the spread of Communism and they have no confidence in the ability 
- 
or 
even the disposition 
- 
of the, Rangoon regime to restrain it'. Karen militancy, 
according to The Times, had as its final object `replacing the Rangoon government by 
men who will work effectively for the real interests of Burma'. 95 The Karen, the paper 
declared in May 1949, had `a strong case to state'. 96 At times, the depth of feeling was 
brought home to officials in a direct and personal way. In July 1949, for example, 
Foreign Office official Leslie Glass, a former Assistant Commissioner in the Burmese 
civil service, reported being harangued in the street by men who had fought with the 
93 The Times, 6 November 1947. 
94 In September 1948, for example, Anthony Eden, the wartime foreign secretary, told the Commons 
that `if the Karens had really had that square deal about which we heard so much [during the debate 
over the independence bill] they would not have expressed their dissatisfaction in the very open way 
they are now doing'. Hansard, vol. 456,15 September 1948, col. 180. 
95 `The Karen Revolt', The Times, 16 September 1948, p. 5. 
96 `Held for Burma', ibid., 14 May 1949, p. 5. 
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Karen during the war; `their emotion', he wrote, `may be sentimental but it is not 
ignoble 
... 
This is the sort of matter involving the heart rather than the head, which 
might raise political difficulties here if ignored'. 97 
The Labour government responded to its critics by trying to ensure that the weapons it 
was supplying the Burmese government were not used against the Karen. On 23 
February, Attlee wrote to Bevin that, while British assistance to the government 
against `communists and dacoits' was to continue, `we should take a firm line that we 
will not afford assistance to the Burmese government in order to help them suppress 
the Karens'. 98 The following day, Bevin told the cabinet that no Commonwealth 
country should give active support to put down the Karen, and argued that the 
Burmese `must be made to see the necessity for a peaceable settlement'. 99 In practice, 
however, ' it was effectively impossible to control how British weapons were used. The 
only way to be certain was to stop supplies altogether, but this was unacceptable given 
the continued need to support the Burmese in their fight against the communist 
insurgency. In any case, Burma was securing growing amounts of arms from non-UK 
sources that did not face the same self-imposed restrictions. The Burmese, reported 
one British official in January 1949, were `shopping for arms all over Europe'. '°° In 
March, the Australian government granted a provisional export licence for 100,000 
rifles bought by Burma from a private Australian company; in July alone, according 
to the BSM, Burma received 10,000 rifles from India, three million rounds of small- 
arms ammunition from Pakistan, a further 2,000 rifles and two million rounds of 
97 Glass, minute, 12 July 1949, F0371/75668/F10584/1018/79, UKNA. 
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ammunition from France, and some $1 million-worth of equipment and a small-arms 
manufacturing plant from Italy. '°' 
Although attempts to ensure that British weapons were not used against the Karen had 
little practical effect, they were problematic politically because they reinforced the 
apparently unshakeable conviction within the Burmese government that British 
official, business and private interests were actively supporting the Karen insurgency. 
As early as February 1948, Bowker was reporting `persistent and increasing rumours' 
in Rangoon that Karen separatists enjoyed British backing, including among members 
of the BSM. 102 Although U Nu assured Bowker that he himself did not suspect the 
British government of supporting the Karen in their `present agitation', he was 
nonetheless persuaded that encouragement was coming from what he called `certain 
vested British commercial interests'. 103 This view proved immovable; although 
Bowker dismissed the charge as absurd and issued a categorical denial to U Nu on 12 
February, similar accusations surfaced at regular intervals over the following 
months. 104 
While British officials largely dismissed allegations concerning commercial or 
101 BSM report on arms supplied to Burma from sources other than the UK, 12 August 1949, 
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political support for the Karen, it was clear that individual British sympathisers were 
being, in Bevin's words, `indiscreet'. los Suspicions centred on former members of 
Force 136, the clandestine SOE group that had operated with the Karen behind 
Japanese lines during the Second World War. 106 Firm evidence of the involvement of 
ex-Force 136 officers with the Karen emerged in mid-August 1948, when Frank 
Owen, the pro-Karen editor of the Daily Mail and one-time head of South-East Asia 
Command's in-house newspaper, engineered a meeting between Dening and Colonel 
John Cromarty Tulloch in a London bar. 107 During the encounter, Tulloch, a former 
member of Force 136, acknowledged his links with the Karen, and told Dening that 
plans were afoot to topple the government in Rangoon. He went on to reveal that he 
had approached the US embassy for American help in the planned revolt, but had 
been rebuffed. This was confirmed by a US embassy official in the UK, who also 
suggested that another British national, a Seventh Day Adventist by the name of J. W. 
105 Bevin to Bowker, no. 142,13 February 1948, F0371/69509/F2190/1087/79, UKNA. 
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Baldwin, was also involved. 108. Both Tulloch and Baldwin, along with the former 
Burma governor, Dorman-Smith, and the head of the wartime SOE, Sir Colin 
Gubbins, were part of a short-lived pro-Karen society calling itself The Friends of the 
Burma Hill Peoples, which had been founded in 1947 to advocate for `the 
preservation and protection of the autonomy and culture of the Karen people'. 109 In 
mid-September, Bowker reported that another sympathiser; Alexander Campbell, the 
newly-arrived Daily Mail correspondent in Rangoon, was working with Tulloch in 
assisting the Karen. Campbell, a former Force 136 officer in Karenni and an old 
friend of Tulloch's, reportedly had the backing of the Mail `to the tune of several 
thousand pounds'. Led by Tulloch, Karen supporters organised a clandestine 
operation involving gem-smuggling and arms-trafficking with Australian black- 
marketeers working through Bangkok. "" According to Tulloch, the Karen were in 
possession of a staggering 140,000 rifles, which they were planning to use to `overrun 
Burma on the grounds of an anti-Communist campaign'. "' All he needed `to stamp 
out Moscow's sphere of influence in South-East Asia', he told British officials, was 
`the best part of £1,000,000 sterling'. 112 
Tulloch's bar-room revelations placed Dening and his colleagues in a delicate 
position. Formally, the British were committed to supporting U Nu's legally 
constituted government, the installation of which they had after all overseen barely six 
108 Murray, minute, 14 July 1948, F0371/69509/F10146/1087/79, UKNA. 
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months before. A draft policy paper prepared in February 1948, for example, 
acknowledged Britain's `strong moral obligation to the Kachins and Karens' for their 
`noble support' during the war, but concluded that `this obligation has inevitably been 
superseded by the pressure of other considerations'. 113 At the same time, however, as 
the furore over the Leftist Unity programme showed, officials were not at all sure that 
they were backing the right horse. U Nu could not be relied upon to stand up to the 
communists and, even if he chose to continue the fight, Burma's armed forces were so 
weak and disunited that his survival was uncertain. Should the communists take 
power, Dening reasoned, the presence in Burma of an armed, anti-communist 
guerrilla force might turn out to be a useful asset. "4 
In the event, matters were taken out of British hands with the arrest of Campbell on 17 
September, prompting a wave of anti-British articles in the Burmese press. 
lts Already 
doubtful that a Karen revolt could succeed, the Foreign Office concluded that the 
game was not worth the candle, and British security officers wound up the London 
end of Tulloch's network. Meanwhile, the Mail's proprietor, Lord Rothermere, was 
politely asked to explain how a leading Conservative newspaper could have become 
entangled in such an embarrassing affair. Not guilty, Rothermere replied: he had 
known nothing about the extracurricular activities of his staff until, returning from 
holiday, he had found a Karen flag flying in front of the Mail building on Fleet Street, 
and a group of Karen ensconced in an empty office inside. Owen was swiftly fired, 
113 Murray, draft policy paper, 2 February 1948, F0371/69469/F2029/17/79, UKNA. 
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and Rothermere himself retreated to the South of France to 'recuperate'. ' 16 Campbell 
was finally released and deported from Burma on 28 November, but the conclusion of 
his case did not mark the end of freelance activity by Karen sympathisers, and the 
issue remained an irritant in Anglo-Burmese relations into the 1950s. 117 
Conclusion 
With the outbreak of the Karen conflict in early 1949, Burma's fledgling government 
faced some half a dozen ethnic, religious and political insurgencies scattered right 
across the country, from Arakan in the west to Karenni in the east and Tenasserim in 
the south. Burma expert Martin Smith estimates that some 20,000 communist, PVO 
and Karen rebels were in the field, plus unknown numbers of Arakanese and Muslim 
fighters. Against this, the Burmese government (the `Six-Mile Rangoon government', 
as it was disparagingly called) could count on perhaps 1,000 regular troops. 118 At one 
point in April 1949, rebels of one stripe or another held towns as far apart as Pakokku 
and Henzada (the CPB), Mandalay, Toungoo, Thaton, Einme and Twante (the Karen) 
and Minbu and Magwe (the PVO). Most of Burma's north-west border was in the 
hands of Muslim separatists, while ethnic groups such as the Mon, Karenni and Pao 
were setting up their own administrations in rural areas well beyond central 
government control. The country's only international airport, at Mingaladon outside 
116 Aldrich, `Legacies of Secret Service', p. 142. 
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Rangoon, was briefly seized by the Karen, who at one stage pushed to within four 
miles of the capital. 119 U Nu's government, never more than a weak and ramshackle 
edifice, seemed on the point of collapse, beset by `multicoloured insurgents', its 
situation `desperate'. 120 In British minds, simply sending arms no longer seemed 
enough; while compromise with the communists was unacceptable and the fight 
against the CPB had to continue, the Burmese had to come to terms with the Karen. A 
Burmese request for financial assistance, delivered in January 1949, appeared to offer 
a chance to bring some pressure to bear. 
119 Aid, pp. 118-119. 
120 U Nu, Saturday's Son, pp. 168,176. 
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Chapter 2 
Aid, conflict and the Commonwealth, 1949-1950 
The previous chapter has described the British government's military response to the 
insurgent crises that confronted Burma's leaders in the months after independence. 
This chapter looks more closely at the financial and political aspects of British post- 
independence policy, and the wider context within which this policy was made. In the 
wake of Burmese appeals for help in January 1949, British planners developed 
measures designed to stabilise the Burmese government's precarious finances and tide 
the country over its immediate problems. In providing aid, the British also sought to 
exert political influence in Rangoon; in particular, they hoped that they could take 
advantage of the goodwill aid was expected to generate to persuade the Burmese 
government to settle its differences with the Karen, thereby freeing up resources to 
tackle the communist insurgency. 
More broadly, British policy-makers sought to use the issue of aid to Burma to 
support wider efforts to reframe relations with the newly independent states of the 
Asian Commonwealth. In the responses to its problems, Burma, ironically itself a 
Commonwealth refusenik, gave the British 'a chance both to buttress the 
Commonwealth as an organising principle of international politics, and to give it an 
early sense of practical purpose by involving Commonwealth members, India 
primarily, but also Australia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and New Zealand, 'in providing 
assistance. As Bevin put it to his American counterpart, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, in September 1949, Burma constituted a `practical problem of common 
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concern on which he could bring the countries in this area together'. ' Commonwealth 
ministers met in Delhi in February 1949 in an attempt to hammer out an agreed 
position on the Karen revolt, and discussed Burma again in London the following 
April. In Rangoon, a Commonwealth ambassadors' committee was set up to scrutinise 
Burmese requests for financial and military aid. When financial assistance was finally 
agreed in June 1950, it was explicitly a Commonwealth initiative, not a British one. 
By involving Commonwealth countries in the problem of Burmese aid, British 
planners were trying to give substance to a set of ambitious regional policies they had 
been thinking about since the end of the Second World War. 2 By the close of the 
1940s, as communist insurgencies flared up in Burma and Malaya and Mao Zedong's 
forces tightened their grip on China, British policy-makers had concluded that only 
Asia's economic and, to a lesser extent, political development could check 
communism's advance. The key to post-war recovery, as in Europe, lay in 
cooperation and collaboration, both within the region and between the region and the 
West. 
- 
In the short term, the objective would be to reinforce local capacities to resist 
communism; in the long term, this regionalist project would aim to create what 
officials hoped would in time become `a system of friendly partnership between East 
and West'. The new Asian Commonwealth was the primary target and key vehicle of 
1 Record of a meeting between Acheson and Bevin at the State Department, 13 September 1949, 
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Lewis Johnman and W. Scott Lucas (eds), Post-War Britain, 1945-64: Themes and Perspectives 
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these regional plans. India in particular was useful now not as a colonial possession, 
but as a newly-independent partner. Aligning Delhi with London in Burma offered 
policy-makers a practical expression of what cooperation might mean 
- 
`an 
opportunity to develop relations on a new basis', as well as a tool for familiarising 
new partners in the requirements and modes of British policy-making and diplomacy. 4 
In framing their regional plans, policy-makers sought to maximise what influence the 
British retained in South-East Asia: while Britain could no longer dominate the region 
as a colonial power, it had not abandoned its habitual aspirations to leadership. As in 
Burma, so in South-East Asia as a whole, officials believed that no other power could 
match Britain's particular combination of history, influence and prestige. Only Britain 
had the credentials to lead Asia's political and economic development, to keep it, as 
officials liked to say, `on the right lines'. At the same time, what Attlee called `the 
lesson of Burma' 
- 
its withdrawal from the Commonwealth and subsequent slide into 
chaos 
- 
allowed the British an opportunity to press on India in particular the benefits 
of continued memberships In this way, the manageable defeat occasioned by Burma's 
departure from the Commonwealth was turned to advantage as part of broader efforts 
to prevent the much more serious setback the loss of India would represent. Thus, 
while the British accepted Burma's decision to sever its constitutional links, and few 
British politicians or officials seriously contemplated 
- 
or indeed would have 
4 Strang to Bevin, 17 March 1949, CAB 129/33/2/CP(49)67, in Ronald Hyam (ed. ), The Labour 
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s Attlee's report to the Cabinet on discussions with India about relations with the Commonwealth, 3 
March 1949, CAB 128/15/CM17(49)2, in Hyam (ed. ), The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 
p. 201. 
61 
welcomed 
- 
Burma's return, this did not mean that the country had no role to play in 
Britain's Commonwealth plans. 
Burma's financial crisis and the case for aid 
Burma formally approached the UK for financial and economic aid on 18 January 
1949. The Burmese wanted three loans: one for £13 million in budgetary assistance, 
another for some £9 million, to buy a one-third stake in the Burma Oil Company; and 
a third for around £10-12 million, to finance that year's rice crop 
- 
in all, some £34 
million. Each component of the loan request presented British planners with difficult 
policy problems. 
British analysts were broadly agreed that the Burmese were in dire financial straits: 
several months before the subject of aid was raised, the Treasury's representative in 
Rangoon reported that Burma was heading for financial collapse. The campaign 
against the country's various insurgencies was incurring heavy expenditure which the 
Burmese could ill-afford, while the disruption the fighting was causing had severely 
curtailed government revenues; capital flight, the Treasury warned, 
. 
'is almost 
certainly" taking place on a considerable scale'. 8 `Grave', was Bowker's assessment: 
`The sooner the Government makes up its mind to face the starkly real fact that the 
6 On Burma's relationship with the Commonwealth, see Ashton, `Burma, Britain and the 
Commonwealth', pp. 65-91. 
7 Scott, minute for the Economic Policy Committee, 22 January 1949, CAB134/220/4, UKNA. At 
today's prices, this would be around £750 million, based on £1 in 1950 being worth just over £22 
today. UK Office of National Statistics, `Consumer Price Inflation Since 1750', 10 March 2004, 
www. statistics. gov. uk/cci/article. asp? ID=726. By way of comparison with contemporary aid spending, 
the Colonial Development Corporation had an initial capital of £100 million. Darwin, Britain and 
Decolonisation, p. 139. 
8 Potter to Grant, 28 August 1948, F0371/69477/F12118/107/79, UKNA. 
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country is heading for bankruptcy, the better it will be'. According to Bowker's best 
guess, the government's budget deficit was indeed as high as the £13 million the 
Burmese were seeking in budgetary aid. 9 Financial collapse was self-evidently 
contrary to the British desire to see Burma stable and self-sufficient. Yet officials 
were consistent in their belief that, without progress towards political stability, 
financial assistance would do little but rob the UK of resources it could not afford to 
spend, and which it would probably not see repaid. Burma had already received a 
large measure of financial assistance in the form of £15 million-worth of debt 
forgiveness at independence (designed to give the new state what officials called `a 
fair start'). That still left an existing debt of some £30 million, but repayment even of 
this amount, let alone of any additional commitments in response to January's 
requests, seemed distinctly unlikely. 
The request for an oil financing loan was triggered by the BOC's announcement 
towards the end of 1948 that, in response to deteriorating security conditions, it 
planned to suspend its rehabilitation programme and lay off several thousand workers. 
By securing part-ownership of the company, the Burmese government would in effect 
be subsidising the BOC's continued operations in Burma. The BOC was an important 
interest, with a significant stake in the Burmese economy: since the end of the war, 
the company had spent some £6.5 million on repairing the war-damaged oil fields in 
central Burma, the refinery at Syriam near Rangoon and the 400-mile pipeline 
connecting the two. Yet Burma's oil fields, even when rehabilitated, were considered 
less efficient than sources in the Middle East or Indonesia, and marginal to global 
supply. Politically, however, there were stronger grounds for aid. The BOC employed 
9 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 340,16 September 1948, F0371/69477/F13330/107/79, UKNA. 
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some 8,000 workers in a notoriously politicised labour sector, and laying them off 
risked further destabilising the Burmese government. The BOC's depot at Duneedaw 
had been the focus of the communist-backed strikes in February 1948 that 
foreshadowed the CPB's insurrection, and oil workers had figured prominently in the 
labour agitation that had marked the last few years of British rule. '° 
The question of an oil loan was also connected to more general British concerns about 
the Burmese government's wider economic plans, in particular its policy of 
nationalisation. The indigenisation of the Burmese economy was enshrined in the 
country's new constitution, and was at the heart of the government's programme. Just 
before independence, in December 1947, the AFPFL had restated its intentions: 
all agricultural land in Burma should be acquired 
... 
all forest land 
within Burma should be acquired 
... 
All wealth underground and 
overground, water and air power, all means of communication and 
all productive industries should be worked by the state and modern 
factories and workshops established in accordance with an 
organised plan. 11 
This was primarily a political project: the predominant position of foreign capital 
- 
including large numbers of Indian moneylenders and landowners, as well as major 
British firms and institutions 
- 
was popularly interpreted in Rangoon as unacceptable 
evidence of Burma's incomplete independence. The communists in particular found 
Burma's continued economic ties with Britain a useful stick with which to beat the 
10 Smith, Burma, p. 69. 
11 Stoodley to the Board of Trade, 3 January 1948, F0371/69491/F1151/633/79, UKNA. 
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`bourgeois' AFPFL. Britain's economic stake, as well as its formal political power, 
had to be removed. Dismantling an oligarchic economic system, whatever its 
ownership, was also, of course, good populist politics. According to U Nu: `We are 
out to crush that evil economic system whereby a handful of people hold the 
monopoly, while the masses of Burma remain in endless poverty. It is immaterial as 
to who causes the perpetuation of this evil system 
- 
British, Indian, Chinese or 
Burman. The evil system must go'. 12 
For a Labour government sympathetic to a progressive politics of socialisation and 
nationalisation, Burma's plans were not in themselves especially controversial. The 
key immediate point at issue was not the policy per se, but the way the Burmese were 
planning to implement it: full-blooded nationalisation would, officials argued, cripple 
the economy, while the Burmese refusal to discuss terms and compensation in 
advance contradicted pre-independence agreements governing business relations 
between the two countries. Although no formal commercial treaty existed, 
commercial links were regulated and protected by an exchange of notes appended to 
the 1947 treaty. This committed the Burmese to respect British business interests; to 
consult the British government before taking any steps that might prejudice British 
business; and to pay `equitable compensation' in the event of nationalisation. Articles 
within the treaty itself bound the Burmese regime to honour existing contracts with 
British firms, and called for the conclusion of a full commercial treaty `at the earliest 
possible date'. 
12 `Sowing the Seeds of Freedom', speech to the Burma Constituent Assembly, 24 September 1947, in 
Towards Peace and Democracy, pp. 2-9. 
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The uncertain future of British business was an early point of contention between 
London and Rangoon. One of the Burmese government's first pieces of post- 
independence legislation 
- 
the Immovable Property Act 
- 
prevented foreigners from 
buying or leasing fixed assets, and there were signs that the government was 
considering restricting the free entry of foreigners into Burma for the purposes of 
business. The Burmese, reported an embassy official in March, were `going flat out to 
get at the British firms'; British objections, complained another, were `pushing against 
a brick wall'. 13 In early April 1948, Kyaw Nyein told Bowker that the government 
intended to eject all foreign capital from the country and establish a thorough-going 
socialist state within five years. !4 ` It is clear, ' conceded one official, `that the Burmese 
feel they can get by by themselves. We cannot make them believe otherwise by 
argument, but must leave them to be educated by experience, and must hope that it 
will not take too long. ' Britain's position in Burma was `deplorably weak'; if 
diplomacy had no effect, there was `little else we can do'. Perhaps ` as we recover our 
world position vis-ä-vis Russia and the United States we shall be in a better position 
to exact proper treatment for our interests from countries like Burma'. In the 
ls meantime, `it would be foolish to try to overplay our hand'. 
Bevin addressed the issue of compensation in parliament on 7 April, telling MPs that 
the government would `follow developments with the closest interest', and would 
`afford the companies concerned all legitimate support'. British business had `a useful 
13 Grey to Crombie, 16 March 1948, F0371/69470/F3201/17/79, UKNA. 
14 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 102,10 April 1948, F0371/69494/F5634/633/79, UKNA. 
15 Murray, `The Threat to British Commercial Interests in Burma', 27 April 1948, 
F0371/69494/F6656/633/79, UKNA. 
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role to play in the development of the country. 16 Neither this public warning nor 
parallel private diplomacy had any obvious effect, however, and the Burmese went 
ahead with their nationalisation programme on 1 June 1948, taking over the British- 
owned Irrawaddy Flotilla Company and around a third of Britain's teak concessions. 
Privately, officials thought the June move `cavalier', `surprising' and 
'disappointing'. 17 In his protest to the Burmese government, Bowker called it 
`thoroughly shabby, not to say dishonest'. 18 It was also potentially politically 
damaging for the Labour government. Representatives of the firms concerned wrote 
repeatedly to the Foreign Office demanding a robust response, and delegations met 
officials and ministers, including Attlee, at least twice between January and June 
1948, and again towards the end of the year. The firms' predicament was discussed in 
parliament, and their cause pressed by the Conservative opposition. 
This public and private lobbying placed the Labour government in a delicate position. 
On the one hand, the government clearly had, and accepted, a responsibility to defend 
British commercial interests. On the other hand, the demands of Labour's broader 
Burma policy, the limitations of British influence in Rangoon and the government's 
own socialist principles implied a degree of circumspection that frustrated the 
business lobby and exposed the government to accusations of anti-business bias. 
Senior ministers, including the Chancellor, Stafford Cripps, rejected the firms' 
demands that the government should negotiate for compensation on their behalf, and 
important sections within the government sympathised with the popular Burmese 
view that British business in colonial Burma had acted in ways not always in Burma's 
16 Hansard, 7 April 1948, vol. 449, col. 140. 
1' Grey to Bowker, no. 462,3 June 1948, F0371/69506/F7776/640/79, UKNA. 
18 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 201,8 June 1948, F0371/69472/F8357/17/79, UKNA. 
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best interests. Change was inevitable: British commerce `had made a very good thing 
out of Burma in the past and cannot reasonably expect the former happy state of 
affairs to return'. 19 
At the end of August 1948, Bevin asked his officials for a paper setting out the 
position. However badly British businesses might have behaved in colonial Burma, 
the principle of equitable compensation had to be defended, not least for the damaging 
precedent Burma's actions might set for other newly independent governments. 20 
`There is, ' the paper argued, `no reason why Burma should nationalise her industries 
at the expense of foreign interests': 
If we accept the argument that the Burmese should not be asked to 
give compensation in negotiable form, we should be inviting them to 
nationalise all foreign concerns without further hesitation. We 
should also be inviting other countries, particularly India, to pursue 
the same policy of virtually expropriating foreign interests without 
compensation and we should be abandoning all claims of having 
benefited Burma and other countries by our past administrative and 
commercial activities. Nor would our gesture of renunciation be 
accepted by the Burmese as more than a confession of weakness and 
a consciousness of past guilt. 
More was at stake, in other words, than a simple calculation of profit and loss; British 
self-respect, as well as British balance sheets, demanded satisfaction. In Bevin's 
19 Pearn, minute, 6 April 1948, F0371/69470/F4415/17/79, UKNA. 
20 Grey, minute, `British Interests in Burma', 29 September 1948, F0371/69500/F14671/79, UKNA. 
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opinion, the Burmese government `have not sought to excuse themselves from 
carrying out the full measure of their obligations on grounds of economic difficulty. 
They have not even suggested a token payment in convertible currency, which they 
could surely afford, and which would at least suggest that they were mindful of their 
obligations. So far they have simply repudiated the impressions which they must 
know were conveyed to His Majesty's Government [in the talks over the treaty in 
1947] in this important matter of principle. This we cannot accept'21 The Burmese 
government, wrote one official in November 1948, `is fundamentally Communist, at 
least in the sense of favouring violent and class- (or race) conscious policies. As we 
continue to support them for want of a better alternative, so they are maintaining a 
crust of goodwill for the advantages they expect from us. We must; therefore, expect 
nothing from them and must assume on all occasions that they will be guided by their 
own calculations of 
- 
their immediate self-interest'. 22 Under these circumstances, 
providing a loan to finance Burmese participation in the BOC looked very much like 
bad tactics. 
Assistance for the financing of Burma's rice export constituted the third element of 
the loan request. The task of buying up the rice crop was in the hands of a state 
monopoly, the State Agricultural Marketing Board (SAMB). Unhusked rice (paddy) 
was bought from producers on credit, which was then repaid on later receipts from the 
sale and export of finished rice. Before the war, this credit had been provided largely 
by individual Indian financiers, but with the collapse of the pre-war economy and 
Burma's generally parlous financial position, access to credit had become severely 
constrained. This, plus periodic raids on its budget to finance other areas of 
21 Bevin to Bowker, no. 900,18 October 1948, F0371/69507/F13749/640/79, UKNA. 
22 Murray, minute, 17 November 1948, F0371/69521/F16068, UKNA. 
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government expenditure, had left the SAMB with a deficit running into millions of 
pounds. Without a bridging loan, Burma's rice export was potentially in serious 
jeopardy. 
This was a cause of significant British concern because Burma was by far the region's 
most important rice exporter, accounting, even in the unfavourable circumstances of 
the late 1940s, for over 60% of East Asia's rice supplies, an amount equivalent to 
40% of the world's total exportable crop. Burmese rice made up more than half of all 
the rice imported into India and Sri Lanka, and accounted for two-fifths of Malaya's 
supply. 23 Even by maintaining existing levels, the amount of available rice was 
significantly below pre-war norms: total imports into India and Pakistan, for example, 
were almost half the levels of the 1930s; in Malaya, rice rations were just over half 
what they had been before the war. Any further reductions in availability thus risked 
increasing already serious food stress. This in turn would pose unacceptable political 
risks in those parts of the region of concern to the British, particularly Malaya, 
Singapore and Sri Lanka. 24 
Burma's rice was also a crucial financial commodity. Although not a member of the 
Commonwealth, Burma had remained within the Sterling Area, relied on the UK 
government as its sole exporting agent and sold its surplus rice exclusively for 
sterling, paid into the country's account held by the Bank of England. Refused help, 
there was a risk that the Burmese would reject their links with sterling altogether and 
23 Foreign Office briefs for Bottomley, 1 February 1949, F0371/75693/F2051/1151/79G, UKNA. 
24 JIC(FE) memorandum, (49)7 Revise, 'Likely Effect of the Present Situation in Burma on Burmese 
Rice Production, and Possible Repercussions on British Territories in the Far East, particularly 
Singapore and the Federation of Malaya', 3 March 1949, CAB134/287, UKNA. 
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seek to sell their whole export crop for dollars; already, in mid-1948, Burma had 
signalled its intention to sell up to a quarter of its 1949 exports in whatever markets it 
chose. 25 In the straitened circumstances of the late 1940s, any significant diversion of 
rice away from sterling constituted a potential hard-currency expenditure that the 
dollar-starved Sterling Area could ill-afford. Indeed, the need to expand sources of 
food and raw materials that did not require dollar payment was a principal motive 
behind the Labour government's ill-fated colonial development schemes in tropical 
Africa in the late 1940s26 Between the end of March and June 1949, Britain's dollar 
deficit doubled, from $330 million to $632 million, and its reserves fell from nearly 
$2 billion to $1.6 billion. In mid-June, Cripps warned the Cabinet that sterling was 
nearing collapse; three months later, on 18 September, the pound was devalued by a 
third against the dollar. 27 
For all these reasons, the Treasury did not believe that general financial assistance 
was justified. 28 Without reform of Burma's chaotic financial administration and an 
improvement in the country's political and security environment, no loan, however 
extensive, could redeem the situation, and any aid risked being wasted, either lost in 
the inefficiencies of the bureaucracy or squandered on inappropriate and expensive 
economic development schemes. Only the rice financing loan had merit, but Treasury 
officials doubted whether lack of funds would prove a more significant handicap to 
exports than general insecurity, and insisted that any loan should be coupled with 
adequate safeguards to ensure that the money was used as intended. 
25 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 741,19 August 1948, F0371/69476/F11541/107/79, UKNA. 
26 Hinds, Britain's Sterling Colonial Policy, pp. 136,140. 
27 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, p. 705. 
28 `Financial Assistance to Burma', Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, EPC (49)5,22 
January 1949, CAB134/221/5, UKNA. 
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The wider politics of the aid question were, however, less straightforward. A refusal 
to meet Burma's requests could not be expected to improve London's relations with 
Rangoon. The Burmese had fired a warning shot with a press statement on 20 January 
1949 which essentially: blamed the country's financial crisis on `monopolistic 
capitalists' and Britain's `ruthless exploitation' before independence. 29 Clearly, 
thought the Foreign Office, the Burmese leadership was `casting about for scapegoats. 
We seem to have been selected as chief scapegoat'. 30 Outright rejection would 
inevitably be met with Burmese hostility, with concomitant risks in other areas of 
British concern., Negotiations were about to begin for the renewal of the Agency 
Agreement, under which the Ministry of Food handled Burma's rice exports, and talks 
were imminent on the fixing of rice prices for 1949. A fresh hard-currency agreement 
too was 
- 
still' pending. Previous negotiations around Burma's hard-currency 
allowances in 1948 had been far from easy, and the prospects for 1949 would not 
improve should the Burmese be disappointed in their loan requests. More broadly, as 
with the question of military aid, there was an inherent inconsistency in refusing 
assistance if doing so increased the likelihood of the government collapsing, to be 
replaced either by chaos or by communism. 
These political considerations encouraged a more flexible response from the Foreign 
Office. Officials accepted the risks of assistance. According to Orme Sargent: 
the Burmese Government are trying to exploit the fact that they are 
unable to maintain law and order in order to extract loans and 
credits from us, on the ground that if we don't finance them they will 
29 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 63,22 January 1949, F0371/75692/F1215/1151/79, UKNA. 
30 Dening, minute, 24 January 1949, CAB 134/220/4, UKNA. 
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collapse and involve British interests 
- 
economic and political 
- 
in 
their fall. We must be careful not to be bamboozled by the wily 
Oriental 
... 
Otherwise we shall find ourselves embarked on the 
never ending business of pouring good sterling down the Burmese 
drain, just as the US Government have been pouring good dollars 
down the Chinese drain, without having any say as to how it is 
used 31 
Nor did the Foreign Office see financial aid as any more of a panacea than the 
Treasury did; according to one official, `it seems doubtful whether we can face the 
vast expenditure involved in subsidising the stability of this incompetent "Marxist" 
Government. There is no guarantee that even if we do pour out these sums, the present 
Government will be able to achieve anything resembling a stable regime'. Burma was 
clearly `a bad bet'. 32 Nonetheless, the political arguments in favour of aid were such 
as to preclude an outright no, and the Foreign Office argued against refusal of a 
general loan, thought that a decision on the BOC loan should be deferred, and 
recommended a minimum loan to help with the rice export. 33 
Aid and Britain's regional planning 
The question of financial and economic aid to Burma was linked to Britain's wider 
planning in South-East Asia in the late 1940s. As Tilman Remme has shown, since 
the end of the war British thinking in South-East Asia had been converging around the 
31 Sargent, minute, 10 January 1949, F0371/75692/F1518/1151/79, UKNA. 
32 Murray, minute, 5 January 1949, F0371/75692/F10/1151/79; Dening, minute, 24 January 1949, 
F0371/75696/F1517/1151/79, UKNA. 
33 Scott, minute, 22 January 1949, CAB 134/220/4, UKNA. 
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need for cooperative action among the region's states, and between them and the 
West. 4 Policy-makers envisaged some form of regional economic and, ultimately, 
political structure, organised under British leadership. Through this mechanism the 
British sought, both to reinforce Asia's capacity to defend itself against communism, 
and to bolster their attempts to preserve for the UK a predominant role in the region's 
political and economic life. 
Arguments in favour of a comprehensive and collaborative approach to South-East 
Asia's problems had been circulating inside the Foreign Office since the end of the 
war. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in April 1946, Bevin raised 
the idea of a regional cooperative body comprising the UK, Australia, New Zealand 
and India. These suggestions were taken forward in a set of Foreign Office discussion 
papers prepared by Dening, who proposed a British-managed regional system `to 
strengthen the political ties between the territories concerned and facilitate a defensive 
strategy'. The aim, Dening argued, should be to develop `a general partnership 
between independent or about-to-be-independent Eastern peoples and the Western 
Powers'. 35 The Foreign Office succeeded in establishing a fledgling regional 
structure, the Special Commission based in Singapore, to facilitate technical 
cooperation and coordinate food supplies. However, more ambitious steps were 
resisted by other parts of the government, in particular the Colonial Office, on the 
grounds that any regional organisation invited unacceptable international interference 
in the UK's remaining South-East Asian possessions. Financial constraints too argued 
against a more expansive policy, and by the spring of 1948 lack of funds had forced 
34 Remme, `Britain, the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and Regional Cooperation in South East 
Asia'; Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia. 
33 Ibid., pp. 126-27. 
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the merger of the Special Commission with the Governor-General's Office in Malaya 
(a Colonial Office post), to form the new position of Commissioner-General. 
The Foreign Office's proposals were rescued by the outbreak of the communist 
insurgencies in Burma and Malaya and the communists' advances in China during 
1948. In December 1948, Bevin told the Cabinet that Chinese communist success 
`will stimulate Communist movements throughout the area'; should Mao succeed in 
overrunning all China, `the possibilities of contacts with the Communists in 
Indochina, Siam and Burma will be greatly facilitated, and it may be expected that 
Communist agitation in various forms will be accelerated to a marked degree'. 36 
Malcolm MacDonald, the UK's Commissioner-General in South-East Asia, argued 
that Mao's advances in China `considerably alter the situation and prospects in South 
East Asia'. The region had become `a major theatre in the "cold war" and will 
continue so throughout this period. The Communist friends of Russia, with such help 
as Russia deems it advisable to give, will push as far as they can by propaganda, 
agitation and subversive activities their progress in every part of the area. We can only 
counter this by a diplomatic and political offensive in South East Asia'. 37 Failure to 
act, officials believed, would be fatal: 
if the general impression prevails in South-East Asia that the 
Western Powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting 
Russian pressure, the psychological effect may be that local 
resistance is weakened, with the result that the process of 
36 'Recent Developments in the Civil War in China', 9 December 1948, CAB129/31/CP(48)299, 
UKNA. 
37 MacDonald to the Foreign Office, no. 1,252,10 December 1948, F0959/23, UKNA. 
75 
undermining systems of government in that region will succeed to 
the extent that eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall 
victim to the Communist advance. 38 
To defend South-East Asia from this apparent communist threat, the British 
concluded that they needed a concerted, region-wide strategy. The creation of the post 
of Commissioner-General, while partly a cost-cutting measure, was also an attempt to 
give this regional strategy institutional form; through the Commissioner-General, 
officials hoped, the UK might promote `political harmony and co-operation among 
the British and foreign territories in the area', as well as preserving British leadership 
and influence. 39 British propaganda efforts were also extended to South-East Asia, 
with the establishment in 1948 of a Regional Information Office in Singapore. 
British planners also sought to exploit the potential for cooperation embodied in the 
new Asian Commonwealth. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in 
October 1948, the first to be attended by independent India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 
Bevin revived the notion of regional collaboration in political and economic matters, 
and in December, the Cabinet agreed to consult Commonwealth countries, as well as 
Burma, Thailand, France, the Netherlands and the United States, on regional 
developments. Provision was also made for the exchange of intelligence information 
within the region, and for increased consultation among security and police officials. 
Further impetus was provided by the new Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign 
Office, William Strang, who had returned from a pre-appointment tour of Asia in 
38 `Brief on South East Asia', 23 March 1949, F0371/76023/F4487/G, UKNA. 
39 Monteath, 9 January 1948, quoted in Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the Cold 
War, pp. 192-93. 
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January and February 1949 ' convinced of the need for a coherent policy approach 
across the region, and the necessity of Commonwealth help in its development and 
implementation 40 
British attempts'to engage other states in cooperative thinking about developments in 
South-East Asia were in fact less productive than officials had hoped; of the 
Commonwealth countries approached only India responded, but Indian analysis of the 
position in China only confirmed the British in their view that Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru did not appreciate the extent of the'regional threat. A communist- 
controlled regime in China would, the Indians argued, `be absorbed by internal 
problems, which they would handle according to Chinese methods and without 
accepting Russian dictation'; the `correct course' for other countries was to `help 
national movements in South East Asia', presumably in their battles against'the 
British, French and Dutch in Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia. 1 Moreover, India was 
making its own, competing case for regional leadership, exemplified by Britain's 
exclusion from a 15-nation conference in Delhi in January 1949. The conference, 
convened by Nehru to discuss the Netherlands' second `police action' in Indonesia in 
December 1948, was highly critical of Western colonial policies; in his opening 
speech, Nehru told delegates that `there can be and there will be no surrender to 
aggression and no acceptance or reimposition of colonial control'. 42 As one British 
official noted, the conference was `another warning that European authority must 
40 'Sir William Strang's Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East', 27 February 1949, 
F0371/76028/F4447/1051/61, UKNA. 
41 Bevin, minute, `The Situation in China', 4 March 1949, CAB 129/32/CP(49)39, UKNA. 
42 Remme, Britain and Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia, pp. 165ff; Tarling, Britain, South- 
East Asia and the Onset of the Cold War, pp. 322ff, Ton That Thien, India and South-East Asia 
(Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), pp. 98-102. 
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disappear from Asia'. 43 The beleaguered French, eager for any outside help, 
predictably welcomed intelligence cooperation, and the Thais asked what assistance 
they could expect from the UK in the event of a Chinese attack, prompting the US 
State Department to warn the British that they were `allowing things to develop 
almost towards inveiglement'. 4 Burma and the Netherlands were in the end not asked 
what they thought `in view of their more immediate preoccupations' 45 
Despite this disappointing outcome, the Foreign Office remained convinced that a 
regionalist and collaborationist approach was essential if communism in Asia was to 
be contained. In early April 1949, Dening told a colleague that, while `the political 
differences which exist today between the various East Asian countries will render 
negative any attempts which we may make to unite a common front against Russian 
expansion, the need seems to us so imperative that we think the effort should be 
made'. The UK alone, thought Dening, `has the experience and the ability to knit the 
South-East Asian region together'. 46 MacDonald too was pressing for a more active 
regional approach: the problems of South-East Asia, he told Bevin in March, could 
not be dealt with individually or in isolation from each other, to be tackled `each as it 
occurs according to the resources at our command in each particular place at each 
particular moment. We should regard South-East Asia as a whole, and devise a 
coherent policy for dealing with it over the whole region'. What was needed, 
MacDonald argued, was `a deliberate and planned effort 
... 
to hold the Communist 
advance in Asia 
... 
To do that we must have a constructive policy in which all 
43 Wakeley, minute, 31 January 1949, quoted in Tarling, Britain, South-East Asia and the Onset of the 
Cold War, p. 323. 
44 Graves to Scarlett, no. G47/49,7 February 1949, F0371/76003/F2415/1017/61G, UKNA. 
45 Bevin, minute, `The Situation in China', 4 March 1949, CAB 129/32/CP(49)39, UKNA. 
46 Dening to Syers, 4 April 1949, F0371/76031/F2191/1072/61G, UKNA. 
Governments in these countries can cooperate as partners 
... 
We need Asian 
equivalents of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic pact'. 47 
Foreign Office thinking on this subject was encapsulated in the summer of 1949 in a 
pair of policy papers prepared by Strang's brainchild, the Permanent Under- 
Secretary's Committee (PUSC). The first, `The United Kingdom in South-East Asia 
and the Far East', restated the case for British leadership in building a system of 
regional cooperation in Asia. 48 The UK, the paper argued, enjoyed a unique, and 
uniquely influential, place within the new Asia. Politically, the British, unlike the still- 
embroiled Dutch and French, had by and large come to terms with Asian nationalism: 
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were independent, though still associated, states; 
Burma, though outside the Commonwealth, was nonetheless `friendly'. Economically, 
British interests remained `substantial', the country's economic influence 
`considerable' and, through the Sterling Area, Britain enjoyed an unparalleled degree 
of financial control within the region's most important economies. The UK's special 
position within South-East Asia in turn gave it a unique opportunity to construct a 
new form of association among Asia's new states, and between Asia and the West. 
Although Britain could no longer dominate the region as a colonial power, `we can 
and should use our political and economic influence to weld the area into some degree 
of regional cooperation'. In the short term, the objective would be to reinforce Asia's 
capacity to resist communism; in the long term, this regionalist project would aim `to 
"MacDonald to Bevin, no. 16,23 March 1949, F0371/76034/F4545/1073/G, UKNA; meeting record, 
24 May 1949, F0371/76034/F6670/1075/61G, UKNA. 
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create a system of friendly partnership between East and West and to improve 
economic and social conditions in South-East Asia and the Far East'. 
Having set out the intellectual groundwork in support of a policy of regional 
cooperation, Strang and his officials then addressed the tactical and practical 
questions of implementation in their second paper, `Regional Cooperation in South- 
East Asia and the Far East'. 49 Strang conceded that the prospects for closer political 
association were bleak. Relations between Asia's new states were neither stable nor 
on the whole especially friendly, and few of the region's new governments were 
internally secure. Continued conflict in French Indochina and Dutch Indonesia made 
the involvement of either France or the Netherlands in any regional political structure 
unacceptable, while British motives too remained suspect. The PUSC accordingly 
ruled out anything approaching the kind of regional political structure emerging in 
Europe. Instead, the committee argued for the use of technical, financial and 
economic assistance as the most effective way of achieving the UK's policy 
objectives. Every South-East Asian state was burdened by low living standards, and 
none possessed the resources or technical expertise they needed to develop their 
economies and meet the expectations of their people. Asia, in other words, needed the 
West's economic help, and was thus more likely to accept it than it was to acquiesce 
in any moves towards political association. In time, this economic relationship could 
perhaps be converted into a closer political and strategic grouping: 
the habit of collaboration is a catching one and the settlement of 
economic difficulties, of common consultation and effort, may lead 
49 
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to greater political and military cohesion 
... 
Regional collaboration 
in the economic field, if achieved, may well lead not only to a better 
understanding between the countries of Asia themselves, but also 
between East and West. 
The Commonwealth, Strang concluded, should act as the nucleus of this regional 
system; India in particular was `the key to the whole problem of South-East Asian 
regional cooperation'. 
Aid and the Commonwealth 
In Burma's financial difficulties, Bevin and his officials saw an opportunity to put 
their regional plans into practical effect, and the key arguments in favour of 
regionalism figured prominently when the Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee 
(EPC) convened to discuss the Burmese government's aid request on 25 January 
1949.50 South-East Asia was, Bevin reminded his colleagues, `gravely threatened' by 
communism; should the region fall under Soviet control, this would be `disastrous' 
for British policy. In Europe, the response to Soviet expansionism had been closer 
political and, in particular, economic integration. A similar regionalist, integrationist 
project was now called for in South-East Asia: what the region needed was `a body 
which would perform functions comparable with those carried out in Western Europe 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation'. 
Unlike in Europe, where US economic leadership had been instrumental in 
establishing the OEEC framework, in Asia the British should take the lead, in 
50 Fourth meeting of the Economic Policy Committee, 25 January 1949, CAB 134/220/4, UKNA. 
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cooperation and consultation with their Commonwealth partners. In this way, Bevin 
argued, Britain could preserve its political leadership in Asia, while at the same time 
beginning to create `a new tradition of practical association in pursuit of common 
political and economic objectives'. Commonwealth consultation over Burma's 
immediate financial problems might pave the way towards the attainment of these 
much wider aims. Other Commonwealth governments, India and Pakistan in 
particular, but also Sri Lanka, Australia and New Zealand, shared with Britain a 
concern for Burmese stability. The UK should take advantage of this congruence of 
interest, and `take the initiative in securing the cooperation of the Commonwealth 
Governments concerned in a joint effort to strengthen and establish a friendly and 
anti-Communist Government in Burma'. 
Bevin's proposals for a formal economic association in Asia were rejected by the EPC 
as ambitious and premature. Nonetheless, the Committee accepted the need for 
assistance to Burma, and agreed that the country should be given whatever aid was 
necessary to safeguard its rice exports. The question of budgetary aid and oil finance 
was left pending. 51 The EPC also accepted the principle of Commonwealth 
participation, and a meeting was proposed in Delhi to discuss Burma's problems, 
comprising India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, as well as the old dominions of Australia 
and New Zealand. Attlee duly wrote to Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart Liaquat 
Ali Khan on 27 January, and to the premiers of Australia, New Zealand and Sri Lanka 
four days later, making the case for Commonwealth assistance and proposing a 
meeting to thrash out a common position. 52 Burma's stability was, Attlee told his 
51 Ibid. 
52 Attlee to the prime ministers of India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand and Sri Lanka, nos 68,53, 
114,27 and 31 January 1949, F0371/75693/F1795/1151/79G, UKNA. 
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colleagues, `a matter of vital interest and importance to all Commonwealth 
Governments which have interests in security in South-East Asia or which are 
I 
dependent on Burma for essential supplies'. Any approach to the Burmese 
government should thus come, not from the UK alone, but from the UK `in 
association with the regional Commonwealth states'. 
Almost immediately, the British ran into the kind of practical and political problems 
that would dog efforts to establish a Commonwealth position on Burma. Although 
India agreed to host a meeting in Delhi, Nehru worried that U Nu's government was 
by now beyond helping. Pakistan chafed at the meeting's location in Delhi, while the 
Australians rejected financial assistance outright. In conversation with the British 
High Commissioner, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley `spoke in extremely 
disparaging terms' of the Burmese; he was, apparently, `particularly caustic about 
their action in first leaving the Commonwealth and then running back to the United 
Kingdom for help as soon as they got into trouble'. Even if justified, aid would do no 
good: `throwing good money after bad', just as the US had done in China. 53 New 
Zealand, while more amenable, only agreed to attend the proposed Delhi meeting if 
Australia did so too, while the Burmese government, informed of the British plan on 
12 February, worried, rightly as it turned out, that British attempts to corral other 
Commonwealth states into sharing the burden of aid would only delay its arrival. 54 
Only Sri Lanka, the most junior partner, seemed to accept the principle of joint 
discussion without reservation or complication. 
33 UK High Commissioner in Australia ' to the CRO, 28 February 1949, no. 124, 
F0371/75686//F3134/1061/79G, UKNA.. 
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Against this background, progress on a Commonwealth basis was clearly going to be 
difficult. In fact, when ministers and officials finally met, in Delhi on 28 February, 
neither New Zealand nor Pakistan was present. Financial aid was barely discussed; 
Britain's representative, Arthur Bottomley, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, tried to 
raise it, but found his colleagues `so clearly disinclined to pursue it at that stage that I 
did not press it'. 55 Instead, the meeting focused almost entirely on the Karen conflict. 
Speaking for India, Nehru reported that he had made several approaches to U Nu 
regarding possible Indian mediation, but had been rebuffed. U Nu was, he indicated, 
`under the influence of the uncompromising elements in his government'. 
Nonetheless, it appeared clear that a military solution was unlikely, and the meeting 
ended with agreement that Nehru should contact U Nu again urging conciliation and 
offering a meeting of Commonwealth representatives in Rangoon to discuss possible 
ways forward. 56 
The meeting's offer of mediation was rejected by U Nu, who told Nehru that the 
Burmese had no need of outside help other than arms. 57 On 6 March, he informed 
Bottomley that his government would rather make peace with the PVO than accept 
58 financial aid if it was made conditional on mediation with the Karen. Significant 
efforts had been made to meet Karen demands, he complained, and any further 
concessions would be taken as a sign of weakness by the Burmese press and Burmese 
public opinion; conciliation would take place `at the proper time' after the military 
55 Bottomley's report of the New Delhi conference, 16 March 1949, F0371/75688/F3971/1061/79, 
UKNA. 
56 Note of a meeting, New Delhi, 28 February 1949, F0371/75687/F3470/1061/79, UKNA. 
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situation had become `favourable'. 59 U Nu also repeated complaints about outside 
assistance for the Karen, referring specifically to Tulloch and Campbell, 60 and 
suggested that the Commonwealth was somehow exploiting Burma's financial 
difficulties in an effort to coerce it into joining. 1 Such suspicions were reinforced by 
ill-judged remarks after the Delhi meeting by Herbert Evatt, Australia's External 
Affairs Minister, to the effect that Burma had `made a mistake' in leaving the 
Commonwealth, and would `sooner or later rejoin'. 2 `I fear, ' wrote Bowker, `we 
must accept the fact that Burmese susceptibilities, tiresome as they are, must be taken 
into particular account in dealing with Burma's present crisis. '63 
Disappointed at this failure, Bevin pressed for another Commonwealth meeting to 
assess the Burmese reply. Interested Commonwealth governments should `tell Burma 
... 
that we regret their rejection of an offer of help from friends, that we remain of the 
opinion that early and peaceful settlement of communal troubles with minorities is 
essential in the interests of stability in Burma and for the sake of her prestige abroad, 
and that the continuance of present troubles can only play into the hands of the 
Communists'. Once the Burmese rejection of good offices became publicly known, 
the British government would find it `very hard 
- 
indeed, almost impossible 
- 
to 
justify in parliament or in the country the grant of financial assistance'. 4 Bevin's 
officials were, however, less sure of the wisdom of another attempt. A second meeting 
59 Ibid. 
60 U Nu to Nehru, reported in UK High Commission in New Delhi to the CRO, no. X439,3 March 
1949, F0371/75687/F3475/1061/79, UKNA. 
61 Evatt's statement to the press, Reuters, 1 March 1949, F0371/75686/F3433/1061/79, UKNA. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 243,5 March 1949, FO371/75686/F3338, UKNA. 
64 Bevin to Bottomley, no. 790,4 March 1949, FO371/75687/F3475/1061/79, UKNA. 
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would do little: `the Burmese assert that they can settle the troubles with the Karens 
without assistance from us; it is true that they agreed to the holding of a 
Commonwealth Conference, but the Conference that they agreed to was one to 
discuss their request for financial assistance, not the Conference which was actually 
held and which discussed mediation. - The Burmese have some justification for their 
virtuous indignation'. 65 Fresh discussions on financial assistance would be `bad 
tactics. It is their crisis and we must wait for them to make the next move'. 66 Nehru 
too thought another meeting futile. Bottomley was duly recalled, and on 8 March the 
Cabinet concluded that any further pressure on the Burmese would do more harm than 
good. A second Commonwealth meeting was `out of the question'. 67 
In the event, military disaster forced U Nu's hand. On 11 March, Karen forces took 
Mandalay, Burma's second city. Four days later, on 15 March, the Burmese asked 
Bowker if he would be prepared to `use his influence' to induce Karen leaders to open 
negotiations. 68 By this point, the BSM estimated that at least 20,000 Karen, including 
a large number of deserters from the army, were engaged in fighting. 69 Karen troops, 
Bowker reported, were fighting with `an almost mystical exaltation of spirit which 
makes them formidable soldiers in battle'. 70 With the poorly-trained and ill- 
disciplined forces at its disposal, the Burmese government could not hope to settle the 
dispute by force, and knew it; its leaders were, Bowker explained, `less sanguine 
65 Note for meeting with Pandit Nehru, 5 March 1949, F0371/75688/F3960/1061/79, UKNA. 
66 Scott, minute for Bevin, 7 March 1949, F0371/75687/F3629/1061/79, UKNA. 
67 Cabinet meeting, 8 March 1949, PREM11/1319/GEN278/4, UKNA. 
68 Bowker to the Foreign Office, 15 March 1949, no. 301, F0371/75666/F3935, UKNA. 
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about a solution by military means than they officially admit'. 1 Nonetheless, the 
unexpected volte-face placed the British in a delicate position, as Bowker explained in 
a lengthy dispatch on 18 March. On the one hand, refusing to help would not be 
consonant with the stated aim of British policy, which was to encourage the Burmese 
to settle their dispute with the Karen by negotiation. On the other hand, assistance also 
carried risks: it was likely that any official British involvement would be vulnerable to 
misrepresentation; it would entail taking some degree of responsibility for any 
settlement reached; and the crisis might in any case have passed the point of no return, 
making any British approach futile. Moreover, the terms proposed by the government, 
namely that negotiations were conditional on the insurgents handing over their 
weapons, went significantly beyond what the Karen would be prepared to concede 
given that well-founded concerns for their security were one of the primary factors in 
their insurgency. On balance, notwithstanding the rare opportunity for leverage that it 
offered, the risks were such that the request should be declined. 
Officials in London shared Bowker's analysis, but not his recommendations. 
Although any attempt at mediation ran the risk of `suffering the usual fate of those 
who extend their good offices in a quarrel and become the target of both sides', the 
opportunity to give some substance to the ` Commonwealth front' established at Delhi 
was too good to miss. 72 In a note to Attlee on 22 March, Bevin stated that a flat 
refusal would `hardly be consistent with the message sent to Thakin Nu by the Delhi 
meeting advocating conciliation and offering Commonwealth help in bringing it 
about'. Commonwealth approval should be sought `for any initiative which we take' 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ledwidge, minute, 19 March 1949, F0371/75666/F4282/1018/79G, UKNA. 
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and the `united front 
... 
should be maintained'. 3 News of the Burmese request, 
together with a note from Bevin urging action, was accordingly passed to the 
governments of India and Pakistan on 24 March and, their agreement to a joint 
approach secured, Bowker was instructed to return a positive reply. Thus briefed, and 
with responsibility duly shared, Bowker wrote to KNU leader Saw Ba U Gyi at his 
base at Insein on 4 April, proposing talks. Discussions followed in Rangoon, and 
agreement on the broad outlines of a settlement was reached the following day. Hopes 
were, however, quickly dashed as the talks foundered over the details of disarmament 
and security guarantees for the Karen. `Things are now, ' reported Bowker, `back 
where they were before. '74 The Foreign Office concurred: Bowker had `brought the 
Burmese and the Karens to the water's brink, but they refused to drink'. 75 
Despite the failure of the Insein initiative, the attempt at talks suggested that there was 
at least some prospect of a negotiated solution to the conflict. The grounds for a fresh 
attempt to secure an aid deal were thus in place, and on 9 April Strang wrote to Attlee 
recommending another approach to the Commonwealth, and authorising Bowker to 
tell the Burmese that their request for assistance was under `active consideration'. 
This would not commit the government to granting a loan, but it would encourage the 
Burmese and `clear the way for prompt action if the provision of financial aid has to 
be considered urgently'. 76 The following day Attlee wrote to the prime ministers of 
Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, suggesting that the time had 
73 Bevin to Attlee, 22 March 1949, F0800/441/30Bur/49/3, UKNA. 
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come for a formal answer to Burma's loan request. 7 What Attlee had in mind was not 
a firm commitment, but rather an indication `that the door is not closed if the political 
troubles are settled and if suitable conditions for financial help are established'. 
However, the UK's commitments elsewhere meant that it could not carry the burden 
of aid alone; would other governments then accept the principle that any financial aid 
for Burma should be shared? 
Again, the Commonwealth response was cagey. Australia in particular remained wary 
of any commitment; Australian opinion would not support assistance for Burma, 
Chifley told Attlee, and aid in any case would do little good. If Australia could afford 
to help anyone, it should be helping the UK, not a country that had `deliberately 
severed its association with the British Commonwealth and then, when in difficulties, 
came back to the United Kingdom for help'. 8 There was some merit in the Australian 
argument that Burma, having left the Commonwealth, could not be considered a 
Commonwealth responsibility, and had no claim on Commonwealth help. But this 
legalistic position had little force in Whitehall: Bevin and other ministers accepted 
Burma's withdrawal from the Commonwealth as an inevitable consequence of its 
prickly nationalist politics, and its constitutional status was not a major factor in 
decision-making. Whatever its formal relationship, Burma was a Commonwealth 
responsibility by virtue of its past links and its continued importance. The key issue, 
for the British at least, was the conditions under which aid should be granted, and the 
degree of Commonwealth engagement that could be obtained in its giving. 
"Attlee to the prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, nos 254,188, 
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A scheduled meeting of Commonwealth heads of government in London in late April 
1949, although primarily concerned with Indian matters, offered a fresh opportunity to 
revisit the problem. In the meantime, the Foreign Office pressed for a more open- 
handed policy towards the question of aid 79 Burma was, Bevin told Attlee, `too 
important a country to be allowed to collapse'. 80 Although `it is not difficult to find 
arguments against helping Burma', there was nonetheless `a very strong case on the 
other side': 
Burma has been faced with exceptional difficulties since the 
transfer of power. Many of her troubles are due to inexperience, 
the inevitable teething troubles of a new country. Our prestige 
will suffer if the Burma experiment is a failure. Whatever the 
shortcomings of the Government, there is no better alternative in 
sight. Communism, both internally and externally (China), is a 
real menace and Burma is too important a country to be allowed 
to drift into chaos, which would be followed by Communism. 
Burmese rice is essential to the well-being of South East Asia; the 
record of the government in promoting exports is good; and we 
cannot afford to lose the rice. 
Then there was `the Commonwealth aspect'. Commonwealth cooperation on Burma's 
`practical and urgent problems' may `pave the way for cooperation in other fields in 
South East Asia'. It might also counteract India's predilection fora form of 
regionalism based on `anti-colonialism and on neutrality'. Burma was, the paper 
79 Scott, minute, 23 April 1949, F0371/75697/F6049/1151/79G, UKNA. 
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concluded, `pre-eminently a case where, if anything constructive is to be done, the 
United Kingdom must play a big part 
- 
clear proof that we cannot be ignored in this 
area and, indeed, that without our participation (even initiative) little progress can be 
made with the major problems of the area'. `Good advice and sympathy', officials 
argued, was no longer enough: if Britain was to succeed in its general aim of helping 
Burma, it would have to give the Burmese practical assistance, `and we should make 
the necessary sacrifices to fulfil this policy. ' The UK should drop its insistence on the 
prior restoration of stability and resolution of the Karen dispute, should promise the 
Burmese interim assistance to tide them over, and should press other Commonwealth 
countries to adopt the same line and `share the burden'. 81 Details should be worked 
out in Rangoon through a `Commonwealth Joint Committee', tasked with 
coordinating financial and military aid. 
Ministers outlined their plans to Commonwealth premiers from India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and New Zealand at the London Commonwealth meeting on 27 April. 82 
Commonwealth countries should send a joint message to U Nu, telling him that they 
were ready to give the Burmese military and financial help `in their present crisis', 
and suggesting the setting up of a joint committee in Rangoon. They should also 
publicly commit themselves to assisting the Burmese, and should make another 
attempt to persuade U Nu to come to terms with his non-communist opponents. Both 
Khan and Nehru were broadly positive. Nehru told the meeting that U Nu had agreed 
to seek fresh talks with the Karen, and that only a small amount of military assistance 
could be enough to turn the tide against the communist opposition. He had, he told his 
colleagues, `a high opinion of Thakin Nu'; there was `nobody else in Burma who 
81 Scott, minute, 23 April 1949, F0371/75697/F6049/79G, UKNA. 
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could control the situation'. Khan too argued for prompt and generous help. ' U Nu 
was, he thought, open to Commonwealth financial advice, if sensitively given, though 
`it would be fatal to create any impression that Thakin Nu was dancing to the tune of 
the other Commonwealth Governments'. 
If the British were hoping for full unanimity they were, however, disappointed. New 
Zealand's Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, expressly ruled out his country's participation, 
arguing that assistance for Burma `would eventually prove as ineffective as the United 
States aid given to the Nationalist Government in China'. Chifley refused to attend the 
meeting at all, and told a Foreign Office official later that Australia would not 
participate in any Commonwealth financial or military aid. Khan was not impressed: 
`Consultation without cooperation. That's their policy. After all their talk that's all 
that happens. ' As for insisting on stability before offering help, `If I were Thakin Nu 
and people told me to restore law and order first, I would go and make peace with the 
communists. That advice is only another way of saying you don't mean to help'. 83 
Although the London meeting failed to secure the broad consensus the British had 
sought, the support of India and Pakistan at least ensured that the Commonwealth 
principle remained intact. On 30 April, U Nu was told that Commonwealth 
governments had agreed to support him, and were `accordingly prepared to do what 
they can to meet the requests which they have received for the supply of arms and 
military equipment. They are also prepared to discuss with the Burmese Government 
the possibility of financial assistance'. 84 Meanwhile, on 11 May, Bevin made his 
public announcement of the policy of Commonwealth aid in a Commons statement 
83 Scott, minute, 28 April 1949, F0371/75698/F6325/1151/79G, UKNA. 
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which emphasised the regional aspect of the Burma problem and the broader value of 
Commonwealth cooperation. 85 In line with Foreign Office advice, neither the message 
to U Nu nor Bevin's public statement mentioned political preconditions, nor did they 
say anything about the Karen. Privately, however, the British were convinced that 
Burma's future hinged on progress on the ethnic question. Since `a policy of sending 
arms and money will not restore the situation in itself, a renewed attempt was needed 
`to bring about peace between the Burmese government and the Karen rebels'. 
Without a `strong initiative', argued Bevin, Makin Nu's Government may well 
collapse and our declared policy of helping it will be stillborn. The atmosphere in 
Rangoon may be favourable to another initiative on our part now that we have just 
made our joint announcement about aid to Burma'. 86 A `basis for negotiation' existed; 
all that was needed was `to create an atmosphere of confidence between the two 
parties'. A fresh approach was judged worthwhile, and on 1 June Bowker and his 
Indian and Pakistani colleagues delivered a joint message to U Nu and his foreign 
minister, U Kyaw Nyein, offering short-term financial assistance, and suggesting a 
roundtable conference to discuss the Karen dispute. 87 
As before, the linkage of aid with political steps to end the Karen conflict proved 
unacceptable to the Burmese, and the offer was duly rejected. No outside mediation 
was either wanted or needed: the Burmese government was perfectly capable, `in its 
own way and consistent with the dictates of justice and clemency', of achieving 
85 Hansard, 11 May 1949, vol. 464, cols 1,828-1,830. 
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`peace and tranquillity in the Union'. 88 The roundtable proposal, U Nu told Cripps, 
was no more than a restatement of unacceptable Karen demands. `One thing remains 
clear, ' Bowker told Bevin in mid-June, `namely that in the present suspicious and 
hyper-sensitive state of mind of Thakin Nu and his colleagues there seems little more 
that the Commonwealth Governments can do to promote a settlement'. 89 There was `a 
deep-seated reluctance' to accept foreign aid `since the acceptance of such aid will 
mean some foreign interference and closer links with the Commonwealth. Opponents 
of aid may have been able to cash in on resentment over the Karen problem, and the 
Government, in unjustified optimism, have in their usual way decided to put off the 
evil day and hope that something will turn up'. Evidently, no further progress was 
possible: `we should accept this reply and drop discussion on aid; they will be along 
again before long'. 90 
The question of aid was raised again six weeks later, when UE Maung, U Kyaw 
Nyein's successor as Burmese foreign minister, took advantage of a visit to London to 
ask for assistance amounting to some £27 million: a stabilisation loan (£11 million), 
an advance for rice purchases (£5.6 million) and help with acquiring a stake in the 
BOC (£9 million), plus a new demand for £1 million to enable Burma to join the 
International Monetary Fund 91 Both the Treasury and the Foreign Office agreed that 
such a large provision was out of the question. Neither India nor Pakistan would be 
prepared to make a major contribution, which meant that the bulk of the costs of any 
assistance would primarily fall to Britain. It still seemed unlikely that Burma would 
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ever repay any assistance; indeed, on normal commercial criteria `no one would think 
of lending them a bean'. While it was still in Britain's interests to see Burma stable 
and intact, `it is clear they must eventually settle down on much lower standards all 
round than their experience of British days, or their inflated hopes for the future, have 
encouraged them to expect. They must learn to live within a comparatively small 
income 
... 
Large loans now would impede this salutary process'. 92 Instead of the £26 
million or so requested by the Burmese, Britain proposed a much more modest loan of 
£7.5 million in ways and means assistance, - disbursed in monthly instalments and 
drawn against Burma's blocked sterling balances held in the UK. Funds would only 
be released if scrutiny of the Burmese government's bank accounts indicated it was 
warranted. 
Bowker delivered the British proposal to the Commonwealth ambassadors' 
committee, set up after the London meeting in April, when it convened in Rangoon in 
August. Two months later, on 19 October, the committee reported its conclusions. 3 
The Commonwealth was `morally bound' to offer Burma some financial assistance, 
and should do so `as far as possible free from the restricting conditions which the 
Burmese in their present hyper-sensitive mood would be likely to regard as grudging 
or humiliating'. In particular, the kind of financial scrutiny recommended by the 
Treasury `would detract greatly from the psychological value of the loan and might 
even lead the Burmese Government to reject the offer of the loan altogether'. 
Commonwealth governments should extend budgetary assistance as far as their own 
financial situations allowed; the request for a loan to join the IMF should be given 
92 Glass, minute, 12 September 1949, F0371/75703/F13674/1151/79, UKNA. 
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`sympathetic consideration'; and rice financing should be provided up to the £5.6 
million the Burmese had asked for. 
Privately, Bowker thought the committee's recommendations profligate; the Sri 
Lankan and Pakistani members in particular were `obsessed with the view that it is 
essential for the Commonwealth countries to display most unreserved generosity for 
Burma'. But pressing a more stringent set of proposals risked splitting the committee 
and painting the British as `hard and ungenerous'. The agreed recommendations, 
Bowker thought, `at least represent a positive if limited act of constructive 
cooperation by the Committee, and the process of its achievement has certainly been 
educative'. Nonetheless, maintaining the wider strategic principle of Commonwealth 
cohesion did not in Bowker's view make the committee's recommendations any less 
of a tactical mistake. As he told the Foreign Office: `I should make it clear that I do 
not consider that the grant of financial aid to Burma will in itself lead to the 
restoration of stability in the country 
... 
The aim of the Commonwealth countries 
should be I consider to force the Burmese Government up against the hard realities of 
their country's financial position'. 94 
The question of aid returned to the Cabinet on 18 November, when it was considered 
again by the Economic Policy Committee. Ahead of the meeting, the official Overseas 
Negotiations Committee recapitulated the arguments. 95 Although Burma had managed 
to avoid the financial collapse that had threatened at the start of the year, ironically 
partly by refusing to pay compensation for expropriated British firms, the 
government's finances remained precarious, and there was little room for manoeuvre 
94 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 51,21 October 1949, F0371/75704/F16072/1151/79G, UKNA. 
95 `Burma: Financial Assistance', 9 November 1949, ON(49)368(Revise), CAB 134/567/368. 
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should projected rice earnings fall short. Nonetheless, the Treasury view was still that 
there was no clear-cut financial case for British aid. Britain could not spare the 
money; territories like Malaya had greater claims on what help Britain could afford; 
and Burmese actions in other areas, such as nationalisation, did not encourage a more 
helpful attitude. The Burmese refusal to accept conditions on assistance would also 
contrast unfavourably with aid practice towards other foreign countries, and even in 
relation to British colonies receiving UK aid. As before, the only economic argument 
in favour of assistance' concerned rice, but experience here had shown that, however 
chaotic the country's finances, adequate exports were maintained. Indeed, budgetary 
assistance could be counter-productive if it allowed the government to hold up exports 
in an effort to push up prices. Although not stated openly by the ONC, officials were 
also concerned that Commonwealth states did not have the will to pay for the more 
generous policy that their ambassadors in Rangoon had proposed. The Indian 
government, for example, had already made clear that its share of any assistance 
would be `extremely small'. 96 In effect, the UK would be bankrolling a policy pressed 
by others, but towards which it harboured significant doubts. 
The arguments in favour of aid were, as they had been from the start, political. 
Granting assistance would encourage the pro-British elements in Burmese politics; 
refusing it would weaken them, possibly fatally, and would significantly enhance the 
position of Burma's pro-communist politicians. Burma could not be `written off. And 
not all the omens were bad. Serious though Burma's political and financial situation 
undoubtedly was, it was better than it might have been, and the Foreign Office at least 
saw signs that the painful lessons of the early independence period were beginning to 
96 High Commission in India to the Commonwealth Relations Office, no. X1817,20 October 1949, 
F0371/75704/F15863, UKNA. 
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sink in. With the breathing space of a loan, they might penetrate further and deeper. 
As the Rangoon committee had pointed out, there was also a moral case. Burma had 
been led to expect help of some sort, and to refuse it at the second time of asking was 
both ungracious, and inconsistent with Britain's overall aims in Burma. 
Failure to help would also have a dangerous demonstration effect. Burma was `a great 
experiment in self-government by a former subject people, with the success of which 
our own prestige in the area is to some extent linked' 97 Granting aid to Burma 
constituted a practical opportunity to give demonstrable effect to the contention that 
the UK did indeed have a unique and central role to play in Asia, and remained 
committed to its future. Conversely, a, refusal to help implied the opposite 
- 
that 
Britain no longer possessed the will or the resources to play the leadership role it 
wanted to claim. The UK's wider objectives in Asia, in other words, argued for the 
approval of aid in principle. In practice, however, this did not imply acceding to the 
generous recommendations of the ambassadors' committee in Rangoon; and the 
Treasury stuck to its suggested figure of £7.5 million in ways and means assistance. 
The IMF loan should be rejected, and no loan would be advanced to finance Burma's 
interest in the BOC. 
The EPC approved the Treasury proposals at its 18 November meeting, and they were 
relayed to India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka a week later. The UK was proposing to pay 
half (£3.75 million), with the remainder divided between India (£2.5 million), 
Pakistan (£1 million) and Sri Lanka (£250,000). The British were also prepared to 
contribute around half a million pounds to a rice financing loan amounting to a 
97 Foreign Office minute for Bevin, 15 November 1949, F0371/75705/F17414/1151/79, UKNA. 
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suggested £3 million. Preliminary indications from the putative loan participants 
were, as before, discouraging: India, for example, while `anxious to assist in every 
way', could manage perhaps £1 million as a `token of goodwill and sympathetic 
understanding'. No reply at all was forthcoming from Pakistan or Sri Lanka `in spite 
of reminders', and neither Australia nor New Zealand appeared any more likely to 
help than hitherto. Meanwhile, Bowker baulked at the delay in reaching a decision, 
and questioned whether maintaining the principle of Commonwealth cooperation was 
sufficiently important to outweigh the need for a timely response. Whatever aid they 
eventually received would `certainly fall short of what the Burmese have asked for 
and the longer it is delayed the greater will be their consequent disappointment 
... 
it is 
now urgently necessary that Burma should be told without further delay what we are 
ready to give them'. 98 
Progress was little better in the parallel committee established in Rangoon to approve 
and coordinate Commonwealth military aid. The arms committee, set up like its 
financial counterpart following the London meeting in April, comprised the British, 
Indian, Pakistani and Sri Lankan ambassadors, ý along with Boume's replacement as 
the head of the BSM, General Bertram Temple. The committee was chaired by the 
head of the Burmese armed forces, Ne Win. 99 Involving Commonwealth countries in 
this way was intended to reduce the confusion surrounding Burma's multiple bilateral 
requests for arms. The committee was also intended as a means of sharing the political 
98 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 1,116,20 December 1949, F0371/75705/F19195/1151/79, 
UKNA. 
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and material burden of supplying arms. '°° In practice, it achieved none of these aims. 
The Burmese continued to seek arms outside of the committee structure; direct 
requests for more small arms were made to France and India, and in September 1949 
the Indian ambassador told Bowker that Burma had asked his country to provide five 
battalions' worth of equipment. 1°' Ambassadorial representatives lacked the 
competence to scrutinise arms requests effectively, while friction between them 
further hampered efforts to reach agreed recommendations. In November, Bowker 
informed the Foreign Office that the Pakistani ambassador was `constitutionally 
incapable of dealing with practical issues', a `pain in the neck' and `fearfully stupid'; 
getting the committee to work was `like trying to drive a motorcar through the jungle 
without a carburettor'. 102 Nor did the committee do much to encourage greater 
exertions from Britain's Commonwealth partners. Sri Lanka declared its interest in 
supplying arms to be `theoretical', while by the end of the year India was claiming 
that its capacity to do so was almost exhausted. 103 
Meanwhile, with no agreement reached on financial assistance, ministers decided to 
press the issue at the Commonwealth conference in Colombo, scheduled for 9-14 
January 1950. If others continued to delay, Cripps argued, Britain should go ahead 
with its planned loan of £3.75 million `without reference to the participation of other 
10° Foreign Office to Rangoon, 11 November 1949, FO371/75712/F16374/1192/79, UKNA. 
101 Foreign Office to Bowker, 5 June 1949, F0371/75709/F8339/1192/79G; Crombie to the Foreign 
Office, 16 September 1949, FO371/75709/F13981, UKNA. 
102 Bowker to the Foreign Office, 14 November 1949, F0371/75712/F16976; Bowker to Scott, 15 
November 1949, FO371/75712/F17712, UKNA. 
103 UK High Commission in India to the Commonwealth Relations Office, 15 December 1949, 
F0371/75712/F18993, UKNA. 
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Commonwealth Governments'. '04 Bevin duly outlined the UK's proposals at the 
conference's seventh meeting, on 12 January. '°5 India, Nehru reported, was having to 
cut its expenditure `drastically'; he could do no more than offer the £1 million already 
on the table. Pakistan too was in `some financial difficulty', not least from supporting 
a quarter of a million Burmese refugees on its soil: perhaps £500,000 might be 
possible. Sri Lanka, though positive, put no figures forward. The only surprise of the 
meeting was Australia, now led by Robert Menzies following Chifley's election 
defeat in December 1949. New Foreign Minister Percy Spender told the meeting that 
his government was `keenly interested' in South-East Asia. While for obvious reasons 
of proximity Australia's prime preoccupation was Indonesia, `they were also 
disturbed at the situation in Burma'. - Under the circumstances, Spender was prepared 
to recommend a contribution of £500,000. The total figure pledged at Colombo, 
including £250,000 promised shortly afterwards by Sri Lanka, 106 was thus £2.25 
million, some way short of the UK's target of £3.75 million. With the British 
contribution, Burma stood to receive £6 million, as against the £26 million-plus it had 
asked for the previous July. 
The Burmese were told of the Commonwealth's offer on 7 March 1950. Their 
immediate reaction was muted: neither enthusiasm nor undue disappointment, 
according to Bowker. Nor did the prospect of aid have much impact on the Burmese 
press, which evinced `little enthusiasm and scanty expression of gratitude'. 107 The 
government's formal reply, delivered on 21 March, was equally low-key. The amount 
104 China and South-East Asia Committee, 1" meeting, 2 January 1950, PREM8/1319, UKNA. 
105 Record of the 7`h meeting, Colombo, 12 January 1950, F0371/83151/FB1151/10, UKNA. 
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101 
offered was well below what was needed, provision in blocked sterling, rather than 
free currency, limited its utility and risked fuelling inflation, and the repayment period 
(set at two years) was shorter than the Burmese would have liked. Nonetheless, the 
loan would still be of `great relief, and it was accepted as it stood. 108 The loan 
agreement was finally signed in Rangoon on 28 June 1950. 
Conclusion 
In response to the growing communist presence in Asia, dramatised most obviously 
by Mao's victory in China in October 1949, British ministers and officials developed 
an ambitious set of regional policies designed to maintain the UK's influence, and to 
instil in the new, post-independence Commonwealth a shared sense of purpose and 
cohesion. In this project, Burma, though itself not a Commonwealth member, was cast 
as a key player: a common, shared problem around which Commonwealth 
cooperation could be organised. This process of Commonwealth engagement was, 
however, never easy, and at times counter-productive and incoherent; its results were 
unpredictable and ultimately much more limited than anticipated, and it was usually a 
source more of confusion than of clarity. 
Likewise, British attempts to support the Burmese government in 1949 and 1950 
failed to achieve the favourable political impact in Rangoon advocates in the Foreign 
Office had hoped for. This was partly because the Burmese remained unhappy with 
the political implications of the deal. In early 1951, U Nu told the British ambassador, 
Richard Speaight, that the loan and its `unpalatable' conditions had been `forced upon 
him'. Only the advice of his officials had persuaded him against rejecting it, and he 
108 Burmese reply handed to the Committee of Ambassadors by the Foreign Minister, 21 March 1950, 
F0371/83152/FB1151/65, UKNA. 
102 
had since decided not to make use of it. 109 Partly too, the immediate financial need 
had eased. In the year and a half it had taken to conclude the aid agreement, security 
conditions in Burma had markedly improved. For the first time in two years, river 
transport was possible between Rangoon and Mandalay, and roads had reopened 
between Rangoon, Mandalay and Prome. llo Burma, the British concluded, had 
weathered the storm: `the tide that was running out so fast in 1948 and 1949', wrote 
Bowker in July, `has certainly turned'. " As government control expanded into the 
countryside, tax revenues increased, while the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 
brought further benefits by inflating the price of Burma's rice. The area under rice 
cultivation increased by half a million acres in 1950-51, and Korea-induced price 
rises netted the Burmese exchequer an estimated £3 million in additional income. The 
Burmese budget for 1950-51, presented in September 1950, showed a projected 
deficit of £675,000, compared with almost £1.5 million the previous year, and the 
government's actual accounts registered an eventual surplus for the year of about 
£750,000. 
Burma's reluctance to accept British help was also a function of its still-fragile 
political relationship with the United Kingom. In some limited respects, the broader 
current of Anglo-Burmese relations seemed at last to be running in favour of the 
British. In March, for instance, a piece of unfinished post-colonial business was 
resolved with the conclusion of a double-taxation agreement, marking a small but 
useful step in the developing structure of relations between Britain and independent 
Burma. Following a short visit in April 1950, MacDonald reported `a greater 
109 Speaight to Bevin, no. 29,7 February 1951, F0371/93040/FZ1102/178, UKNA. 
110 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 282,24 July 1950, F0371/83107/FB1015/34, UKNA. 
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readiness in responsible circles to admit that Burma's interests lie with the democratic 
countries and that Britain is a good friend to Burma'. 112 At the same time, however, 
important sticking-points remained, over the status and function of the British military 
mission, the fate of British business, Burma's financial relations with the UK and 
British access to Burmese rice. The following chapter looks at how these issues 
affected Anglo-Burmese relations in the first half of the 1950s. 
't 
112 MacDonald to the Foreign Office, no. 436,10 May 1950, F0371/83106/FB1015/9, UKNA. 
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Chapter 3 
The decline of British influence, 1950-1954 
Before they quit Burma in 1948, British officials had confidently expected that their 
influence in the country would long outlast the transfer of power. Burma would 
continue to rely on British capital and British expertise in its economy, British 
financial aid and British political support; it may have elected to leave the 
Commonwealth, but this did not mean that the UK did not `retain a very special place 
in Burma as a result of her long and close association with the country and (we hope) 
the friendly and mutually satisfactory terms of the final transfer of power'. Some 
xenophobia was to be expected in the `first exuberant reactions of independence', but 
overall Burma's leaders understood the need for external backing `to assist their 
country to recover from the war and to avoid being sucked in by India or China'. As 
Burma found its feet, the country might perhaps have to rely on Britain less, but by 
then relations would have settled into `a position of instinctive friendship'. ' 
However else Anglo-Burmese relations in the early 1950s might be described, 
`instinctively friendly' they were not. To be sure, the picture that emerges during this 
period is not uniformly negative, and there were instances of cooperation and 
expressions of amity. But there were also unmistakeable signs that relations were 
entering a new, more dilute and perhaps more problematic phase. Burma's decision 
not to draw on the Commonwealth loan was one early indication that the country's 
leaders were prepared to distance themselves from past connections. In other areas, in 
financial relations or commercial links, for instance, or over the British military 
Murray, minute, `Future British Interests and Representation in Burma', 14 October 1947, 
C0537/3362, UKNA. 
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mission in Rangoon, U Nu and his ministers acted in ways that directly challenged the 
British, and against which the British had little retort. This chapter follows a set of 
issues = the Anglo-Burmese military agreement primarily, but also the status and 
ownership of the oil industry, Britain's commercial position, the question of Burma's 
debt to the UK and its rice supplies to Britain 
- 
to show how Anglo-Burmese relations 
developed and changed in the first half of the 1950s. The focus is on subjects that 
were more-or-less bilateral in nature, in the sense that they stemmed primarily from 
the conditions and arrangements of Burmese independence and, with the partial 
exception of rice, generally involved only the UK and Burma in their resolution. 
Military ties and the termination of the British military mission 
By the early 1950s, Britain's military relationship with Burma was in a state of some 
disarray. While the Burmese government's military position had certainly improved 
since the dark days of 1948 and 1949, it was far from clear that the thousands of guns 
and millions of rounds of ammunition that the British had supplied had had any 
meaningful effect on the Burmese government's military fortunes. In January 1950, a 
report on the political effects of arms supplies, produced by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (Far East) in Singapore, declared the political advantages to be `illusory', 
and argued that arms supplied to date had been `misapplied' and `wasted'? According 
to Foreign Office figures, since arms transfers began in 1948 Burma had received 
sufficient to equip the equivalent of three British army divisions; as the government 
had only one division's worth of forces, the report concluded that enough weaponry 
for two divisions 
- 
in effect two-thirds of transfers 
- 
had been lost, trafficked, given to 
2 'Political Implications of the Provision of Military Aid By the United Kingdom', report by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, 19 January 1950, F0371/84604/FZ1193, UKNA. 
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irregular forces or fallen into insurgent hands. Accounting systems were so chaotic 
that even the Burmese themselves did not know for sure what they had. 4 Writing in 
July 1950, one exasperated Foreign Office official asked how much longer British 
policy could `tolerate the confusion that covers our military relations with Burma'. 5 
Personal relations between British officers and Ne Win also remained strained. One 
assessment, produced in August 1950, concluded that the general was 'somewhat anti- 
British, unscrupulous, ignorant of army administration and generally unreasonable'. 
Speaight described him unflatteringly as `an ambitious, unstable and unscrupulous 
adventurer, out for himself and with little sense of true patriotism', `cunning rather 
than clever', incompetent militarily and with no cultural or intellectual interests 
beyond `women and gambling'. 6 There were persistent concerns about Ne Win's 
stockpiling of British-supplied arms; early in 1951, for example, the British learned 
that he had some 18,000 surplus rifles, with another 6,500 in transit from Britain. 
Whatever his motives 
- 
trafficking or preparations for a coup attempt were the 
favoured theories 
- 
the existence of such a large number of weapons in the hands of a 
single, and apparently less than scrupulous, individual was a source of some vexation 
in Whitehall, as indeed it must have been to U Nu, who may well have arranged for 
news of the size of Ne Win's holdings to leak in the first place. The larger the private 
stockpile Ne Win accumulated, observed the Foreign Office, `the more he will be 
tempted to make some nefarious use of it'. 
3 FORD note on arms supplies to Burma, 9 March 1950, F0371/83163/FB1192/14, UKNA. 
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Despite these difficulties, and despite the opposition of the supply ministries and the 
Treasury, the Foreign Office continued to attach political importance to the overall 
arms relationship. One official, referring to the rearmament programme then 
underway in response to the conflict in Korea, reminded his colleagues that it was 
important that the UK did not lose sight of its `small commitments' such as Burma 
amid the `major upheavals of policy' occasioned by the war. 8 The Bukit Serene 
conference of regional representatives held at MacDonald's residence in Singapore in 
December 1950 restated the need to meet Burmese requests deemed acceptable by the 
BSM, and noted that the delays that dogged the approval process risked doing 
disproportionate damage to relations with Rangoon. 9 Both Speaight and Temple 
remained persuaded of the political value of British supplies and of Burmese 
acquiescence in the continued presence of the mission, and both argued for Burma's 
retention of some form of special consideration in arms supplies. 10 Finally, in May 
1951, a tripartite military conference between the US, the UK and France in 
Singapore recommended that `everything possible should be done to improve the 
training and efficiency of the [Burmese] armed forces', and that `all possible steps 
should be taken to increase the effectiveness of the British Military Mission'. " This 
was important less for its content, which simply reinforced existing British hopes for 
the mission, than for its context; by making its recommendations in a tripartite forum, 
the conference introduced a measure of international interest in the BSM. Any 
8 Hilton Young to Coombes, 6 October 1950, F0371/83165/FB 1192/73, UKNA. 
9 MacDonald to the Foreign Office, 13 December 1950, F0371/83127/FB1052/6, UKNA. 
10 Speaight to the Foreign Office, 4 December 1950, F0371/83167/FB1192/121; Speaight to Dalton, 3 
January 1951, F0371/92167/FB1192/1; Temple, appended report, 28 December 1950, 
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11 Report of the Tripartite Talks Held at Phoenix Park, Singapore, 15-18 May 1951, 
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decision to alter the current arrangements could therefore no longer be considered a 
purely bilateral matter to be discussed only with the Burmese. The undertakings given 
at the conference meant that `it was very important from the point of view of our 
relations with the Americans and the French that we should be able to show that we 
were doing our best' to make the mission more effective. 12 
Thus, occasional complaints notwithstanding, there is little indication that officials 
had given up on the BSM, and considerable energy was expended in identifying a 
replacement for Temple, whose tenure as the mission's head drew to a close at the end 
of 1951. Temple himself, officials conceded, had perhaps not been the wisest choice 
for such a difficult and sensitive posting. One called him `something of a "flog the 
nigger" diehard'; 13 certainly, he displayed little sympathy for the Burmese officers 
whose training he was meant to be supervising, regarding them as unenterprising, lazy 
and easily-discouraged prevaricators culturally incapable of taking instruction: 
`anyone seen to be asking or taking advice is obviously admitting that his knowledge 
is NOT all-embracing and he therefore loses face'. 14 Perhaps a more junior officer 
was needed, and preferably one not from the army (Ne Win's service branch). The 
eventual choice, Air Commodore E. L. S. Ward, took up his post in April 1952, and 
duly set about trying to repair relations with Ne Win. His first interview was 
encouraging: Ne Win, he reported, had admitted that he had not got on with either 
Temple or his predecessor, Bourne, but `as far as he was concerned' he was quite 
prepared to forget and forgive and start afresh'. Greater openness over the state of 
Burma's weapons stocks was promised, and Ward was invited to look over the 
12 Murray, note of a meeting, 12 October 1951, F0371/92172/FB 1201/53, UKNA. 
" Olver, minute, F0371/92171/FB1201/20, UKNA. 
14 Temple, first quarter report, 3 March 1951, F0371/92170/FB1201/11, UKNA. 
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government's arms depots for himself. 15 This was, thought one British official, `quite 
exceptional frankness'. 
These positive changes encouraged a more forthcoming attitude towards Burmese 
arms requests. `We are convinced, ' argued the Foreign Office in July 1952, `that 
failure to give the Burmese at least reasonable satisfaction over their current requests 
for arms and ammunition will impair Burmese operations against the Communist and 
Karen insurgents and delay the return of the country to order and stability; and will 
lead to the crippling, if not the dissolution, of the British Services Mission, with a 
consequent marked deterioration in our relations with Burma. ' Any such deterioration 
would `weaken the anti-communist front in South-east Asia, just at the moment when 
Burma is beginning to show signs of climbing out of the slough of despond in which 
she has laboured since gaining independence'. Accordingly, `every effort' should be 
made to meet Burmese requirements `to the fullest possible extent'. 16 Fresh supplies 
- 
some 25 million rounds of ammunition, half a million hand grenades and a million 
mortar shells 
- 
were duly agreed in September 1952, and the following month Ne Win 
declared himself `completely satisfied' with British efforts to meet his needs. 17 He 
also asked for a significant expansion in the BSM's training capacity, and hinted that 
he expected it to stay in Burma for at least another five years. There was even talk of 
setting up a Sandhurst-style military academy in Rangoon. This was, officials thought, 
a development of `first importance': `All our efforts since 1948 to persuade the 
15 Record of conversation between Ward and Ne Win, 10 May 1952, F0371/101024/FB1201/17, 
UKNA. 
16 Scott to Ewbank, 12 July 1952, FO371/101021/FB1194/12G, UKNA. 
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Burmese to make proper use of the Services Mission seem now at last to have been 
completely successful'. 18 
Given these encouraging signals, British officials were caught by surprise when the 
Burmese government announced that it had decided to terminate its defence 
agreement with Britain and renegotiate a new one. In essence, the Burmese proposals, 
delivered in July 1953, sought to downgrade Burma's military ties with the UK, and 
to remove those aspects of the old defence agreement that did not relate specifically to 
questions of military aid. The BSM's activities were to be confined to training, 
thereby stripping it of its procurement function; its privileges were to be reduced by 
removing its diplomatic status and separating it from the embassy, and the UK was to 
be tied to supplying a fixed volume of arms. The new Burmese proposals also omitted 
the original agreement's injunction preventing the Burmese from accepting military 
missions from outside the Commonwealth, and its provisions covering staging and 
overflight rights for British ships and aircraft. 19 
All of these changes, officials thought, could perhaps have been expected. The 
Burmese had never liked having to work through the BSM to get the arms they 
wanted, an arrangement they had always considered patronising, and they had always 
resented the special diplomatic privileges members of the BSM enjoyed. `With that 
devastating combination of pride, stupidity and inferiority complex that so bedevils 
our relations with these people, ' Speaight complained, `they remain convinced that 
18 Speaight to Eden, no. 197,22 'November 1952, F0371/101025/FB1201/52; Olver, minute, 4 
December 1952, 'F0371/101025/FB1201/52; Scott, minute, 3 December 1952, 
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they are being treated as inferiors and condescended to. '20 The Burmese proposals, in 
particular the omission of the strategic elements of the 1947 agreement, were also in 
line with the broader evolution of the country's domestic politics. Following a set of 
rolling elections, a new government with a more left-wing complexion had taken 
power in March 195221 Although U Nu remained prime minister, the arrival in 
government of politicians of a more doctrinaire hue clearly was not likely to make 
Anglo-Burmese relations any easier. One of the more significant changes was the 
appointment as defence minister of veteran nationalist politician U Ba Swe, regarded 
by the British as a `crypto-communist and a party dictator, bent on steering Burma 
into the Stalinist camp'22 According to Speaight, `there are people in the government 
who would not be sorry to see the whole British position in Burma undermined'. It 
was `only a short step from wanting to get the British out to being ready to play ball 
with the communists'. 23 
Burma's new proposals for the BSM prompted fresh debate about the merits of 
Britain's military relationship with Rangoon. On strictly military grounds, officials 
judged, there was by now little value in maintaining the mission in Burma. Internal 
security had improved to the point where even sceptical British officials were 
beginning to accept Burmese claims that the war with the communists was, if not 
won, then at least winnable. 24 The conflict with the Karen too seemed to be 
descending into a desultory stalemate. Although rebellion continued in parts of 
Thaton, Salween and Amherst districts, the British were confident that the Karen 
20 Speaightto Salisbury, no. 146,30 July 1953, FO371/106708/FB1192/29, UKNA. 
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threat, so urgent in 1949, had receded, and by July 1953 Speaight was telling the 
Foreign Office that the Karen rebellion in the Delta had 'disintegrated'. 25 Emboldened 
by its successes, the government unveiled ambitious welfare reforms and development 
plans for education, health and housing, all of which spoke of a `confident, resurgent 
Burma'. 26 Doubts as to the permanence of this happy state of affairs persisted; 
MacDonald, for instance, considered the improvement in the government's position 
`perhaps more psychological than material'. 27 But these concerns were not widely 
shared, and officials were broadly, persuaded that the government had seen off the 
immediate insurgent challenge. 
The military arguments in favour of keeping the BSM were not, therefore, strong. Yet 
the British had always viewed the mission as primarily a political artefact: a tangible 
expression of continued British influence and interest in Rangoon. Here the arguments 
for retention remained as persuasive as they had always been. Withdrawing the 
mission, Speaight contended, would `stimulate anti-Western elements and be 
interpreted by our friends'as meaning that we are no longer prepared to make great 
effort to help the Burmese resist Communism. We should thus be giving the 
Government a fresh inducement to reinsure with Moscow and Peking'. 28 It was 
`axiomatic' that the BSM should stay, for strategic reasons, for reasons of `prestige 
and general influence', and to keep out `undesirable countries'. 29 Ministers agreed: the 
`balance of advantage', Prime Minister Winston Churchill decided, `appeared to lie on 
the side of retaining this link with [Burma's] armed forces'. Negotiations should be 
25 Speaight to the Foreign Office, 15 July 1953, F0371/106681/FB1017/5, UKNA. 
26 Minute, Olver, 18 July 1952, F0371/101002/FB1015/60, UKNA. 
27 Macdonald to Scott, 6 June 1952,13214/39/52G, F0371/101002/FB1015/51, UKNA. 
28 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 293,12 August 1953, F0371/10678/FB1192/37, UKNA. 
29 Clemens, minute, 5 August 1953, F0371/106708/FB1192/29, UKNA. 
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opened with a view to concluding a new agreement 30 
The British presented their counter-proposals to the Burmese on 30 November 1953, 
in the form of a new draft agreement. This retained the stipulation that Burma could 
not accept a military mission from outside the Commonwealth, rejected Burma's 
attempt to tie the UK to providing a specified amount of arms and maintained 
Britain's staging and overflight rights. 1 It was promptly rejected by the Burmese, 
who insisted that they were interested only in an agreement on arms supplies. Finally, 
on 31 December 1953, the British were told that the Burmese government was 
dispensing with the BSM. There was virtually no discussion of the British draft. Like 
so much else in Burma, complained the ambassador, Paul Gore-Booth, the Burmese 
government had acted with `sublime disregard of the international effects of their 
decision and any effects on our own feelings'. 32 The mission was finally withdrawn 
on 4 April 1954; it had lasted just over six years. 33 
The withdrawal of the BSM did not spell the end of Britain's role as an arms supplier 
to Burma; even as the mission was being wound up, the Burmese were discussing 
buying patrol boats, ammunition and training aircraft from the UK. Other requests 
included £4 million-worth of ammunition, £1 million of weapons and 22 tanks. Nor 
30 Cabinet, 51# meeting, 8 September 1953, CC(53), CAB128/26, UKNA. 
31 
`United Kingdom Government's Proposals for a New Defence Agreement with Burma', 20 
November 1953, BDA/P(53), F0371/106711/FBI 192/75, UKNA. 
32 Gore-Booth to Allen, 6 January 1954, F0371/111983/DB1192/13, UKNA. 
33 Burma was not the only former British possession to question its military arrangements with the UK. 
In Sri Lanka, there was increasing opposition during this period to the much larger British military 
presence there, concentrated at the naval base in Trincomalee. In a slightly different context, the British 
agreed in 1955 to transfer the naval station at Simonstown to the South African government. The 
transfer was completed in April 1957. Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez (Oxford: OUP, 
1973), p. 85. 
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did it materially affect British assessments of the overall importance of military 
supplies; government guidelines covering arms exports, revised in March 1954, put 
Burma on a par with the Commonwealth and NATO as a recipient of British weapons. 
Only Iraq and Indochina were ranked as high. 34 The termination of the BSM was 
nonetheless an important political defeat 
- 
the diplomatic equivalent of `a slap in the 
face with a wet fish', according to Gore-Booth. 35 Over the years, officials and 
ministers had fought hard to preserve the mission and make it work, and had never 
really questioned its strategic and political value, even if the military arguments in its 
favour had become increasingly threadbare. To that extent, the end of the BSM 
marked a turning-point in Burma's early post-colonial development. At independence, 
British observers, perhaps even senior Burmese politicians themselves, had half 
expected the new government to collapse. Six years later, Burma felt secure enough in 
its own interests to act directly against the wishes of its former ruler and probably its 
key foreign supporter, in the process breaking off an agreement that constituted one of 
its main surviving formal links with the UK. 
Commercial ties, rice and the debt settlement 
The second main area of concern in Anglo-Burmese relations in the early 1950s 
related to commercial, financial and trade issues. In some respects, Britain's position 
here was still relatively strong. Trade ties, though modest, were expanding; between 
1949 and 1953, British exports to Burma rose from £7 million to £20 million, and 
Britain was Burma's second-biggest source of imports after India. Burmese exports 
into Britain in 1953 
- 
mainly rice, timber, rubber and tungsten 
- 
were worth £8 
million, against £3 million in 1949. Trade was deemed sufficiently important to 
34 Johnstone, minute, 28 June 1954, F0371/111990/DB 1193/64, UKNA. 
35 Gore-Booth to Allen, 6 January 1954, F0371/111983/DB1192/13, UKNA. 
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warrant a special trade mission to Burma in 1953, and the Burmese made several trips 
to the UK to buy goods and services for the country's development programme. UK 
firms won several large-scale development contracts in pharmaceutical production, 
construction and railway rehabilitation, amounting to around £10 million-worth of 
business. 6 ` To the average Burman, ' reported Speaight towards the end of 1953, `the 
outside world still means Britain first and foremost, and there is an increased 
readiness to do business with us for the purchase alike of our goods and services. '37 
In fact, however, confident assertions of British primacy in commercial and financial 
matters in Burma were beginning to wear a little thin. While Britain was still one of 
Burma's primary trading partners, others 
- 
Japan mainly, but also Germany and the 
United States 
- 
were beginning to show an interest in the possibilities of Burmese 
trade. In 1953 alone, Burma hosted trade and goodwill missions from a wide range of 
countries, including India, Japan, Sri Lanka, Austria, Denmark, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia (which also sent a military mission in January 1953, perhaps contributing 
to the decision to end the British mission). In October 1953, the Burmese abolished 
the system of imperial preferences that had ensured favourable treatment for British 
imports, and introduced a single customs tariff that treated all goods on the same 
terms, whatever their origin. Clearly, commercial competition was going to increase. 
A set of long-standing commercial and financial questions also remained outstanding, 
including the status of British businesses in Burma, compensation for the 
nationalisations of 1948 and British and Commonwealth access to Burmese rice. 
36 United Kingdom Industrial Delegation to Burma, General Brief, February 1954, 
F03 71/111977/DB 1151116, UKNA. 
37 Speaight to Salisbury, 15 September 1953, FO371/106678/FB 1015/28, UKNA. 
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Although the question of Commonwealth financial assistance had effectively been 
closed by Burma's decision not to make use of the loan agreed in June 1950, other 
financial matters of concern to the UK, not least the repayment of Burma's colonial- 
era debt and its place within the Sterling Area, were still proving troublesome, and the 
Burmese were still treating British firms in ways that caused consternation in 
Whitehall. In May 1950, the dispute over compensation for the nationalised Irrawaddy 
Flotilla Company was finally resolved, but the compensation paid 
- 
£300,000 
- 
was 
well short of the company's expectations. Meanwhile, the absence of any progress at 
all over the teak concessions taken over in June 1948 prompted Bowker to issue yet 
another protest in early February 1950, accusing the Burmese of `active prevarication 
and bad faith'. A stiff rebuke, thought officials, but well-deserved: `the Burmese are 
all take and no give, and will exploit our friendliness and tolerance to the utmost 
degree unless we draw the line somewhere'. 38 A series of decisions by Burma's 
Industrial Court, further limiting capital movement in and out of Burma and making 
private firms responsible for the support of unemployed workers, did little to improve 
the country's appeal as an investment destination, while continued allegations of 
business complicity in Burma's various insurgencies only confirmed in official minds 
that Burmese politicians remained `fundamentally hostile to British firms as a result 
of political prejudice and ignorance of the facts'. 39 
Pressure on Britain's commercial presence continued throughout the early 1950s. By 
the end of 1954, laws had been passed nationalising British-owned plantation land, 
the Arakan Flotilla Company, a British-owned brewery and a bank. Legislation 
38 Bowker to the Burmese Foreign Minister, 11 February 1950, and Glass, minute, 23 February 1950, 
F0371/83188/FB 1464/1, UKNA. 
39 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 374,29 April 1950, F0371/83188/FB1464/6, UKNA. 
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allowing for the takeover of the Rangoon Electric Tramway and Supply Company, 
originally passed in November 1948, was also brought into effect. Whether the 
affected firms would receive the `equitable compensation' stipulated under the 
arrangements established at independence seemed as unlikely as it always had; the 
award for the Arakan Flotilla Company, announced in 1954, came to about a fifth of 
the firm's claim, a figure `so small as to amount to confiscation'. 40 As one official put 
it towards the end of 1953, `the ultimate aim of the Burmese Government as now 
constituted or as it is likely to be constituted in any foreseeable time, is to eliminate 
alien economic interests'. While `from the point of view of British commercial 
interests this is of course unfortunate 
... 
they ought by now to have realised that there 
is no means of reversing the process' 41 
Tensions also persisted over the status and future of Burma's oil industry, and the 
Burmese government's role in it: No decision had been reached on the question of a 
loan to finance Burmese participation in the BOC when the Cabinet discussed the 
question early in 1949, and the issue was shelved pending further official scrutiny of 
the request. A paper duly emerged from the Ministry of Fuel and Power on 28 
January, concluding that, while the BOC would probably have to withdraw if the 
Burmese proved unable to finance the share deal, any British assistance in that 
direction would have unpredictable consequences for the UK's oil interests elsewhere, 
notably in the Middle East, and would also encourage the Burmese to put forward 
similar joint-venture schemes in other British-owned industries. 2 In any case, the oil 
40 Cook to Patterson, 22 July 1954, F0371/111994/DB1461/5, UKNA. 
41 Pearn, minute, 10 November 1953, F0371/106678/FB1015/32, UKNA. 
42 MFP memorandum, `Burma Oil Company', 28 January 1949, F0371/75717/F4135/1531/79G, 
UKNA. 
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fields were in insurgent hands, and no large-scale production was feasible until at 
least 1951, and probably considerably later given the country's fragile security 
conditions. On the other hand, warnings from Bowker spoke of unwelcome political 
repercussions should the British refuse to help, for the regime and its capacity to resist 
its communist opponents, for relations with the UK, for British efforts to encourage 
settlement of the Karen dispute, and for the BOC itself, whose assets would probably 
be expropriated or looted should the rehabilitation programme stall 
. 
43 
Unable to decide what to do, ministers deferred the problem by granting the BOC a 
guarantee against losses in its rehabilitation programme up to 7 April 1949. By the 
end of March, however, a decision was becoming pressing, and the issue returned to 
the EPC on 1 April 1949 44 The Foreign Office view was that the BOC guarantee 
exempted the Burmese from their proper obligations, and should not be extended; `on 
balance, it seems better to take the decision now to discontinue the guarantee and to 
place the responsibility firmly on the Burmese Government for its failure to bring 
about conditions at the oilfields in which the Company can usefully carry out its 
work'. 45 Nor was there any financial or productive justification for the subsidy. 
Politics in the end decided the issue within the EPC: the Burmese government was too 
precarious, and its stability too important, to allow the subvention to be discontinued. 
Thus the British found themselves in the paradoxical position of subsidising the 
Burmese oil industry, while refusing to lend the Burmese government the funds that 
would allow it to participate in the industry's rehabilitation. 6 ` Profoundly distasteful, ' 
43 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 204,25 February 1949, F0371/75696/F2946/1151/79, UKNA. 
44 EPC 11th meeting, 1 April 1949, CAB 134/220/11, UKNA. 
45 Scott, minute, 30 March 1949, F0371/75697/F5342/G, UKNA. 
46 Ledwidge, minute, 25 April 1949, F0371/75717/F4037/1531/79, UKNA. 
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noted Dening. `Personally I would hope that the time will come - and come soon - 
when we shall decide to abandon what is a very expensive luxury. '47 
Despite strenuous efforts by Bowker to keep it going, the subsidy was eventually 
discontinued in January 1950, prompting the BOC to lay off some 7,000 workers. 
Under labour union pressure, the Burmese government responded by declaring the 
redundancies illegal, and referring the case to the Industrial Court in Rangoon. For 
good measure, the Burmese also took the opportunity to restate their view that foreign 
firms like the BOC, grown rich on Burmese resources under the British, now had a 
debt to clear with independent Burma. 48 U Nu was, the BOC reported, `very bitter'; 
the BOC problem was `the outstanding issue between Britain and Burma 
subordinating every other consideration'. 9 Meanwhile, security at the oilfields 
deteriorated, with sabotage and looting. At the end of January, a European staff 
member was robbed at gunpoint 50 The BOC was thinking of quitting Burma 
altogether. No wonder, remarked Rob Scott, the head of the South-East Asia 
Department (SEAD), given the `inequitable and inept legal harrying to which they are 
sl being subjected'. 
The dispute came to a head in June 1950, just as the Commonwealth loan agreement 
was being finalised. At the end of May, the Industrial Court ruled the BOC's labour 
discharges illegal, ordered it to continue paying its workers for at least another three 
months, and told it to review its decision to suspend its rehabilitation work. This was, 
47 Dening, minute, 29 April 1949, F0371/75717/F4037/1531/79, UKNA. 
48 BOC Rangoon to BOC London, 16 January 1950, F0371/83194/FB1531, UKNA. 
49 BOC Rangoon to BOC London, no. 36,19 January 1950, F0371/83194/FB1531/26, UKNA. 
50 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 72,30 January 1950, F0371/83195/FB1531/31, UKNA. 
51 Scott, minute, 7 February 1950, F0371/83195/FB1531/36, UKNA. 
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Bowker noted, `most unsatisfactory'. 52 Should the decision be confirmed, this would 
`make it impossible for industrial concerns in Burma to carry on, and reduce to a 
minimum any possibility of fresh foreign capital being invested in Burma'. 53 The 
Foreign Office saw in the decision the risk of `a major crisis in Anglo-Burmese 
affairs'. 54 The principle that workers should be retained whatever the circumstances 
was `obnoxious' and unacceptable. On the other hand, if the BOC refused to comply 
it would be acting illegally, and would probably decide to abandon Burma altogether. 
This the British government could not contemplate: it would involve the loss of some 
£9 million of British capital, plus the £1 million or so the government had spent in its 
guarantee to the BOC during 1949; it would weaken Burma economically; it would 
provide' an ideal opportunity for a `fierce wave of anti-capitalist propaganda which 
could seriously damage Anglo-Burmese relations and might even push Burma into the 
arms of Mao Tse Tung'; and it would do `great damage to all the British business 
interests and perhaps danger to the lives of British subjects in the oil fields'. It would 
also, notably, `expose HMG's policy of aid to Burma to widespread and serious 
" criticism in this country'. 
The BOC's departure would also spell the effective end of Burma's oil industry, an 
outcome certainly not in line with the UK's broader goals of economic progress in 
Burma and South-East Asia more generally. The consequences of `an unsatisfactory 
ending to this dispute might be so disastrous on the whole of our policy in South-East 
Asia that there are very strong political considerations for making representations now 
52 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 462,31 May 1950, F0371/83 198/FB 1531/89, UKNA. 
s' Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 464,31 May 1950, F0371/83198/FB1531/93, UKNA. 
54 Murray, minute, 6 June 1950, FO371/83198/FB1531/101, UKNA. 
55 Glass, minute, 7 June 1950, F0371/83199/FB1531/108, UKNA. 
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... 
it is therefore essential that we should bring our heaviest guns to bear while there is 
still time'. 56 Attlee duly wrote to U Nu on 21 June 1950 to express his `personal 
concern'. 57 Although the BOC referred its case to the Supreme Court in July, the 
dispute was not resolved until the end of October, when the Court ruled that, while the 
original redundancies could stand, the BOC was liable to pay `heavy compensation'. 
This was, officials decided, `as good as we could have expected'. 58 
The BOC's legal problems over its retrenchment plans made it abundantly clear that 
the oil industry could not continue under exclusive British ownership; some form of 
joint venture would in the end have to be established, for political reasons if nothing 
else. U Nu duly revived the joint venture idea in November 1950, and in January 1951 
the BOC was asked to prepare proposals for a partnership scheme. 59 As before, the 
Burmese were' thinking along the lines of a one-third stake. Speaight was optimistic 
that, this time, a solution would be found: the BOC had become `much more realistic' 
about the need for Burmese cooperation, while the government's more secure political 
and economic position allowed it greater latitude in facing down domestic opponents 
of foreign business. Hopefully, there was now an opportunity not only to establish the 
oil industry on a sound footing, but also to build `the foundations for a better 
relationship between the Burmese Government and foreign enterprises more 
generally, on which the country will be dependent for some years to come for its 
development to be effective' 60 
56 Ibid. 
57 Foreign Office to Rangoon, no. 453,21 June 1950, F0371/83201/FB1531/196, UKNA. 
58 Glass, minute, 20 October 1950, F0371/83200/FB1531/190, UKNA. 
59 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 94,24 November 1950, F0371/83201/FB1531/206; Speaight to 
the Foreign Office, no. 18,23 January 1951, F0371/92176/FB1531/7, UKNA. 
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The key problem remained who would foot the bill. Again the Burmese claimed 
penury: at the end of March 1951 U Nu wrote to Attlee, asking for a loan of £5 
million. Strictly speaking, Speaight reported, the Burmese had no case. At least £17 
million was available to the government, and there was no financial reason why it 
should not meet the costs of participation itself. 61 Herbert Morrison, Bevin's successor 
as Foreign Secretary, agreed, and wrote to Attlee advising that the loan be turned 
down, and the Burmese told to discuss any deal directly with the company. 62 This 
time, however, the issues at-stake extended beyond Burma, to encompass Britain's 
much more significant oil interests in the Middle East. In May 1951, the Iranian 
government of Mohammad Mossadeq had nationalised the BOC's sister firm, the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The British, having failed to browbeat 
Mossadeq into backing down, sought instead to paralyse the industry by withdrawing 
oil staff and taking legal action to prevent foreign sales of Iranian oil. Although partial 
control of the industry was regained following Mossadeq's removal in a British- and 
American-organised coup in 1953, the episode was acutely embarrassing; according 
to Anthony Eden, in opposition at the time of the takeover, it meant `the collapse of 
British power and prestige in the East'. 63 
Burma was no Iran, strategically, politically, or in terms of its importance to global oil 
production. There were nonetheless enough similarities to suggest that a positive 
outcome in Burma might have beneficial effects in Iran and perhaps elsewhere 
-a 
tangible example of fruitful cooperation in the oil sector, to set against Mossadeq's 
61 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 95,11 April 1951, F0371/92177/FB1531/25, UKNA. 
62 Morrison to Attlee, 12 June 1951, F0800/631, UKNA. 
63 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 159-63. 
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antagonistic approach. 64 Conversely, failure to help raised the unwelcome possibility 
that U Nu would follow Mossadeq's example and simply nationalise the BOC 
outright, leaving the British with nothing but a claim on Rangoon that was unlikely to 
be met. While in private U Nu told the British that he disapproved of Mossadeq's 
tactics, the Burmese pointedly asked for copies of the agreements governing Anglo- 
Iranian oil relations (the documents were not released). 65 As Hartley Shawcross, 
President of the Board of Trade, put it to Attlee, `there was so much to be said for the 
proposed association of the Burmese Government with the Company in respect of the 
oil operations in Burma that we should give at least some limited help if there was any 
chance of the scheme breaking down otherwise 
... 
we should look at the arrangement 
as one which might help avoid a recurrence of the situation in Persia'. 6 Faced with 
competing arguments, ministers compromised: Burma was offered a loan of £2.5 
million, with' the BOC making the other £2.5 million-worth of shares available in 
exchange for a tax refund. 67 
This was the position confronting Foreign Secretary Eden and the new Chancellor, R. 
A. Butler, as the Conservative administration took office at the end of October 1951. 
As in other areas of Anglo-Burmese relations, there was little suggestion that the 
decisions reached by Attlee's government would be substantially reversed; indeed, 
withdrawing Attlee's offer of a loan was rejected in part precisely because doing so 
would imply to the Burmese that Churchill's government was intent on changing the 
64 Minister of Fuel and Power to Attlee, 15 June 1951, F03 71 /92 17 8/FB1531/53, UKNA. 
65 Paul Scott, minute, 6 July 1951, F0371/92178/FB1531/46, UKNA. 
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general lines of policy that had shaped relations since 1948 68 Nonetheless, 
Churchill's ministers faced economic problems every bit as difficult as those that had 
confronted Attlee and his colleagues. At the same time, they lacked Labour ministers' 
personal ties with Burmese leaders, and their instinctive sympathy with Burma's 
socialist aspirations. For the Burmese, personal contact was a vital and living part of 
diplomacy, and U Nu and his senior colleagues felt themselves to enjoy a special 
rapport with the key Labour figures who had overseen the transition to independence, 
like Attlee and his Chancellor, Stafford Cripps. Although frowned on in the Foreign 
Office, senior Burmese figures regularly wrote directly to both to press a particular 
point, or argue a particular case. 
While the Conservative victory did not materially change the main lines of British 
policy towards Burma, therefore, it did bring to power individuals less familiar to the 
Burmese, and less in tune with the socialist lines of Burmese policy-making. While in 
opposition, Churchill and Eden had both spoken against British financial assistance, 
and in favour of the insurgent Karen; Churchill in particular had made no bones about 
his belief that the transfer of power to Burma had been a mistake, and that the Karens 
in particular had been abandoned by a British government over-eager to wash its 
hands of imperial responsibilities. Under these circumstances, Conservative ministers 
were unlikely to view the decisions of their predecessors uncritically, and Butler in 
particular sought to stiffen the British position. Any loan, he told Eden, would be a 
purely political gesture `against which there are powerful arguments of a practical 
kind'. While it would yield some political advantage, this was unlikely to be either 
`great or lasting'. As such, although the loan offer could not now be rescinded, there 
68 Olver, minute, 17 December 1951, F0371/92182/FB1531/143, UKNA. 
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was `a very' strong case indeed for not' making it easier than we need for the 
Government of Burma'. In particular, the British should resist Burmese pressure for a 
loan on anything other than commercial terms. 69 
Butler's arguments were given` added force by parallel Burmese attempts to ' defer 
repayment of the country's existing debt to the UK, which stood at some £27 million. 
Under the terms of the 1947 treaty of independence, monthly repayments were 
supposed to begin in April 1952 70 For a variety of reasons 
-a sense that the 
repayment terms had been unfairly imposed on Burma in 1947; a belief that the 
independent government was not responsible for debts run up by the previous British 
administration; dissatisfaction with the level of war reparations Burma stood to 
receive from Japan; and a conviction that the priority for Burmese spending should be 
domestic development, not external obligations 
- 
Burma was not willing to settle its 
debts, and in February 1952 the government formally asked if repayments could be 
postponed. 71 This the British government could not accept: Burma had a legal 
responsibility to meet its obligations, whatever the moral case, and had already 
benefited from debt forgiveness at independence amounting to around £15 million. 
Moreover, to concede the principle that independent regimes could unilaterally wash 
their hands of colonial debts would set a dangerous precedent in Britain's remaining 
colonies in Asia and Africa. Defaulting would also undermine Burma's financial 
standing internationally, jeopardising any further development loans. In short, while 
`the prospects of recovering the ` whole of these debts may not be good', it was 
`essential to maintain fully our position in principle. Every effort should be made to 
69 Butler to Eden, 29 December 1951, F0371/101035/FB1531/1, UKNA. 
70 Foreign Office to Rangoon, 6 November 1951, F0371/92166/FB 1153/4, UKNA. 
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persuade the Burmese to pay'. 72 If Burma defaulted on its obligations now, argued the 
Treasury, `it is difficult to believe that she has any serious intention of ever honouring 
them'. 3 
One possible solution to the debt problem was to offset at least part of what Burma 
owed against the country's rice exports to British colonies. Although by the early 
1950s Thailand had overtaken Burma as the world's largest rice exporter, the country 
still accounted for between a quarter and a third of the world market, and many 
British territories, Malaya and Hong Kong especially, but also North Borneo, 
Sarawak, Mauritius and Aden, still depended on imported rice to'meet at least part of 
their basic consumption needs. Burma remained the primary supplier to Sri Lanka and 
India; India alone imported some 860,000 tons in 1949, equivalent to about a quarter 
of the world's supply. 74 As we have seen, for British planners in post-war South-East 
Asia, rice was more than a foodstuff: it was a political and strategic commodity. 
Hungry people were unhappy people: `Rice is the staple food of South East Asia and a 
serious shortage in one country would, by upsetting the whole economy, have 
unfortunate political and indeed strategic results, which with the present rather 
delicate balance in South East Asia between the appeals of Communism and those of 
the democratic system, we simply cannot afford'. 75 According to the Commissioner- 
General's office in Singapore, should supplies fail British territories had between 
72 Treasury brief, 'Burmese Negotiations April 1952', 31 March 1952, F0371/101017/FB1112/10, 
UKNA. 
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three and six months' worth of rice stocks - insufficient to carry most through to their 
own rice harvests. 76 
Immediately after the Second World War, rice exports had been controlled by the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation under the International Emergency Food 
Committee, which allocated supplies according to each recipient's relative food 
needs. At the end of 1949, however, the Committee had been abolished, opening up 
the rice market and allowing major new buyers, primarily Japan, to bid for rice in 
what was essentially a monopoly trade dominated by the big two producers, Burma 
and Thailand. As a result, traditionally strong British buyers, like Hong Kong and 
Mauritius, found their purchases drastically reduced, and prices significantly raised. 
For the first six months of 1952, for example, the entire Burmese allocation to the UK 
and British colonies was 39,000 tons, against a request for 200,000; before the war, 
Malaya and Singapore alone had imported 250,000 tons, and Hong Kong over 60,000 
tons. Meanwhile, non-traditional customers like Japan and the Philippines were 
negotiating successfully for amounts running into the hundreds of thousands of tons. 
`I do not think', remarked a Hong Kong official, `any of the British territories can feel 
satisfied with their treatment in rice matters in Burma'. 77 
The British were further disadvantaged by Burma's tendency to dispose of an 
increasing proportion of its rice exports through open tenders, rather than via bilateral 
negotiation with the British government, and by its decision to set up its own 
brokerage machinery, thereby excluding the British firms who had for years handled 
the country's rice exports. Burma was also, for the first time, selling its rice for dollars 
76 `Report by Office of the Commissioner-General', 24 August 1950, FE(O)50/53, UKNA. 
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to other Sterling Area countries; in July 1951, for example, Sri Lanka bought $5 
million-worth. For officials in the Bank of England in particular, struggling with 
balance of payments problems in the early 1950s, this was a notable blow. According 
to one official: `It seems to us essential that the Burmese understand that one of the 
underlying principles of the sterling area is that one sterling area country does not 
accept dollars offered by another, and that they agree to follow the fundamental rule 
that trade between members of the sterling area takes place in sterling'. 78 
At the end of June 1952, Scott wrote to the embassy in Rangoon to see what could be 
done. 79 The reply was not encouraging. Representations and `visits to the Prime 
Minister', the embassy reported, would do little good, nor would formal negotiations, 
`personal busyness, journeyings to and fro and general intrigue'. Under current 
circumstances it was `so much easier 
... 
to think of something we want than to 
conceive what we might be able to offer in exchange and, as things are at present, a 
general diplomatic operation tends to grind to a halt with the realisation that nearly all 
the trump cards 
... 
are in the other person's hand'. Burma produced a fixed supply of 
rice, and the UK `and four or five avid and wealthy customers want that given supply 
for ourselves'. All were capable of making appeals `ad misericordiam, or to the 
greater glory of the anti-communist cause, and I am not sure that our case for 
specially kind treatment, whether in Hong Kong, Malaya or elsewhere, is necessarily 
stronger than that say of Ceylon or the Philippines'. Old colonial connections or 
notions of special influence, in other words, meant little: `the best way to have more 
rice than anybody else is to have more money than anybody else'. 80 The only real 
78 Heasman to Bell, 19 July 1951, F0371/93093/FZ1301/169, UKNA. 
"Scott to Boothby, 27 June 1952, F0371/99089/UES1301/61, UKNA. 
B0 Boothby to Scott, 17 July 1952, F0371/990921UES1301/79, UKNA. 
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sanction available to the British was to expel Burma from the Sterling Area, but this 
was rejected on the grounds that doing so would inflict unacceptable harm on 
Britain's own financial position. Once ejected, 'Burma would probably decide to 
conduct all its rice transactions in dollars; Thailand, the other main supplier, would 
follow suit, costing Sterling Area countries perhaps as much as $200 million. 
Financial retaliation on this scale was plainly unacceptable. `Burma, ' complained the 
Treasury, `is a classic example of the primary producer enjoying an invincible 
commercial position at a boom period 
... 
Burma sells products which we must buy 
almost, it can be said, in any currency and at any price. '81 The UK, complained 
Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton, was on a `very weak wicket'. 82 
In the event, the seller's market favouring Burma proved short-lived; by early 1953, 
as the Korean war drew to a close, market conditions had begun to swing against the 
Burmese; Britain's needs were more or less being met, and any notion of a barter deal 
linking rice with the country's debt was shelved. The debt problem still remained, 
however, and in October 1952 a Burmese financial mission arrived for talks in 
London. Although the Burmese made no attempt to deny their general obligation to 
repay their debt, evincing instead a gratifying concern for their future credit- 
worthiness, it was clear that no agreement would be possible without substantial 
British concessions. On 5 November the Treasury proposed a cut of 50%, reducing 
the debt to £13.5 million. Of this, the Burmese would make an immediate down- 
payment of £5.8 million, offset by £3.3 million owed by Britain to Burma's central 
81 
`The Possible Consequences of Expelling Burma from the Sterling Area', undated, 
F0371/93093/FZ1301/169, UKNA. 
82 Secretary of State for the Colonies to Hong Kong, no. 605,19 June 1952, 
F0371/99091/UES 1301/65, UKNA. 
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bank for currency redemption, plus the £2.5 million already offered under the joint 
venture plan. In effect, no money would change hands. The remainder of the debt 
(around £ 10 million, including the oil loan) would be repaid in 20 annual instalments, 
starting in April 1954.83 Although this represented an obvious loss to the British, it 
was at least better than the likely alternative, which was no deal at all; moreover, 
argued officials hopefully, `a generous and freely negotiated settlement of this kind 
should have a beneficial effect on our relations with Burma generally'. 84 
Burma's counter-proposals emerged in June, but they fell significantly short of the 
terms the British had put forward the previous November. Essentially, Burma was 
proposing to take over the £3.3 million the UK owed to the central bank, and would 
drop its request for £2.5 million for the joint venture. In return, the UK should cancel 
the remainder of the debt outright. 85 In effect, the Burmese had turned the problem on 
its head: at issue now was not Burma's debt to the UK, but Britain's debt to Burma. 
Speaight's view was that, poor though the offer was, the wider health of Anglo- 
Burmese relations argued for its acceptance. The question of a financial settlement 
could not safely be separated from other issues of concern to the British, not least the 
broader position of British commercial interests and the future of the UK's military 
ties. Neither, as we have seen, was secure. Outright rejection would `make our whole 
position here more difficult, by giving the impression that we do not appreciate 
Burma's difficulties, and are more interested in getting our money back than in 
helping her to her feet again. Our attitude would be exploited by the left wing 
83 Foreign Office to Rangoon, no. 415,8 November 1952, F0371/101019/FB1112/65, UKNA. 
84 Tahourdin, minute, 8 November 1952, F0371/101019/FBI112/66(A), UKNA. 
85 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 233,24 June 1953, F0371/106701/FB1113/8, UKNA. 
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socialists and the opposition would encourage the Anglophobe element in the 
government and administration'. 86 
Speaight's colleagues back in' London were, however, less impressed. In particular, 
the argument that a British rebuff would expose the government to extremist attack 
`was an old bogey which has been advanced by U Nu and his supporters whenever we 
have wanted him to do something which he did not wish to do'. 87 Further steps might 
perhaps be possible, but the `very generous concessions' already made left little room 
for bargaining. 88 Britain's counter-proposals, delivered on 18 August, sought a cash 
payment of £6.5 million, plus £3.3 million to take care of the debt to Burma's central 
bank. Thus, in the year or so since substantive negotiations began in October '1952, 
Burma's obligations had been reduced from £27 million, repayable over 20 months, to 
under £10 million, a third of which was essentially an invisible transfer of a British 
debt. Even this reduced demand was, however, too much for the Burmese, who 
responded with an offer of £4 million. 89 This was, Speaight advised, the best the 
British were likely get, and the EPC accepted it on 28 October 1953. Payment was 
finally made in early May 1954.90 
With the debt problem settled, albeit in Burmese, rather than British, favour, attention 
turned once again to the oil question. This had become a somewhat simpler issue in 
October 1953, when the Burmese had finally made up their minds that they did not 
86 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 239,27 June 1953, F0371/106701/FB1113/11, UKNA. 
87 Clemens, minute, 29 June 1953, F0371/106701/FB1113/11, UKNA. 
88 Foreign Office to Rangoon, no. 290,29 July 1953, F0371/106701/FBI 113/17, UKNA. 
89 Sarrell to the Foreign Office, no. 367,23 September 1953, FO371/106702/FB1113/5, UKNA. 
90 O'Regan, minute, 28 October 1953, FO371/106702/FB113/30(B); Chancery Rangoon to the Foreign 
Office, 12 May 1954, F0371/111973/DB1111/17, UKNA. 
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after all want British government help in acquiring a stake in the BOC. Lingering 
constitutional problems around ownership of assets, leases and exploitation rights had 
also been disposed of, and a survey of the BOC's holdings and future prospects had 
satisfied the Burmese government that the company was worth its £15 million 
valuation. On 12 January 1954, five years almost to the day after the Burmese had 
first approached the British government for help, the joint venture agreement was 
finally signed. 91 No British government loan had, in the end, been wanted. By happy 
chance, the joint venture agreement coincided almost exactly with Burma's formal 
notice that it was terminating the British military mission, and officials took it as 
welcome evidence that, in some areas at least, the Burmese still valued their British 
connections. 92 But it was also clear that continued British participation in the oil 
industry would be strictly on Burma's terms. While the Burmese had not pressed for a 
majority stake in the firm, settling instead for the one-third holding that had been on 
the table from the beginning, even BOC officials admitted that the deal represented 
only a stay of execution for Britain's oil interests in Burma, and that full 
nationalisation was in the end inevitable. 93 
Conclusion 
By the summer of 1954, some of the key issues that had dominated Britain's political, 
military and financial relations with Burma over the previous six years had been 
resolved. In important areas, notably the position of the military mission, the status of 
British business and the settlement of Burma's debt, developments had gone 
" Gore-Booth to the Foreign Office, no. 35,12 January 1954, F0371/111999/DB1531/2, UKNA. 
92 Tahourdin to Gore-Booth, no. 12,20 January 1954, F0371/111999/DB1531/4, UKNA. 
93 Gore-Booth to Eden, 13 January 1954, F0371/111999/DB1531/4, UKNA. The BOC joint venture 
was in fact wound up in January 1963. 
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decisively against the British. On other subjects, however, Britain's diplomats and 
politicians could point to some modest successes. Trade ties remained positive and 
political relations were generally cordial, if not exactly close. Most important of all, 
Burma had survived as an independent, non-communist state 
- 
no mean feat given the 
profound political, military, economic and social challenges the country had faced at 
independence. 
As they took stock of these changes, British policy-makers looked again at what 
Burma meant to Britain, and what British policy towards the country should be. The 
process began with a lengthy appraisal from Gore-Booth, dispatched to the Foreign 
Office on 21 July 1954.94 Admittedly, tangible British assets and interests in the 
country were not large. British economic and commercial interests amounted to 
perhaps £30 million, and Anglo-Burmese trade, while showing promise, made up only 
a very small part of Britain's global business. Britain's military presence in the 
country had been drastically curtailed with the removal of the BSM, and the UK 
generally faced growing political and economic competition from others, primarily 
the US, but also the Soviet bloc, Germany and Japan. At the same time, however, the 
UK still retained an important set of intangible interests in Burma, and the influence 
of British ideas, though weaker than it was, had not entirely dissipated. The question, 
Gore-Booth argued, was whether it was worth Britain's while to perpetuate that 
influence, or whether the UK should `assume a rapid decline to be inevitable and cut 
our efforts and our expenditure accordingly'. 
94 Gore-Booth to Eden, no. 154,21 July 1954, F0371/111969/DB1051/5, UKNA. This dispatch, and 
the discussions that it stimulated in the Foreign Office, are also discussed in Ashton, `Burma, Britain 
and the Commonwealth', pp. 83-86. 
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Gore-Booth's answer, unsurprisingly, was that the UK's connection with Burma was 
sufficiently valuable to warrant what he called `special efforts' to maintain it. Burma's 
rice remained crucial to British territories in Asia, and the country's retention outside 
the communist orbit was no less important than it had been in 1948. Indeed, by the 
mid-1950s keeping Burma for the West was if anything a more pressing concern 
following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the partition of Vietnam 
at the Geneva Conference in July 1954 and the installation of a precarious non- 
communist government in South Vietnam. While there was no prospect of Burma 
joining the Commonwealth, the country's links with the organisation were close, and 
Burma could perhaps play an important role in educating Commonwealth members 
like India about the dangers of international communism. The country was also a 
potentially valuable link between the Commonwealth and Thailand, Indonesia and 
Indochina. In trade terms, Burma may have been a small market, but it was still a 
useful one, and government plans to introduce conscription into the armed forces 
promised a significant expansion in arms orders, which the British were in a good 
position to win despite the ejection of the BSM. This was not, Gore-Booth argued, a 
question of sentiment or a nostalgic yearning for a predominance that had gone for 
good; whether Burma deserved well of Britain was `irrelevant'. What mattered was 
that, `from the point of view of expediency and the interests of the United Kingdom, 
Burma would appear to justify a special effort to keep her friendly to the West and to 
help her to develop the strength and sureness which will enable her to resist 
Communism'. 
Gore-Booth proposed no radical changes in British policies to meet these objectives. 
Clearly, some courses of action were impossible; substantially increased investment in 
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the country, for example, was unwise until such time as the Burmese had clarified 
their attitude towards foreign business. Nor could the British, still smarting from the 
expulsion of the BSM, contemplate a military commitment to Burma in the event the 
country was attacked. With the ever-present Chinese giant at their shoulders, Burmese 
leaders had since independence steadfastly maintained a studied neutralism in their 
international relations and, despite signs of increasing anxiety in Rangoon in the wake 
of Dien Bien Phu, U Nu and his colleagues had refused to join the US-led South-East 
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) when it was formed in September 1954, regarding 
it, as many other Asian leaders did, as unnecessarily provocative to the Chinese and 
an unwarranted Western intrusion into Asian affairs. At the same time, however, 
practical steps could be taken to enhance relations. More visits and delegations could 
be arranged, greater efforts could be made to improve and deepen commercial links, 
and what remained of Britain's military relationship could be preserved by keeping up 
contacts with anglophile officers in Burma's armed forces. Educational and cultural 
links could be improved, and Burmese politicians could be encouraged to meet like- 
minded socialist counterparts in the West. Finally, there was the question of `frills'; 
Britain may be much-impoverished, but there was nonetheless a level below which `it 
was not wise to look threadbare'. The ambassador's official car had recently been 
upgraded to a Rolls-Royce, albeit an aged one, and this had had a favourable effect on 
his standing `which I should not have believed if I had not experienced it'. 
Gore-Booth's 16-page analysis stimulated considerable discussion inside the Foreign 
Office. On the whole, officials were not persuaded that Burma did indeed merit more 
energetic diplomatic or political engagement. Gore-Booth was right that keeping 
Burma 
- 
or, more accurately, its rice 
- 
out of communist hands was an important 
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objective, and the UK's propaganda machinery could do much to stiffen resolve by 
reminding the Burmese of the realities of life under communist rule. Beyond that, 
however, there was little that Britain could do to preserve what was left of its position. 
The UK's influence was bound to decline as the period of British rule receded, 
whatever policies were pursued; the challenge lay, not in reversing this process, but in 
adapting thinking to it. 95 Given the multifarious demands facing Britain in the world 
in the mid-1950s, a valuation of Burma's importance in Gore-Booth's intangible 
terms was not good enough: Burma's importance had to be weighed in material terms, 
and on that basis officials saw little to justify its elevation to a position of special 
concern. 96 Thus, while `we may hope that Burma will settle down as a stable 
democratic state and will remain friendly towards this country, she cannot be regarded 
as being of the first importance to us'. 7 In this way, the British concluded that their 
days as the paramount outside power in Burma had ended. The real question now was 
whether the niche they had vacated would be filled by the Americans, or by the 
communists in Beijing and Moscow. 
95 Minute, MacCleary, 24 August 1954, F0371/111969/DB105115, UKNA. 
96 Minute, Paterson, 3 January 1955, F0371/111969/DB1051/5, UKNA. 
97 Allen to Gore-Booth, 21 January 1955, F0371/111969/DB1051/5, UKNA. It is perhaps suggestive 
of Burma's waning importance to British planners that Gore-Booth's dispatch languished for several 
months in a dusty Foreign Office cupboard before being rediscovered in December 1954, partly 
explaining the six-month delay in answering it. Paterson, minute, 3 January 1955, F0371/111969, 
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Chapter 4 
The China crisis and the beginnings of American aid, 1948-1952 
At Burma's independence in 1948, the US possessed few compelling ties with the 
country aside from the local educational and religious links formed through a century 
and a half of Baptist missionary work. ' US troops had fought in Burma during the 
Second World War, but their main aim was to open a land route to China rather than 
liberate Rangoon, and the Burma campaign was in any case always a distant second to 
the much more significant conflict in the Pacific. Burma had fallen, the Americans 
felt, through British ineptitude and arrogance, and the Burmese themselves scarcely 
merited rescuing from the Japanese. ` I have never liked the Burmese, ' US President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt told Churchill in April 1942, `and you people must have had a 
terrible time with them for the last 50 years. Thank the Lord you have He-Saw, We- 
Saw, You-Saw under lock and key. I wish you could put the whole bunch of them into 
a frying pan with a wall around it and let them stew in their own juice. i2 
American interest in Burma's affairs did not appreciably increase once the war was 
over. Although Washington exerted some pressure on the British to press forward 
with their plans for independence, and welcomed it when it came, the US had few if 
any important political, economic or trading interests in the country. As if to 
1 John F. Cady, The United States and Burma (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
American missionary assets in Burma were valued at more than $20 million. Much of this property was 
requisitioned by the Burmese after independence. 'Burma', 16 June 1950, Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS), 1950, vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington DC: USGPO, 1976), p. 237. 
2 Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941- 
1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 6. By 'He-Saw, We-Saw, You-Saw', Roosevelt 
meant the former Burmese prime minister U Saw, who spent the war in a Ugandan jail as punishment 
for his illicit contacts with the Japanese. 
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demonstrate the point, America's first ambassador to Burma, J. Klahr Huddle, was 
away from his post for months at a stretch serving on the UN commission on Kashmir 
- 
although given Huddle's undiplomatic opinion of the Burmese, his prolonged 
absences were perhaps a blessing in disguise. 3 For the US administration, thinking in 
Asia was preoccupied fundamentally by the far more potent communist challenge in 
China, the demands of reconstruction in Japan and the Dutch and French colonial 
crises in Indonesia and Indochina. Burma was a minor concern, its problems 
seemingly intractable, its prospects bleak and any meaningful improvement years, if 
not generations, away. 4 
This lack of attention for Burma within the American foreign policy-making 
establishment was part of a wider neglect of South-East Asia as a whole. To be sure, 
Dutch difficulties in Indonesia and the travails of the French in Indochina attracted 
important attention within the State Department, but this concern did not encourage 
extensive US engagement with the many and complex political and economic 
problems South-East Asia contained. Like the British, the Americans faced far more 
pressing strategic, economic and political challenges in the defence and reconstruction 
of Europe; unlike the British, they did not possess long-standing relations with South- 
3 Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots of Commitment (New York: Thomas Y 
Crowell Company, 1974), p. 102. Burmese politicians, Huddle told the State Department in May 1948, 
were unreasonably suspicious of foreigners, took decisions 'impulsively and on the spur of the 
moment, without due consideration of the results' and were generally ignorant, inexperienced and 
lacking in confidence. Huddle was also unimpressed by the way the Burmese were handling the 
British. While relations with the United States were progressing with `reasonable satisfaction, 
everything considered', Burma's attitude towards Britain was `a little like that of a truculent child who 
habitually kicks his father in the shins though dependent on him for support'. Huddle to the Secretary 
of State, 25 May 1948,845C. 00/5-2548, CDF, box 6120, RG59, US National Archives (USNA), 
College Park, MD. 
4 Huddle to the Secretary of State, 8 November 1949,845C. 00/1 1-849, CDF, box 6121, RG59, USNA. 
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East Asia outside of the Philippines, and regarded the region's difficulties, as they did 
Burma's, as primarily a European responsibility. As one historian of the period puts it, 
`The United States could perhaps reshape Japan as it wished, but it had no control 
over Southeast Asia. It essentially had no policy there'. 5 
Why and how the US filled this policy void has been well explored, particularly by 
US writers interested in the roots of America's later entanglements in Vietnam. 
Andrew Rotter, for example, has shown how the communist victory in China during 
1949 refocused US attention on China's vulnerable neighbours to the south. 6 South- 
East Asia's raw materials and markets were assuming a greater importance in US 
plans for Japan's economic rehabilitation, while Malaya's dollar-earning potential 
was increasingly recognised as crucial to Britain's post-war economic recovery. These 
concerns prompted a flurry of analytical and policy-making activity. Working groups 
were formed in Washington, and fact-finding missions were dispatched to examine 
the prospects for South-East Asian aid. By the end of 1949, the US had redefined its 
Asia policy in the shape of NSC 48, `The Position of the United States with Respect 
to Asia', a blueprint for the containment of communism and a programme of political, 
economic and military assistance. By mid-1950, economic and military aid had been 
approved for Indonesia, Indochina and Thailand. 
Although Indochina became the primary focus of American interest in South-East 
Asia, there were also important ancillary implications for the region's lesser states, 
including Burma. Beginning in September 1950, Burma received US assistance and 
s Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 46. 
6 Ibid. 
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advice, valuable commodities in their own right, and important politically since 
American help was, to some extent at least, free from post-colonial stigma. America's 
deeper engagement in South-East Asia also had important implications for Britain's 
position, and for its aspirations to regional leadership. The British accepted that US 
resources were essential to their plans for regional development; Strang, for example, 
argued in early 1949 that American wealth was `indispensable' to the success of any 
Western efforts in South-East Asia, and he and his colleagues expended considerable 
energy trying to convince the Americans to take greater interest in South-East Asian 
affairs. 7 At the same time, however, America's emergence as an actor in South-East 
Asia explicitly challenged Europe's long-standing primacy there. As one writer puts 
it, American policy-makers came to believe that `it was now their turn to offer 
leadership in Asia, with all the political and commercial advantages that this might 
bestow'. 8 
The regional context: Britain and US planning in South-East Asia 
Just before Christmas 1948, Britain's ambassador in Thailand, Geoffrey Thompson, 
decided to get some things off his chest in a long memorandum to the Foreign Office 
entitled `Siam and the Communist Threat to South East Asia'. 9 ` It is clear, ' he wrote, 
`that the frontiers of Malaya are on the MEKONG and that if we desire to establish a 
bastion against Communism in this area then we must be ready to give very 
substantial help to Siam. ' This help would have to be provided in conjunction with the 
United States. However, `signs of American assistance to Siam are so far meagre', 
7 
`Sir William Strang's Tour in South-East Asia and the Far East', 27 February 1949, 
F0371/76028/F4447/1051/61, UKNA. 
8 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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and where the Americans were forthcoming, `they are in competition with or 
encroaching on British interests': 
Since the end of the war they have suffered here in particular from a 
growing sense of frustration and irritation because they have not 
succeeded in ousting British influence either political or economic and 
supplanting it with their own. This Anglo-American rivalry, which 
derives primarily from the American disappointment with our 
commercial comeback, must go if we are to make a good job of 
strengthening this country. If the United States of America will not work 
with us, it should at least be guaranteed that they will not work against 
us. 
Here in a nutshell was the problem facing British policy-makers in South-East Asia in 
the late 1940s: how could the vital engagement of the US be secured, and how could 
this engagement be managed so that it supported, rather than challenged, Britain's 
ambitions to regional leadership in South-East Asia? '° 
Early' signs, as Thompson had noted, were not encouraging. In the spring of 1948, 
Dening had been dispatched to Washington with a brief to widen Anglo-American 
discussion of Asia to encompass South-East Asian affairs, only to find that `State 
10 For a fuller discussion of Anglo-American exchanges on South-East Asia in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, see Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions 
and the Cold War (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 144-184. British efforts to attract 
American attention to South-East Asia are also discussed in Mark A. Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: 
Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2005). 
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Department planners have not yet gone into any detail on the broader range of Far 
Eastern policy'. " The following January, with British forces in action against the 
communists in Malaya, the Foreign Office tried stimulating American interest via an 
assessment of the impact of events in China on the Far East and South-East Asia. 12 
What the British called `desultory exchanges' with State Department officials duly 
followed, but these revealed only continued US caution over any public commitment. 
The State Department's response to the British paper on China, delivered in March, 
ruled out US material aid, and warned the British against encouraging South-East 
Asia to expect any; outside assistance `may appear an easy and politically painless 
solution, [but] it can in no way take the place of soundly conceived measures of self- 
help. Quite apart from the heavy burden which would be placed on the American 
people, experience in China has shown that the extension of external aid under certain 
circumstances is not an effective means for encouraging a country to face squarely its 
problems with the determination to help itself. 13 Having `had their fingers burnt in 
China', concluded one British official, the Americans were `unwilling to risk burning 
them further in South-East Asia'. '4 
Discussions resumed in April, when Bevin and Acheson touched on South-East Asian 
problems during Bevin's trip to Washington to sign the Atlantic Pact, but little 
concrete emerged beyond a general agreement that both sides wanted to `clean things 
"Sargent to Wright, no. 2,183,10 May 1948, F0371/69926/F6803/G, UKNA. 
12 `Recent Developments in the Civil War in China', 9 December 1948, CP(48)299, CAB129/31/CP, 
UKNA. 
13 Washington to the Foreign Office, no. 114,18 March 1949, CAB 134/287/FE(O)(49)16,4 April, 
1949, UKNA. 
14 Graves to Scarlett, 7 February 1949, no. G47/49, F0371/76003/F2415; Scott, minute, 5 May 1949, 
F0371/76004/F5735/1017/61G; Dening to Syers, 18 March 1949, F0371/76023/F4486, UKNA. 
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up' there. 15 In another attempt to excite American interest, a second paper outlining 
British thinking was left with Acheson at the end of Bevin's meeting. In its emphasis 
on the need for Asian self-help, its downplaying of the potential costs of engagement 
to the US and its strategic linkage of South-East Asia with primary US geopolitical 
interests in the Middle East and Europe, the paper was clearly drafted to appeal to key 
American concerns. While the `strategic necessities' of Europe and the Middle East 
should have priority, the paper concluded, South-East Asia's needs were of `vital 
importance': `We should therefore, parallel with our efforts in Europe and the Middle 
East, do our utmost to encourage a spirit of cooperation and self-reliance in South- 
East Asia with a view to the creation of a common front against Russian expansion in 
that area'. 16 Again, however, there was little American reaction `beyond a general 
assent to the proposition that a spirit of cooperation and self-reliance should be 
encouraged'. 17 As one discouraged official put it, in response to articles in the British 
press speculating about possibly expanded US interest in South-East Asia: `One day 
the Americans may wake up to the fact that they, as well as ourselves, ought to do 
something about South-East Asia, but until then I fear we can only make pious 
references in our dealings with the press to the desirability of Anglo/US solidarity in 
all parts of the world'. 18 
Inconclusive conversations on South-East Asia continued on and off throughout the 
latter half of 1949. In June, during a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris, 
Acheson told Bevin that he thought it `very important that our two Governments 
13 Memorandum of conversation, by the Secretary of State, 4 April 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 6, The Near 
East, South Asia and Africa (Washington DC: USGPO, 1977), pp. 50-54. 
16 `Brief on South-East Asia and the Far East', 23 March 1949, F0371/76023/F4487/G, UKNA. 
17 Graves to Dening, 16 April 1949, no. G47/37/49, F0371/76023/F5743, UKNA. 
18 Lloyd, minute, 11 June 1949, F0371/76034/F8357/1073/61, UKNA. 
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should work together in South East Asia', and vouchsafed that the State Department 
was studying the problem. However, while `entirely sympathetic 
... 
he did not 
commit himself about a public declaration in support of our policy'. 19 Fresh talks in 
Washington in September evinced stronger interest, but this was still not enough to 
guarantee meaningful American assistance. 20 Nor, despite Dening's strenuous efforts 
at official level (he had, he reported, talked himself `almost to a standstill 21), did the 
State Department accept the Foreign Office view that South-East Asia's economic 
development must precede political change. The US was `fully aware of the 
importance of the economic factor in Southeast Asia', Dening was told, but officials 
were not convinced that `a solution of the economic problems of the area was a 
general panacea for the general instability which has afflicted it'. Until the region's 
political problems were resolved, it was `difficult to accept the desirability of 
extending economic and financial assistance'. 2 
Publicly, American officials refused to be drawn on South-East Asia. Privately, 
however, thinking on the region was gathering pace in line with the ever-worsening 
news coming out of China. By late 1948, American officials had all but given up on 
Chiang Kai Shek and his Nationalist regime. Communist armies in northern China 
secured Manchuria in November 1948, and Beijing was seized in January 1949. To 
the south, in one of the decisive battles of the civil war, Nationalist armies were 
routed, and some 600,000 troops killed. Complete communist victory, reported John 
19 Bevin to Attlee, no. 33,1 June 1949, F0800/462/FE/49/10, UKNA. 
20 Dening to MacDonald, 1 October 1949, F0371/76032/F14256/1072/61G, UKNA. 
21 Dening to Strang, 15 September 1949, F0371/76024/F14149, UKNA. 
22 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth), 12 
September 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, The Far East and Australasia, part 2 (Washington DC: USGPO, 
1976), p. 1,198. 
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Leighton Stuart, America's ambassador to Nationalist China, was 'inevitable'. 3 
According to George Kennan, the head of the State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff (PPS): `The disappearance of the Chinese Nationalist Government, as now 
constituted, is only a matter of time and nothing that we can realistically hope to do 
will save it'. 24 Harry Truman's administration maintained its support for the 
Nationalist regime, and continued to send it economic and military aid, largely to 
counter Republican charges that Chiang had failed through lack of US help, rather 
than his own venality, incompetence and lack of popular appeal. Behind the scenes, 
however, officials began to take stock of the implications of a communist China for 
American interests elsewhere in Asia, including in the countries to China's south. 
Chinese communism, like Soviet communism before it, had to be contained. Since the 
end of the war, American policy-makers had by and large regarded South-East Asia as 
a European colonial problem, and had framed their policies accordingly. Now, with 
massive communist armies encamped on the region's borders, this passive posture no 
longer seemed enough. 
Kennan's PPS addressed itself to the problem in March 1949, in a paper entitled 
`United States Policy toward Southeast Asia' (known as PPS 51). 25 This began by 
outlining the region's importance to the West as a source of strategic raw materials, 
and as a link in global communications. South-East Asia, the paper argued, 
represented a `vital segment on the line of containment'; its loss to communism would 
23 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 24. 
24 Ibid., p. 28. 
25 For a fuller discussion of PPS 51, see Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, pp. 76-78; Gary R. Hess, The 
United States' Emergence as a South-East Asian Power, 1940-1950 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), pp. 337-40; and Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American 
Foreign Policy, 1947-S0 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 275-76. 
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constitute `a major political rout the repercussion of which will be felt throughout the 
rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and a then critically exposed 
Australia'. 26 To prevent this, the paper recommended American pressure on the Dutch 
and the French to moderate their colonial policies, and urged steps to encourage 
collaboration among the region's non-communist states. What was needed was `a 
constructive overall approach to the region as a whole', involving the US in a 
multilateral relationship with the French and the Dutch, the Commonwealth and the 
Philippines. Thailand should be strengthened, British authority in Malaya supported 
and the Philippines encouraged to play an `active and constructive role'. 7 Efforts 
should also be made to supplement American private investment in South-East Asia 
with US government aid. A second PPS paper, entitled `Suggested Course of Action 
in East and South Asia', followed in July. 28 With the US failure in China, American 
policy required `a change of climate' to win the support and confidence of US voters, 
and to improve what the paper called the `psychological atmosphere' in Asia, an 
atmosphere which was becoming `surcharged with nervous apprehension'. America 
should institute `comprehensive and closely-timed actions on a wide front', ranging 
from efforts to win domestic political backing for a more assertive US posture in Asia 
to the conclusion of a defence treaty with Australia and the Philippines and the 
signature of a peace treaty with Japan, all by October 1949. 
PPS 51 was accepted within the State Department, and several of the detailed 
recommendations contained in the July paper were carried through. In August, for 
instance, the US released over $40 million-worth of Japanese-held gold to Thailand as 
26 Hess, The United States' Emergence as a South-East Asian Power, p. 336. 
27 PPS 51,29 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, part 2, p. 1,128-1,133. 
28 'Suggested Course of Action in East and South Asia', 7 July 1949, ibid., p. 1,148. 
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payment for war-incurred expenses, a move advocated by the PPS as part of efforts to 
bolster the Thai government 29 While Acheson was sympathetic to the arguments of 
the PPS, its papers did not, however, prompt an immediate change in broader US 
strategy. Instead, Acheson opted for further preparatory work by commissioning a 
team of external consultants to explore the options for an American Asia policy. Like 
the PPS, Acheson's consultants, headed by Philip Jessup, a Columbia University 
academic, agreed that the situation in South-East Asia was grave, and that US 
interests were threatened there. 30 Again like the PPS, and indeed like the British, 
Jessup's team viewed South-East Asia as a coherent unit, with common problems; US 
policy and planning should therefore be framed so as to address the region as a whole. 
South-East Asia's states were weak and vulnerable, and required both moral and 
material help, with the cooperation and partnership of Britain and the Asian 
Commonwealth states. In formulating its policies, Jessup argued, the US `should 
emphasize and develop common action in and among the non-Communist nations of 
the area'. In particular, Jessup urged US pressure on India, Australia and New 
Zealand to persuade them to take greater responsibility for South-East Asia's welfare 
and stability. 31 
Other areas of the US government were also showing signs of interest in South-East 
Asia. In June 1949, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson asked staff in the National 
29 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 78. 
30 `Recommended Steps toward Meeting Situation in Far East', Memorandum to the Secretary of State, 
29 August 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, part 2, p. 1,195; Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 118. 
31 Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State, 16 November 1949, 
ibid., pp. 1,209-1,214. 
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Security Council (NSC) for a comprehensive appraisal of US policy in Asia 32 
Between August and October, NSC analysts developed a 40-page study calling for 
robust US action. Moscow, the draft claimed, was intent on building up its own 'Co- 
Prosperity Sphere', working through proxies in China and, if it should fall to the 
communists, Taiwan. To counter this threat, the NSC paper called for the deployment 
of Japanese technical expertise in South-East Asia, to replace the departing 
Europeans, a renewed campaign against Chinese communism, and a fresh 
commitment to the defence of Taiwan. Through the `aggressive and effective' 
backing of `indigenous forces', the United States could begin the `rollback of Soviet 
control'. Trade with China should be halted, private contacts banned and US control 
established over Taiwan. 33 
In their focus on China, and their calls for an aggressive policy against the new 
communist regime there, the NSC's proposals went significantly beyond State 
Department thinking, and Acheson responded by having them watered down. The 
fruits of this revision emerged on 23 December 1949, in the shape of NSC 48/1, `The 
Position of the United States with Respect to Asia'. 34 Although elements of the 
original NSC analysis remained, as did its anti-communist rhetoric, NSC 48/1 
reflected the State Department's belief that additional efforts in China or on Taiwan 
would be pointless and counter-productive. Limited support, to Taiwan would 
32 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 120. On the development of NSC 48, see also Michael Schaller, The 
American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), pp. 195-211. 
33 Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp. 202-203. 
34 `The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia', NSC 48/1,23 December 1949, in United 
States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 8 (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1971), pp. 
225-65 
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continue, but Washington should be prepared to recognise the government in Beijing 
when it was `clearly in the US interest to do so'. As far as South-East Asia was 
concerned, US policy should seek the resolution of the region's remaining nationalist 
conflicts `in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the nationalist- 
colonial conflict, lay the basis for political stability and resistance to communism, and 
avoid weakening the colonial powers who are our western allies'. 
The conclusions of NSC 48/1 were rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 
insufficiently detailed and robust, necessitating a second, expanded paper, NSC 48/2. 
This defined four basic security objectives for US policy in Asia: the development of 
stable, self-sufficient states `in conformity with the purpose and principles of the 
United Nations Charter'; the development of sufficient military power in non- 
communist Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by 
communism; the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet influence in Asia; and 
the prevention of `power relationships' threatening to US security, or to the `peace, 
national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations'. In keeping with America's 
main preoccupations in Asia, NSC 48/2 focused most closely on the Philippines, 
Korea, China and Taiwan, with a nod to the conflict in Indochina. Nonetheless, 
general references to military aid, economic assistance and political support held 
important policy implications for all of Soüth-East Asia's non-communist states, 
including Burma. In the two NSC 48 documents, the US government had equipped 
itself with both the intellectual justification and the policy framework to support a 
significantly deeper political, economic and strategic engagement in South-East Asia. 
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Truman approved NSC 48/2 as US government policy on 30 December 1949. Two 
weeks later, on 13 January 1950, Acheson delivered his often-quoted speech on Asia 
to the National Press Club in Washington. In it, he stated that the US was `organizing 
the machinery through which we can make effective help possible'. While the US 
would only assist where it was wanted, and was in any case not primarily concerned 
with South-East Asia, Americans possessed techniques of administration and 
agriculture that could benefit the region's predominantly agrarian economies. The US 
would, he concluded, supply aid where it was the ` missing component' for economic 
success. 35 Privately, Acheson told the British that the ` world across the Pacific' would 
be the State Department's ` principal preoccupation' in 1950; he and his colleagues 
had changed their minds about the likely consequences of the communist victory in 
China, and expected `early expansion south and east'. 36 
Two possible sources of economic aid for South-East Asia were available to the US 
administration. The first, known as Point IV after the position the proposal occupied 
in Truman's inaugural address in January 1949, provided for some $35 million in 
technical assistance to all `economically underdeveloped countries', potentially 
including South-East Asia. Legislation authorising the appropriation, however, 
remained stuck in Congress in late 1949. The second source of aid came from unspent 
provisions under the China Aid Act, amounting to some $100 million. For military 
aid, the US government could take advantage of $75 million as part of the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act of 1949.37 The financing 
- 
and by January 1950 the political 
33 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 123. 
36 Franks to Bevin, no. 5,855,17 December 1949, F0800/462/FE/49/40, UKNA. 
37 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 116; Samuel P. Hayes (ed. ), The Beginning of American Aid to 
South-East Asia: The Gruen Mission of 1950 (Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1971). 
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will 
- 
for a limited programme of economic, technical and military aid for South-East 
Asia were thus in place; the question remained how these dollars should be spent. 
To help provide an answer, two diplomatic missions were dispatched to South-East 
Asia and the Far East in late 1949 and early 1950.38 The first, led by Jessup, left the 
US in mid-December 1949, and spent six weeks in the region, visiting 14 countries 
and territories from Japan to Afghanistan. Jessup's findings, reported to the State 
Department on 23 March, painted a bleak picture: there were wars in Indochina, 
Malaya and Burma, a state of `near-war' existed between India and Pakistan, while 
violence in the Philippines and Indonesia was retarding recovery there. Asian 
governments were unrepresentative, undemocratic, corrupt and inefficient; they 
lacked trained personnel and the military capacity to confront armed communism, and 
were wracked by economic and financial weakness. Psychologically, Asia was 
unprepared to commit to the West, preferring to `wait and see who is winning', and in 
any case distrusted Western motives. Finally, the Western countries with interests in 
Asia had failed to coordinate their policies effectively. The US and Britain were at 
odds over China, the US, Britain and France disagreed over Indochina, and a `hard 
core' of Dutch colonials wanted Indonesia back; `we are not', Jessup concluded, 
`pooling our skills'. What was needed was a coordinated Western effort to help 
38 A military survey mission headed by John Melby, a State Department official, was also dispatched, 
but it bypassed Burma because Ne Win, apparently irritated that he had not been consulted, refused to 
receive it. This may have been a fortunate chance given the manner of the mission's senior military 
official, Marine General Graves Erskine. According to the Legation in Saigon, Erskine ` decidedly does 
not have the personality and judgement to maintain decent working relations with either military and 
civilian officials of the Southeast Asian States', and was prone to `fits of rudeness and irascibility'. 
Heath to Lacy, 3 January 1950, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, Correspondence File, 1949-1955, Lot 58D201, box 3, RG59, USNA. 
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South-East Asia resist communist expansion. The position, Jessup told Acheson, was 
bad, but not desperate: `The area cannot be written off. We are committed'. 39 
The second mission, designed to look more closely at the possibilities for economic 
assistance, was dispatched at the end of February 1950. It was led by R. Allen Griffin, 
a California newspaper publisher, a Republican and a former official with the 
Economic Cooperation Administration in China. Griffin and his team spent between 
ten days and two weeks each in Indochina, Singapore, Malaya, Burma, Thailand and 
Indonesia, returning to the US on 22 April. Like Jessup, Griffin found Asians 
ambivalent about US aid: appreciative on the one hand of America's own record as a 
former colonial state and of its action in granting Philippine independence; on the 
other, suspicious of Washington's long-term intentions, and wary of the implications 
for their independence of accepting American aid and advisors. 0 Nonetheless, Griffin 
and his team did not return `in a pessimistic frame of mind'; a `small group of good 
men and the expenditure of small amounts of money could accomplish wonders'. 41 In 
all, Griffin's recommendations called for a programme of technical and economic 
assistance to South-East Asia worth about $66 million for the 15 months to June 1951. 
Developing an aid programme for Burma 
By the end of January 1950, the US government had made up its mind that America 
was going to establish some form of economic aid programme for South-East Asia. 42 
For strategic and political reasons, US engagement 
- 
and US aid 
- 
was primarily 
39 'Oral Report by the Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup Upon His Return from the East', 3 April 
1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 68-76. 
40 Hayes (ed. ), The Beginning ofAmerican Aid to South-East Asia, p. 33. 
41 `Record of an Interdepartmental Meeting on the Far East', I1 May 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 87. 
42 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 191. 
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concerned with Indochina: $10 million in military assistance to the French was 
authorised on 1 May, followed by further aid in June, immediately after the outbreak 
of fighting in Korea. Another $3 million was earmarked for Indonesia. 43 By October 
1950, Congress had appropriated half a billion dollars for military assistance to the 
Far East, a major part of which was intended for Indochina. 44 At the same time, 
however, American policy-makers understood that the problems of South-East Asia 
were somehow interconnected. Action was needed across the region, including in 
Burma. 
Officials began discussing an aid programme for Burma in late 1949. In October, 
Jessup's group recommended the `unstinted application' of measures to reinforce U 
Nu's government, including `administrative, economic and security help'. George 
McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African 
Affairs, was also pressing for action; Burma, he told Acheson, merited `particular 
attention' from the State Department. `Urgent positive assistance' was needed if U 
Nu's government was to face down the communists and improve Burma's parlous 
economic condition. The key, McGhee thought, lay in `identifying the common 
interests or common objectives of all the peoples of Burma and then assisting the 
present Government to demonstrate that, given popular support, it can realize these 
objectives' 45 While admittedly there was insufficient evidence that `Burma either 
43 'Status of Problems Considered at the Foreign Ministers' Meetings', 22 May 1950, records of the 
Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 1951-1955, Lot 58D207, RG59, USNA. 
44 Rotter, The Path to Vietnam, p. 210. 
45 McGhee to Acheson, `Attainment of United States Objectives in Burma', 21 October 1949, 
845C. 00/10-2149, CDF, box 6121, RG59, USNA. 
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wants or can be saved, the important thing is that it is not yet lost'. 6 More to the 
point, perhaps, by the end of 1949 embassy officials in Rangoon were noticing 
increasing Burmese irritation at America's failure to act; Burmese attitudes towards 
the United States, the embassy reported in February 1950, 
oscillated between expressions of friendship and confidence 
apparently designed to attract American interest to Burma in the 
hope that substantial material and military assistance would follow, 
and annoyance at the lack of a definite move by the United States to 
aid Burma in the latter country's present plight. Many informed 
Burmans reproached the United States for leaving Burma to the 
mercies of the British while uttering pious platitudes as to its 
benevolent interest. 47 
Others were less sanguine about the possibilities for US aid. The PPS, for example, 
believed that the situation in Burma was so chaotic that it defied external resolution; 
the best the US could do was keep an eye on things, and cooperate with British and 
Indian attempts to support the regime in Rangoon. 8 George Kennan, the director of 
the PPS, warned Acheson early in January 1950 that getting involved in Burma would 
be `sheer madness': `Burma is [a] typical example of [a] country where US aid and 
46 McGhee to Acheson, 'US Policy for Burma', 25 January 1950,611.90B/1-2550, CDF, box 2856, 
RG59, USNA. 
47 Martin to the State Department, 'Review of Events in Burma 1 December 1949 to January 31,1950', 
20 February 1950,790B. 00/2-2050, CDF, RG59, USNA. 
48 PPS 51,29 March 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, part 2, pp. 1,128-1,133. 
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effort have very little to tie into'. 9 Kennan's arguments did not, however, carry 
weight, and aid for Burma was formally approved on 13 February 1950. The United 
States, Acheson instructed, should `take steps to complement Brit[ish] and 
Commonwealth efforts to stabilize Burma and forestall Commie subversion'. 50 
Detailed proposals for an aid programme were worked out by Griffin and his team 
during their two-week stay in Rangoon, between 23 March and 4 April. The mission 
consulted widely during its visit, meeting cabinet ministers, government officials, 
business leaders, students and representatives of Burma's minority groups. 51 Progress 
was, however, difficult, and Griffin's stay in Burma appears to have been significantly 
bumpier than Jessup's the month before. Jessup had been given strong hints that the 
Burmese government would welcome American aid, and in April the Burmese foreign 
minister, Sao Hkun Hkio, wrote to him asking for an American loan to finance a 
series of education projects and a `rehabilitation corps'. 52 Griffin, by contrast, found 
the Burmese `pathologically suspicious', the only people he had encountered in 
South-East Asia `who did not believe in Santa Claus'. Griffin and his team were 
treated `as a band of pickpockets'. 53 Burmese sensitivities forced him to send away 
his mission's military members, and Griffin himself had great difficulty in persuading 
Burmese officials to put forward viable proposals for the spending of American aid. 
Nonetheless, Griffin concluded that US assistance was possible, and could prove the 
49 Memorandum by Kennan to the Secretary of State, 6 January 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 1, National 
Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington DC: USGPO, 1977), p. 131. 
50 Secretary of State to Rangoon, 13 February 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 233, fn. 4. 
51 Hayes (ed. ), The Beginning ofAmerican Aid to South-East Asia, p. 197. 
52 `Memorandum of Conversation with Prime Minister Thakin Nu', 8 February 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 
6, p. 229; Hare to Jessup, 31 May 1950,611.90B/5-3150, CDF, box 2856, RG59, USNA. 
53 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 278,3 April 1950, F0371/84555/FZ1108/20; Bowker to Bevin, 6 
April 1950, F0371/84555/FZI 108/23, UKNA. 
156 
`necessary element which would lead to [a] rapid improvement in the whole situation 
in Burma'. 54 His proposals envisaged aid worth around $12 million. 55 What was 
needed, officials thought, was a `positive and vigorous program' with a `quick 
tangible impact on the masses of the people, demonstrating the effective interest of 
the US in their welfare'. 56 
A policy framework to support US assistance emerged in mid-June. 7 American 
efforts in Burma could not by themselves solve the country's problems, and as such 
should be regarded `merely as a technique whereby we may be able to contribute to 
the gradual overcoming of these weaknesses in Burmese national life'. Nonetheless, 
officials hoped that the provision of American help would alleviate Burmese 
suspicions of the motives behind foreign assistance more generally. US aid could also 
enhance the Burmese government's domestic standing. There were also strategic 
considerations, linked to US assessments of the expansionist nature of the communist 
threat in Asia. The `basic question' confronting the US in Burma, the June paper 
argued, was whether `a reasonably stable political situation and the reorganization 
under the Burmese leadership of an adequately functioning economy can be 
completed soon enough to make possible successful Burmese resistance to the 
34 'Record of an Interdepartmental Meeting on the Far East at the Department of State, 11 May 1950', 
FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 87-91; Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 278,3 April 1950, 
F0371/84555/FZ1108/20, UKNA. 
55 Griffin's proposals for Burma included projects in agriculture ($4 million), power ($2.4 million), 
public health ($2.3 million), education ($1.8 million), industry, transport and communications ($1.4 
million), $1.4 million for commodities, $1.2 million for help with Burma's economic planning, and a 
small provision to finance increased contacts between Burmese and American politicians. Hayes (ed. ), 
The Beginning ofAmerican Aid to South-East Asia, p. 37. 
56 `Notes on Assistance to Thailand and Burma', 15 May 1950, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, 
Burma Subject Files 1950-1961, box 14, RG469, USNA. 
57 `Burma', 16 June 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 233-244. 
157 
impending Communist effort to bring Burma under Communist domination'. This in 
turn had regional implications. Holding Burma against communism was essential for 
the West's position in South-East Asia: hold Burma and Indochina, and South-East 
Asia would probably be secure; lose either Burma or Indochina and Thailand would 
follow, leaving South-East Asia `practically defenceless against the onrush of 
communism'. According to McGhee: 
Control of Burma would represent a major strategic victory for 
Chinese and International Communism. Control over Burma's rice 
would give the Communists a significant economic weapon in 
Southern and South-eastern Asia, and a Communist Burma would 
divide free South and Southeast Asia, actually and psychologically, 
and in addition would provide international Communism with new 
frontiers with India, Pakistan, Indo-China, Malaya and Siam. 58 
Negotiations on an aid deal began in Rangoon in July 1950. The key sticking-point 
(and one that would become all too familiar to American officials) centred on the 
extent of the conditions the US sought to impose on its assistance. Unlike, for 
instance, European recipients of American aid, the Burmese were `unwilling to place 
[their] full confidence [in the] good faith and reasonableness [of the] US'; Burmese 
officials were, negotiators reported, `mistrustful and ignorant', and wary of any 
indication that the provision of aid afforded the US a `blank check in deciding [the] 
extent of [the] obligations to be imposed on Burma 
... 
and in deciding [the] extent to 
which [the] US will intervene in economic life in order [to] assure [the] successful 
58 McGhee to Acheson, 'US Policy for Burma', 25 January 1950,611.90B/1-2550, CDF, box 2856, 
RG59, USNA. 
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execution [of the] aid program'. 59 "We must bear in mind that [the Burmese 
government] is not actively soliciting aid'; U Nu had made it clear, in a speech to 
parliament on 19 July, that `under Burmese national policy foreign aid [was] 
acceptable only if no strings [were] attached'. 60 Progress was nonetheless made, and a 
bilateral economic cooperation agreement 
- 
the first such arrangement concluded by 
the United States with a South-East Asian government 
- 
was signed on 13 September 
1950.61 Under the deal, the country stood to receive around $10 million in grant aid. 
Detailed proposals for the spending of US aid were worked out in mid-December, 
covering the health sector, agriculture, industry and communications, housing and 
education. 62 The following February, the Burmese government announced plans to 
hire an American consulting firm to help it with its economic planning, and in 
September 1951 a contract worth $3 million was signed with the US company 
Knappen, Tippets and Abbot. There was also talk of appointing an American financial 
expert to advise the central bank. Early plans for, assistance up to June 1952 
contemplated a programme worth up to $25 million. 63 In all, aid officials thought the 
Burmese would need over $100 million in American assistance in the five years to 
59 Key to the ECA Administrator, 27 July 1950, part 1 of 2, CDF, records of the US foreign assistance 
agencies 1948-1961, Far East Geographic Files, Burma, box 2, RG469, USNA. 
60 Key to the ECA Administrator, 27 July 1950, part 2 of 2, CDF, records of the US foreign assistance 
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61 The ECA Administrator to Rangoon, 14 September 1950, CDF, records of the US foreign assistance 
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F0371/92164/FB11345/1, UKNA. 
63 Economic Cooperation Administration Far East Program Fiscal 1952 Budget, Burma, 20 February 
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1956.64 American help for Burma, the British embassy reported, `was running into 
quite big money' 65 
Plans for military aid were also taking shape. The Burmese had first approached the 
US for military help in April 1948, just after the start of the communist insurrection, 
but their requests had been politely rebuffed and they had been told to look to private 
sources for supplies. 6A year later, however, the very different regional environment 
occasioned by the communist victory in China prompted a rethink. In December 
1949, a State Department report advised `as a matter of urgency' the use of military 
assistance funds for Burma, and the following March a proposal was put forward to 
supply the Burmese with ten second-hand Coast Guard cutters, to improve the 
security of the country's inland waterways. Provision of these boats, the State 
Department argued, would `increase the Government's capability for offensive 
military operations against Communist-held territory in the Irrawaddy valley; and 
their very presence in the country would raise the morale of the people and the 
prestige of the Burma Government'. 67 The plan was approved in May 1950, and the 
agreement transferring the ten vessels to the Burmese navy, worth just under $3 
million, was concluded the following November. 68 
64 `Burma: Summary', undated, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma Subject Files 1950- 
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US aid and British policy 
British officials watched the development of American interest in Burma, and in 
South-East Asia as a whole, with a mixture of relief and trepidation. Broadly 
speaking, US thinking was gratifyingly in tune with British analyses of the position; 
PPS 51, for example, was on the whole well-received in the Foreign Office when it 
found its way there towards the end of 1949.69 In particular, the paper's calls for a 
collaborative, region-wide approach, and its cautious arguments in favour of limited 
US government aid, were thought to fit well with British views. Acheson's public and 
private statements in late 1949 and early 1950 were also greeted positively. His 
obvious caution 
- 
January's Press Club speech, for example, is cited mainly for what 
it ruled out, rather than what it ruled in 
- 
was `regrettable', and the US clearly still did 
not contemplate playing a `leading role' in Asia. 70 There was nonetheless agreement 
that, by the spring of 1950, an important threshold had been crossed. American 
interest in South-East Asia 
- 
and, more to the point, American money 
- 
had been 
secured. 
US engagement with South-East Asia also raised obvious problems. How would the 
US act, now that it was acquiring an interest and a stake in South-East Asia's non- 
communist states? What effect would the arrival of US capital and US advisors have 
on Britain's aspirations to regional leadership? Would America compete with Britain 
for Asia's resources, markets and friendship, or would the two countries succeed in 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Act', 4 January 1950, records relating to the Mutual Security 
Assistance Program (Far East), 1949-1954, Lot 57D472, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
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developing complementary policies and plans? According to Strang, in his expositions 
of British policy in the summer of 1949, Britain had little to fear. While the United 
States could certainly overmatch the UK in economic terms, Strang argued, it did not 
enjoy similar prestige and lacked Britain's vital historical connections with the 
region. 1 More fundamentally, American officials did not possess the kind of detailed 
understanding of South-East Asian problems, and their potential solutions, that long 
contact had given the British. Thus, while the arguments advanced in PPS 51 were 
broadly welcomed as evidence of a useful congruity of view, the Foreign Office 
concluded that the paper glossed over the ` fissiparous trends' in South-East Asia, and 
worried that America's emphasis on the Philippines, rather than India, as a potential 
regional power was a mistake. Having the Philippines as America's ` stalking horse' in 
South-East Asia was bad enough; that it was `weak at the knees' and suffered from 
`internal complaints' was worse. 
British diplomats closer to the sharp end of American interest in South-East Asia were 
less sanguine about the implications of US engagement for Britain's position there. 
According to Bowker, reporting in March 1950, US officials in Rangoon were 
beginning to ask: 
whether they should now revise the policy they have hitherto 
adopted of regarding Burma as primarily Great Britain's preserve. 
They are, I thinly beginning to wonder whether the suspicions which 
the Burmese still harbour about us as a result of our former 
domination here 
... 
make it difficult for us to carry out our 
71 `The United Kingdom in South-East Asia and the Far East', PUSC(32), 28 July 1949, F0371/76030, 
UKNA. 
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predominant role here, which might better be taken over by the 
Americans. 
Bowker's advice was clear: `while we should continue to encourage the Americans to 
take an active and positive interest in Burma we should disabuse them of any idea that 
we ourselves are no longer able to play a useful role here. We should on the contrary 
try to convince them of what I am sure is the truth, namely that our former 
associations with the Burmese and our policy of giving them their independence give 
us still a special position here which is not enjoyed by any other power. 
Formally, the State Department accepted this view. It was, the British were told, a 
`fundamental concept of United States policy' that the UK and the Commonwealth 
`should accept the primary responsibility for assistance [to Burma] and, in light of 
this, United States aid should be complementary to British and Commonwealth 
plans'. 73 The State Department's June policy statement on Burma emphasised the 
UK's primary responsibility for Burma's financial and military assistance, and 
officials took great care to discuss their river boat project with their British 
counterparts before embarking on negotiations with the Burmese. 74 According to one 
paper, `The British, through long experience in ruling Burma, have a long knowledge 
and understanding of the Burmese 
... 
It is probably only through Britain that Burma 
can be saved for the Western world'. 75 
72 Bowker to Scott, 2 March 1950, F0371/83122/FB10345/4, UKNA. 
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At the same time, however, US officials were uneasy with the direction of events in 
Burma, and concerned that the UK was not doing enough to rescue the position there. 
During a meeting with a British embassy official in January 1950, for example, 
Donald Kennedy, the deputy director of the State Department's Office of South Asian 
Affairs, remarked that the British `had forsaken their proper task of bringing the 
Burmese government to shoulder its responsibilities with resolution', even if there 
was `no chance of the United States Government taking up the burden if Britain laid it 
down'. 76 During his stay in Rangoon, Jessup had made reference to the difficulties the 
British were having in establishing an effective relationship with the Burmese 
government, and wondered whether `some other power, e. g. the United States, might 
not be able to make more headway'. 77 The following May, during official discussions 
ahead of Anglo-American ministerial talks in London, Dening was asked whether 
Britain could defend ý its policies and say that it had `used its imagination and 
ingenuity to the utmost' in finding ways to help U Nu's government. 78 
Privately, views were more trenchant. In November 1949, for example, the ever- 
forthright Huddle complained to the State Department of Britain's `defeatist complex' 
towards Burma. The UK, Huddle argued, bore a significant share of the responsibility 
for independent Burma's problems thanks to the `tragic political, economic and social 
errors' it had made while running the country. Unfortunately, however, `the attitude 
and effort' of the British government did not `justify any hope that material aid in 
Burma's extremity is to come from that source': 
76 Note of a meeting between H. E. Graves and Donald Kennedy, 9 January 1950, 
F0371/83168/FB1193/1, UKNA. 
77 Foreign Office brief, 10 March 1950, F0371/84514/FZ1022/5, UKNA. 
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The Burmese profess to have no faith in British intentions and too 
often flatly refuse British advice and practical assistance. Their 
well-intentioned advances spurned or ignored, the British, having 
no longer the national urge for domination, are hurt and bewildered 
and are at a loss for a practical approach and remedy for a bad 
situation. 79 
Huddle's criticism was probably overstated, and strenuous British efforts in 1949 and 
1950 to tackle the Karen conflict and arrange Commonwealth financial aid belied the 
defeatism he detected in British policy-making. Nonetheless, the general burden of his 
views struck a chord, and Huddle was not alone in believing that the British had 
somehow failed in Burma. Griffin, another American official with first-hand 
experience of the state of relations between the British and the Burmese, warned in 
March 1950 that the US had to `modify [its] thoughts re backstopping [the] British 
here or considering Burma their primary responsibility': 
If the US is effectively to assist [the] Burma Government, which at 
best will be difficult due to temperamental conditions, it must be on 
[a] straight and mutually acceptable Burma-US basis. Association 
with [the] British in any obvious common plan ör effort here will 
bring on Americans the mistrust already held of [the] British 
... 
[The] problem is not of accepting too much US responsibility here 
but of securing sufficient responsibility in US hands independent of 
79 Huddle to the Secretary of State, 8 November 1949,845C. 00/1 1-849, CDF, box 6121, RG59, USNA. 
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any British influence to cause a useful program to be carried into 
effect. 80 
The State Department agreed: while officials were careful to remind Griffin that their 
main objective was not replacing the British in Burma, but rather persuading them to 
`carry [the] main load', any `obvious' association with the UK in aiding Burma would 
be `unwise', and approaches to the Burmese would be on a `detached and independent 
basis'. 81 Clearly, Bowker was right to be concerned. 
The modalities of US aid also cast British efforts to help in an unflattering light. The 
US deal was drawn up and signed in weeks, compared to the months of tortured 
negotiations involved in the Commonwealth loan. It contemplated a free grant and 
promised visible and tangible results, whereas the Commonwealth offered a loan 
which had to be repaid, and which could only be used for the limited (and invisible) 
purpose of currency backing. Despite Burmese concerns during the negotiation of the 
aid agreement, there appeared to be no political conditions attached to American help 
beyond the stipulation that the money was effectively and transparently used. Unlike 
the Commonwealth, the US did not try to interfere in the Burmese government's 
handling of the Karen dispute, nor did it insist on a general improvement in the 
security situation as a precondition for help. 82 Finally, the deal enjoyed prominent 
80 Griffin to the Secretary of State, 30 March 1950, records relating to the Economic Survey Mission to 
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media and political support in Rangoon: senior government figures spoke in its 
favour, and only one MP opposed it when it was ratified on 9 October 1950.83 
The arrival of American aid also complicated British efforts to persuade Burma to join 
the Commonwealth's regional development programme, the Colombo Plan for 
Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. 84 The Colombo 
Plan began life as a set of proposals for economic and technical aid to Asia, presented 
by Spender to the Commonwealth meeting in Colombo in January 1950. 
Commonwealth leaders met again in Sydney the following May, and by September 
1950, following a third meeting in London, the Plan's basic objectives and 
management structure were in place. According to the report that emerged from the 
London meeting, the Colombo Plan would `involve the application of modern 
technology and skills to the under-developed and traditional economies of the 
countries of South and South-East Asia'. 85 In all, the Plan envisaged aid worth over 
£1 billion in its first six years, to Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth states 
alike. 86 
Ironically, the signature of Burma's aid agreement with the US in September 1950 
coincided with the London meeting at which the Colombo Plan took concrete form. It 
also coincided with a visit to Rangoon by British experts to explain the workings of 
83 Speaight to Bevin, no. 376,9 October 1950, F0371/83149/FB11345/8, UKNA. 
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the Plan to the Burmese. 87 These coincidences neatly encapsulated the dilemma 
American aid posed, both for the British and for the Burmese. For the British, the fact 
of US help, and the genuine prospect of more, was bound to reduce Colombo's appeal 
in the eyes of the Burmese; as Speaight put it, the existence of a US aid programme 
did not obviate the need for Colombo assistance, but it did imply that `we should be 
coming in as a sort of junior partner, to ECA [the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, the agency that managed America's overseas economic aid], whose 
contribution in money, material and manpower is always likely to exceed anything the 
Commonwealth can put up'. 88 For the Burmese, participation in Colombo raised the 
risk that American help might be curtailed in response, with no guarantee that 
Colombo aid would be on a similar scale, and provided in a similar way. Politicians 
and officials also balked at the bureaucratic demands of membership. Like the 
Marshall Plan in Europe, Colombo's rules required applicant states to submit detailed 
multi-year reports and proposals for how they intended to spend their aid. Burma, 
with its inadequate bureaucracy, partial statistical base and generally poor levels of 
security, could not hope to provide plans of the depth and completeness Colombo 
appeared to demand. Persuading Burma into the Colombo Plan was clearly going to 
be tricky. 
Burma, along with Thailand, Indonesia and the three Indochinese states, was invited 
to take part in the Colombo Plan in May 1950, and again the following October, after 
the London meeting of the Plan's Consultative Committee. Neither approach elicited 
a reply, and Speaight was asked to press the question with U Nu in January 1951. The 
problem, Speaight reported, was practical and political. The government did not 
81 Freese-Pennefather to Bevin, 21 September 1950, F0371/83149/FB11345/7, UKNA. 
88 Speaight to Scott, 21 February 1951, F0371/92164/FB11345/1163/61, UKNA. 
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possess the competent officials it needed to develop detailed development plans, and 
could make no guess as to costs. More fundamentally, there was a `deep-rooted 
suspicion that there are strings attached and that the Commonwealth would only grant 
aid in return for some limitation on its use which would be incompatible with 
Burma's independent status'. There was also a not-unreasonable fear that the 
acceptance of Commonwealth help would jeopardise aid from America, ` from whom 
they expect early benefits on a liberal scale and with no strings attached'. 89 
Nonetheless, there was a `good chance' of bringing Burma in `provided she can 
participate in her own way and does not feel she is being made to toe the line' 90 The 
Foreign Office conceded the practical point, exempting Burma from the need to 
produce detailed plans, and asked the US to reassure Rangoon that American aid 
would be unaffected if Burma signed up. As for the attachment of strings, Burma 
should be told that no other Asian participant had regarded participation as imposing 
unacceptable restrictions on their freedom of action. 
The real stumbling-block, at least as far as the British were concerned, was Burma's 
demand that the Colombo countries announce in advance how much assistance the 
country would receive once it had joined 91 In the British view, this in effect reversed 
Colombo's logic: instead of formulating a development plan and then negotiating the 
finance to implement it, the Burmese were asking for an unspecified up-front 
commitment, without any detailed proposals as to how the funds would be spent. As 
one official argued, `it is clear that the Burmese have no idea of what they want to 
89 Speaight to Bevin, no. 29,7 February 1951, F0371/93040/FZ1102/178, UKNA. 
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plan or how to set about it'. 2 Burma's demand was accordingly rejected when the 
Consultative Committee met at the end of February, and the British decided to let the 
matter drop; while it would be nice to have Burma in Colombo, noted one official, it 
would be no tragedy if the country stayed out. 93 
The impact of the Korean war on American aid planning 
While the British grappled with the Burmese over Colombo, American officials were 
reassessing their own plans in the light of China's entry into the Korean war in 
November 1950. The Chinese, US officials believed, were flexing their muscles, and 
Burma, with its pool of domestic communist insurgents, its inadequate armed forces 
and its long, disputed border, looked an obvious target. 94 Although the Chinese were 
certainly capable of overrunning Burma (US analysts estimated that up to 50,000 
troops were available for operations in the country, far more than the Burmese army 
could hope to repel), and neither the Americans nor the British were prepared to 
commit troops to stop them, the prevailing view within the State Department was that 
the risk of an outright Chinese communist attack was small 95 There were, however, 
worrying signs of growing Chinese material and tactical support for Burma's 
92 Merrells, minute, 9 February 1951, F0371/93038/FZ1102/178, UKNA. 
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- 
would be a mistake'. It was also `very unlikely that 
the Americans would respond favourably to any suggestion from us that they might be ready to send 
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communist insurgency. In June 1951, the US ambassador in Burma, David 
McKendree Key, reported collaboration between the CPB and Chinese communists; 
Chinese military advisors were attached to Burmese formations, and the CPB was 
receiving Chinese military aid. 96 US intelligence suggested that the regime in Beijing 
had established a centralised administration to manage a coordinated aid effort for 
communist groups in Burma, Thailand and Indochina. Chinese diplomatic pressure on 
the Burmese government too seemed to be increasing, and the Chinese embassy in 
Rangoon was active within the city's minority Chinese population. 97 
Concerns about China's intentions in Burma prompted officials to look again at the 
prospects for the government in Rangoon. 98 While on their own, Burma's communists 
had proved too weak to seize control of the government, with sufficient outside 
assistance analysts believed that they were easily capable of establishing de facto 
control over large areas of the north, creating a kind of `People's Republic of Burma' 
from where they could mount `stronger military and psychological attacks against the 
government'. Should they succeed, the Burmese would be faced with `a situation too 
serious to be ignored'. 99 Continued Chinese aid would probably cause U Nu's 
government to fall, which would in turn `drive a wedge between India-Pakistan and 
Southeast Asia, facilitate Communist penetration into Indochina and the other 
countries of South and Southeast Asia, and in a psychological sense give impetus to 
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the claim that Communism in Asia is an irresistible force'. American officials also 
worried that greater Chinese support for Burma's communists would enhance the 
prospects of an effective anti-government coalition among the country's various 
insurgent groups. '°° In October 1951, the US embassy in Rangoon reported that the 
CPB was `openly wooing' Karen insurgents; should they succeed in winning Karen 
support, the communists could gain access to thousands of additional fighters, posing 
a `serious 'threat' to the government's survival. '0' 
American assessments of the communist threat facing the Burmese government both 
justified and made more urgent the need for US political and economic engagement 
and aid-If it was going to survive, officials thought, Burma needed more outside aid, 
and needed to learn how to make the most effective use of it. Whether the Burmese 
would 
- 
or indeed could 
- 
accept significantly increased amounts of US help was, 
however, another matter. Already, in June 1951, hints' were reaching the British that 
the aid programme was not going well. US aid officials were pessimistic about its 
prospects, and were concerned that the Burmese were relying almost exclusively on 
American efforts, while doing little themselves to address the country's development 
problems. Hla Mating, the head of Burma's economic planning committee and a later 
critic of American aid, had become `so over-confident that he thinks he can talk his 
way out of any difficulty and that consequently it is increasingly difficult to bring him 
down to realities'. 102 By the end of the year, Key was warning his colleagues in 
Washington that Burma was already receiving as much aid as it could use, and did not 
10° Ibid. 
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have the capacity to take more even if more was made available. '03 It was, the US 
embassy reported, `questionable whether the aid program contributes to our political 
objectives at this time', if it ever would: `to reach the masses and lift the dead weight 
of centuries of low living standards is a tremendous undertaking. The benefits may 
not be very widely felt for years'. '°4 What political gains the programme had 
achieved, noted one official, had been confined to the country's senior politicians, and 
there was `no evidence' that American aid `has had an effect upon the political 
opinions of the Burmese people'. '°5 Publicity had been reduced to a `trickle of official 
handouts'; the aid programme was neither widely known nor understood. 106 
The challenges facing the US in Burma were partly practical, but fundamentally 
political. As the British knew well, insecurity meant that little development work was 
possible outside Rangoon; in the city itself, there were problems with accommodation 
and personnel. Although the aid mission was led by a relatively senior official, Abbot 
Low Moffat, a former head of South-East Asian affairs at the State Department, other 
posts remained unfilled. The inadequacies of Burmese officialdom, and the Burmese 
government's habit of modifying American project proposals in ways the Americans 
did not always like, also imposed constraints, while the Burmese government found it 
difficult to muster the counterpart funds required to meet the programme's local 
currency costs. More fundamentally, accepting US assistance implied an unwelcome 
proximity to Washington, an outcome resisted in Burma partly because of post- 
colonial sensitivity, and partly for the sound strategic reason that any indication of a 
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closer relationship between Burma and the West risked provoking a reaction from 
China. `Any close association with the more powerful countries of the free world, ' 
reported the US embassy in Rangoon, `could not offer advantages to counterbalance 
the dangers from the hostility the association would provoke in Peking. ' Burma's best 
hope of escaping disaster `lies in maintaining the friendliest possible relations with 
Communist China. This is not a sentiment based on ideological sympathies but a 
conviction founded on instinct to survive'. '07 
For all their public support for the aid deal, Burmese leaders had from the start been 
uneasy about the implications of accepting American aid. They had tackled US 
negotiators in detail about the provisions of the agreement signed in September 1950, 
and the ink was barely dry on the aid documents before Burmese politicians were 
complaining to the British that the Americans were overdoing things with the high 
profile and large volume of visitations to their country. 108 Matters came to a head in 
January 1952, when the US requested' an exchange of notes to meet the new 
requirements for American aid embodied in the Mutual Security Act, a piece of 
legislation passed in October 1951 which sought to tie US aid recipients more closely 
to the country's strategic objectives. Under the Act, governments receiving US aid 
were required to `join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and in 
maintaining world peace, and to take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to 
eliminate causes of international tension'. 109 This was rejected by the Burmese as an 
unwarranted infringement of their country's sovereignty and politically unacceptable. 
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The fiction that American aid was somehow divorced from Washington's political 
and strategic objectives in Asia had been exposed: US aid had strings of its own. 
These unwelcome developments in the aid relationship with the United States 
encouraged in the Burmese second thoughts about the Colombo Plan, and on 9 
January 1952, the day after the US had delivered its request for an exchange of notes, 
the British government was told that Burma wanted to join. Although U Nu had 
hinted in December that he was reconsidering Burma's position on Colombo, this 
volte-face took the British by considerable surprise, though its cause seemed clear. As 
one official reasoned: `The explanation lies in the outbreak of a noisy press campaign 
directed to preventing the country from participating in further US aid on the plea that 
the assurances demanded under the Mutual Security Act endanger the country's 
neutrality'. The move was a bid for `reinsurance against present uncertainties'! 10 In 
1950, American assistance had been preferred to Commonwealth help because it 
appeared less encumbered with political or bureaucratic freight and post-colonial 
baggage. Now, two years on, the position had reversed. With the conditions imposed 
under the Mutual Security Act, Burma's acceptance of aid openly linked it to 
American policies in Asia. Colombo, by contrast, now seemed to make much less 
onerous political demands, while its multinational, consensual and decentralised 
architecture suited Burma's preference for loose, informal association. Unlike the 
Mutual Security Act, no national legislation underpinned it, and it reflected no single 
country's foreign policy. The fact that, in theory at least, Colombo made no 
distinction between donors and recipients, preferring instead to see its membership as 
110 Boothby to Murray, 23 January 1952, F0371/101244/FZ1105/7, UKNA. 
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engaged in a project of mutual self-help, may also have appealed to the Burmese 
sense of amour propre. "l The country formally joined in March 1952. 
Conclusion 
Burma's accession to Colombo did not mean the end of American aid, and a 
compromise formula was reached in February 1952 that enabled Rangoon to meet the 
Mutual Security Act's requirements without committing itself quite so obviously to 
America's strategic aims in Asia. The Burmese also remained interested in US 
military supplies. Ne Win discussed Burma's military needs with American officials 
during a visit to Washington in October 1952, for instance, and spoke in detail about 
his plans for reinforcing the Burmese military. He also hinted that he would like to 
send Burmese officers to the United States for training. 112 For their part, American 
planners continued to regard the aid programme, and the US relationship with Burma 
more broadly, as valuable. A policy paper prepared by the NSC in June 1952, for 
example, called for military aid and advice, along with continued economic and 
technical assistance; despite Burmese sensitivities, the US should seek to encourage 
the Burmese `to cooperate fully with the anti-communist nations', and arouse Burma 
to `the dangers of Chinese Communist expansion and to the need for effective military 
defense against it'. 113 Aid officials contemplated continued assistance of up to $12 
million a year as part of a `long-range rehabilitation and economic development 
111 Adeleke, ` The Strings of Neutralism', p. 602. 
112 `General Ne Win's Activities in the United States', 7 November 1952, records of the Director, 
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence, 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950- 
56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
113 3 'United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia', NSC 124/2,25 
June 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 132. 
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program'. 114 Even while officials drew up their aid plans, however, other parts of the 
US government were pursuing a contradictory set of policies against China which 
would, within a year, help to bring the American aid programme to an end. 
114 
`Technical Cooperation Program 
- 
FY 1954: Burma', 13 October 1952, CDF, Office of Far Eastern 
Operations, Burma Subject Files 1950-1961, box 14, RG469, USNA. 
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Chapter 5 
The Kuomintang crisis and the termination of American aid, 1952-1954 
The previous chapter has explained how apprehensions of an increasing regional 
threat from communist China encouraged American officials to develop a far- 
reaching programme of economic and military assistance for the states of South-East 
Asia, including Burma. In developing their aid plans, US foreign service officers 
hoped to strengthen the Burmese government, increase its legitimacy in the eyes of 
the Burmese people and tie it more closely to the West. At the same time, however, 
Burma's position on the borders of China made the country strategically valuable to 
American planners seeking to strike at the new regime in Beijing. In the later stages of 
the Chinese civil war, remnants of the Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) armies in 
southern China had fled across the border into north-eastern Burma. These forces, US 
planners believed, constituted an important military and political asset, and a covert 
network was established to support them with arms and personnel ferried out of Japan 
and Taiwan. 
The corrosive effects of the KMT occupation of Burma were felt both locally and 
internationally. Locally, the KMT's presence exemplified and exacerbated the 
Burmese government's crisis of control. As a military actor, the KMT participated in 
the country's rebellions, trading arms, briefly allying with the Karen, and forcing the 
government to deploy such a large portion of its scarce military resources that, by the 
spring of 1953, serious operations against the country's other insurgent groups had 
become virtually impossible. ' As a political actor, the KMT displaced what local 
Sarell to the Foreign Office, no. 378,28 September 1953, F0371/106690/FB1041/22, UKNA. 
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authority and prestige the government and its agents possessed by setting up a de 
facto administration, levying `taxes', preying on local communities for recruits and 
supplies and exposing the government to debilitating attack from its domestic 
opponents in Rangoon. As a criminal actor, the KMT was heavily involved in 
Burma's opium trade, where its access to weapons and transport into northern 
Thailand transformed what had been a relatively minor opium-producing region at the 
end of the Second World War into one of the world's major sources of the drug. 2 
The KMT's occupation also raised significant problems for British and US policy- 
makers. In London, analysts clearly understood the potential damage the West stood 
to incur; even if U Nu's government pulled through, which officials periodically had 
cause to doubt, US complicity in supplying the KMT's illegal occupation was felt to 
be sufficiently well-established as to imperil the Anglo-American position, not only in 
Burma, but in the region more widely. This fear dictated a straightforward response, 
and throughout this period British diplomats sought to inveigle the US into curtailing 
its covert activities in Burma and exerting pressure in Taiwan to force the KMT's 
removal. For the United States, the KMT problem was more complex and difficult. 
Avowed American policy aimed to encourage Burma's friendship and stabilise its 
regime through economic and military aid and political support. Against this, 
important links with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, the increasingly perilous 
strategic environment occasioned by China's entry into the Korean war in 1950 and 
the shrill tenor of domestic politics in Washington all argued in favour of support for a 
clandestine campaign against the communist Chinese. As this chapter explains, 
however, the pursuit through covert means of one objective 
- 
confronting and 
2 Alfred McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in South-east Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) 
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containing communism in Asia 
- 
had precisely the opposite effect by alienating the 
Burmese and forcing them into closer relations with Beijing. 
The KMT crisis and Burma's relations with the US and China 
KMT troops first entered Burma's north-east early in 1949, when some 2,000 troops 
crossed into Kengtung from Yunnan. 3 Despite Burmese attempts to round them up 
and disarm them, the Nationalists gave every impression of planning for a long-term 
occupation. According to a press conference he gave in Bangkok in June 1950, their 
commanding officer, former Yunnan Governor Li Mi, declared that his troops had no 
intention of joining the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, but would remain in Kengtung, 
from where they would `continue the struggle against the Communists' 4 Militarily, 
however, these troops posed an insignificant threat, and periodic incursions across the 
border into Yunnan were easily repulsed. 5 The main effect of their presence was to 
destabilise the Burmese government, and expose Burma to possible Chinese reprisals. 
In November 1949, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En Lai warned that his 
government reserved the right to pursue Nationalist remnants wherever it found them; 
any country `which gives shelter to the Kuomintang reactionary armed forces must 
take responsibility in this regard and moreover must accept all consequences arising 
therefrom'. 6 The KMT presence in Kengtung, reported the British embassy in July 
3 
`Chinese Nationalist Troops in Burma: Chronology of Developments, 1949-April 1951', DRF 
Information Paper no. 424,28 May 1951, records relating to the Mutual Security Assistance Program 
(Far East), 1949-1954, Lot 57D472B, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
4 Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 520,30 June 1950, F0371/83113/FB10110/8, UKNA. 
s John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War 11 
Through the Persian Gulf (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), p. 75. 
6 
`Chinese Nationalist Troops in Burma: Chronology of Developments, 1949-April 1951', DRF 
Information Paper no. 424,28 May 1951, records relating to the Mutual Security Assistance Program 
(Far East), 1949-1954, Lot 57D472B, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
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1950, was `extremely embarrassing to the Burmese'. Even if the government in 
Beijing were not `anxious to add Burma to their many other preoccupations, and even 
if they are genuinely anxious to avoid being implicated in accusations of international 
aggression, there is an obvious danger that the Nationalist deserters, in their present 
aggressive mood, will provoke their Communist enemies across the border into some 
offensive move'. 7 
Having failed to dislodge the Nationalists by force, the Burmese turned to the US for 
diplomatic help, and several times during 1950 the American government was asked 
to bring pressure to bear in Taiwan to rein in the KMT elements roaming around 
Kengtung. 8 Interviews by US officials with the Nationalist ambassador in 
Washington, and two formal calls on Foreign Minister George Yeh in Taipei, met 
with prevarication, prompting U Nu to threaten to internationalise the issue through 
recourse to the UN (a ploy he would use several more times to good effect). 
Meanwhile, both the Burmese and the British were beginning to suspect US and Thai 
involvement in supporting the irregulars as a local area force against the communist 
Chinese. In early May 1951, British military intelligence in Hong Kong reported that 
the US army was ferrying arms, ammunition and medical supplies from Okinawa to 
Nationalist guerrillas in southern China and Burma, and US and Thai personnel were 
known to be active in north-eastern Burma. 9 There was `little doubt' that the KMT 
was receiving American encouragement, and that a large amount of modern US 
7 Freese-Pennefather to the Foreign Office, no. 275,7 July 1950, F0371/83113/FB10110/9, UKNA. 
8 Hare to Rusk, 1 July 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, p. 244. 
SO(I) Hong Kong to the Admiralty (Director of Naval Intelligence), 6 May 1951, F0371/92140; 
Foreign Office to Franks, no. 3,898,4 August 1951, F0371/92141/FB1019B4G, UKNA. 
181 
equipment had been supplied; `certain agencies' of the US government were `actively 
involved'. '0 
The covert US operation to support the KMT in Burma was code-named Operation 
Paper. l l It was coordinated by Alfred Cox, Hong Kong station chief for the Office of 
Policy Coordination (OPC), a short-lived covert action group established by the NSC 
in June 1948. Also involved was Sherman B. Joost, who ran the Bangkok-based Sea 
Supply Company, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) front whose ostensible 
function was to equip and train the Thai police. Transport was provided by Civil Air 
Transport (CAT), whose founder, Claire Chennault, a friend of Taiwanese leader 
Chiang Kai Shek, had extensive links with the CIA and with Richard Stilwell, the 
head of the Far East Division of OPC. Via CAT, weapons, ammunition and personnel 
were transported from Japan and Taiwan to Bangkok, and then on to Chiengmai and 
Chiangrai in northern Thailand, from where Thai border troops arranged onward 
transport to Nationalist forces in Burma. In return, the KMT shipped significant 
amounts of opium to northern Thailand, where it was purchased by agents acting for 
Lieutenant-General Phao Sriyanon, the director-general of the Thai police and a CIA 
client. The opium was then shipped to Bangkok for local consumption and export. 
10 Murray to Ewbank, 7 May 1951, and Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 197,28 April 1951, 
F0371/92140/FB1019/80, UKNA. 
11 This description of US covert activity in Burma is drawn from Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars; 
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in South-east Asia; Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1995); John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and 
American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997); William M. Leary, Perilous 
Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (University, AL: University of 
Alabama Press, 1984); William M. Leary (ed. ), The Central Intelligence Agency: History and 
Documents (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984); and Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's 
Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981). 
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American planning for a secret war against the communist Chinese predated the 
Nationalist retreat from the mainland, as did clandestine aid to non-communist groups 
around and within China, including Li Mi's forces. However, events in Korea - 
specifically China's entry into the conflict at the end of 1950 - provided the crucial 
impetus for a massive expansion in covert action by OPC. The growth in resources 
and investment was remarkable: between 1949 and 1952, OPC's budget increased 
from under $5 million to $82 million, and its staffing from 302 to almost 3,000, with a 
further 3,000-plus contract personnel. A supporting policy framework was also 
established. On 17 January 1951, the NSC recommended an increase in defence 
assistance to Taiwan and Thailand, together with the provision of `all practicable 
covert aid to effective anti-communist guerrilla forces in China'. 12 The following 
May, Truman approved NSC 48/5 as the administration's policy statement on Asia. 
While this stopped short of an explicit endorsement of covert action, it did 
nonetheless permit the taking of `acceptable risks' in specific areas in pursuit of US 
security interests, and committed the US to supporting anti-communist Chinese 
12 William O. Walker, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia 
1912-54 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 200. The possibility that the 
US would seek to widen the Korean conflict was deeply concerning to the British. In January 1951, 
Attlee told Truman that `I am left with the impression that the United States Government may wish to 
substitute for a policy of localising the conflict in Korea a policy aimed at developing limited action 
against China'. There was, Attlee warned, `little doubt that a campaign of subversion of or guerrilla 
warfare against China involving the use of Chiang Kai Shek's men would certainly have that effect. I 
do not know whether such a project is intended by the United States Government, and I should like to 
know whether they would intend to recommend such action by the United Nations'. Truman replied on 
9 January: `We do not intend to recommend to the United Nations a campaign of subversion or 
guerrilla warfare against the mainland of China by Chinese national forces 
... 
my chief concern is that 
[UN action in Korea] should be honest and honourable and directed to preserve the very essence of the 
great principle for which the United Nations was created - the principle of collective security'. Foreign 
Office to Washington, no. 87, FE/51/3,8 January 1951, F0800/462, UKNA; Washington to the 
Foreign Office, no. 76, FE/51/6,9 January 1951, F0800/462, UKNA. 
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elements `both outside and within China with a view to developing and expanding 
resistance in China to the Peiping regime's control'. 13 
Clandestine support for Li Mi's Burma irregulars was ' consistent with this broad 
objective. With American troops under pressure in Korea, and with Truman's 
administration reeling from domestic criticism of its handling of Asian problems, any 
effort to divert Chinese attention from the Korean war must have seemed attractive to 
planners in Washington. US diplomats in Rangoon, however, were distinctly less 
enthusiastic. On 21 June 1951, Key told Acheson that `positive action' was urgently 
needed to `dissociate the US Government from any Americans who may be operating 
with Chinese troops on Burmese soil'. 14 By August, Key was warning the State 
Department that American participation in KMT operations constituted a `serious 
impediment' to relations with the Burmese and made a `mockery in Burmese eyes of 
our officially expressed desire to aid in the restoration of internal stability and to 
strengthen Burmese independence'. The KMT `adventure', he reported, `has cost us 
heavily in terms of Burmese goodwill and trust', and was `prejudicing everything 
which we are trying to accomplish and threatens all our future prospects. Whatever 
the original justification may have been for these operations, it now seems obvious 
that they have failed to achieve useful results commensurate with the harm they have 
done our interests in Burma'. ls 
Worse was to come at the turn of the year, when China publicly charged the US with 
aiding the KMT, with allegations in the communist Chinese press and radio that US 
1' NSC48/5, 'Statement of Policy on Asia', 17 May 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, part 1, pp. 33-39. 
14 Key to Acheson, 21 June 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, part 1,1951, pp. 273-74. 
13 Key to Acheson, 15 August 1951, ibid., p. 288. 
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warships were ferrying Nationalist reinforcements from Taiwan to Thailand and 
northern Burma. 16 On 3 January 1952, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky 
took the matter up in the UN General Assembly: China was the victim of aggression 
from the US and its allies; America was `busily transferring Kuomintang troops from 
Taiwan to Thailand and to the western part of Burma on ships of the Seventh Fleet', 
was preparing large-scale military operations on the border of China through the 
`military occupation' of local states and was planning to maintain Chinese Nationalist 
troops on the border of Thailand, Burma and China in preparation for `new aggressive 
acts'. 17 The State Department issued an immediate rebuttal, and sought allied support 
for a more elaborate statement at the UN, which denied US involvement and claimed 
that Vyshinsky's allegations were aimed at justifying potential communist expansion 
in East Asia. 18 Despite British reservations (and outright opposition from the British 
delegation at the UN, which thought that Vyshinsky's claims of US complicity were 
quite justified19), the statement was delivered at the General Assembly on 28 January, 
where it was supported by the British and French. At the same time, the Burmese 
government was told that the `supply of arms and equipment to these troops has been 
entirely eliminated or reduced to insignificant quantities'. After thorough 
investigation, the State Department had concluded that no US citizens `are or have 
been involved '20 
16 Day to Acheson, 10 January 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 1. 
17 A transcript of Vyshinsky's statement is in F0371/101008/FB1041/11, UKNA. 
18 USIS Daily Wireless Bulletin, 4 January 1952, F0371/101008/FB1041/2, UKNA. 
19 Hope, minute, 25 January 1952, F0371/101008/FB1041/23, UKNA. 
20 Day to U Tun Shein, Permanent Secretary, Burmese Foreign Office, 17 January 1952, records of the 
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Officer in Charge of 
Burma Affairs Subject Files 1948-1955, Lot 58D3, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
Publicly, the response from the Burmese was, if not exactly supportive, then at least 
more moderate than either the British or the Americans might reasonably have 
expected. 21 Privately, however, the Burmese representative at the UN, Myint Thein, 
was much less diplomatic: the Americans had `lost the propaganda battle', he told 
Britain's ambassador, Sir Gladwyn Jebb. His government `knew for a fact' that the 
bulk of the supplies reaching the KMT were passing through Thailand, and that they 
were being organised `by American officers with the knowledge of the Pentagon, if 
not the State Department'. 2 Meanwhile, on 25 January, Burmese Foreign Minister 
Sao Hkun Hkio told Speaight that some 10,000 KMT troops were now present in 
Kengtung. The situation had become `intolerable': the local authorities had no control 
outside Kengtung town itself, and the state faced a food crisis brought on by forced 
requisitioning by the KMT. 23 The opposition, reported the US embassy in Rangoon, 
was `flailing' U Nu's government over its handling of the crisis, while Burma's 
communists were `taking full advantage of the opportunity the question provides for 
anti-American propaganda'. 4 
By the start of 1952, therefore, the official US line on the KMT's presence in Burma 
faced open contradiction from America's enemies, private scepticism from its friends 
and continued unease among its own foreign service officials; one of them, Key, was 
so agitated that he resigned over the issue. 5 Other, more senior posts were also 
21 Minute, Paul Scott, 1 February 1952, F0371/101008/FB1041/33, UKNA. 
u Selwyn Lloyd to the Foreign Office, no. 68,28 January 1952, F0371/101008/FB1041/19, UKNA. 
23 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 37,25 January 1952, F0371/101008/FB1041/9, UKNA. 
24 Day (? ) to Acly, 26 February 1952, records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Philippine 
and Southeast Asian Affairs, Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs Subject Files 1948-1955, Lot 58D3, 
box 1, RG59, USNA. 
25 Day to Acly (? ), undated, records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs Subject Files 1948-1955, Lot 58D3, box 
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voicing concern. The US ambassador in London, Walter Gifford, reported that the 
flood of complaints, which by now included a French protest over KMT-bound 
aircraft staging through Indochina, was rendering official US denials `ineffective'. 
Unless the KMT problem was resolved and rumours of US complicity definitively 
scotched `some of Vyshinsky's mud will stick'26 Gifford's counterpart in Delhi, 
Chester Bowles, was `profoundly disturbed'; US assistance to KMT guerrillas would, 
he argued, jeopardise the US position in Korea, convince the Indian government that 
the US was intent on attacking China and igniting a wider regional war and place his 
personal credibility with the Indians at risk. The government was `playing with fire'. 27 
Against this, there were countervailing arguments in favour of continued clandestine 
support. In March 1952, for instance, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote to the 
Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett, noting `the military potential inherent in the 
Chinese Nationalist forces along the northern frontier of Burma'. 28 Diplomatic posts 
in Indochina, Taiwan and Hong Kong also pressed for US assistance for what was 
after all perhaps the only remaining source of armed opposition to the communist 
Chinese on the mainland. On 4 February Donald Heath, minister and later ambassador 
in Saigon, told Acheson that, if the US was not supporting guerrilla action against the 
communist Chinese, then it ought to be: `we must be very certain of definite 
advantages in abandonment of ChiNat guerrillas before we let slip one of [the] few 
remaining area forces with some will to resist ChiComs'; the dangers of communist 
consolidation in South-East Asia, he concluded, far outweighed those posed by the 
1, RG59, USNA. Acly reports that the first official news of Key's 'retirement' had come in a telegram 
summarising Key's travel orders on 11 February 1952. 
26 Gifford to Acheson, 1 February 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 5. 
27 Bowles to Acheson, 18 March 1952, ibid, p. 21. 
28 Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, p. 154. 
187 
`affronted sensibilities of some Asian opinion or [the] professional hysterics of 
Sov[iet] spokesmen'. 29 Absolutely right, cabled Karl Rankin, America's staunchly 
pro-Nationalist ambassador in Taipei. The belief that US support for anti-communist 
forces in Asia would somehow provoke communists into aggressive action that they 
would otherwise not take was a `common error 
... 
fostered by Commie propaganda 
[which] simply plays into enemy hands by delaying or preventing effective US action 
while they perfect arrangements for [their] next aggression'. 30 
This was dismissed by Acheson. Any American assistance to irregular forces in 
Asia's independent states would have a `most harmful effect in our relations with 
those nations'; the State Department `firmly oppose any material assistance to them', 
and would take `all feasible steps toward a final solution of this serious problem'. 31 In 
the absence of cooperation from Taipei, four main options appeared to present 
themselves: 1) the KMT remnants could be left in Burma, but this meant that they 
would remain `a source of annoyance' to the Burmese government, would `continue 
[to] offer [a] standing pretext for Chi[nese] Comm[unist] intervention and w[ou]ld 
become increasingly difficult to manage and restrain from provocative action'; 2) the 
troops could be disarmed and interned inside Burma, but how was unclear since the 
Burmese lacked the military capacity to do it; 3) they could be repatriated to Taiwan 
via Rangoon, but this was opposed by the Burmese Foreign Office for fear of 
offending Beijing; or 4) they could be repatriated to Taiwan via Thailand, but this was 
opposed by both the Thais and by the State Department because it would expose 
Thailand to possible Chinese attack. Given these complexities, Acheson concluded 
29 Heath to Acheson, 4 February 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 8. 
30 Rankin to Acheson, 16 February 1952,790B. 00/2-1652, CDF, box 4137, RG59, USNA. 
31 Acheson to New Delhi, 19 March 1952,790B. 00/3-1952, CDF, box 4137, RG59, USNA. 
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that the problem was `essentially one for Burm[a] to solve'; the US conscience at any 
rate was clear, and its position `beyond reproach'. 32 
While the US was clearly not as blameless as Acheson claimed, there were indications 
during the latter half of 1952 that, in official US circles at least, the appeal of the 
KMT in Burma may have begun to pall. In early September, the US army attache in 
Taipei told the British consul that the Nationalist troops had been ` more or less' 
abandoned and `now had to shift for themselves'. This was consistent with reports 
reaching the British from other sources suggesting that these forces no longer enjoyed 
`enthusiastic' American support. 33 The following month, the acting director of the 
Office of South-East Asian Affairs, Bill Gibson, told a member of the British embassy 
in Washington that the KMT forces in Burma had received `little or no reinforcements 
in arms or men for many months'. As a cohesive force, the Kuomintang amounted to 
`next to nothing', and the US government regarded the resolution of the problem as a 
`top priority' in its policy towards Burma. 34 Meanwhile, increased pressure was being 
brought to bear in Taipei. In October 1952 John Allison, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern Affairs, told Chiang directly that the KMT contingents in Burma 
were a `liability to the anti-Communist cause and a disruptive factor in Southeast 
Asia, and that an effort should be made to withdraw them'. 35 The following 
December, Ne Win was told that the US was `fully aware of the dangerous 
32 Acheson to Saigon, 12 February 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 9. 
39 Paul Scott, minute, 24 September 1952, F0371/101012/FB1041/114, UKNA. 
34 Tomlinson to Tahourdin, 21 October 1952, FO371/101012/FB1041/118, UKNA. 
35 Taipei to the State Department, 21 May 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 35. 
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potentialities' of the KMT problem, and was `thinking about ways and means' to 
resolve it 36 
This apparent hardening in US attitudes was maintained as Eisenhower's government 
took office in January 1953. Ten days into its term, on 29 January, the new 
administration spelt out its position on the KMT in Burma in a lengthy dispatch to 
Taipei. The US `must make a vigorous attempt to eliminate the explosive situation 
resulting from the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma'. The Taipei 
embassy was instructed to convey to Chiang the `view of the United States 
Government that the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma are a disruptive influence in 
Burma and Southeast Asia and consequently a threat to security', and to urge on him 
`measures to put an end to the activities of these troops in Burma and make it possible 
for them to return to Formosa'. The US `wishes to make suggestions looking toward a 
solution with the knowledge that President Chiang concurs in the desirability of 
supporting measures which improve the stability of independent states and strengthen 
their sovereignty'. American plans envisaged the evacuation of around 3,000 KMT 
troops 
- 
the minimum deemed necessary to convince the Burmese that the US had 
tried its best 
- 
via Thailand or, failing that, by air from Rangoon. 37 
Chiang had already rejected repatriation when Allison had broached the possibility 
during his interview in Taiwan the previous October. 38 There was little reason to 
36 Memorandum of conversation between Sebald and Ne Win, 18 December 1952,790B. 00/12.1852, 
CDF, box 4137, RG59, USNA. 
37 State Department to Taipei, 29 January 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, 
RG59, USNA. 
38 Taipei to the State Department, 21 May 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 35. 
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suppose that he had changed his mind since, and the January statement offered no 
fresh ideas as to how he might be made amenable other than a vague appeal to 
Burmese sovereignty, a consideration unlikely to carry much weight in Taipei. For all 
the evident worthlessness of Li Mi's troops as a military force, Rankin warned the 
State Department, Chiang remained convinced that their presence constituted `a useful 
guard against the Communist threat to Indo-China and possibly an actual deterrent to 
systematic infiltration southward by Chinese Communist forces'. In any case, neither 
the government in Taiwan nor commanders on the ground in Burma exercised 
effective control over the bulk of the KMT irregulars, and would be unable to extract 
them even if they agreed to do so. 39 
In Burma, meanwhile, Eisenhower's arrival in office coincided with a marked 
increase in KMT military activity. In January, the Burmese War Office reported 
clashes with KMT troops near Lashio in the Shan State and further north around 
Bhamo, in Kachin State 40 The KMT also reached a local agreement with Karen 
insurgents, and KMT troops began to move into KNU-held territory along the Thai 
border, pushing as far south as Thaton on the Indian Ocean. In February 1953, a joint 
Karen-KMT operation was launched against the Karenni capital Loikaw. 41 Thanks to 
the KMT, the US embassy reported, the security situation had been ` thrown back to 
39 Rankin to Allison, 18 December 1952, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast 
Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, 
USNA. 
40 Rangoon to the State Department, 16 January 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, 
RG59, USNA. 
41 Smith, Burma, p. 153. Contacts between the KMT and the Karen were not new; the two had carried 
on an arms trade since at least April 1950 in south-west Kengtung, and they are also likely to have 
collaborated in the area's opium business. Bowker to the Foreign Office, no. 275,7 July 1950, 
F0371/83113/FB10110/9, UKNA. 
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where it was three years ago 
... 
the advances in security which the Burmese 
government succeeded in making during its first five years of independence have been 
nullified'. Burma was fighting `what amounts to an international war, with the 
aggressor on her own soil. The KMT activity has laid all parts of Burma open to such 
attacks as the communists and minorities may desire to make, since the bulk of the 
Burmese Army is required to fight the KMT'. 42 Politically, the effect was just as 
serious `since the [Burmese] Communists can now, with more reason than ever 
before, call for the Government to unite with the commie insurgents to repel the 
KMTs' 43 
This escalation appears to have had a galvanising effect in Washington. On 19 
February, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told Rankin that the situation in 
northern Burma was deteriorating so badly that `it does not admit of further delay'. 
Rankin was instructed to extract from Chiang an assurance that Li Mi would be 
ordered out of Burma forthwith, and that arrangements for the evacuation of his forces 
would be made without delay. 44 At the time, Chiang was in Kaohsiung in southern 
Taiwan, but such was the pressing nature of the problem that it could not wait, and 
Rankin was told to fly directly there to see him. Despite this demonstration of resolve, 
Chiang proved no more receptive than he had previously: asking him to order Li Mi's 
42 According to a Rangoon newspaper, the KMT mustered more troops than the communist and Karen 
insurgencies combined. The Nation, Rangoon, 16 April 1953, cited in Robert H. Taylor, Foreign and 
Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
South-east Asia Program, 1973). Estimates of the KMT's total troop strength in Burma vary from 
around 12,000 (the figure most contemporary observers appear to have settled on) to 18,500 (given in 
Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, p. 154). 
43 Franklin to Blancke, 3 March 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
44 Dulles to Taipei, 19 February 1953, FRCS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 53. 
192 
troops out was `asking the impossible', and in any case did not, he argued, correspond 
with stated US policy towards `Free China' more broadly. 45 This gambit did not fly: 
the US, Dulles replied, `cannot believe [that the] free Chinese policy supports hostile 
acts against [a] non-Communist Government in utter disregard [ofJ its sovereignty. 
Moreover, [the] US does not see how troops engaged in marauding acts deep within 
Burma are providing effective support [to the] Yunnanese resistance against 
Communists and thus fails to see how [the] withdrawal [of] these troops from Burma 
would significantly weaken such resistance' 46 
Continued pressure in Taipei finally produced results on 7 March, when Yeh told a 
member of the US embassy that Li Mi had agreed that a fact-finding mission of US, 
Chinese and Burmese officers should pay a visit to his troops in Burma to investigate 
the practicability of their removal. In the meantime, Taipei would seek to persuade Li 
Mi to confine his forces where they were currently deployed, and to refrain from 
offensive action against the Burmese. The Nationalist government also promised to 
suspend its monthly payments to Li Mi (for medical supplies, it was claimed), would 
do its best to prevent the raising of fresh private finance and would not allow further 
supply flights from Taiwanese airfields. 47 While the Nationalists restated their belief 
that Li Mi's contingents could still serve a useful purpose and should be retained, the 
offer was nonetheless better than nothing, and it was conveyed to the Burmese 
government on 10 March. By now, however, U Nu had taken matters into his own 
hands. On 3 March, he told the Burmese parliament that he intended to raise the KMT 
problem at the United Nations. Two weeks later, on 17 March, the US government 
43 Rankin to the State Department, 22 February 1953, ibid., p. 57. 
46 Dulles to Taipei, 24 February 1953, ibid., p. 59. 
47 Taipei to the State Department, 7 March 1953, ibid., p. 66, fn. 1. 
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was given notice that Burma was terminating its economic cooperation agreement 
`until such time as the Government of the Union of Burma are able to settle the KMT 
issue completely'. 48 
The effects of the KMT crisis on US economic and military relations 
Burma was the first (and, with Cambodia, seemingly the only) country to unilaterally 
sever an aid agreement with America, and the decision appears to have badly wrong- 
footed US officials. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued barely three weeks 
beforehand, covering possible developments to the end of 1953, saw no reason why 
Burma should not continue to accept US economic and military aid. Aid officials in 
Burma were as active as ever (the agricultural advisor, for instance, had stood as a 
judge in a flower show in Rangoon in February), and planners in Washington were 
busy developing programmes covering US assistance into 1955.49 At the same time, 
however, US observers freely acknowledged the corrosive effects the -increase in 
KMT activity was having on Burma's security and political life, and on America's 
reputation for integrity. The KMT problem, the Rangoon embassy reported, 
`dominated the political scene'; Burmese politicians were `frustrated and disillusioned 
at not being able to find a quick, satisfactory solution through diplomatic channels'. 
Press criticism of the United States had become `unremitting', and the credibility of 
US propaganda work in Rangoon had been `seriously jeopardised'. Until the problem 
was resolved, US relations with the Burmese would remain `precarious'. 50 
°S Sebald to the State Department, 17 March 1953, ibid., p. 74. 
49 NIE-74, `Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953', 20 February 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, part 2, 
1952-54, p. 54; 'Comments on ECA's Proposed FY54 Program for Burma', undated, records relating 
to the Mutual Security Assistance Program (Far East), 1949-1954, Lot 57D472, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
so Rangoon to the State Department, 23 April 1953,790B. 00/4-2353, CDF, box 4138, RG59, USNA; 
'KMT Troops in Burma', 5 March 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast 
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The US embassy dispatched its assessment of the motives for and implications of the 
termination of the aid agreement on 19 March. Clearly, the tensions generated by the 
KMT issue were instrumental. Even so, the decision to cancel aid had been taken with 
the `utmost reluctance', and was the result of a `serious crisis' within the AFPFL, 
`some of whose members have in effect accused the Prime Minister and some of his 
colleagues of accepting "hush money" in the guise of United States aid for their 
complacency in the matter of the KMT troops'. The step was `clearly not thought 
through' and `shows ignorance of the consequences such a move might have with 
respect to United States public opinion'. Nonetheless, caution was required: the US 
must not `lose sight of the important objective of keeping Burma out of the 
Communist camp 
-a process which might be accelerated by too hasty a reaction on 
our part'. 51 
Officials in the State Department agreed. Anything other than a `sympathetic view' 
risked `losing the confidence of the GOB 
... 
and in the long run perhaps even losing 
Burma to the Free World' 5.2 U Nu's `factitious' linkage of aid with the KMT problem 
could not, however, be allowed to stand, and Sebald was instructed to tell the prime 
minister that, unless the two issues were separated, US diplomatic efforts to resolve 
the crisis would have to end. U Nu was also told that American aid `could not be 
turned on and off like a faucet'; if the current agreement was curtailed `it would be 
Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, 
USNA. 
51 Day to Bonsai, 19 March 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
52 Ibid. 
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very doubtful that there would be anything for Burma in 1954.53 The Burmese 
conceded the first point, and references to the KMT were deleted in a revised 
document giving notice of the termination of aid. 4 The decision itself was not, 
however, rescinded, and the aid programme was officially ended on 30 June 1953. 
Although several ongoing projects continued, and the Burmese later asked if they 
could have all of the outstanding $31 million in aid allotted to them, some $10 
million-worth of programmed assistance was pointedly cancelled by the United States 
in an effort to make the Burmese `suffer somewhat the consequences' of their 
55 decision. 
Burma's concerns about the KMT were part of wider unease over the trajectory of 
American policy more generally in the early months of 1953. In particular, Burmese 
politicians worried that Eisenhower's arrival in the White House might signal a new 
and more belligerent US posture in Asia. Eisenhower's inaugural address, which cast 
the confrontation with communism in apocalyptic terms that spoke of freedom `pitted 
against slavery' and `lightness against the dark', was criticised in parts of the Burmese 
press as dangerously provocative, and Burmese officials expressed deep concern at 
the president's early decision to withdraw the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan 
33 `Political Developments in Burma as a Result of the KMT Crisis', 27 March 1953, records of the 
Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and 
miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
54 'Transmittal of Documents Concerning Termination of Economic Cooperation Agreement', 26 
March 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 
1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
53 'Status of Burma Program', 24 September 1953, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma 
Subject Files 1950-196 1, box 14, RG469, USNA. 
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Strait 56 On 4 February, Sao Hkun Hkio told Sebald that his government was `gravely 
concerned' that China might now move against the KMT in Burma on the pretext that 
the Nationalists, no longer constrained by the presence of American warships, were 
preparing an attack across the Burmese border in coordination with strikes on the 
mainland from Taiwan. 57 The fact that Burma was receiving progressively less in 
American aid may also have influenced the decision to end it. In 1952, general cuts in 
the overseas aid budget reduced assistance from an estimated $18 million to just over 
$12 million for the 1953 financial year, and further reductions of around 30% were 
planned for 1954 S8 A post-mortem on the end of the aid deal, written in December 
1953, suggested that a contributory factor may also have been political complications 
arising from tensions between the two senior aid officials in Rangoon, Abbot Low 
Moffat, the head of the aid mission, and his deputy, Frank Trager. 59 
56 Rangoon to the State Department, 17 June 1953,611.90B/6-1753, CDF, box 2856, RG59, USNA. 
The deployment of the Seventh Fleet was authorised by Truman in the opening days of the Korean 
conflict in June 1950. It was designed to prevent communist moves against Taiwan, and to discourage 
Nationalist attacks on the mainland. Like much else in US China policy, Eisenhower's redeployment of 
the fleet owed more to domestic political pressures and tensions within the administration than to any 
significant change in overall US strategy, and neither Eisenhower nor Dulles were any more supportive 
of a Nationalist invasion of the mainland than Truman had been. On the so-called 'unleashing' of 
Chiang, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, `A House Divided: The United States, the Department of State 
and China', in Warren Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1961 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 43-45. 
s' Sebald to the State Department, 4 February 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 51. 
58 ` Burma FY53 Allocation', 17 October 1952, records relating to the Mutual Security Assistance 
Program (Far East), 1949-1954, Lot 57D472B, box 1, RG59, USNA; Rangoon to the State 
Department, 10 June 1952, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma Subject Files 1950-1961, 
box 14, RG469, USNA. 
59 `Why Did Burma Pull Out of ECA? ', 11 December 1953, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, 
Burma Subject Files 1950-1961, box 14, RG469, USNA. 
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Difficulties over US economic aid increased the political significance of military 
assistance. American planners had begun to think about the provision of military aid 
towards the end ofý 1952, ahead of Ne Win's visit to the United States that October. 
Burma, officials believed, certainly seemed to need urgent military help, and did not 
appear to be getting enough of it from the British. According to Sebald, Ne Win and 
his officers were becoming increasingly impatient with what they considered a 
`dragging of feet and a lack of forthrightness' from the BSM; the UK was supplying 
`just enough material to keep their campaign moving but not enough to risk the 
capture of important quantities by a possible- aggressor'. British planners were 
`treading too softly and too slowly, when in Southeast Asia time is of the essence and 
the Burmese Government sorely needs encouragement in its determination to defend 
itself. The British, Sebald concluded, had to be `awakened to the necessity for giving 
more realistic satisfaction if Burma is to be developed into a free world bulwark' 
. 
60 
This was a ticklish problem. On the one hand, Burmese interest in military aid, 
evinced by Ne Win's visit, was `a favourable indication of [the] Burmese attitude 
toward the US' 
-a particularly valuable commodity given the strains the KMT crisis 
was causing. 61 On the other, the US did not wish to usurp the British as Burma's 
principal source of arms, partly out of sympathy for British sensitivities, and partly 
because it suited US planners to let someone else do the work. 62 Officials were also 
60 'Reimbursable Military Assistance for Burma', 29 September 1952, records of the Director, Office of 
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 
58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
61 ` Random Observations on US Military Assistance to Burma', undated, records of the Director, 
Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950- 
56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
62 Ibid. 
198 
aware that Britain's conservative supply policy stemmed at least in part from 
legitimate concerns about the general proliferation of uncontrolled arms in South-East 
Asia, many of which were finding their way to communists in China and Malaya. 63 
Accordingly, while `we should not be stampeded into running to the British with 
inordinate exhortations, we should take counsel with them to ensure that Burma gets 
what it needs'. 64 Copies of correspondence with the Burmese on arms questions were 
passed on to the'Foreign Office, and British officials were assured that the United 
States regarded Britain as Burma's primary source of military supplies, had no wish to 
compete and would seek British advice as soon as the Burmese came up with a 
definite request. 65 Privately, however, American officials were contemplating a larger 
role; as one put it, if the UK did not `sharpen up its diplomacy and [manage] its 
British Services Mission in such a manner as to give the Burmese at least an 
impression of satisfaction, the US may have to step in by default' 66 
63 Ibid. The problem of arms-trafficking in South-East Asia had been one of the subjects discussed at 
the tripartite conference of American, British and French defence officials in Singapore in May 1951. 
The conference had concluded that steps should be taken to `prevent the smuggling of arms and 
military equipment' and to stop `the creation or building up of stocks of arms' on the periphery of 
South-East Asia; to that end, the Burmese government `should again be asked to exercise a greater 
degree of control over facilities for the export of arms'. `Report of the Tripartite Talks Held at Phoenix 
Park, Singapore, 15-18 May 1951', F0371/93081/FZ1197/91, UKNA. 
6' Foster to Acly, 24 October 1952, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
65 Scott to Bancroft, 18 December 1952, F0371/101023/FB1194/71, UKNA. 
66 Minute, undated, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 
correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
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The Burmese made their approach on 10 March 1953, with an order for materiel 
including artillery, tanks, radar, ammunition, guns, grenades and mines. 67 This was 
just before the economic aid agreement was cancelled, and the KMT problem was 
very much on Burmese minds. A generous response, the Americans were told, would 
be taken in Rangoon `as a test of sincerity and goodwill'; failure or `inordinate delays' 
would be interpreted as `a desire to protect their friends the Chinese Nationalist troops 
and to deny help to the Burmese in disposing of them'. 8 Unless aid was forthcoming, 
Sebald warned, Burma might seek a `political accommodation' with the communist 
Chinese. 9 This American planners could not countenance, and the Burmese 
government was accordingly told that any requests for military assistance would be 
received `with sympathy'. Negotiations began at the end of April, and an agreement 
providing for reimbursable military aid was signed on 9 June 1953.0 
The signature of the aid deal prompted a lively discussion on the implications of US 
military assistance between Sebald and the US ambassador in London, Winthrop W. 
Aldrich. Aldrich was strongly opposed to the provision of aid; however tactful the 
approach, the British were `bound [to] resent US participation and competition in [a] 
field heretofore largely monopolized by [the] UK'. Britain regarded Burma as one of 
its `few remaining spheres of influence' in South-East Asia; once the US started to 
play an `active and independent role in giving military assistance to a country, we 
67 Rangoon to the Department of the Army, 10 March 1953, records of the Director, Office of 
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 
58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
68 Rangoon to the Foreign Office, 6 May 1953, F0371/106712/FB1193/26, UKNA. 
69 Sebald to the State Department, 22 October 1952, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 34. 
70 State Department briefing paper, 5 August 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, 
RG59, USNA. 
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undermine already sadly depleted British prestige to [the] point that [the] British are 
no longer able to carry effectively [a] significant share of the burden'. On balance, 
Aldrich argued, the `junior partnership' with the British should be maintained, even if 
it meant `playing second fiddle' to a less powerful nation. 71 Not so, argued Sebald; to 
be sure, it was not in the United States' interest to weaken British prestige in Burma, 
nor to replace Britain `in [a] position of proctorship'. The fact remained, however, 
that the British had `exhausted their once ample reservoir of prestige in Burma 
through their propensity to use their preferred position as [a] lever with which to 
exercise [a] measure of control over these highly nationalistic people'. Any 
suggestion that the US, by refusing to supply military aid itself, was in tacit agreement 
with this policy would `gratuitously offend Burma's aspirations for freedom of action, 
lend credence to charges of American support for colonial practices by metropolitan 
powers [a reference, presumably, to US backing for the French in Indochina] and 
discard [the] opportunity to demonstrate [the] avowed American desire [to] assist free 
Asian countries [to] maintain their freedom in [the] face [of] Communist pressures'. 72 
Sebald's arguments prevailed, and in late October 1953 the State Department decided 
that `prompt and favourable action' should be taken to meet Burma's arms requests. 
Problems with the British were not, however, easily overcome. The BSM thought 
many of the items the Burmese were asking for were simply duplicated in requests the 
British themselves were fielding; others, jet planes for example, were `absurd' and far 
beyond Burmese capacities to use. 73 According to Speaight, both the US and the UK 
`want to see the Burmese forces become more efficient and realise that they have an 
71 Aldrich to the State Department, 17 September 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 141. 
72 Sebald to the State Department, 28 September 1953, ibid., p. 149. 
73 Ward to the Foreign Office, 29 July 1953, F0371/106713/FB 1193/3 1, UKNA. 
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important role to fill in the fight against Communism in South-East Asia. But I fear 
that the Americans may easily go a long way towards defeating our common object 
unless they are willing to accept advice from us'. 74 To that end, the State Department 
was told that Britain was prepared to supply the bulk of the items the Burmese had 
requested from the United States; American assistance was justified only in cases 
where no British equivalents existed, or where delivery dates could not be met. 5 Jet 
planes and the like may well be unwise purchases, Speaight advised the Foreign 
Office, but `we need not worry unduly so long as the new toys do not interfere with 
the proper development of the Burmese armed forces'. 76 
According to Sebald, reporting from Rangoon, continued British opposition to US 
military aid left the State Department in an `invidious position'. There were, he 
reported, three alternatives. The US could refuse to sell anything at all, sell selected 
items approved by the British or, if agreement was impossible, ignore the British and 
go ahead unilaterally. Of the three, Sebald much preferred unilateral action, a position 
strengthened by the termination of the BSM in January 1954.7 Meanwhile, Burmese 
irritation at continued procrastination in Washington appeared to be growing; in 
December 1953, Ne Win told the US army attache in Rangoon that he had lost 
confidence in the United States and was `resigned to getting along without American 
74 Speaight to the Foreign Office, 30 July 1953, F0371/10671/FB1193/31, UKNA. 
75 Minute, 2 October 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 
correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
76 Speaight to the Foreign Office, 30 July 1953, F0371/10671/FB1193/31, UKNA. 
77 Sebald to the State Department, 30 October 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, 
RG59, USNA. 
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arms'. 78 In response, diplomatic pressure increased in London, and in March the two 
sides reached agreement on a list of items that the US should supply. 79 While `we well 
recognise that our friends the British have been something less than cooperative in the 
matter of arms', remarked the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Affairs, Everett Drumright, in April, `at least we have finally got to the point where 
the Burmese are free to put in a bid for certain equipment 
- 
if they still wish to do 
so'. 80 
The main problem now, officials thought, was cost. In all., Burma's requests amounted 
to just under $70 million, well out of reach of the country's limited finances; Ne Win, 
Drumright reported, `was talking of bargain basement specials despite all efforts to 
disabuse him'. 81 Since the Burmese could not buy everything they wanted, and for 
legal reasons prices could not be cut to accommodate them, some portion of their 
request had to be given gratis, and at the end of October 1954 the US government 
approved grant aid. The following February, the Burmese were told that America was 
prepared to supply military equipment, and to defray some of the cost by furnishing a 
portion of it as grant assistance. 82 In parallel, the long-standing policy of consultation 
78 `Burma Facing Serious Arms Supply Problem', 22 January 1954, records of the Director, Office of 
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 
58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
79 Sarell to the Foreign Office, 24 March 1954, F0371/111988/DB1193/37, UKNA. 
80 Drumright to Sebald, 1 April 1954, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
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and coordination with the British was revised. Writing in January 1955, a Foreign 
Office official noted that `the Americans do not seem to be as cooperative with us 
about military matters in Burma as they have been in the past'. With the departure of 
the BSM `they no doubt feel that they have an opportunity now to move in on our 
former preserve'. 83 
A problem deferred 
The progress American officials made in discussing military aid indicated that 
Burma's military leaders at least were not prepared to let the KMT problem damage 
other important areas of bilateral concern. The termination of the aid agreement was 
nonetheless an embarrassment for the new administration in Washington, and Dulles 
responded by increasing the diplomatic pressure in Taiwan. 84 American assistance to 
Chiang's regime, he told Rankin on 18 March, the day after the news that the 
Burmese were cancelling their aid deal, was `predicated on close cooperation. If such 
cooperation in essentials is not forthcoming, [the] foundation of the program is 
weakened'. 85 Rankin saw Chiang again on 21 March, and put to him the suggestion 
that Taiwanese refusal to give way could prompt Washington to rethink its aid 
83 Minute, MacCleary, 4 January 1955, F0371/111990/DB1193/80, UKNA. 
84 The termination of the aid deal, and the KMT debacle more broadly, received widespread critical 
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plans. 86 Three days later, Yeh gave Rankin an informal letter stating that his 
government had agreed in principle to the withdrawal of Li Mi's forces. Taipei could 
not, however, be held responsible for failing to accomplish `more than was feasible 
and reasonable under the circumstances'. Moreover, news of Taipei's agreement was 
to be kept secret until ways had been found to implement the evacuation. 87 Although 
Rankin accepted this as adequate, his colleagues did not: the caveats Yeh had 
appended rendered Taipei's agreement to the principle of evacuation `virtually 
meaningless and unsatisfactory as [a] basis for settlement', while Taiwan's refusal to 
make a public statement nullified the key immediate object of securing such an 
agreement, namely inducing the Burmese to think again about their appeal to the UN. 
Yeh's approach was accordingly rejected, and Rankin was instructed to press for a 
straightforward, formal statement of agreement that the US could pass on to 
Rangoon. 88 
Whether this would have been enough to keep the matter out of the UN is, however, 
doubtful. Having publicly committed his government to action, U Nu had little choice 
but to press ahead, and on 25 March the Burmese government formally requested that 
Burma's complaint be placed on the General Assembly agenda. The resolution Burma 
proposed charged the KMT with violating international law, called on the Assembly 
to condemn the KMT government in Taiwan as an aggressor and requested member 
states to `take all necessary steps to ensure the immediate cessation' of hostile acts 
against the Burmese state. 89 In London, meanwhile, British officials were beginning 
86 Rankin to the State Department, 21 March 1953, ibid., p. 79. 
87 Rankin to the State Department, 24 March 1953, ibid., p. 84. 
88 Dulles to Taipei, 26 March 1953, ibid., p. 84. 
89 The text of the Burmese resolution is in F0371/106685/FB1041/62,26 March 1953, UKNA. 
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to wonder whether they should get involved. Since the Burmese plainly would not be 
deterred from pressing their resolution, the primary aim was to ensure that its wording 
was as innocuous as possible 90 The British alternative called on the KMT troops in 
Burma to surrender, requested the authorities in Taipei to use their influence to 
arrange for the removal of these troops to Taiwan and suggested the appointment of a 
conciliator to negotiate along these lines with the governments and authorities 
concerned. These alternative suggestions were passed to the ambassador in 
Washington, Oliver Franks, who was told to discuss them with the State Department 
to see whether the US could support them. 
The reaction from officials in Washington was lukewarm, particularly over the 
proposal to appoint a conciliator to manage negotiations. Appointing a conciliator, the 
British were told, would do more harm than good, and was no more than `window 
dressing'. 91 This rebuff was not well received in London, where it was deemed scant 
thanks for an initiative that was, after all, designed to help the US out of a problem 
that the British unanimously thought was largely of its own making. 92 Nonetheless, 
t 
doing nothing was unacceptable: the Burmese had asked for British support in the UN 
and for advice on how to handle the debate, and Eden was not in any case prepared to 
leave the floor open to the communist delegations without making some form of 
supportive statement as an earnest of British good faith. 93 The West's relations with 
90 Tahourdin, minute, 2 April 1953, F0371/106686/FB1041/72, UKNA. 
91 Makins to the Foreign Office, no. 729,7 April 1953, F0371/106686/FB1041/71, UKNA. 
92 Paul Scott, minute, 9 April 1953, F0371/106686/FB1041/71, UKNA. 
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Burma and Asia more generally, Jebb was told on 16 April, `will be prejudiced if we 
do not display considerable sympathy and readiness to help'. 94 
The committee debate on Burma's draft resolution began on 17 April. It lasted for 
four days, with a final plenary session of the General Assembly on 23 April. The 
Burmese representative, Myint Thein, opened proceedings with what the British 
regarded as a convincing and well-documented case. 95 Little in it was new, though 
Burmese estimates of the increase in KMT strength, from 1,500 in 1950 to 12,000 by 
1952, were significantly higher than expected. Much of the Burmese statement 
concerned links between Li Mi's forces and the authorities on Taiwan: US 
involvement escaped mention beyond a 'reference to three ` Caucasians' found among 
the dead from the fighting in early 1953, and Myint Thein contented himself with an 
attack on Thailand for its involvement in cross-border trafficking. Over the following 
days, delegations from Poland and the Soviet Union all hinted at American 
involvement, but no direct charges were made. Jebb met his brief to support the 
Burmese complaint against Li Mi, but not the further charge of Taiwanese aggression, 
and the US representative, Henry Cabot Lodge, concentrated on the efforts the US had 
been making to secure the troops' withdrawal. Behind the scenes, the US and British 
delegations prevailed upon Mexico to table an alternative resolution, which stopped 
short of condemning Taiwan and instead recommended that existing efforts to secure 
the evacuation of `foreign forces' from Burma should continue. This was accepted 
unanimously in the General Assembly, and officials in London congratulated 
themselves on a diplomatic job well done. 96 
94 Foreign Office to UK UN delegation, no. 370,16 April 1953, F0371/106686/FB1041/85, UKNA. 
93 Scott, minute, 23 April 1953, F0371/106687/FB1041/103, UKNA. 
96 Scott, minute, 23 April 1953, F0371/106687/FB1041/106, UKNA. 
The Burmese were in fact decidedly unhappy with the outcome of their appeal, to the 
point that, later in the year, senior figures openly contemplated withdrawing from the 
UN altogether. 97 Nonetheless, the public ventilation of the KMT problem did at least 
seem to breathe some new life into efforts to resolve it. On 22 April, Sebald was told 
that the Burmese government was prepared to suspend military operations against the 
KMT to enable the US to `exercise its good offices'. 98 On the same day, the 
Nationalist government publicly announced its intention to cooperate in the 
withdrawal of Li Mi's troops 99 Meanwhile, the US pressed ahead with efforts to set 
up a mechanism to oversee the evacuation via a multinational commission based in 
Bangkok. On 27 April, the Thai government indicated its willingness to participate, 
and the following day the Burmese told Sebald that, although they could not deal 
directly with the Nationalist Chinese because of their diplomatic links with Beijing, 
indirect contacts were acceptable via the committee's US and Thai representatives. '00 
Whether the Burmese actually expected anything concrete to result was, however, 
doubtful: on 5 May, Sao Hkun Hkio told Speaight that his government had 
`abandoned hope of a peaceful withdrawal and had gone back to the belief that the 
KMT question is only going to be solved by force of their own arms'. '°' Rejecting the 
commission before its work had even begun seems nonetheless to have been judged 
impolitic, and a Burmese representative, Colonel Aung Gyi, was duly appointed. 
After some chivvying in Taipei, the Chinese Nationalists nominated their 
97 Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 355,17 September 1953, F0371/106690/FB1041/201, UKNA. 
9' Sebald to the State Department, 22 April 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 98, fn. 5. 
" Speaight to the Foreign Office, no. 160,23 April 1953, F0371/106690/FB1041/108, UKNA. 
10° Sebald to the State Department, 22 April 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 99, fn. 2. 
101 Speaight to Tahourdin, no. 1091/119,6 May 1953, F0371/106688/FB 1040/13 1, UKNA. 
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representative, Colonel I Fu-de, on 6 May. Li Mi refused to participate and no 
representative of the KMT in Burma was present at the committee's meetings. 
The `Joint Military Committee for the Evacuation of Foreign Forces from Burma' met 
for the first time on 22 May, in Bangkok. 102 Progress was slow, partly for procedural 
reasons (the Burmese refusal to deal directly with the Chinese necessitated alternating 
meetings between the two delegates), and partly because the Nationalist delegates did 
their best to delay. The main early sticking-point was a Nationalist demand for a 
general ceasefire prior to evacuation, which the Burmese rejected on the reasonable 
grounds that this would benefit not only the KMT, but also the government's various 
other insurgent opponents. Confidence in the committee's prospects was not helped 
by reports that groups within the Nationalist government were lobbying not only to 
prevent the withdrawal of Li Mi's contingents, but also for supplies to them to 
continue. According to the British consulate at Chiengmai, CAT planes were still 
ferrying arms and ammunition to Li Mi's irregulars; one: flight, on 28 June, had 
apparently been photographed by the Burmese. 103 
Preliminary agreement within the committee on a US-drafted evacuation plan was 
reached on 22 June, a month after the talks had first convened. This stipulated that, 
once arrangements for evacuation were in place, the Burmese would establish a 
ceasefire and safety zones to allow KMT troops to assemble and hand over their 
102 `Approval of Draft Agreement Submitted by Bangkok Committee on Evacuation of Chinese 
Irregulars from Burma', 3 July 1953, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian 
Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
103 Clemens, minute, 16 July 1953, F0371/106689/FB1041/172; Stewart to Tahourdin, 
F0371/106689/FB1041/172; Stewart to Tahourdin, 25 July 1953, F0371/106689B1031/167/53G, 
UKNA. 
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weapons. They would then be evacuated by air, from Myitkyina, Lashio and 
Moulmein in the south; other groups would go by road via Tachilek, from where they 
would cross into Thailand for eventual airlift to Taiwan from Chiengmai. 104 This 
necessarily complex scheme did little to improve outside expectations. In London, 
officials thought that, while some of the `mess' may well be cleared up, a `residual 
problem' would remain, which US exhaustion would compel the British to tackle 
themselves. 105 The Americans too did not expect complete success, partly because by 
now they accepted Taipei's contention that its control over the semi-autonomous 
Burma contingents was indeed incomplete. 
Opposition to the evacuation scheme among commanders on the ground in Kengtung 
(what officials called the `jungle generals') coalesced around the `recalcitrant' figure 
of General Li Tse-fen. At the end of June, he and his associates held a lengthy if 
unproductive meeting with Edwin Stanton, the US ambassador in Bangkok, during 
which the general repudiated the UN's April resolution as illegal, rubbished the 
prospects for evacuation and insisted on extensive Burmese guarantees for the 
protection of the KMT's non-Chinese `allies' in Kengtung. 106 These demands were 
duly rejected by the US, and on 8 July a group of senior officers was dispatched from 
Taipei to encourage the cooperation of Li Tse-fen and his group. 107 Far from the 
advertised knocking together of heads, however, the arrival of these reinforcements, 
104 Stanton to the State Department, 22 June 153, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol. 12, part 2, p. 114. 
105 Selby, minute, 18 June 1953, F0371/106688/FB1041/144, UKNA. 
106 Stanton to the State Department, 29 June 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 114; `Telegram 
Urging Chinese Nationalist Irregular Leader To Accept Repatriation from Burma', 30 June 1953, 
records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-55 and 
miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
107 Rankin to the State Department, 3 July 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 118, fn. 3. 
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led by Li Mi's deputy chief of staff Li Wen Pin, appears merely to have added to the 
procrastination and confusion surrounding the Bangkok talks; on 23 July the Bangkok 
embassy told Dulles that the jungle generals and the leadership in Taipei were 
`throwing [the] ball back and forth in [an] endeavour [to] postpone positive action'. 
The delegation dispatched from Taipei purportedly to secure the cooperation of Li 
Tse-fen and his clique in fact comprised `strawmen who lack authorization [to] make 
firm decisions and whose actions are inhibited by what appear to be instructions to 
ios delay'. 
The British watched the continued lack of progress in Bangkok with mounting alarm. 
Nothing short of the outright suspension of US aid, officials thought, would now be 
enough to coerce the government on Taiwan into full cooperation with the evacuation, 
but such a move was not conceivable within the existing framework of US policy, and 
pressing it in Washington risked raising suspicions about British attitudes towards 
Chiang's regime more broadly. 109 In any case, it was not guaranteed that suspending 
aid would be sufficient to persuade the jungle generals into accepting evacuation. At 
the end of July Gordon Whitteridge, the UK's ambassador in Thailand, raised the 
unwelcome possibility that, thanks to its involvement in opium trafficking, the KMT 
in Burma had achieved financial and material independence from Taipei; `we may', 
he thought, `be up against a lucrative racket in which the peddling of "black gold" 
[opium] is the chief incentive, while military operations have been reduced to a side- 
line'. Whitteridge also suspected that covert opium-related links still existed between 
the KMT, senior figures in the Thai police, the Sea Supply Company and CAT, and 
log Brown to the State Department, 23 July 1953, ibid., p. 118. 
109 Selby, minute, 31 July 1953, F0371/106689/FB1041/183, UKNA. 
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was convinced that private American citizens, if not an official US agency, were still 
`running a racket': 
Any gang of adventurers which is willing to take large risks for high 
profits is comparatively impervious to governmental sanction. And 
in this particular case, where CAT will presumably always have a 
sanctuary in Formosa, and both it and the Sea Supply Company are 
well-established in Siam, it seems even more difficult than usual to 
suppress their activities. If this is so, there seems nothing to prevent 
Li Mi from continuing to cock a snook at the 59 nations who voted 
for the UN resolution last April. 110 
Much the same thought appears to have occurred to the Burmese. On 24 July U Kyaw 
Nyein told Sebald that the Bangkok committee had reached an impasse; the Burmese 
were on the point of withdrawing from it, and issuing a public denouncement of 
Nationalist bad faith. Sebald was also informed that the regime was toying with the 
idea of a non-aggression pact with Beijing, and asking the communist Chinese army 
into Burma to solve the KMT problem once and for all. Although Sebald did not take 
the suggestion of an accommodation with Beijing entirely seriously, to raise the idea 
at all was a clear signal that the Burmese government was nearing the end of its 
patience. "' On 12 September, after several more weeks of inconclusive talks, U Nu 
appealed directly to Eisenhower. 112 The Bangkok committee, he told the president, 
10 Whitteridge to the Foreign Office, no. 113,30 July 1953, F0371/106689/FB1041/180; Whitteridge 
to Tahourdin, no. 1024/173/53,5 August 1953, F0371/106689/FB1041/183, UKNA. 
"' Sebald to the State Department, 24 July 1953, FRUS, vol. 12, part2,1952-54, p. 119. 
112 U Nu to Eisenhower, 12 September 1953, ibid., p. 136. 
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was a sham; the Nationalist Chinese were not acting in good faith, and had no 
intention of carrying through their obligations to the UN. No reply was immediately 
forthcoming, and four days later, on 16 September, the Burmese delegate in Bangkok 
issued an ultimatum: unless a final agreement was reached by 23 September, 
providing for the withdrawal of at least 5,000 KMT troops (around half of the 
estimated total) within 21 days, the Burmese government would pull out of the four- 
power talks. 113 Although the evacuation period was subsequently extended to 35 days, 
this was rejected by the Chinese Nationalist representative and, despite a last-ditch 
attempt by the US to keep the talks alive, the Burmese withdrew from the committee 
on 17 September. 
Although the State Department did not regard the Burmese figure of 5,000 as 
reasonable or for that matter achievable, Rangoon's withdrawal from the Bangkok 
talks did nonetheless inject fresh energy into efforts to find a compromise. 
Immediately after the Burmese pulled out, Smith told Rankin that the evacuation issue 
was now of `top urgency', and demanded an undertaking from the government on 
Taiwan that at least 2,000 troops would be across the Thai frontier by the end of 
October, as well as a commitment that `every effort' would be made to induce as 
many as possible to leave thereafter. 114 Taiwan responded with a counter-proposal on 
22 September: Taipei would sign up to the evacuation plan hammered out at Bangkok 
in June, but could not order these troops out and would not guarantee that any more 
than 2,000 in all would withdraw. "" Given that most observers by now accepted 
Burma's figure of 12,000 as the total number of KMT troops in the country, 2,000 did 
113 Donovan to the State Department, 16 September 1953, ibid., p. 140. 
114 Smith to Taipei, 17 September 1953, ibid., p. 144. 
113 Taipei to the State Department, 22 September 1953, ibid., p. 145, fn. 2. 
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not represent a significant reduction. Yeh was told that it was not enough, and 
Eisenhower wrote personally to Chiang to warn him that the time had come `when 
concrete results must be produced'; without meaningful progress `a situation will be 
created which the communists will not fail to exploit'. 116 
Eisenhower also took the opportunity to reply to U Nu's earlier appeal for help. 
Although sympathetic in tone, in content it merely restated Taiwan's position that, 
while a limited number of KMT troops would accept evacuation, nothing could be 
done to compel the unwilling to leave. Eisenhower also argued that Burma's 
insistence on anything more was unrealistic, and rejected as unfounded Burmese 
accusations that the US was not trying as hard as it might to force a solution on its 
allies in Taipei. "? Given the requirements of wider policy towards Taiwan, it is 
doubtful that Eisenhower could have offered the Burmese a statement any more 
critical of the Taipei regime's behaviour; even had he done so, it is not obvious that 
this would have salvaged Burmese participation at Bangkok. According to British 
reports, U Nu was by this stage `depressed', `disillusioned' and convinced that, 
`whatever the American Embassy in Formosa was saying, other American influences 
there were inciting the KMT to maintain their foothold in Burma'; anti-American 
feeling was `very strong'. I18 
With Western efforts apparently compromised and exhausted, the Burmese again 
raised the possibility of accepting communist bloc help. In September, U Pe Kin, 
Burma's ambassador in Thailand, told the British that Rangoon had received an offer 
116 Eisenhower to Chiang, 28 September 1953, ibid., p. 153. 
117 Eisenhower to U Nu, 28 September 1953, ibid., p. 151. 
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of assistance from the Soviet Union. 119 Like Kyaw Nyein's earlier hints to Sebald 
about a possible non-aggression pact with the communist Chinese, this latest sally was 
taken less as a serious proposition than an attempt to provoke. Nonetheless, `the 
possibility cannot be discounted that if no other solution is offered the Burmese may 
invoke Chinese Communist help'. Even if Rangoon were prevailed upon to keep faith 
with the United States, relations were `bound to suffer from the continuation of this 
anti-American attitude and from the Burmese disillusionment with the UN'. 120 On 3 
October, Dulles told the US embassy in Rangoon that America's efforts to assist in 
the removal of the KMT had reached a `critical and decisive stage'. While privately 
officials still hoped for a figure closer to 3,000, Taiwan's maximum of 2,000 troops 
was now presented to the Burmese as a `tangible offer' that Rangoon would be well 
advised to accept. Rejection would mean that the `prospect of any progress through 
international good offices will have been lost because of [the] Burmese refusal [to] 
face facts'. 121 Meanwhile, Chiang was urged to issue `as strong a public commitment 
as possible' to evacuation so as to strengthen Taiwan's international position and 
thereby `shift responsibility to [the] Burmese for [the] breakdown of negotiations'. 122 
The US, Thailand and Taiwan finally signed the evacuation agreement in Bangkok on 
12 October, with the withdrawal slated to begin in the first week of November. By the 
end of the month, some 1,104 troops and 174 dependants had been evacuated, and 55 
119 Mackenzie to Tahourdin, 22 September 1953, no. 11024/209/53, F0371/106690/FB1041/219, 
UKNA. 
120 Foreign Office to the UK UN delegation, no. 675,1 October 1953, F0371/106690/FB1041/231, 
UKNA. 
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122 Jones to the State Department, 5 October 1953, ibid., p. 159. 
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rifles, only 11 of them serviceable, had been surrendered. 123 Just over 1,100 troops in 
three weeks represented an evacuation rate of about 50 troops a day, many of them 
unfit. This was not sterling progress, and prompted officials once again to ask 
questions about Taiwanese good faith. On 23 November, Sebald told Dulles that the 
evacuation was a `smokescreen for [the] continuation [of] KMT operations'; Li Mi, 
`possibly aided and abetted by certain segments [of the] Chinese Government', was 
intent on maintaining his control over the KMT remnants with a view to `continuing 
nefarious operations in Burma and Thailand including [the] opium smuggling racket'. 
The time had come, he declared, when the US should `squarely face [the] issue 
whether it should continue [to] bear [the] brunt [of] criticisms over this affair in 
Burma in particular and SEA in general when [the] party most directly involved fails 
[to] exert its utmost in bringing about [a] reasonable solution'. The argument that 
Chiang had no influence over Li Mi was `patently transparent': if he wanted to do so, 
he could `cleanse this sordid affair without undue difficulty'. 124 Sebald was blunter 
still in conversation with his British colleagues in Bangkok: the jungle generals had 
no intention of evacuating their best troops but, with the connivance of Li Mi, were 
organising `phoney' operations; the Nationalists were `completely discrediting 
themselves', and Chiang himself was `double crossing'. 125 
The evacuation's bumpy progress was as important internationally as locally: 
Burma's complaint of KMT aggression remained before the UN, and the US remained 
preoccupied with the damage the KMT crisis threatened to Taiwan's international 
standing, as well as to its own. The debate at the UN reopened at the end of October, 
'23 Wallinger to the Foreign Office, no. 394,28 November 1953, F0371/106693/FB1041/314, UKNA. 
124 Sebald to the State Department, 23 November 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 12, part 2, p. 173. 
125 Wallinger to the Foreign Office, no. 399,29 November 1953, F0371/106694/FV1041/315, UKNA. 
216 
and had its final plenary session at the General Assembly on 8 December. It was by 
all accounts a more bruising encounter than the April discussion, though again the US 
and its allies escaped serious damage. The Burmese government, represented once 
more by Myint Thein, declared itself `unimpressed' by moves to evacuate the KMT, 
which it regarded as a `token response to lull the United Nations'. Myint Thein was, 
according to the British report of the proceedings, `more embittered' than at the 
previous session, and `definitely critical' of the UN for its apparent reluctance to 
condemn the Chinese Nationalists. 126 He also dealt robustly with his Nationalist 
counterpart, Tingfu Tsiang, and there was a sharp exchange between the two over 
what Tsiang called Burma's `obnoxious' policy of neutrality. Although the US 
representative, Archibald J. Cary, did what he could to present the Nationalists in a 
favourable light, allegations of aggression and US connivance therein were again 
produced by Soviet bloc delegates, albeit the British at least thought that they made 
`no more trouble than expected'. 127 
By the time the UN session closed, the first phase of evacuation had ended. In total, 
1,923 individuals had been removed, just shy of the 2,000 target, plus over 300 
dependants. 128 After further delays occasioned by haggling between the US and 
Burma over Rangoon's reluctance to bear a larger share of the costs of the evacuation, 
and between the US and Taipei over payments to departing KMT troops, a second 
phase in February and March 1954 saw the evacuation of another 2,962 troops and 
126 UK UN delegation to the Foreign Office, 5 November 1953, F0371/106693/FB1041/299, UKNA. 
127 Clemens, minute, 8 December 1953, F0371/106693/FB1041/326, UKNA. 
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513 dependants. 129 This marked the end of efforts in the north, and attention turned to 
the 1,500-strong KMT contingent further to the south. This third phase of evacuation 
finally began in early May, and by 9 May 764 people had been removed. 130 Although 
the embassy in Rangoon raised the possibility of further action, officials in 
Washington were by now becoming disenchanted with the Burmese government's 
lack of gratitude for American efforts, and the authorities in Taipei were adamant that 
enough was enough. 131 The Joint Commission wound itself up on 1 September, 
marking the formal end of the evacuation process. The operation had lasted almost a 
year; in all, around 7,000 people, both fighters and dependants, had been removed. 
Conclusion 
Later writers have tended to agree with U Nu's assessment of the Nationalist 
evacuation as more-or-less a sham. It certainly had its share of chaos, duplicity and 
fraud, at least during the first phase up to December 1953, with locals smuggled in to 
make up the numbers, worthless weapons surrendered and irregulars simply melting 
away into the jungle, preferring banditry and the opium traffic to an uncertain future 
in the alien surroundings of Taiwan. For all the thousands removed, several thousand 
more 
- 
perhaps 5,000, if Burmese pre-evacuation estimates of 12,000 were accurate 
- 
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remained in Burma, and their presence would trouble America's relations with Burma 
again in the early 1960s. Yet for all that, there was a sense among officials that, 
though partial and difficult, the evacuation had at least taken some of the venom out 
of the KMT problem. According to Gore-Booth, the Americans had achieved, `by 
their generosity and patience, the removal of a dangerous source of trouble'. 132 
Had this `generosity and patience' also salvaged America's relations with the 
Burmese? US officials thought so: just before he left his post in July 1954, Sebald told 
the State Department that `the evacuation of a goodly portion of the KMT's from 
Burma appears to have satisfied the Burmese Government and people that at least the 
United States Government has done its utmost to bring about a successful 
evacuation'. 133 According to Sebald's charge d'affaires, Bob Acly, the exertions the 
US had made had convinced the Burmese that `we are sincere in our efforts to help 
them, and some part of their deep suspicion had been removed thereby'. 134 
Counterparts in Washington agreed: relations were now, it was felt, back to where 
they would have been had the KMT problem never intervened. 135 These perhaps 
complacent conclusions failed fully to understand the almost visceral response that the 
KMT crisis had generated within Burmese politics. In June 1953 a Burmese 
journalist, Maung Maung, published an account of a visit to the Burmese front lines. 
`The war against the KMT, ' he wrote, `is a grim war and a lonely war 
... 
The KMT 
have waged open brutal war against the hill peoples in the Shan State, against the 
132 Gore-Booth to the Foreign Office, 30 June 1954, F0371/111967/DB1041/47, UKNA. 
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Union of Burma. They have pillaged and plundered, slaughtered innocent people and 
committed atrocities 
... 
It has been a grim, bitter war. ' 136 Eisenhower's Vice- 
President, Richard Nixon, came as close as anyone to an appreciation of what the 
KMT conflict meant to the Burmese: `without exception', he noted in November 
1953, it was their `primary preoccupation 
... 
It permeates their thinking to the point of 
obsession and vitiates their ability to act on other domestic and foreign matters'. 137 
By any measure, US involvement with the KMT in Burma was an unmitigated 
political and military disaster, part of a series of botched covert operations in the early 
1950s: `of agents betrayed; dropped into the waiting arms of the communist security 
138 apparat; dragged before people's tribunals; interrogated, tortured and shot'. It failed 
dismally in its ostensible aim of diverting Chinese troops from the Korean theatre, 
was thoroughly penetrated 
- 
Li Mi's radio operator at the Sea Supply Company in 
Bangkok was apparently a communist agent 
- 
and left an ugly legacy of KMT- 
sponsored heroin trafficking in the Golden Triangle between Burma, Laos and 
Thailand. It also embroiled two US administrations in a very public series of 
propaganda embarrassments, further undermining America's already diminished 
standing in Asia. As MacDonald put it to Eden in February 1955, America's 
reputation in South-East Asia had suffered a `deplorable decline'. Thanks mainly to 
its confrontational China policy 
- 
of which the KMT adventure was a part 
- 
and the 
136 Mating Mating, Grim War Against the KMT, Rangoon, June 1953. 
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militarised containment of the SEATO pact, the United States was seen by much of 
Asian opinion, not as the guardian of peace and the champion of freedom, but as a 
narrow-minded, intolerant bully, resented for its wealth and feared for its power: 
instead of being liked as generous benefactors of small, under 
developed countries, they are resented as a rich power attempting to 
buy the allegiance of poorer states; and instead of being respected 
as the staunchest guardians of world peace they are suspected as 
the most likely provokers of a third World War. 139 
MacDonald's complaints are testimony to the extent to which fears about US policies 
and actions across a wide range of issues, from nuclear testing and arms control to the 
unruly behaviour of US personnel overseas, were making even America's friends 
doubt its commitment to responsible and constructive leadership. 140 It is therefore not 
surprising that, when Soviet and Chinese leaders launched a concerted diplomatic 
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offensive in Asia in the mid-1950s, they found a ready audience among the region's 
politicians, including in Burma. ' 
222 
Chapter 6 
Communist intervention and the resumption of American aid, 1955-1958 
In the years immediately after Burma's independence, policy-makers, first in London 
and then in Washington, were concerned largely with the problems of regime stability 
stemming from conflict and economic weakness. Accordingly, the main features of 
Anglo-American policy 
- 
attempts to extend economic assistance through the 
Commonwealth loan, American technical aid or via the Colombo Plan, favourable 
treatment in military supplies, or political support for the government against Karen 
claims to autonomy, for example 
- 
were all intended to bolster the government's 
ability to stave off economic crisis and maintain its capacity to resist its Karen and, in 
particular, communist opponents. Although planners acknowledged the more 
hazardous regional environment created by the emergence of the communist regime in 
China, the assumption remained that the primary threat to the Burmese government 
was domestic, not international. 
By the mid-1950s, it appeared that, in large part, the objective of stability had been 
achieved. British officials in Rangoon were reporting the effective end of major Karen 
armed opposition in the Delta. ' The communist insurgency, while undefeated, 
appeared to be in retreat, and the period ended with a series of mass surrenders in 
which perhaps 10,000 communist and PVO fighters laid down their arms. Burma's 
third main source of instability 
- 
the KMT troops encamped on its eastern border 
- 
had also lost much of its venom following the evacuations of 1953 and 1954. 
1 Gore-Booth to the Foreign Office, no. 142,29 March 1955, F0371/117032/DB1017/5; Sarell to the 
Foreign Office, no. 580,24 November 1955, F0371/117032/DB 10 17/16, UKNA. 
2 Smith, Burma, p. 163. 
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Operations against the irregulars that remained, by now in tandem with the Thai 
armed forces, were making solid, if modest, progress, and American observers had 
concluded that the government in Rangoon no longer considered them a serious 
security threat. 3 Politically too, Burma seemed to have reached a new level of 
maturity. The country's second parliamentary elections since independence went 
ahead as planned in 1956. Although the AFPFL retained its hold on power, competing 
parties won about a third of the vote, suggesting that a constitutional opposition was 
beginning to emerge. 
These apparent improvements in the political and security spheres were not, however, 
matched by comparable progress in tackling Burma's economic problems, and the 
government's primary source of weakness during the period remained its economic 
dependence on a single commodity, rice. When Asian rice was in short supply, as it 
was in the early 1950s, prices were buoyant and the dangers inherent in this 
dependency were masked. By the mid-1950s, however, the rice market was turning 
against the Burmese. Traditional customers such as India were becoming self- 
sufficient, forcing down prices and leaving the Burmese with huge surpluses they 
could not sell. Unable to find customers in its old rice markets, the Burmese 
government sought out new ones, and a series of barter deals were agreed with China 
and the Soviet bloc in 1954 and 1955. 
Burma's trade agreements were part of a pattern of Soviet and Chinese diplomatic 
initiatives in the Third World in the mid-1950s. Similar trade and aid deals were 
3 Minute, MacCleary, 17 February 1955, F0371/117038/DB1041/1, UKNA; `Political Situation', 21 
September 1955, records of the Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs, 1954-1956, Lot 56D206, 
RG59, USNA. 
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concluded with India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Cambodia, all accompanied by a flurry 
of diplomatic, activity as high-profile delegations streamed out of Moscow and 
Beijing, heading for Delhi, Kabul, Rangoon and Cairo. To analysts in Washington and 
London, accustomed to the belligerent diplomacy of the Stalin years, these overtures 
constituted an important and worrying change in communist foreign policy, and 
planners responded with a significant reappraisal of the nature of the communist 
threat, and of the significance of the countries at which it appeared to be aimed. The 
Soviet Union, officials concluded, was engaged in a concerted offensive aimed at 
displacing Western influence in the Third World. 
This broader analysis invested Burma's trade ties with the communist bloc with an 
importance that in themselves they perhaps did not merit, and efforts to frame a 
response constituted the defining factor in British and, especially, American relations 
with the country during this period. The rice deals, officials in Washington and 
London argued, were the thin end of a dangerous wedge, portending communist 
economic, and through that political, predominance. Apprehensions of a communist 
threat to the Burmese government had of course been central to British and American 
thinking about Burma since independence, but this threat had primarily been 
understood as a domestic one; although officials acknowledged the risks of Chinese 
subversion, and the lesser risk of Chinese invasion, the most urgent danger seemed to 
stem from the country's communist insurgency. Burma's independence from 
communist control no longer seemed to rest on its ability to counter the political and 
military challenge of its own communists, but on its ability to resist the economic 
advances of Moscow and Beijing. As Gore-Booth put it to the Foreign Office at the 
° Robert J. McMahon, `The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 
1955-1956', International History Review, vol. 18, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 591-619. 
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end of 1955: `The thing which hits one most forcibly is that whereas we in Burma 
were in the stalls watching a drama called the cold war, we now occupy a very small 
but active corner on that large stage'. 5 
Burma's evolving relations with China and the Soviet Union 
Although Burma was the first Asian state to recognise the communist government in 
China, in December 1949, relations between Rangoon and Beijing developed slowly 
at first. In December 1951, a Chinese cultural delegation visited Rangoon, and a 
Burmese mission toured China early in 1952 to investigate Chinese land reforms. 
Neither trip was a particular success, and the atmosphere was not improved by 
China's failure to send a representative to Burma's independence day celebrations on 
4 January 1952. Relations began to warm towards the middle of the 1950s, partly in 
response to the strains caused by the US-supported KMT occupation. In June 1954, 
Chou En Lai stopped off in Rangoon on his way back from the Geneva Conference on 
Indochina for what the Chinese called `free and frank discussions on matters of 
common concern'. While little substantive emerged, the episode was nonetheless 
symbolically significant for the two countries' endorsement of the `Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence', a reciprocal rhetorical commitment to territorial integrity, 
non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit and `peaceful coexistence'. U Nu made a reciprocal visit to Beijing in 
November and December 1954, concluding a series of agreements covering the 
opening of new consulates in Burma and China, preparations for an air link and the 
3 Gore-Booth to Allen, 28 December 1955, F0371/123329/DB1051/2, UKNA. 
6 
`U Nu's Visit to Communist China', 22 February 1955, records of the Director, Office of Philippine 
and Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence 1949-1955 and miscellaneous, 1950-1956, Lot 58D207, 
box 4, RG59, USNA. 
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restoration of cross-border traffic. There was also talk of steps to settle the 
undemarcated border between the two countries, and China agreed a barter deal under 
which Beijing would import up to 200,000 tonnes of Burmese rice in exchange for 
industrial plant and consumer goods. 
Political and economic relations with the Soviet Union were also becoming closer. 
Early in 1955, a Burmese trade delegation toured the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in search of purchasers of Burmese rice, and in March the Burmese press 
reported that the Soviet government had offered Rangoon technical aid. 7 A series of 
barter deals was reached with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and 
Yugoslavia, and in July 1955 the Soviet Union and Burma concluded a three-year 
trade agreement under which Moscow undertook to buy some 600,000 tons of 
Burmese rice. In exchange, Burma stood to receive a range of communist goods, 
including industrial plant, vehicles, heavy machinery and chemicals! The trade deal 
prompted a fresh round of diplomatic activity, beginning with a two-week visit by U 
Nu to the Soviet Union from 21 October to 4 November 1955.9 U Nu (or `Comrade U 
Nu', as his hosts liked to call him) saw an array of senior officials, including Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev, chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin and 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The trip took him right across the country, 
from Moscow and Leningrad to the Crimea, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. According to 
British reports of the visit, the treatment he received was `unprecedentedly lavish'. '0 
On 3 November, U Nu signed a joint declaration with Bulganin pledging Burmese 
7 Moscow to the Foreign Office, 31 March 1955, F0371/117046/DB1121/11, UKNA. 
8 Sarell to the Foreign Office, no. 317,2 July 1955, F0371/117051/DB11338/1, UKNA. 
9 Hayter to Macmillan, no. 188,11 November 1955, F0371/117073/DB1632/86, UKNA. 
10 Tomlinson, minute, 16 November 1955, F0371/117073/DB1632/86, UKNA. 
support for Soviet foreign policy, including the rejection of military blocs and backing 
for communist Chinese membership of the UN (China's UN seat being occupied by 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan). He also reached agreement in principle on 
Soviet technical assistance, in exchange for more Burmese rice. " 
U Nu's trip was followed by a return visit to Burma by Bulganin and Khrushchev on 
1-8 December. Preparations were extensive and painstaking: schools and government 
offices were closed, Rangoon's populace was told to line the streets as the Soviet 
motorcade passed, and the government issued instructions on how to cheer 
(apparently `a foreign habit'). The visit concluded with another trade deal, and an 
agreement covering Soviet technical help in agriculture and industrial development. 
The Soviets also offered to build and equip a technical institute in Rangoon 
(duplicating an engineering institute being built by a British firm). A joint Soviet 
Burmese communique signed on 8 December reaffirmed the friendly relations 
between the two countries, and foreshadowed still closer economic and political ties. 12 
Finally, a short visit by Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet First Deputy Premier, on 30 
March-2 April 1956 produced an agreement extending the three-year trade deal 
reached in July 1955 by a further two years, taking it up to 1960, and a protocol 
providing for the delivery by Burma of 400,000 tons of rice a year for the following 
four years. Mikoyan also announced that the Soviet Union had undertaken to build 
and equip a hospital, a theatre, an exhibition hall, a sports complex and a hotel, and 
the delegation floated the possibility of a long-term development loan. According to 
11 Rangoon to the State Department, 10 November 1955, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 22, Southeast Asia 
(Washington DC: USGPO, 1989), p. 27, fn. 3. 
12 Gore-Booth to Macmillan, no. 264,19 December 1955, F0371/1 1 7070/DB1631/25, UKNA. 
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the British report of the trip, Burma now stood to receive just under £50 million-worth 
of Soviet goods and services. 13 
For the Burmese government, closer trade relations with the communist bloc were 
primarily a pragmatic response to the country's economic and developmental needs, 
in particular its need to dispose of a large quantity of surplus rice. As British colonial 
buyers had discovered (in Chapter 3), by the mid-1950s a general shift against 
suppliers in the global market had drastically reduced Burma's rice earnings and left a 
significant portion of its surplus unmarketable through the country's traditional 
commercial channels. According to British estimates, about three-quarters of Burma's 
foreign exchange earnings and almost half of the country's national revenue was at 
risk, just as expenditure was beginning on an ambitious development programme 
designed to reduce the appeal of Burma's insurgent communists. 14 Communist offers 
to take large amounts of rice 
- 
between a third and a half of the country's exportable 
surplus, the British reckoned 
- 
were thus seized upon in Rangoon as the only 
available way of averting a financial, and through that political, crisis. The Soviet 
Union, Gore-Booth told his colleagues, `could help where the West had failed'. '5 
At the same time, these growing economic ties, alongside measures antagonistic to the 
West, such as the termination of the BSM and the curtailing of American aid, 
contained obvious political risks: `Sooner or later', Gore-Booth told London in May 
1956, ` and I am afraid it may be sooner 
- 
Communist trade, Communist experts and 
Communist-designed and erected buildings could be followed by Communist arms, 
13 Gore-Booth to Selwyn-Lloyd, no. 121,12 April 1956, F0371/123343/DB11338/8, UKNA. 
14 Sarell to Macmillan, no. 184,23 August 1955, F0371/117047/DB1121/26, UKNA. 
15 Gore-Booth to Macmillan, no. 264,19 December 1955, F0371/117070/DB1631/25, UKNA. 
Communist ideas and, ultimately, Communist control of this country. Lenin said the 
way to London was through Peking and Calcutta; Bulganin and Khrushchev seem to 
have concluded that Rangoon is also on the way'. 16 Analysts in Washington were 
reaching similar conclusions. Soviet tactics in Burma, noted Kenneth Young, `present 
a real threat to the free world's previously favourable position'. 17 Moscow, officials 
thought, was `steadily enveloping Burma in the Communist vise 
... 
The ultimate aim 
appears to be to squeeze out Western influence and to switch Burma from her neutral 
position to the Communist bloc'. 18 The obvious question this conclusion posed was 
whether Britain or the United States were prepared to counter the Soviet Union and 
China by offering assistance of their own. Both Washington and London had, of 
course, been here before, and neither had succeeded in establishing a workable aid 
relationship with Rangoon. A crisis in the rice market was also nothing new, and even 
Burmese officials accepted that they had brought at least some of their problems upon 
themselves through unrealistic pricing policies, poor-quality produce and bureaucratic 
hitches in the state marketing monopoly, the SAMB. 19 Why try again, in other words, 
when past attempts to support the regime had failed, and when the specific problem at 
issue arguably called for domestic reform, as much as external help? More broadly, 
why expend political or economic capital helping a government that refused to side 
openly with the West in Asia? The answer lies in changes in Anglo-American 
assessments of Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World. 
16 Gore-Booth to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 128,2 May 1956, F0371/123343/DB11338/9, UKNA. 
17 Young to Satterthwaite, 28 December 1955, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence file, 1949-1955, Lot 58D207, box 3, USNA. Young was the 
Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs. 
18 ` Countering Communist Bloc Tactics in Burma', 27 January 1956,790B. 001/1-2756, CDF, box 
3854, USNA. 
19 Satterthwaite to the State Department, 26 May 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 9. 
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The communist `economic offensive' 
In early October 1955, two State Department officials, Robert Bowie, director of the 
PPS, and his PPS colleague William Leonhart, produced a short paper outlining the 
Department's assessment of the future direction of Soviet foreign policy. 20 In terms of 
strategic objectives 
- 
the elimination of NATO, the removal of overseas US bases and 
the diminution of US influence abroad 
- 
the paper's authors detected no significant 
change, and in some areas of dispute, such as over Germany, a hardening of the 
Soviet position seemed likely. Tactically, on the other hand, some important and 
worrying shifts appeared to be under way. The Soviet Union, the paper explained, had 
come to recognise that general war `no longer can advance its own national interests'. 
Instead, planners in Moscow were placing greater emphasis on "`amiability" and lure 
than on threat'. 
This new, more agreeable approach to international relations was of concern primarily 
because it threatened to undermine the unity of Western purpose forged by a sense of 
shared and imminent danger. Already, the paper argued, America's allies were 
showing a disturbing tendency towards ` trusting accommodation', greater reluctance 
to `continue to build up national and coalition military establishments', and greater 
willingness to pursue `separate national interests and ambitions'. The paper's authors 
also foresaw an intensification of communist non-military competition with the West 
in areas of the Third World which had hitherto been of only marginal interest to 
Moscow. While an atmosphere of detente may well induce some of these states to 
work more closely with the West, such a positive outcome could not be guaranteed, 
and the US should seek to `strengthen the healthy nationalism of those areas and 
20 `Department of State General Comments on NSC 5501', 3 October 1955, FR US, 1955-1957, vol. 19, 
National Security Policy (Washington DC: USGPO, 1990), pp. 123-25. 
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increase its assistance to their governments in achieving stability'. Moscow's 
`creeping expansionism', the paper concluded, could not be allowed to proceed 
unchecked. 
These themes were developed at substantially greater length the following month, in 
an NIE entitled `World Situation and Trends'. 21 The paper's authors were in no doubt 
that Soviet tactics, if not Soviet strategy, had undergone a significant change. In place 
of the aggressive propaganda and uncompromising negotiating style of the Stalinist 
era, the Soviet Union had become less openly belligerent in its attitudes and more 
conciliatory in its actions: since the start of 1955, the paper reported, the Soviet Union 
had sought `more or less consistently to convince the Free World that it is possible to 
establish conditions of "mutual trust"'. To explain this change, the paper highlighted 
several factors: a realisation of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, and a 
recognition that the US possessed a significantly larger arsenal; the growing economic 
costs of maintaining a large military establishment, and the implications for Soviet 
economic and industrial development; Washington's success in developing regional 
alliances against the Soviet Union, first in Europe, and latterly in the Pacific and Asia; 
and changes within the Soviet leadership following Stalin's death in March 1953. 
Combined, these factors had stimulated a transformation in the conflict between the 
Soviet Union and the West, from `a phase marked by direct Bloc threats and pressures 
to one marked by increasing emphasis on less obvious forms of Communist political 
warfare'. 
21 NIE 100-7-55, `World Situation and Trends', 1 November 1955, ibid., pp. 131-145. 
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This new direction in Soviet foreign policy made itself felt in a variety of ways. 
Moscow had, for example, agreed to a long-delayed Austrian peace treaty, in May 
1955, was showing greater flexibility over disarmament issues and was engaging in 
greater official contact with the West 22 The Soviets were also displaying greater 
interest in 
- 
and offering assistance to 
- 
uncommitted states in Asia and the Middle 
East. In addition to Moscow's overtures to the Burmese, offers of industrial and 
financial aid were extended to India in December 1954, along with development 
assistance, soft loans and the promise of increased trade ties. Nehru travelled to 
Moscow in June 1955, just ahead of U Nu, and enjoyed a similarly rapturous 
reception. Highlights included a flower-strewn motorcade through Moscow and an 
address by Nehru to an 80,000-strong crowd, a privilege never before afforded a 
foreign dignitary and the kind of public appearance Soviet leaders themselves rarely 
made. 23, 
Nehru returned the favour in November and December 1955, when Khrushchev and 
Bulganin visited India on the same Asian tour that took Ahem to Burma. By all 
accounts, the visit was a resounding success; during a stop at Calcutta, crowds in the 
millions greeted the Soviet delegation, forcing its members to make the journey from 
the airport in a police van. 24 Although the reception in Afghanistan, the delegation's 
last stop on its Asian tour, was according to British observers less than wholehearted 
(one described it as `polite but quite without enthusiasm'), it nonetheless yielded an 
economic aid deal with the Afghan government worth $100 million, prompting one 
US official to conclude that the country had ` advertised to the whole world that she 
22 McMahon, `The Illusion of Vulnerability', p. 598. 
Z' Hayter to the Foreign Office, no. 360,10 June 1955, F0371/123587/DL1631/10, UKNA. 
24 Middleton to Reading, no. 6,23 January 1956, F0371/123587/DL10338/7, UKNA. 
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had become a Soviet satellite'. 25 Another $100 million in Soviet assistance was agreed 
with the Indonesian government during 1956, while Cambodia received over $20 
million-worth of Chinese aid. 26 Meanwhile, energetic communist wooing of Egypt led 
to an arms agreement with Czechoslovakia in September 1955, regarded by British 
Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan as the `opening of a new [Soviet] offensive in 
the Middle East'. 27 
What linked these apparently disparate targets of Soviet largesse was their shared 
adherence to neutralism and their reluctance to align themselves outright with either 
power bloc. Stalin's Kremlin had had little time for neutrals: the ` two camps' doctrine 
allowed no room for non-commitment, and the governments of non-aligned countries 
like India and Burma were regularly pilloried as unenlightened stooges of the West, 
intent on suppressing the revolution at the behest of Washington or London. By the 
mid-1950s, however, this hostility had manifestly failed to advance Soviet interests in 
these countries, and the belligerent rhetoric that had marked Chinese and Soviet 
relations with non-aligned nations was replaced by sympathy for the struggles of the 
colonial and post-colonial world and warm appreciation of the merits of non- 
alignment as a valuable contribution to peace; Afghanistan, for example, was praised 
for its `policy of neutrality and evident determination to avoid entanglement in the 
blocs hostile to the Soviet Union'. 28 Neutrality, Bulganin explained, `is pre-eminently 
designed to further the interests of ensuring the security of peoples and preserving 
25 Lascelles to the Foreign Office, no. 270,19 December 1955, F0371/116993/DA10338/45; Lascelles 
to the Foreign Office, no. 272,20 December 1955, F0371/116993/DA10338/46, UKNA. 
26 Minutes of an ANZUS Council meeting, Washington, 17 November 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 
21, East Asian Security; Laos; Cambodia (Washington DC: USGPO, 1990), p. 265. 
21 Quoted in McMahon, 'The Illusion of Vulnerability', p. 605. 
28 Lascelles to the Foreign Office, no. 267,17 December 1955, FO371/116993/DA10338/42, UKNA. 
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their independence'. 9 Soviet and Chinese interest in the non-aligned world was also 
evident in the strong support the communists gave to the conference of African and 
Asian states which convened in Bandung, Indonesia, on 18-24 April 1955 
-a 
conference that both British and American officials regarded as deeply' problematic. 30 
Dulles' advisors duly took note. Soviet tactics, they warned, `seemed aimed in the 
first instance at spreading the concept of neutralism, and in this they have powerful 
but unwitting allies in India and Burma'. 31 
For non-aligned countries like India and Burma, their international policies 
constituted a rational response to their historical experiences, their domestic political 
environments and their international circumstances. James Barrington, Burma's most 
senior foreign service officer and a one-time ambassador in Washington, sought to 
explain his country's position to an American audience in 1958, in an article for the 
US journal The Atlantic. 32 `The basic content and continuity of Burma's foreign 
policy', he wrote, `has its roots firmly embedded in the nation's past history. ' In that 
29 Foreign Office to Kabul, no. 267,20 December 1955, F0371/116993/DA10338/42, UKNA. 
30 Eden, preoccupied with the anti-colonial statements Bandung was bound to generate, called it a 
`foolish plan' (Paterson, minute, 15 October 1954, F0371/111930/D2231/61, UKNA). Dulles worried 
that the conference would `provide Chou En Lai with an excellent forum to broadcast Communist 
ideology'. Worse still, it might signal the start of a concerted communist effort to establish regional 
blocs that excluded the US; should that happen, `the Communist engulfment of these nations will be 
comparatively easy'. Memorandum of conversation, 9 April 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 21, p. 4. For 
a discussion of the official British record, see Nicholas Tarling, "`Ah-Ah": Britain and the Bandung 
Conference', Journal of South-East Asian Studies, vol. 23, no. 1, March 1992, pp. 74-111. On the 
racial aspects of Bandung, see Matthew Jones, `A "Segregated" Asia?: Race, the Bandung Conference, 
and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954-1955', Diplomatic History, vol. 29, no. 
5, November 2005, pp. 841-68. 
31 MacArthur to Dulles, 2 December 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 21, p. 158. 
32 James Barrington, `The Concept of Neutralism: What Lies Behind Burma's Foreign Policy', The 
Atlantic, vol. 201, no. 2,1958, pp. 126-28. Barrington's article was part of an extensive 60-page 
feature on Burma's politics, economy and culture. 
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sense, Burma's adherence to neutralism represented the extension of a post-colonial 
preoccupation with national independence into the international sphere. For a post- 
colonial state like Burma, genuine independence implied complete autonomy in 
foreign policy, and `any suspicion that the Government had accepted the dictation of 
another country or group of countries, or that it had succumbed to pressure, would 
immediately put it in trouble'. Above all, for a country fought over twice in living 
memory, in a war many Burmese regarded as none of their concern, neutralism 
seemed to offer a space between the Cold War's two blocs in which well-disposed 
countries such as Burma could work for peace. Burma's most important international 
contribution, Barrington argued, was to `keep out of the blocs, and from this position 
of active neutrality to work for the reduction of tensions whenever opportunity 
affords'. Thus, while declining to join the key practical expression of Western 
commitment to Asian security, SEATO,, the government in Rangoon would judge 
each international issue on its merits, without prejudice to either side, and `maintain 
friendly relations with all other nations'. According to one contemporary American 
observer, the political scientist Robert A. Scalapino: `Neutralism is a basic technique 
of limiting involvement with the major powers and thereby avoiding the kind of crisis 
which such involvement might well produce'. 33 
Critics of neutralism, many of them American, argued that it was both strategically 
misconceived and morally barren. In strategic terms, the protection that neutralism 
appeared to offer its adherents was an illusion in a conflict so apparently all- 
encompassing and potentially catastrophic as the contest between the West and the 
Soviet bloc. Moreover, neutralism implied an equality of moral status between the 
33 Robert A. Scalapino, `Neutralism in Asia', American Political Science Review, vol. 48,1954, pp. 49- 
62. 
236 
Christian, democratic and law-abiding governments of the West and the atheistic, 
blood-stained and repressive dictatorships of the Soviet Union and China. To refuse to 
judge one against the other and act accordingly was perceived as an unacceptable 
abrogation of moral responsibility. According to Scalapino: `Many Americans view 
"neutralism" as a new type of social disease. Its probable causes: intimacy in some 
form with communism; its symptoms: mental confusion and moral dereliction; its 
cure: unknown'. 34 The primary problem facing planners concerned with America's 
relations with Burma and other neutralist states was therefore how to reconcile such 
instinctive dislike of neutralism with the need to frame a response to the Soviet 
Union's new diplomacy in the non-aligned world. 
Developing a response 
By the end of 1955, there was little doubt in Washington that Soviet tactics in the 
Third World had changed, both in their nature and in their direction, and that this 
change somehow constituted a threat to US security. Publicly, the administration 
played down the implications 
- 
in a speech to an audience of Chicago industrialists in 
December 1955, for example, Dulles reassured his audience that: 
we need not become panicky because Soviet communism now 
disports itself in this new garb. We need not assume, as some seem 
to assume, that the leaders of the Asian countries are unaware of the 
danger and easily duped by false promises. 35 
34 Ibid. 
35 
`The New Phase of Struggle with International Communism', speech by Dulles to the Illinois 
Manufacturers' Association, Chicago, 8 December 1955, quoted in Michael Guhin, John Foster 
Dulles: A Statesman and His Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 256. 
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Privately, however, officials were deeply rattled. In November 1955, CIA Director 
Allen Dulles told a meeting of the NSC that the West confronted `coordinated long- 
term and high-level operations designed to advance Communist influence'; offers of 
Soviet assistance, he argued, `had a very considerable impact on the position of the 
United States in these under-developed parts of the world'. 36 The following month, 
Young warned Sebald's replacement as US ambassador in Burma, Joseph 
Satterthwaite, that the `Soviet thrust to the South from Egypt to Burma is deliberate, 
planned and presents a serious threat to Free World influence in that area'. 37 On 5 
December, Eisenhower wrote to John Foster Dulles to tell him that `nothing has so 
engaged my attention for the past few weeks as the change in the international 
situation'. The Soviet Union's new, more flexible diplomacy and'its offers of trade 
and aid in the Third World, he argued, were weapons the US found it difficult to 
counter, and were being deployed with tactics of secrecy and selectivity unavailable to 
a democratic government. 38 
Khrushchev and Bulganin's triumphant odyssey through India, Burma and 
Afghanistan only confirmed Eisenhower in his apprehensions. On 8 December, 
midway through the 
-Soviet trip, he shared his concerns with the NSC. 39 The 
`character of the struggle between the US and the USSR', he told his officials, `was 
36 Memorandum of discussion, 266th meeting of the National Security Council, 15 November 1955, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 10, Foreign Aid and Economic Defense Policy (Washington DC: USGPO, 
1989), pp. 28-31. 
37 Young to Satterthwaite, 13 December 1955, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and 
Southeast Asian Affairs, correspondence file, 1949-1955, Lot 58D207, box 3, USNA. 
38 Eisenhower to Dulles, 5 December 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 9, Foreign Economic Policy; 
Foreign Information Program (Washington DC: USGPO, 1987), p. 10. 
39 Memorandum of discussion, 269th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 December 1955, ibid., 
pp. 44-64. 
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clearly changing'. The challenge may well not be genuine, `inasmuch as it was not the 
real intention of the Russians to assist the economies of the countries they professed 
to assist'. Nevertheless, the threat was real, and meeting it was `a very difficult job 
- 
almost as hard as it had earlier been to meet the military challenge'. The essence of 
this challenge, officials believed, was as much psychological as material. As Dulles 
put it, the US had `very largely failed to appreciate the impact on the under-developed 
areas of the world of the phenomenon of Russia's rapid industrialization'. The Soviet 
Union's transformation from an agrarian society to a modern industrial state was `an 
historical event of absolutely first class importance'; in the minds of the people of 
Asia, Dulles argued, the prestige of the "`Great American Experiment"' was being 
eroded by the successes of the "`Great Russian Experiment"'. Communism, in other 
words, seemed to be winning the battle of ideas; should the US fail to respond, `the 
Soviet Union would end by dominating all of Asia' 40 
The conclusions of this analysis found formal expression in a revised statement of 
national security policy, NSC 5602/1, approved by Eisenhower on 15 March 1956 41 
As Robert J. McMahon shows, NSC 5602/1 constituted a significant development in 
the way the United States conceived of its security. 42 Previously, US planners had 
sought to draw a distinction between areas core to US interests 
- 
principally Western 
Europe and Japan 
- 
and peripheral regions such as South Asia. Of course, in practice 
this did not preclude American engagement with these peripheral areas; India received 
a US loan to buy several millions tons of wheat in 1951, for example, and concerns 
40 ibid. 
41 'Basic National Security Policy', NSC5602/1,15 March 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 19, pp. 242- 
68. 
42 McMahon, ` The Illusion of Vulnerability'. 
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for the stability of the Burmese government led to the establishment of the American 
aid programme there in 1950. But it is clear that, in response to Soviet interest in these 
countries, their importance to US policy-makers had increased. According to NSC 
5602, `The dangers to free world stability are particularly acute in the less developed 
areas, and are enhanced by recent Soviet initiatives there'. 3 Thus, US planners made 
a direct connection between the welfare of the Third World and the preservation of 
American security. As McMahon argues: `Even developments in the far periphery of 
the Third World 
... could have a potentially decisive impact on overall correlations of 
world power'. 44 
British analysts largely avoided making such explicit strategic linkages between 
communist overtures to the Third World and core security interests, preferring instead 
to see communist trade and barter arrangements first and foremost in terms of their 
potential economic damage to Britain and its Sterling Area partners. 5 Nonetheless, 
planners did agree that Soviet and Chinese interest in these areas constituted a new 
and disturbing development. Moscow and China, concluded an intelligence report in 
December 1955, were `conducting a determined and increasing drive to extend their 
influence by economic means in the non-communist countries of the Middle East and 
South and South-East Asia', with a view to creating a `climate of opinion favourable 
to the Sino-Soviet Bloc'. 6 While an all-out offensive, in competition with major 
Western exporting nations, did not seem to be in prospect, Moscow was likely to 
target individual projects of particular developmental importance to recipient states. 
43 'Basic National Security Policy', pp. 250 and 251. 
44 McMahon, `The Illusion of Vulnerability', p. 615. 
45 For example Sarell to MacMillan, no. 184,23 August 1955, F0371/117047/DB1121/2, UKNA. 
46'Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in the Middle East and South-east Asia', EIG33/55(Final), 20 
December 1955, F0371/116128/N1127/5, UKNA. 
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The primary aim would be to encourage Third World countries to believe that there 
was greater advantage in remaining neutral, rather than aligning themselves with the 
West, thereby weakening SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Beyond that, Moscow hoped 
to `acquire sufficient ties with the neutral countries to be able to blackmail at least the 
weaker and less experienced of them into actively supporting Soviet policies directed 
against the West'. The threat may be long-term, analysts concluded, but it was no less 
serious for that, especially in Asia. In particular, like the Americans, the British were 
concerned that, in addition to the appeal of material help, the recipients of Soviet and 
Chinese largesse were becoming dangerously attracted to the communist economic 
model as the answer to Asia's developmental challenges; as one paper put it, `In many 
countries there is some tendency to accept the view that the peculiar problems of Asia 
call for Russian/Chinese methods of treatment rather than those of the West'. 7 
In formulating a response, British planners called on political, military and economic 
tools. Politically, Asian neutralism had to be, if not welcomed, then at least accepted; 
the failure of efforts to bring neutralists like Nehru and U Nu into SEATO showed 
that they could not be persuaded into closer formal alignment with the West, and the 
popular hostility towards the pact evident in both countries suggested that it would be 
self-defeating to try. Indeed, ` a genuine neutrality, provided that it is not based on a 
complacent disregard of the true aim of Sino-Soviet communism, need not be 
inconsistent with the interests of the West'. 48 By the same token, Washington had to 
be discouraged from dealing exclusively with allied states, a `fatal' mistake that 
would `divide rather than unify', and would do little to meet Soviet attempts to woo 
47 Brief for the Washington talks, January/February 1956, undated, F0371/123246/D1073/1, UKNA. 
49 Ibid. 
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uncommitted countries 49 Militarily, SEATO should be supported and developed `to 
show that it is intended to ensure that Asian countries may develop their institutions 
unmolested, not to threaten or provoke', and arms supplies should be maintained. 
Finally 
- 
and this, officials thought, was the key 
- 
Western economic aid to Asia must 
continue, `with the avowed aim of improving standards of living in the recipient 
countries and not of securing an advantage in the cold war'. 5° Such aid could, 
however, only come from the United States. The UK was already doing a great deal 
`and could not be expected to do more'; over the previous five years, Britain had 
disbursed an estimated $1,000 million overseas, albeit much of it in British colonies, 
rather than in the newly-independent states being targeted by the Soviets and the 
Chinese. Military spending in Malaya alone accounted for £60 million annually, and 
£1 million a year was earmarked for the Colombo Plan. 51 Accordingly, while the UK 
should continue to play a role in the long-term development of the Third World, `we 
must put it to the United States that they must bear the burden of countering the new 
Soviet moves [emphasis in the original]' 
. 
52 
British officials hoped to discuss possible responses to the Soviet Union's new tactics 
during a trip Eden made to Washington in January and February 1956, but talks on the 
subject remained at a very general level, and no substantive decisions were reached. 53 
This may have been because, whereas a consensus had emerged in Washington that a 
49 'Countering the Economic Offensive of the Soviet Bloc', SSC(56)4,14 January 1956, T277/578, 
UKNA. 
50 Brief for the Washington talks, January/February 1956, undated, F0371/123246/1) 1073/1, UKNA. 
51 Allen, minute, 9 May 1956, F0371/123212/D1052/5, UKNA. 
52 'Countering the Economic Offensive of the Soviet Bloc', SSC(56)4,14 January 1956, T277/578, 
UKNA. 
53 Garner to Rowan, 29 March 1956, F0371/123257/D11338/2, UKNA. 
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new Soviet threat existed, there were sharp differences within the administration, and 
between the administration and Congress, over how the US should respond to it. 
Eisenhower for one argued that Soviet tactics demanded more positive and supple US 
diplomacy. In particular, he accepted that, in some cases, it was legitimate for the 
United States to extend assistance to neutralist governments, if the alternative meant 
their loss to communism: `it was clearly to the security advantage of the United 
States', he told the NSC at its 8 December meeting, `to have certain important 
countries like India strong enough to remain neutral or at least "neutral on our 
side"'. 54 This more nuanced analysis of the relationship between non-alignment and 
US and Western security interests would have met with ready agreement in London. 
The British report on the implications of Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to India, for 
example, concluded that, `much as we may dislike the Indian contention that one 
power bloc is as bad as another, non-alignment and neutralism do work both ways. If 
India were to succumb to Soviet pressure it would be from weakness only; if we 
continue to help India to grow strong this danger will be averted'. 55 
Dulles too saw the need for a more sympathetic posture towards the non-aligned 
world, despite his personal aversion to some of its leaders, particularly Nehru 56 
Speaking to Congress in 1954, he argued that the United States `cannot adopt a policy 
of not extending a certain amount of assistance to countries which also deal with the 
54 Memorandum of discussion, 269th meeting of the National Security Council, 8 December 1955, 
FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 10, pp. 44-64. 
55 Middleton to Reading, no. 6,17 January 1956, F0371/123587/DL10338/7, UKNA. 
56 The antipathy was mutual. In conversation with Mao Zedong in October 1954, for example, Nehru 
ventured the view that Dulles 'is a great menace. He is a Methodist or a Baptist preacher who 
religiously goes to Church and he is narrow-minded and bigoted'. Jones, `A "Segregated" Asia? ', p. 12. 
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Soviet Union 
... 
that would in effect involve writing off India'. 57 While not quite a 
Damascene conversion, this was nonetheless a notably more pragmatic Dulles than 
the one who had told an interviewer in 1949 that `the first thing you must do in Asia is 
to bring the peoples 
... 
to realize that the struggle which is on in Asia is a struggle that 
primarily concerns them and is not just a struggle between Soviet Communism and 
American capitalism 
... 
If they try to be neutral they will themselves be overrun'. 58 
Thus, while Dulles retained his belief in the deterrent power of collective security and 
alliances (derided as `pactomania' by his critics), he also recognised that ignoring or 
berating governments that elected to stay outside of them was no longer sufficient. In 
a speech to the Council on World Affairs in October 1956, for example, he conceded 
that, while some newly independent states `prefer not to adhere to collective security 
pacts, we acknowledge of course their freedom of choice. We have a deep interest in 
the independence of these nations and we stand ready to contribute from our store of 
skills and resources to help them achieve a solid economic foundation for their 
freedom'. 59 To be sure, he told his British counterpart Selwyn Lloyd in January 1956, 
the US `favoured countries that are lining up with us and 
... 
should not treat neutrals 
better than these'. But this was `quite a different thing from doing nothing at all': 
On the contrary the US showed that it was important to provide help 
to the neutral countries in order to help keep them from going over 
to the Communist side 
... 
the all-or-nothing approach would throw 
57 Guhin, John Foster Dulles, p. 255. 
58 Dulles, interviewed on Capitol Cloakroom, 29 June 1949, quoted in Guhin, John Foster Dulles, p. 
367, fn. 22. 
59 Ibid., p. 263. 
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them into the Soviet arms unnecessarily while there is still some 
salvation possible. 60 
Although both Dulles and Eisenhower lobbied heavily in defence of American 
assistance to the uncommitted world, opposition to a more forthcoming approach 
proved difficult to overcome, both in Congress and in the administration itself. 
Congress cut Eisenhower's foreign aid budgets every year between 1956 and 1958, 
and by significant amounts; the budget request for 1957, for example, was reduced by 
$900 million, a fifth of the $4.7 billion the president had asked for. 61 Within the 
administration, officials like John Hollister, the Director of the International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA), worried that the US was already over-extended, 
and could not afford to spend more. Just six recipients 
- 
South Korea, Indochina, 
Turkey, Taiwan, France and Pakistan 
- 
accounted for between $100 million and $1 
billion each in military assistance every year, and absorbed over half of America's 
existing non-military aid programmes. American assistance to South Korea alone was 
equivalent to South Korea's gross national product, but even outlays as significant as 
this could not guarantee material progress; `it required all the money that the United 
States could pour in by way of assistance', Hollister told the NSC in December 1955, 
`simply to enable Korea to stand still and not recede into worse economic 
difficulties'. 62 Lavish spending alone, Hollister warned, would not meet the needs of 
the Third World. 
60 Minutes of a US-UK Foreign Ministers' meeting, 31 January 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 21, p. 
169. 
61 McMahon, 'The Illusion of Vulnerability', p. 616; Guhin, John Foster Dulles, p. 259. 
62 Memorandum of discussion, 269`h meeting of the National Security Council, 8 December 1955, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 10, p. 48. 
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Opponents of greater economic assistance also questioned the wisdom of investing in 
the socialised economies of countries like Burma and India. Aid to these countries, 
Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson opined, `posed a very difficult problem for the 
United States. If we went in and spent our money building industrial plants and other 
installations for some backward country, who was going to have title and ownership 
over these plants which had been built with US funds. If the ultimate owner was the 
state, we would be helping these countries to proceed down the road which led to state 
socialism or Communism'. 63 American aid, argued Treasury Secretary George M. 
Humphrey, could not be used to `create and maintain other government-controlled 
economies in the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa. To do this would be 
self-defeating for the United States' 64 
Finally, sceptics argued that non-alignment in and of itself precluded greater US 
efforts. Existing aid programmes overwhelmingly favoured countries that had 
declared their allegiance to the United States 
- 
five of the six primary recipients of 
American aid listed by Hollister were directly allied with Washington by treaty, and 
the US was committed to the defence of the sixth, Indochina, under the terms of the 
Manila Pact 
- 
and this precedence seemed a legitimate expression of American 
approbation. Conversely, the withholding of aid from governments that had elected 
not to side with Washington was an equally legitimate expression of American 
disapproval. As Admiral Felix B. Stump, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific 
63 Memorandum of discussion, 266th Meeting of the National Security Council, 15 November 1955, 
ibid., p. 29. 
64 Memorandum of discussion, 273`d Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 January 1956, ibid., 
pp. 64-68. 
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Command, put it in a trenchant response to Cambodian complaints of niggardly US 
help: 
I think that it is about time for the US to make some reaction other 
than turning the other cheek when neutralists and others spit in our 
face. Aid to neutralist countries and anti-American countries makes 
our allies wonder what is the best policy to get more aid ie to follow 
the policies of Nehru or Nasser or to follow the policies of the US 
... 
Available foreign aid money is not sufficient to do the job we need to 
do. Therefore we cannot afford to throw any of it down the rat hole, 
but should place it where it will do the most good to strengthen the 
democratic world 
... 
My feeling is that Congress is sick and tired of 
overloading the American taxpayer to provide aid for the 
pussyfooters and I personally certainly share those sentiments. 65 
The problem of alignment featured prominently in the administration's discussions of 
a revised statement of US policy in South-East Asia, entitled NSC5612, in the 
summer of 1956. The key point at issue was whether allied states warranted 
preferential treatment in US economic and military aid programmes. Treasury and 
Defense department officials argued that they did, not least because the integrity of 
America's alliance relationships depended on it. According to Admiral Arthur W. 
Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: `we would never be able to retain 
our allies in Southeast Asia if our allies felt that other countries were in a position to 
obtain US assistance without ever joining any kind of an alliance with the United 
65 Stump to the State Department, 30 March 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 21, p. 505. 
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States'. 6 Congress too, Radford pointed out, was of the view that `we should give 
military assistance only to dependable allies of the United States'. For Dulles, on the 
other hand, vetoing aid to non-aligned governments robbed the administration of the 
tactical flexibility it needed to match the Soviet Union's recent moves. Aid, he 
argued, could not be denied from neutrals simply on the grounds of their neutrality: `It 
might well happen', he told the NSC, `that some country aligned with the United 
States in some kind of collective security pact would not actually be in need of 
economic or military assistance; whereas some other country which was in a neutralist 
posture might need our help to prevent itself from being absorbed into the Communist 
orbit'. Better to lose allied Thailand, he argued, than neutral India. There could be no 
`fixed formula' that would prevent the US from helping Burma, India or any other 
neutral, if to do so was in the US interest. 
The final draft of NSC5612, approved by Eisenhower on 5 September 1956, did its 
best to accommodate these conflicting views. 67 The US, the document stated, could 
not accept the neutralist argument that non-alignment was an effective defence against 
communist pressure, and Washington should `make every effort to demonstrate the 
advantages of greater cooperation and closer alignment with the free world, as well as 
the dangers of alignment with the Communist bloc'. Nor could the US accept equality 
of treatment in economic and military help. While a country's participation in 
collective security arrangements did not in itself constitute a claim for increased aid, 
`measures to assure adherence are desirable, normally including preferential treatment 
66 Memorandum of discussion, 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, 30 August 1956, FRUS, 
1955-1957, vol. 21, pp. 240-52. 
67 `Statement of Policy on US Policy in Mainland South-East Asia', NSC5612/1,5 September 1956, 
ibid., pp. 253-63. 
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in the fields of economic and military assistance, as justified by US strategic 
objectives'. At the same time, however, NSC5612 formally endorsed Eisenhower and 
Dulles' contention that a country's independence from communist control was 
essentially in the US interest, irrespective of its international posture. Some Asian 
countries, it noted, had chosen to join regional security structures, while others had 
not. To the extent that both groups were ultimately concerned with maintaining their 
independence and freedom of action, this served US interests, and the US should 
`accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future, and should not 
exert pressure to make active allies of countries not so inclined'. Instead, America 
should `support and assist [non-aligned countries] as they remain determined to 
preserve their own independence and are actively pursuing policies to this end'. 
The resumption of American aid to Burma 
Within months of Khrushchev and Bulganin's odyssey around Asia at the end of 
1955, the American government had equipped itself with a policy framework 
designed to counter Soviet activity in the non-aligned world, including Burma. As 
they had done in 1950, planners started from the assumption that Burma was of key 
importance to the West, and that its loss to communism would have significant 
economic, political and military repercussions for America's position in South-East 
Asia and beyond: 
such loss, by whatever means, would immediately pose a dangerous 
threat to the security of Thailand and Pakistan, our SEA TO allies, 
and India. Exposing these SEATO countries, particularly Thailand 
with its long border with Burma, to such a threat might undo the 
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costly efforts which the US has undertaken to improve their security. 
This threat might require revision of our strategic planning for the 
whole area. Psychologically, a Communist take-over in Burma 
would undermine the prestige of the Free World globally, and 
seriously damage the position of the now friendly elements in Asia 
and Africa. 
Accordingly, the `basic objective of US policy is to prevent Burma from falling into 
the Communist orbit by frustrating the intensive Communist bloc program to win 
Burma over'. 68 Given past experience, however, any explicit attempt to influence 
Burma away from its new attachments plainly would not succeed; the Burmese 
government, reported the embassy in Rangoon, did not share America's distrust of the 
Soviet Union, set great store by the trade deals it had concluded and had no intention 
of undoing them. Simply assuming that the Burmese would seek US help `for [the] 
purpose of "assisting Burma [to] counter Communist tactics"' would therefore be a 
mistake'. Nonetheless, officials believed that there were elements within the Burmese 
government who were `aware of [the] danger [of] too close [an] involvement with 
[the] USSR 
... 
and might be amenable to [an] offer of assistance by [the] US as [a] 
means of redressing [the] balance and facilitating Burma's chosen course of 
neutralism'. 69 
6e 'Burma', undated, records of the Director, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 
correspondence, 1949-55 and miscellaneous, 1950-56, Lot 58D207, box 4, RG59, USNA. 
69 Rangoon to the Secretary of State, 7 January 1956, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma 
Subject Files 1950-1961, box 27, RG469, USNA. 
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Rice was the key 
- 
the `wedge' which the communists had `seized upon 
... 
to 
penetrate Burma'. 70 Since Burma's primary motive in its aid dealings with China and 
the Soviet Union was its pressing need to sell its surplus, the most obvious solution 
was for the United States to match or better Soviet offers. For reasons of US 
legislation, however, this option was unfortunately not available. In July 1954, 
Congress had passed Public Law (PL) 480 (the Agricultural Trade and Development 
Act), which provided for the overseas disposal of surplus US agricultural produce, 
including rice. The US was selling, in other words, not buying. The Burmese, already 
struggling to manage huge surpluses of their own, viewed the prospect of further 
competition with foreboding, and Burmese diplomats lodged a series of protests in 
October and November 1954. The following February Dulles, who was in Rangoon 
for a short visit, was told that America's rice policy would deal the country's 
economy a `crippling blow'; as a result, Dulles reported, 'US position and influence' 
had been `badly shaken'. 1A US delegation dispatched to Burma at the end of May 
1955 to discuss the rice problem was cordially received but ineffective: the Burmese 
remained `skeptical of assurances that the United States would really take precautions 
not to hurt the economies of rice-growing countries [and] fundamentally could not 
believe that any US rice could be sold in Asia without damaging Burmese interests'. 72 
What effect did US rice policy have on Burma's decision to negotiate its rice barter 
deals with China and the Soviet bloc states? In practical terms, it seems unlikely that 
America's position can have had much impact on Burma's efforts to rid itself of its 
70 Hoover to Hollister, undated, records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Subject Files, 1956, Far 
East General, Lot58D3, box 1, RG59, USNA. 
71 Dulles to the State Department, 27 February 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 3. 
72 `Political Report 
- 
May 1955', 27 June 1955,790B. 00/6-2755, CDF, box 3849, USNA. 
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own surplus. The guidelines governing US rice disbursement were in principle at least 
careful to minimise the disruption to existing rice producers, American agriculture 
officials were certain that US production was not in direct competition with Burma's, 
and the rice market had in any case turned against Burma for a variety of internal and 
external reasons that had little to do with US sales. 3 Politically, though, the effects 
were clearly unfortunate. Rightly or wrongly, Burmese leaders blamed American rice 
policy for their turn towards the Soviet bloc, 74 and US officials somewhat closer to the 
problem than the Department of Agriculture argued strongly for a change. Was it not 
illogical, Satterthwaite asked the State Department, that, while the US was spending 
`astronomical figures to maintain and strengthen our defense perimeter in the western 
Pacific we should for the few million dollars involved in [the] sale [of] surplus rice to 
Asia risk further loss [in] our prestige here and pushing Burma closer to 
Communism? '. Through its rice policy, the US was running the `definite risk of 
seeing a hitherto strongly anti-Communist government so weakened politically that it 
may be overthrown and Burma itself become a Chinese Communist satellite'. 5 
Despite Satterthwaite's pleas, the administration approved the sale of some 230,000 
tons of rice to Asia during 1955.76 Officials in the State Department, from Dulles 
down, were nonetheless sensitive to the need for some positive action to counteract 
Soviet advances. The first step, agreed in February 1956, just as the administration 
was finalising NSC5602/1, was a commodities deal under which the US agreed to 
provide Burma with some $22 million-worth of surplus agricultural produce, 
73 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 22, p. 6. 
74 Oakeshott to Landymore, 12 July 1955, F0371/117052/DB 11345/3, UKNA. 
75 Rangoon to the State Department, 28 May 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 12. 
76 State Department to Rangoon, 5 May 1955, ibid., p. 6. 
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including cotton, dairy products, tobacco and fruit. 7 This was followed in March by 
an offer to supply $1 million-worth of US technical assistance in exchange for 10,000 
tons of Burmese rice ('good news', thought the British, which `shows that the 
Americans are alive to the need for helping Burma to market her rice') 78 Other plans 
included a $3.4 million loan to meet Burmese requests for help in building a medical 
centre in Rangoon (agreed under the initial aid deal concluded in September 1950, 
and a useful counterpoise, officials thought, to the technical institute offered during 
Khrushchev's visit), and US assistance in Burma's attempts to obtain a loan from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 79 Finally, on 29 
March 1956, the day before Mikoyan's delegation arrived, Satterthwaite was 
instructed to open negotiations with the Burmese government over a development 
loan worth up to $25 million. 80 The ambassador was also told that, while the US was 
`bending every effort to work out a coordinated program' to meet Burma's needs, `it 
may be desirable to re-emphasize [the] importance of making no further commitments 
to the Russians'. It would be `unfortunate indeed if just at [the] psychological moment 
favourable to US aid to Burma' anything happened which might `negate efforts to 
date and render difficult [the] institutional assistance already in prospect'. The 
77 State Department press release, no. 70,8 February 1956, F0371/123344/DBI 1345/T, UKNA. 
78 ICA press release, no. 119,12 March 1956, F0371/123344/DB11345/2, UKNA; Duncan, minute, 23 
March 1956, F0371/123344/DB11345/2, UKNA. To get around the legislative restrictions governing 
American rice procurement, the technical assistance was actually paid for in the local-currency 
equivalent of $1 million. This cash was then used to buy the rice, which was shipped to famine-stricken 
East Pakistan. 'Exchange of Technicians for Rice', CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma 
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`sensitivity of US opinion and Congressional reaction to developments [in] this area', 
Dulles warned, `cannot be over-estimated'. 81 
As with the negotiations over assistance in 1950, the principal obstacle to Burma's 
acceptance of US help derived from the political conditions attached to it, in this case 
the stipulations contained in the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (the Battle 
Act). The legislation, passed by Congress in October 1951, forbade US assistance to 
countries shipping strategic goods to states deemed to pose a threat to US security. In 
August 1955, the Burmese had issued a licence for the export of several thousand tons 
of rubber to China, and was also committed to supplying copper, both of which were 
defined as strategic materials under the terms of the Battle Act. 82 For the Burmese 
government, acceding to the Battle Act and reneging on these deals was politically out 
of the question. 83 If aid was to be possible some flexibility was therefore necessary in 
the interpretation of the Battle Act's restrictions. Accordingly, American officials 
concluded that existing Burmese exports were too small to merit Battle Act scrutiny, 
and the country was deemed eligible for US aid as long as no further commitments 
contrary to the Act were made. 84 Important figures in the Burmese government, 
notably U Kyaw Nyein, were prepared to accept this condition if it meant US aid, and 
hence potentially a reduced reliance on the Soviet Union. It was, however, too much 
81 Dulles to Rangoon, 26 March 1956, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma Subject Files 
1950-1961, box 27, RG469, USNA. 
82 Rangoon to the State Department, 22 August 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 21, fn. 3. 
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for U Nu, and the offer was rejected when it came before the Burmese cabinet at the 
beginning of May. 
U Nu explained his decision in a letter to Eisenhower on 22 May. 85 From Burma's 
point of view, there were two impediments to any revival of American aid. The first 
was Burma's `strong disinclination [to] take anything free from another country, 
however friendly, and consequent need to make at least token payment in rice for any 
grant assistance received'. The second obstacle was U Nu's long-standing anxiety to 
maintain some distance between his government and the governments of the West. 
This had become more urgent in the wake of parliamentary elections on 27 April. 
Although the ruling AFPFL retained a comfortable majority, the opposition National 
United Front (NUF) coalition did much better than expected, winning about a third of 
the vote. Such was the alarm within the Burmese leadership that U Nu relinquished 
the premiership in order to devote himself- to rejuvenating and reorganising the 
AFPFL. He handed over to U Ba Swe, the defence minister, on 5 June 1956. In 86 
terms of the country's foreign policy, the election result was important because the 
NUF's main component, the Marxist Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP), 
was avowedly pro-communist, and the coalition as a whole contained a large number 
of communist sympathisers. 87 In such a climate, U Nu told Eisenhower, even the tacit 
acceptance of Battle Act restrictions would place the government in an `untenable' 
position. 
85 U Nu to Eisenhower, 22 May 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 64. 
86 Gore-Booth to Selwyn-Lloyd, no. 194,21 June 1956, F0371/123314/DB1015/28, UKNA. 
87 Smith, Burma, p. 163. 
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Publicly, American officials expressed themselves baffled, and wondered whether the 
Burmese had perhaps misunderstood the terms of their offer. 88 Privately, however, U 
Nu's reaction was not unexpected, and proponents of aid pressed for further 
concessions. The inflexibility of the Battle Act, Satterthwaite warned, `could defeat 
US efforts [to] prevent Burma falling under Soviet economic domination'. Soviet 
offers of help, he noted, were free of the conditionality imposed on US aid; surely the 
time had come to `stretch our policy' and do the same-89 According to State 
Department advisor Douglas MacArthur, one of the chief doom-mongers in the 
administration's discussions of Soviet tactics in the Third World, the US should 
`move heaven and earth to act'. 90 No issue in American foreign policy was more 
important, he told Dulles; `if we can rapidly exploit this situation, the effect on all the 
uncommitted and neutralist Arab-Asian States will be tremendous'. Burma was the 
`key to the prevention of Communist domination of Southeast Asia'. If the US failed 
to meet even the country's minimum needs, `I do not think we should be in 
business'. 91 Dulles agreed, and on 28 June Satterthwaite was told to reopen talks with 
the Burmese. No formal assurances of Battle Act compliance would be required. 92 
Two days later, on 30 June, the two sides exchanged notes activating the rice-for- 
technicians deal the US had offered in March. 93 The following August, Hollister told a 
88 State Department to Rangoon, 12 May 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 63. 
89 Rangoon to the State Department, 8 May 1956, ibid., p. 62. 
90 Memorandum, MacArthur to Dulles, 5 June 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 65. 
91 Memorandum, MacArthur to Dulles, 15 June 1956, ibid., p. 71. 
92 Dulles to Satterthwaite, 28 June 1956, ibid., p. 75. 
93 Rangoon to the State Department, 30 June 1956, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma 
Subject Files 1950-1961, box 27, RG469, USNA. 
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press conference in Washington that the United States was planning a `substantial 
program' of aid for Burma, which would `go forward quite rapidly'. 94 
Discussions of possible American military assistance were also under way, prompted 
by a request in March 1956 for US help with ambitious plans to expand the Burmese 
army. 95 Satterthwaite as ever urged a positive response. Admittedly, military aid 
would not `turn Burma into [a] friendly force on our side'. But it would help the 
country address its various insurgencies, deter external aggression and `generally help 
stiffen the backbone of [the] country to our advantage'. 96 In particular, aid to the 
Burmese army offered Washington a chance to bolster one of the country's better 
organised and more reliably anti-communist organisations. 97 `Modest' military 
assistance would `assure and reinforce the anti-Communist orientation of Burma's 
military establishment and the Government in general'. Increased cooperation with 
the US in military matters would also have ` a beneficial effect on other neutral nations 
throughout the world'. The `present situation and temper in Burma', the State 
Department concluded, `provide an unparalleled occasion and opportunity for 
effective US action'. 98 
America's military leaders were, however, less enthusiastic, and the question of 
military assistance posed thornier problems within the administration than economic 
94 ICA to Rangoon, 3 August 1956, CDF, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Burma Subject Files 1950- 
1961, box 27, RG469, USNA. 
95 Army Attache in Rangoon to the State Department, 9 March 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 54, 
fn. 3. 
96 Rangoon to the State Department, 3 April 1956, ibid, pp. 54-55. 
97 Sebald to Gray, 4 April 1956, ibid., p. 56. 
98 `Refinement of FY1957 Military Assistance Program', 28 August 1956, records of the Officer in 
Charge of Burma Affairs, Subject File, 1949-1958, Lot 59D612, USNA. 
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aid. As a neutral nation, Burma's armed forces played no part in US military planning, 
so strengthening them offered no tangible military advantage; furnishing aid to a 
neutral nation without a formal agreement on how it was to be used 
-a condition that 
everyone concerned knew the Burmese would not accept 
- 
`could generate damaging 
dissension within our useful alliances'. The US was in any case over-extended, and 
could spare neither the funds nor the equipment. 99 Any assistance, Radford told 
Eisenhower, would attract criticism from Congress and from allied states, `who would 
also ask for more themselves', and all for a government that Radford regarded as 
neither trustworthy nor especially friendly to the United States. 1°° Notwithstanding the 
promises of gratis aid made to the Burmese in 1955, if they wanted American military 
supplies, Radford argued, they would have to pay for them. The whole assistance 
programme, one State Department official complained on 8 August, `is still up in the 
air with several new wrinkles'. ' 01 
These divergent views on military aid to Burma came before the NSC at the end of 
August 1956, as one of three points of disagreement in the draft text of NSC 5612 (the 
other two were the question of alignment in South-East Asia more generally, 
discussed above, and policy towards Laos). As with the problem of the Battle Act, 
here too the final decision favoured tactical flexibility, and the agreed text of NSC 
5612 approved military aid, if necessary on the basis of a loan, rather than outright 
99 Gray to Sebald, 26 April 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 59; Robertson to Dulles, 31 July 1956, 
ibid., p. 79. 
10° Goodpaster, memorandum, 30 August 1956, ibid., p. 82, fn. 3. 
101 Kocher to Braddock, 8 August 1956, records of the Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs, Subject 
File, 1949-1958, Lot 59D612, USNA. 
258 
payment. 102 On 20 September, Satterthwaite was instructed to explore the possibilities 
with the Burmese leadership. While the US could give no `long-term assurances' 
about continued assistance, Washington nonetheless possessed a `sincere and friendly 
interest' in helping Burma remain `independent and secure'. 103 The following 
February, a small mission under Marine General Graves Erskine was dispatched to 
Burma to prepare detailed recommendations. Erskine's visit was itself an important 
sign of changing times; the last occasion Erskine had led a military mission to South- 
East Asia, in 1950, the Burmese had rebuffed it at the last minute and it had bypassed 
Rangoon altogether. Reviewing Erskine's recommendations in April 1957, Young 
noted that American assistance to the Burmese military constituted a `matter of the 
highest political importance for developing effective US-Burmese relations and for 
influencing the course of events in Southeast Asia for the next five to ten years'. '°4 
Arguments in favour of assistance were made more persuasive by perceived changes 
in Burmese attitudes towards relations with the communist bloc. By the end of 1956, 
both the Americans and the British were detecting clear signs of unease in Rangoon 
over the political and economic implications of Burma's dealings with China and the 
Soviet Union. Burmese press reports spoke of Chinese meddling in the country's 
general elections in April 1956, with allegations that Beijing had provided the 
opposition with campaign funds and arranged for opposition leaders to visit China. '05 
Meanwhile, Chinese troops mounted a series of incursions across the disputed border, 
102 Memorandum of discussion, 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, 30 August 1956, 
FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 21, pp. 240-52. 
103 State Department to Rangoon, 20 September 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. 22, p. 84. 
1°4 Young to Robertson, 24 April 1957, records of the Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs, Subject File, 
1949-1958, Lot 59D612, USNA. 
105 Gore-Booth to Selwyn-Lloyd, no. 194,21 June 1956, F0371/123314/DB1015/28, UKNA. 
259 
sparking clashes with Burmese units. 106 Requests for the troops' withdrawal went 
unanswered, and by the summer of 1956 some 6,000 Chinese soldiers were thought to 
be on Burmese soil. 107 Although the dispute remained contained, Chinese forces were 
withdrawn and tentative agreement on border demarcation was reached towards the 
end of 1956, the issue served as an uncomfortable reminder to the Burmese that, for 
all Beijing's declarations of friendship and peaceful coexistence, they remained 
acutely vulnerable to Chinese pressure. 108 According to one British observer, the 
frontier dispute, combined with Chinese interference in Burma's politics, had starkly 
demonstrated the difficulties inherent in `conducting a policy of "benevolent 
neutrality" towards non-benevolent countries'. 109 
Concerns over the economic implications of their barter deals were also giving the 
Burmese pause for thought. In his annual review for 1956, Richard Allen, Gore- 
Booth's successor as British ambassador in Rangoon, reported that, while `Burma's 
policy of "dynamic neutralism" still tended to make her carp at the West and fawn on 
the East', the barter deals had proven `full of snags'. Few of Burma's new trading 
partners had honoured their commitments, and most were heavily in debt to Rangoon. 
What goods had been supplied were expensive and unpopular, and the Burmese had 
struggled with unfamiliar languages and alien trading practices. As a result, there was 
`general disillusionment among the Burmese over trade with the Soviet Union and the 
satellites'. These misgivings were compounded by shifts in Burma's favour in the rice 
market, in particular India's re-emergence as a major purchaser. In May 1956, just a 
106 State Department Intelligence Report, no. 7,330,29 August 1956, F0371/123322/DB10310/63, 
UKNA. 
107 Reading, minute, 29 August 1956, F0371/123320/DB10310/29, UKNA. 
108 Ralph Pettman, China in Burma's Foreign Policy (Canberra: ANU Press, 1973), p. 23. 
109 McCormick, minute, 10 August 1956, F0371/123314/DB 10 15/37, UKNA. 
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month after Mikoyan's visit, India agreed to take two million tons of Burmese rice, 
thereby largely removing the economic rationale that had prompted the barter deals in 
the first place. The Burmese were, in other words, left with a series of trade 
agreements that they no longer either needed or wanted. 110 The Burmese, averred one 
US official, had come to recognise that `they are getting the short end of the deal on 
the barter arrangements with the Commie bloc'. "' 
As the detrimental effects of the barter deals became clearer, the Burmese government 
sought to scale them down. In February 1957, Burma reached agreement with its 
barter partners to limit rice supplies during the year to 200,000 tons, and the British 
concluded that Rangoon was making a determined effort to extricate itself from its 
barter agreements and re-establish its cash trade. 112 Only a handful of Soviet bloc 
technicians were active in Burma 
- 
perhaps 20 
- 
as against several hundred 
American, British, Indian and Japanese specialists. Moreover, while Soviet technical 
help focused exclusively on agriculture, Westerners were working in almost every 
area of Burma's economic and professional life, from pharmaceuticals and tea- 
planting to education, health and social services. 113 Burma had not `responded to the 
Bloc's trade and aid drive as the Soviet Union must have hoped'. 114 A sense of 
proportion was called for: `there must still be infinitely more Westerners in Burma 
than there are nationals of the Soviet bloc. And the opportunities for the West to 
110 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 32,1 February 1957, F0371/129401/DB I OII/I, UKNA. 
111 Tyson to Sebald, 16 February 1957, records of the Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs, Subject File, 
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indirectly influence Burmese policy remain vastly greater than those open to the 
Russians and their friends'. 115 This analysis was reinforced in March 1957, when the 
negotiations on a development loan begun the previous year concluded in a pair of 
agreements providing for US loans worth over $40 million. ' 16 Taken together, these 
developments seemed to imply that the ominous forebodings of Soviet predominance 
that had so deeply preoccupied officials in Washington and London in the closing 
months of 1955 had perhaps been overstated. As one US official put it in April 1957, 
American relations with Burma `are, in general, as good at this moment as they have 
been since the country gained its independence'. Although `Burmese neutralism and 
fear of involvement impose definite limits on our possible actions', within those limits 
`a favourable predisposition seems to exist for a careful, long-term program'. 117 
By the start of 1958, the US and Burmese governments were engaged in three 
separate sets of negotiations, over military assistance, police assistance and economic 
aid. Agreement was reached first on the economic part of the package, with the 
conclusion on 27 May 1958 of a new commodities deal providing for the sale of 
agricultural surpluses to finance a local-currency loan worth about $14.5 million. "8 
An agreement providing for a $10 million loan to fund the purchase of police 
equipment was reached on 16 June, and a week later, on 24 June, the two sides 
finalised a similar deal for $10 million-worth of military supplies. 119 The first 
"s Duncan, minute, 13 February 1957, F0371/129418/DB11338/4, UKNA. 
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consignment of equipment arrived in November 1958.120 Admittedly, officials in 
Washington conceded, these initiatives would do little to moderate Burma's 
fundamental attachment to neutralism in its foreign policy, nor had the Burmese 
altogether abandoned their attempts to secure assistance from the communist bloc, as 
well as from the West; in January 1958, for example, China and the Soviet Union 
agreed to lend the Burmese the equivalent of about £5 million to finance the building 
of a pair of irrigation dams and a textile factory. 121 But the agreements were a further 
sign that the Burmese were prepared to move closer to the West with much greater 
conviction than planners in Washington had expected when they considered the 
implications of communist overtures to Rangoon in 1955. The US, officials 
concluded, was `in a better position than ever before to influence Burma toward a 
closer cooperation with free world activities and identification with free world 
objectives'. 122 
Conclusion 
Between 1955 and 1958, in response to what was deemed to be an aggressive 
initiative to extend the Soviet Union's political and economic reach in the Third 
World, US policy-makers designed a wide-ranging programme of military, security 
and economic aid for Burma worth some $100 million. 123 In doing so, officials 
120 Kerr to Sullivan, 18 November 1958, Subject Files Relating to Burma and Thailand, 1956-1959, 
Lot 61D200, box 17, RG59, USNA. 
121 Murray to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 2,13 January 1958, F0371/135744/DB1121/2, UKNA. 
122 `Overseas Internal Security Program for Burma', Operations Coordinating Board, 21 March 1958, 
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microfiche supplement (Washington DC: USGPO, 1993), document 111. 
123 Comprising about $80 million in economic aid and around $20 million in military and security 
assistance. Burma was also receiving about $35 million in aid from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 'Highlights of 
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adopted a more flexible interpretation of US aid legislation, which enabled them to 
furnish assistance to the Burmese in the absence of the formal assurances called for 
under the Battle Act. They also developed a more elastic and nuanced appreciation of 
America's relationship with neutralism. Unanimity on this was not achieved, and 
military leaders in particular sought to maintain a distinction between aligned and 
non-aligned governments in the distribution of American aid. But the issue at stake 
was primarily political, not military, and objections to the provision of assistance to 
the Burmese were noted, but not accepted. The need for a practical response to meet 
Soviet initiatives in Rangoon seemed to call for a flexibility in policy-making that 
principled objections to neutralism did not permit. 
This chapter has argued that America's policy-making towards Burma in the latter 
part of the 1950s cannot be understood in isolation from the broader changes under 
way in American perceptions of the scale and nature of the Soviet and Chinese threat 
to Burma and other countries in the Third World. Essentially, US fears of Soviet 
expansionism ascribed to Burma and other previously peripheral countries a strategic 
and political significance out of proportion to their inherent value to US interests. But 
were these fears justified? Was US policy towards Burma responding to a threat that 
was more perceived than real? 
From the record, it seems clear that the assumptions underpinning US policy were 
flawed. Soviet and Chinese initiatives did not mark the start of a concerted assault on 
Burma's economic or political independence. Indeed, Soviet initiatives may even 
Burma's Economic Situation', 10 January 1958, Subject Files Relating to Burma and Thailand, 1956- 
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have been counter-productive. According to one American assessment, produced in 
January 1960, `The Soviet Bloc economic penetration effort which began in 1955 has 
been a failure, both in general and in detail. Bloc prestige and repute have been 
brought to a new low by the ill-conceived or ill-implemented program, and there is 
much Burmese resentment'. 124 Nor can we be certain that the steps the US took to 
counter this perceived threat exerted anything more than a marginal influence on 
Burma's management of its relations with the communist bloc. True, US concerns had 
an instrumental function for the Burmese, in the sense that Burmese leaders exploited 
the spectre of `economic domination' by the Soviet Union to exert pressure on 
Washington to release aid. But in terms of the practical politics of Burma's relations 
with communist countries, objective economic factors, and in China's case strategic 
considerations, appear to have dictated Burma's behaviour far more than the existence 
or otherwise of US political, economic or military support. In short, US policy 
towards Burma during the later 1950s overestimated the scale and intent of Soviet and 
Chinese diplomatic initiatives, underestimated Burma's ability to resist them and 
exaggerated America's capacity to influence the outcome through the provision of 
aid. 
Hindsight, of course, is a wonderful thing, and neither the US nor the British 
government enjoyed its benefits. It is also worth pointing out that officials did not 
imagine the lavish receptions U Nu and Nehru were given in Moscow, the crowds that 
greeted Bulganin and Khrushchev in Rangoon and Delhi or the series of extensive aid 
and trade deals that followed their visits. Their conclusions did not, in other words, 
come out of the blue. Nonetheless, it is legitimate to ask why such apparently 
124 `Sino-Soviet Assistance Programs in Burma', 2 January 1960, CDF, Office of Far Eastern 
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erroneous analysis gained such currency so quickly. 125 One possibility is that officials 
and politicians consciously exaggerated the threat to press a particular policy agenda. 
Certainly, a sense of heightened danger was important in overcoming opposition 
within Eisenhower's administration to aid to non-aligned countries, and it could 
plausibly be argued that the Burmese aid programme as a whole would not have been 
possible had US officials not interpreted Soviet and Chinese actions in the way that 
they did. But the nature of the discussion revealed in the documents does not lead to 
the conclusion that these threat assessments were anything other than honest 
appraisals of Soviet tactics, and the record reveals very little, if any, dissenting 
opinion: the assumption that Soviet activity constituted a serious challenge went 
virtually unquestioned. The arguments within the NSC over assistance to countries 
like Burma did not rest on the validity or the quality of the analysis, but on whether 
aid was in the US interest, and whether the US had the capacity to provide it without 
compromising America's existing aid programmes or damaging its existing 
relationships in Asia. Nor does this interpretation adequately answer the point that 
analysts in London arrived at broadly similar conclusions, and for broadly similar 
reasons. Clearly, something more than bureaucratic imperative was at work. 
A more persuasive explanation of the official response to the Soviet Union's 
initiatives in the mid-1950s may reside as much in the unpredictability of Moscow's 
actions as in their specific effects or implications: without warning, planners in 
Washington and London were confronted by an adversary behaving in new ways, 
opening up new relationships and deploying new, more flexible techniques, in areas 
of the world that the US at least did not know or understand especially well. Faced 
"-5 This discussion draws particularly on McMahon, ` The Illusion of Vulnerability', pp. 616-19. 
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with this new direction in Soviet and Chinese diplomacy, policy-makers had few 
historical references to draw upon to frame their thinking or give them a meaningful 
sense of perspective. Under US leadership, the West had developed political and 
military structures to counter the political and military challenge of the communist 
system. Now, planners believed they were confronting an economic and 
psychological test that existing mechanisms were not properly designed to meet. 
Indeed, if anything the Soviet Union's choice of economic diplomacy seemed 
specifically designed to play to the country's strengths; a command economy, after 
all, was more amenable to manipulation in the service of foreign policy than the more 
open market economies of the West. Under these circumstances, perhaps the more 
interesting question is not why policy-makers reached the conclusions they did, but 
whether they could plausibly have arrived at different ones. 
Whatever the motives driving them, the policies and actions the United States 
developed in the latter half of the 1950s constituted a significant advance in 
Washington's relations with Burma. In 1953, the Burmese had peremptorily 
abrogated their aid agreement, inflicting an unearned humiliation on Eisenhower's 
administration and adding to the list of very public disasters encountered by American 
planners as they sought to come to terms with the problems and crises besetting post- 
war Asia. Two years later, changing perceptions of the communist threat to Burma 
and other fledgling governments in the Third World had stimulated a flexible and 
imaginative aid programme worth tens of millions of dollars. With the advent of 
Kennedy's government in 1961, there was every chance that these ties would deepen 
further. As the following chapter explains, Kennedy and his planners came to office 
with a much more extensive and explicit commitment to investing in America's 
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relations with the Third World, underpinned by a sophisticated analysis of the 
developmental potential of US aid. 
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Chapter 7 
Britain, the United States and the end of civilian government, 1958-1962 
This final chapter explores Anglo-American relations with Burma between 1958 and 
1962. In contrast with previous years, this was a period of significant upheaval in 
Burma's domestic politics. For all the volatility of the immediate post-independence 
period, with its insurgencies, its foreign incursions, its bureaucratic problems, its 
crime and banditry and its periodic economic crises, Burma's parliamentary politics 
had been remarkably 
- 
indeed, unhealthily 
- 
stable. As in other post-colonial contexts, 
power remained largely in the hands of the nationalist politicians who had secured 
Burma's independence and, despite the opposition's encouraging showing in the 1956 
elections, there was little sign yet of an effective constitutional alternative to the 
AFPFL, which was still by far Burma's largest political organisation. U Nu, who 
resumed the premiership in 1957, marked ten years in power the following year, a 
notable achievement given the many and various travails his government had faced 
since independence, and a testament to his considerable political skills and personal 
charm. 
Between 1958 and 1962, however, the post-independence political consensus 
unravelled. Without a constitutional opposition to focus minds and enforce party 
discipline, tensions within the AFPFL finally became impossible to contain, and the 
coalition split into competing factions. Faced for the first time with a political 
opposition with the potential to bring him down, U Nu turned to the communist- 
dominated NUF to keep himself in power. He also softened his government's position 
towards the communist insurgents, announcing an amnesty and inviting communist 
269 
leaders to Rangoon for talks. This was too much for the army, which took control of 
the government in October 1958. Although U Nu returned to government again 
following elections in early 1960, his tenure this time was short; the army took over 
once more in March 1962, and has remained in charge in one form or another ever 
since. 
For British and American planners, the rapid oscillation between civilian government 
and military rule between 1958 and 1962 
- 
and the very different courses each 
administration pursued 
- 
presented considerable difficulties of analysis and policy- 
making: What did these changes mean for Burma's domestic and foreign policies, and 
its links with London and Washington? What was the appropriate response? Initially, 
the collapse of the post-independence political settlement in Rangoon appeared to 
signal a new and more promising phase in relations. In particular, the arrival in power 
of a military government in 1958 offered the prospect of more effective and efficient 
administration, and more robust action against Burma's communist insurgents. The 
new government also adopted a more cautious policy towards the regimes in Moscow 
and Beijing, encouraging US policy-makers to extend further substantial amounts of 
aid, including in areas of strategic importance that would previously have been taboo. 
Barely a year later, however, U Nu's return to government revealed the fragile basis 
on which American aid plans had been conceived. Political and economic ties with 
Beijing were rejuvenated, culminating in an $80 million loan agreement in January 
1961. At the same time, the new government distanced itself from the aid agreements 
its predecessor had reached with the United States. 
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America's relations with U Nu's government were further complicated during this 
period by the re-emergence of the Kuomintang problem in Burma's north-east. As 
before, US efforts to persuade Taipei to extract these troops made slow progress, and 
the Burmese turned to Beijing for military support to oust the Nationalists by force. 
Finally, in April 1961, several thousand troops were evacuated to Taiwan, a step that 
owed much to the advent of a new government in Washington. Under Kennedy, the 
United States maintained and enhanced the more positive and flexible attitude to 
neutralism that had emerged during Eisenhower's government, and American 
assistance to the developing world increased significantly. There were also indications 
that Kennedy's officials were considering opening up a new relationship with the 
Burmese. Any such hopes were, however, dashed by the second coup in March, as the 
new regime curtailed Burma's contacts with the outside world and the country entered 
a period of isolation from which it has yet to emerge. 
The political crisis of 1958 
The first signs of political difficulty emerged at the end of January 1958, during a 
five-day AFPFL congress in Rangoon. The event was enormous, with over 2,000 
delegates and a further 100,000 rank-and-file members. Its chief political significance 
resided in a marathon four-and-a-half hour speech by U Nu in which he rejected the 
League's long-standing adherence to Marxism on the grounds that it was fallacious, 
`undesirable as a political philosophy' and incompatible with Buddhism. The practical 
implications of U Nu's statement were arguably limited. Despite his government's 
early enthusiasm for a Marxist programme of state ownership, U Nu's interpretation 
of Marxist theory had always been idiosyncratic, and one of his earliest public 
references to it 
- 
the 15-point Leftist Unity programme, unveiled in 1948 
- 
caused 
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such consternation internationally that it was hastily dropped. In terms of the politics 
of the AFPFL, however, it was explosive (the US ambassador, Walter McConaughy, 
called it 'epic-making"). As previous chapters have shown, a rhetorical commitment 
to Marxism was one of the central features of Burmese political life. In rejecting it, U 
Nu was also rejecting the vocabulary of more than a decade of political debate. 
U Nu's repudiation of Marxism split the AFPFL into two competing factions: the 
`Clean' AFPFL, led by U Nu and Thakin Tin, the deputy prime minister and head of 
the All Burma Peasants Organisation (ABPO), by some way the largest constituent of 
the AFPFL; and the `Stable' AFPFL, organised around U Ba Swe, leader of the 
Trades Union Congress (Burma) (TUC(B)), and U Kyaw Nyein. 2 Months of fractious 
politicking followed, culminating in June with the resignation from the cabinet of U 
Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein and 13 other ministers, and a vote of confidence in the 
Burmese parliament. Although U Nu saw off that challenge (albeit only just: he won 
127 votes, against 110 for his opponents3), he was forced to rely on the support of the 
communist-dominated NUF to do so, raising the possibility of a formal role for the 
above-ground communists in government. There were also concessions to the 
insurgents, with the announcement of an amnesty at the end of July 1958 and hints 
that U Nu was considering opening negotiations with the CPB. 4 For the first time 
since the crises of 1948, a communist government had become plausible. According 
to one British intelligence assessment: `the split within the AFPFL has seriously 
1 Rangoon to the State Department, 18 February 1958,790B. 00/2-1858, CDF, box 3850, RG59, 
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weakened the democratic forces and government generally in Burma and opened the 
way to a great increase in Communist influence'. 5 
The extent of the communist challenge during 1958 must remain unknown; even the 
British, who had spent the best part of a decade worrying about the stability of 
Burma's government, were not fully convinced that recent events really portended the 
emergence of a communist regime, and American officials were inclined to accept as 
sincere U Nu's assertions that he would not take communists into his government. 
Only one NUF leader 
- 
and that a non-communist, former Justice Minister UE 
Maung 
- 
was appointed to the government U Nu formed after the confidence vote, 
and the popular appeal of communism was uncertain. True, the NUF had done well in 
the last elections, in 1956, but not well enough to mount a real challenge for power. 7 
The NUF itself was in two minds over its support for U Nu, and by September splits 
were emerging within it between moderate parties and groups further to the left who 
favoured negotiations with the communist insurgents! In the febrile atmosphere of 
Rangoon, however, these were fine distinctions, not least for Burma's increasingly 
restive military leadership. After more than ten years fighting the communists, senior 
officers were in no mood to see them take power now. 
Matters came to a head in late September. On 22 September, under pressure from the 
communist leaders of the NUF, U Nu agreed to allow CPB leader Thakin Than Tun to 
travel to Rangoon for talks. A cabinet meeting later that day decided to dissolve 
5 ` The Outlook in Burma', JIC(FE), undated draft, F0371/135729/DB1015/41/G, UKNA. 
6 'CINCPAC's Evaluation of U Nu Parliamentary Victory', 19 June 1958, Subject Files Relating to 
Burma and Thailand, 1956-1959, Lot 61D200, box 18, RG59, USNA. 
7 Smith, Burma, p. 177. 
8 Murray to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 210,20 September 1958, F0371/135729/DB1015/42, UKNA. 
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parliament and call an election for November, raising the possibility of communist 
gains at the ballot box. The army responded by surrounding Rangoon, and U Nu was 
given an ultimatum: renounce his links with the NUF and cease efforts at negotiation 
with the communist insurgents, or face an army takeover. Three days later, on 26 
September, an apparently weeping U Nu handed power to Ne Win. The following 
month, on 28 October,! U Nu formally resigned, and the Burmese parliament elected 
Ne Win prime minister in an uncontested vote. 9 Although constitutional proprieties 
were observed through an exchange of letters between the two protagonists, and the 
transfer of power was bloodless, the threat of force was clear. This was to all intents 
and purposes a coup. '° 
Ne Win's first government 
Ne Win, a Sino-Burman, was born in 1911. His real name was Shu Maung (Ne Win 
- 
`Radiant Sun' 
- 
was a nom de guerre). His early career was undistinguished: he failed 
his examinations at Rangoon University (he studied biology in hopes of becoming a 
doctor), then took a junior job in the Burmese Post Office. He resigned in 1939, 
before joining Aung San and other Burmese nationalist leaders in Japanese-occupied 
China. Returning to Burma, he became Aung San's Chief of Staff, and worked closely 
with him in the resistance to Japanese occupation at the end of the war. Prior to 
independence he served as a Battalion Commander and Special Commissioner in 
operations against communist insurgents in Upper Burma. In 1949 he succeeded 
Smith Dun, a Karen, as Supreme Commander of the Burmese armed forces. He also 
briefly held the post of deputy prime minister, with responsibility for defence and 
home affairs. 
9 Murray to Selwyn Lloyd, 1 November 1958, F0371/135729/DB1015/60, UKNA. 
10 Smith, Burma, p. 175. 
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In temperament and habits, Ne Win was the polar opposite of the Buddhist ascetic U 
Nu: `good-looking, sport-loving, debonair, normally easy-going and out for a good 
time', as the British reports had it. " His two visits to the UK prior to taking control in 
1958 pointed up the differences in personality nicely. Ne Win, a keen gambler, was 
taken to the races at Sandringham and enjoyed West End musicals; U Nu by contrast 
preferred the more contemplative pleasures of the Scottish Highlands. During the 
insurgency's early years, British observers had been unimpressed by Ne Win's 
military credentials and tactical skills, looked askance at his womanising (he 
eventually married seven times, twice to the same woman) and disliked the whiff of 
corruption that emanated from his arms dealings. He was also dogged by health 
trouble and may have suffered from depression, though given the longevity of his 
subsequent career 
- 
he stepped down finally in 1988, and died at the ripe age of 91 in 
2002 
- 
he seems to have coped with his various ailments well enough. Above all, he 
commanded considerable personal loyalty within the Burmese army, and exercised 
rigid control through a circle of politically-minded fellow officers known as the 
colonels. Indeed, political power seems to have been the making of him; according to 
one British observer who knew him well, Malcolm MacDonald, after a year in office 
Ne Win had developed `a remarkable balance of qualities': 
I think he has considerable sheer ability. Previously this was not 
always apparent, for he was inclined to be lazy, with a streak of the 
playboy in his nature. Now he is working very hard and very 
conscientiously. His ability is spurred and aided by notable driving 
Ne Win had a particular fondness for golf, and managed to find time away from running the country 
to take up sailing in 1959. `Leading Personalities in Burma 1959', 12 August 1959, 
F0371/143858/DB1012/1, UKNA. 
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power. As Prime Minister and Supreme Commander he does not 
hesitate to issue orders if necessary, and to see that those orders are 
carried out 
... 
In addition, his deep and quietly passionate sincerity 
has grown with the years. 12 
MacDonald was not alone in eulogising Ne Win and his regime. US press comment 
was broadly favourable. In a' typically sympathetic editorial, the New York Herald 
Tribune declared that Ne Win was just the man `to bring peace and security at last to a 
country that has had more than its share of trouble'. 13 Fresh from a short visit in April 
1959, Graham Parsons, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, 
opined that `Ne Win's colonels struck me as self-effacing people who are doers first 
and talkers afterwards. I could 
... 
detect no motivation on the part of Ne Win's other 
than service to the country. On [the] contrary there seemed to me to be [an] evident 
element of idealism tempered with realism and [a] conscious intent to preserve 
people's democratic rights'. 14 Another noted with approval the new government's 
`energy, dedication, cohesion [and] effectiveness'. is 
Ne Win and his colonels certainly set about their task with unaccustomed vigour. The 
bureaucracy was reformed, and corrupt or incompetent officials were replaced, 
squatters' camps in Rangoon were demolished and the streets swept clean. Roads and 
pavements were improved, traffic regulations enforced and municipal services 
overhauled. Policing became more robust, and rates of violent crime fell to levels not 
12 `A Brief Visit to Rangoon', undated, F0371/143861/DB1015/48. 
13 Caccia to the Foreign Office, no. 575,5 October 1958, FO371/135729/DB1015/50, UKNA. 
14 Parsons to Dulles, 24 April 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 88. 
's Memorandum of conversation with Colonel Maung Maung, 27 April 1959, ibid., document 93. 
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seen since the British period. 16 At the same time, however, there were clear 
indications of incipient autocracy. On taking power, Ne Win had agreed to step down 
after elections in April 1959, but he wasted no time in forcing through changes to the 
constitution allowing him to extend his tenure beyond that date. The cabinet, though 
composed of civilians, was hollow, and real power was exercised by the circle of 
senior officers around Ne Win. The military rapidly gained an important economic 
stake in power, as officers took advantage of their hold on government to expand their 
business interests through an organisation called the Defence Services Institute, which 
had connections in industry, retailing, banking, pharmaceuticals and shipping. 
'7 There 
was also a degree of arbitrariness in the government's handling of foreign businesses, 
exemplified by the peremptory decision to cancel the contract of a British firm, Evans 
Medical Limited, which had been brought in to manage Burma's fledgling 
pharmaceuticals industry. The government also abruptly ended Burma's association 
with the US consulting firms U Nu had employed to help him in his economic 
planning, on the grounds that Burma `already had all the advice, plans and projects' 
that it could absorb. 18 
These less welcome aspects of the regime attracted intermittent expressions of 
concern. One American observer dubbed Burma under the military a police state, and 
likened the new-found cleanliness of Rangoon's streets to the punctuality of Italian 
trains under Mussolini. 19 Another spoke of a `vague feeling of increasing uneasiness 
16 Pearn, minute, 1 July 1959, F0371/143860/DB1015/33, UKNA. 
"Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 200,6 October 1959, F0371/143861/DB101S/48, UKNA. 
18 Rangoon to the State Department, 31 December 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 64. 
19 Gore-Booth, minute, 'Situation in Burma', 1 April 1959, F0371/143859/DB1015/18, UKNA. The 
official in question, Louis Walinsky, had good reason to be bitter at the turn of events in Burma. Until 
277 
over the stamp which this Caretaker Government is going to place on the trend in 
Burma'. ° But these were second-order concerns for planners in London and 
Washington, for whom Burma's stability and territorial integrity were far more 
important than the nature of the government or the propriety of its methods. 
Admittedly, British officials conceded, the presence of military governments in 
countries like Burma posed a theoretical difficulty to the extent that `the West "stands 
for" democracy'. At the same time, however, the West `stood for' the practice of 
effective government, and in late 1950s Asia, with its `inexperienced and ignorant 
electorates' and its `apprentice parliamentary democracies', authoritarian methods 
`seem to offer the best hope of achieving stability and countering Communist 
subversion'. The `free play of political parties' in South-East Asia had led to impotent 
administration; authoritarian regimes were `more likely to get things done and to 
achieve material progress '21 
State Department officials addressed themselves to the problem of military rule in 
Burma and elsewhere in the Third World in May 1959, in a briefing paper for the 
NSC entitled `The Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers'. 2 
Military government, the paper noted, was the `predominant environment in which the 
United States must associate its interests with those of the emergent and developing 
societies of Free Asia'. This was certainly a fair conclusion, with military coups in the 
its contract was terminated by the military government, Walinsky had been the Burma representative of 
Robert Nathan Associates, the US firm acting as financial adviser to U Nu's government. 
20 Kerr to Sullivan, 25 February 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 72. 
21 Foreign Office Planning Section, Steering Committee, 19 May 1959, SC(59)25 2"d Revise, 
CAB21/5128. 
22 `The Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers', 27 May 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, 
vol. 15/16, document 273. 
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late 1950s in Pakistan, Thailand and Iraq as well as Burma, and `Guided Democracy' 
in Sukarno's Indonesia. 23 In the State Department's analysis, this trend towards 
authoritarianism would only accelerate as developmental problems became more 
acute and the `facades of democracy left by the colonial powers prove inadequate to 
immediate tasks'. In the short term, the United States could do little to change this 
beyond finding ways to preserve `the residue of human rights and dignity essential to 
the growth of democratic values'. In the meantime, the essential test of a 
government's legitimacy would reside, not in the quality of its popular mandate, but 
in its effectiveness in addressing security and developmental problems. Under that 
test, the ; arrival in power of military men like Ne Win `has thus far advantaged US 
interests'. As long as developmental progress was maintained, `no loss of prestige 
should be involved in our supporting nön-democratic regimes'. 
The defects of this analysis would of course become abundantly clear during the 
1960s, most obviously in Vietnam. For that matter, US planners in the late 1950s had 
only to look back a decade, to Chiang Kai Shek's China, for a cautionary warning of 
the risks involved in supporting unpopular, corrupt and autocratic regimes. Yet there 
is little indication that past experience in Asia was used to inform current policy, and 
there was little disagreement with the State Department's views when America's 
relationship with military government was discussed in the NSC on 18 June 195924 
Eisenhower called the State Department paper `the finest thing he had ever heard 
given before the National Security Council'. Only 40 years of American political 
23 Yong Mun Cheong, `The Political Structures of the Independent States', in Nicholas Tarling (ed. ), 
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 
59-131. 
24 Memorandum of discussion, 410`s Meeting of the NSC, 18 June 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 16, 
East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos (Washington DC: USGPO, 1992), pp. 97-102. 
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education, he told his colleagues, had kept dictatorship at bay in the Philippines. 
Elsewhere, the trend towards military government was firmly established; the aim of 
US policy must therefore be, not to reverse it, but to ensure that the military leaders it 
brought to power looked towards the West, rather than towards communism. The re- 
establishment of civilian, democratic rule could only be a long-term objective. 
A more workmanlike approach to the business of government in Burma was clearly in 
British and US interests; after a decade of fractious muddle under U Nu, it is perhaps 
understandable that the governments in London and Washington saw Ne Win's more 
authoritarian approach as at least a partial answer to the political and bureaucratic 
weaknesses that had dogged Burma since independence. There is also a sense, in both 
the British and the American record, that Burma and other Third World states were 
somehow too politically immature for the rigours of Western-style parliamentary 
democracy. One British official ventured the opinion that ` it would be idle to pretend 
that the Burmans as a people are, as yet, fitted to govern themselves democratically'. 25 
Similar views were being expressed in Washington; parliamentary democracy, C. 
Douglas Dillon, the Under-Secretary of State, told his colleagues in the NSC, `simply 
will not work in these countries as it works in the US'26 Indeed, military rule might 
even be a necessary stage in the political and social evolution of the Third World. 
According to the State Department's analysis, recent US experience with dictatorships 
in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America 
showed that authoritarian government was `required to lead backward societies 
through their socio-economic revolutions'. Given the prevalence of military regimes 
25 Murray to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 238,1 November 1958, F0371/135729/Dß1015/60, UKNA. 
26 Memorandum of discussion, 410`h Meeting of the NSC, 18 June 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 16, p. 
101. 
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in Asia, the Middle East and the Americas, the fact that civilian government in Burma 
had survived for as long as it did was arguably an achievement in itself; by adopting a 
military government, Burma was doing no more than falling into line with a well- 
established pattern of autocracy. 
American diplomats in Rangoon were less sanguine than their Washington colleagues 
about the merits of military government when they were asked to comment on the 
State Department's conclusions towards the end of 1959.27 It was true, McConaughy 
conceded, that the increasing prevalence of military rule in Asia and Africa was not 
necessarily harmful to US interests, and in certain circumstances military government 
may indeed offer `the best available alternative to a weak civilian government unable 
to cope with the internal threat of Communism or demands for rapid industrial and 
economic change'. In Burma's case, Ne Win's government had been instrumental in 
arresting a `seriously deteriorating situation' in 1958. But this did not imply that the 
continuation of military government was desirable or for that matter necessary, and 
might in the long term not prove effective in addressing Burma's developmental 
problems. Nor was it evident that Ne Win's seizure of power stemmed from any 
systemic political collapse; the military takeover in 1958, McConaughy argued, `was 
not the result of failure in the democratic parliamentary system as such, but the 
consequence of personal feuds that reflected loss of cohesion, once independence was 
relatively secure, within the ruling group that had achieved it'. 28 What Burma really 
27 'Comments on Papers Concerning Military Takeovers in Asia and Africa', 6 October 1959, CDF, 
611.90B/10-659, box 2560, RG59, USNA. 
28 Ne Win's dislike of U Nu was certainly deeply held; in conversation with Bill Snow, McConaughy's 
successor as US ambassador, Ne Win characterised him as a `very dangerous man', `not quite sane' 
and `loose and vague mentally at times'; he was 'petulant and changeable and quite willing to play one 
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needed was not prolonged military administration, but a civilian government 
`supported, energised and, to the extent necessary, guided by a dedicated military 
leadership'. 
McConaughy's assessment of the problem of military government was in some 
respects both more sophisticated and more sceptical than the State Department's 
analysis, perhaps reflecting the insights closer proximity afforded him. McConaughy 
did not, however, differ with the main conclusion, namely that US support for the 
Burmese government must continue, irrespective of its new khaki complexion. While 
America should maintain its contacts with civilian leaders and opinion-formers, it was 
`indispensable that the United States demonstrate its support of the present 
Government and its approval of the constructive measures it has undertaken'. In 
particular, McConaughy was thinking of the new government's stance towards the 
communists. Here, there was a marked change from the guarded approach of the 
previous administration. Domestically, communist influence was curbed through a 
range of legislative and military measures. The leaders of the communist-dominated 
students' union at Rangoon University were arrested, and the union's right to appoint 
representatives to the university's governing body was abolished. 29 Legislation was 
introduced to make national service compulsory, increasing the state's control over 
the country's communist-inclined young people; left-wing newspapers were closed 
down and their editors arrested, and Burmese hoping to attend communist events 
abroad were denied permission to travel. Military operations against the communist 
person or country off against another'. Rangoon to the State Department, 9 March 1960,790B. 00/3- 
960, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
29 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 73,23 April 1959, F0371/143859/DB1015/24, UKNA. 
282 
insurgency were also prosecuted with much greater vigour, and several important 
communist leaders surrendered or were killed during this period. 30 
Popular and governmental attitudes towards China and the Soviet Union also 
appeared to be changing. Prominent newspapers in Rangoon shed the circumspection 
of the U Nu period in favour of a series of strident editorials attacking China over its 
suppression of revolt in Tibet in March 1959.31 Further ammunition was provided by 
a series of very public embarrassments to the Soviet establishment in Rangoon, 
starting in April 1959 with the attempted defection, failed suicide and hasty 
repatriation of the Soviet military attache, Mikhail Strygin. 32 The following month, a 
Rangoon magistrate issued a warrant for the arrest of the Tass representative in 
Rangoon, who had taken refuge in the Soviet embassy to avoid libel charges 
stemming from a Tass article accusing the editor of Burma's principal English- 
language paper, The Nation, of being in the pay of the Americans. 33 This was 
followed in June by the defection of a junior Soviet diplomat, Aleksandr Kaznacheev, 
who promptly gave a news conference to announce that the Soviet government had 
ordered him to spy on his `Burmese friends'. 34 Finally, in July, a Burmese firm was 
awarded damages against a Soviet company for supplying damaged and underweight 
30 Smith, Burma, p. 183. 
31 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 124,2 July 1959, F0371/143860/DB1015/33, UKNA. 
32 As Strygin was being bundled aboard his flight home at Rangoon's Mingaladon airport, a brawl 
broke out between Burmese journalists and Soviet officials. The offended journalists retaliated by 
pelting the Soviet embassy with rotten tomatoes, only to have chairs thrown at them by the staff inside. 
`Lost Rapture', The Times, 1 July 1959, p. 13. 
33 Ibid., 16 May 1959, p. 5. 
34 `Russian Seeks Asylum in US Embassy', ibid., 28 June 1959, p. 10. Kaznacheev's account of his two 
years in Burma 
- 
Inside a Soviet Embassy, published in 1962 
- 
detailed at length the organisation and 
extent of Soviet intelligence activity in Rangoon. 
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goods. 5 According to The Times, in a leader entitled `Lost Rapture', `the gilt' was 
`off the gingerbread' in Burma's relations with the Soviet Union. 6 Although 
Khrushchev passed through Rangoon in February 1960, en route to Indonesia, his 
reception was distinctly cooler than it had been five years earlier. The visit was brief 
(barely two days, compared to the week he had spent in the country in 1955); there 
were no crowd-lined streets or government-orchestrated demonstrations of welcome, 
and the joint communique issued at the end of the trip made no mention of Soviet 
aid. 7 From the `Free World viewpoint', the State Department concluded, the situation 
in Burma had undergone `a marked improvement': 
Internationally Burma [is] expected [to] maintain [its] posture [ofj 
overt neutrality [in] view [of] its exposed geographical position 
[and is] unlikely [to] seriously jeopardise correct relations with 
[the] Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc or desist entirely from 
accepting Communist aid. However sound indications at present 
suggest [that the] current Burmese Government and [its] probable 
successor will seek closer and more positive relations with [the] US 
and [the] Free World and at [the] same time will [not only] curtail 
trade and aid relations with [the] Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc 
but also follow [a] policy of progressive political disentanglement. 38 
35 `Breach of Contract on Russian Steel', ibid., 23 July 1959. 
36 'Lost Rapture'. 
37 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 46,18 February 1960, F0371/152259/DB10338/2, UKNA. 
38 State Department Circular, 1 July 1959,790B. 00/7-159, CDF, box 3853, RG59, USNA. 
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Officials concerned with Burma affairs were clear that these changes, combined with 
Burmese attempts to extricate themselves from their burdensome barter deals, 
demanded some form of positive action. In April 1959, Parsons told his colleagues 
that the United States had a `dramatic opportunity which may never recur to share in 
possibly spectacular improvements in a country which has long been in [the] 
doldrums'. The opening was there, he argued, to achieve an `important improvement 
in this critical sector of Southeast Asia'. 39 McConaughy too thought that a new 
initiative was called for. The advent of Ne Win's government, he told the State 
Department, offered the US an opportunity to `bring about a subtle but significant 
change for [the] better in Burmese foreign policy orientation', with potentially 
beneficial effects throughout the region. 40 America's relations with Burma were at a 
`turning point' 41 
US thinking crystallised around Burmese requests for American help in the 
construction of a 900-mile highway linking Rangoon, Mandalay and the northern 
town of Myitkyina. 42 This was a significant proposal, both in terms of its profile and 
cost 
- 
estimated at between $75 million and $100 million 
- 
and because of its political 
and strategic implications. Although it offered some potential economic benefit, the 
road's purpose was primarily military; as one Burmese official put it, the road would 
`serve notice on the ChiComs that Burma will be defended' by enabling the efficient 
deployment of troops and equipment to north Burma in the event of Chinese attack 43 
The decision to request American help in a project of such potential strategic 
39 Parsons to Herter, 24 April 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 88. 
40 McConaughy to Herter, 12 May 1959, ibid., document 94. 
01 Rangoon to the State Department, 14 May 1959,611.90B/5-1459, CDF, box 2560, RG59, USNA. 
42 Rangoon to the State Department, 7 April 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 82. 
43 Memorandum of conversation, 27 April 1959, ibid., document 92. 
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importance did not preclude constructive contacts between Ne Win's government and 
the regime in Beijing, and a broadly favourable settlement of the border dispute 
between the two countries was reached in January 1960 44 Nonetheless, for a country 
accustomed to treading extremely delicately in its relations with Beijing, deeply 
alarmed by Chinese actions in Tibet and itself the recent victim of a Chinese military 
incursion, this was a bold, and potentially provocative, step, with considerable 
symbolic importance. Under the circumstances, McConaughy reported, `nothing short 
of [an] undiluted positive response' would have the desired impact 45 Officials in 
Washington agreed; and on 11 June 1959 Eisenhower authorised a grant of $750,000 
for a preliminary feasibility survey of the highway project. Privately, American aid 
officials thought that additional funding of up to $75 million could eventually be 
made available. 46 This was by some distance the most noteworthy single expression of 
US support for Burma since the country's independence in 1948, and a `significant 
development in Burma's relations with the West'. 47 
Further similar developments depended fundamentally on the course of Burma's 
domestic politics and the make-up of its government. Both became less certain in 
August 1959, when Ne Win finally met the commitments he had made when he took 
44 The two sides also signed a ten-year Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression, which among 
other things precluded Burmese membership of SEATO, a vanishingly small possibility in any case. 
Pettman, China in Burma's Foreign Policy, p. 23. Pettman follows contemporary observers in arguing 
that China's willingness to conclude an agreement, having stalled on one for several years, was 
stimulated less by any creative diplomacy on Ne Win's part and more by the need to resurrect the 
concept of `peaceful coexistence' after the battering inflicted upon it by Beijing's actions in Tibet and 
its escalating border dispute with India. Stewart to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 10,23 February 1960, 
F0371/152256/DB 10310/13, UKNA. 
45 McConaughy to Herter, 12 May 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 94. 
46 Allen to the Foreign Office, no. 134,9 July 1959, F0371/143876/DB11345/4, UKNA. 
47 Allen to the Foreign Office, no. 305,6 July 1959, F0371/143876/DB11345/2, UKNA. 
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power by announcing plans for fresh elections in 1960 48 Given the later trajectory of 
Burmese politics, Ne Win's decision to relinquish government cannot be interpreted 
as a statement of respect for democratic principles, and he himself later described it as 
a mistake. 9 At the time, however, it was taken as further evidence of his lack of 
political ambition and admiration for constitutional process; according to one British 
official, `one must concede that there are few other statesmen in the world who have 
shown so moderate and pure an attitude towards the exercise of power 
... 
I wish we 
could find a few men like Ne Win and his senior officers to take over Indonesia, Laos 
or Ceylon'. 50 That said, even his admirers conceded that some of his government's 
more draconian measures were distinctly unpopular, and by the end of 1959 Allen 
was reporting a growing sense of fatigue with the regime-51 British officials also 
speculated that Ne Win was becoming increasingly concerned with the debilitating 
effects of his officers' political and economic activities on the army's fighting 
capacity, and increasingly aware of U Nu's continued personal popularity, both in the 
country at large and within the military rank and file. In any case, whatever the 
outcome of the polls analysts in London and Washington were in no doubt that Ne 
Win and his senior colleagues would continue to exert decisive political influence 52 
In important respects, therefore, the military's role in government would continue, 
albeit behind a civilian facade. 
48 Rangoon to the Foreign Office, 19 August 1959, F0371/143861/DB1015/41, UKNA. 
49 Harriman to the State Department, 18 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 23, Southeast Asia 
(Washington DC: USGPO, 1995), p. 113. 
so Warner to Allen, 10 May 1960, F0371/152252/DB 10 15110, UKNA. 
s1 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 253,23 December 1959, F0371/143861/DB1015/61, UKNA. 
52 `U Nu Probable Victor in Burmese Election', State Department Intelligence Note, 5 February 1960, 
790B. 00/2-560, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
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U Nu's return to power 
The elections were held on 6 February 1960. They resulted in a resounding victory for 
U Nu and his Clean AFPFL, which won 52% of the vote, giving it an overwhelming 
parliamentary majority. U Nu's opponents in the Stable faction took 31%, and the 
NUF, which attracted just 5% of the vote, was virtually eliminated as an electoral 
force. By all accounts the military did not interfere significantly in the polls, despite 
Ne Win's evident preference for a Stable victory and his mistrust of U Nu, and the 
elections were generally regarded as the fairest since independence. They were 
certainly the most representative, with a turnout of nearly 6 million, compared with 
about 3.6 million in 1956.53 
U Nu's government took power on 4 April 1960. Early British assessments of the new 
administration's prospects were largely encouraging. U Nu's declared policies on 
communism were sound, Allen reported, and he had resolved not to open negotiations 
with the insurgents. Press freedom, freedom of speech and freedom of association 
were guaranteed (a Burmese version of Speakers' Corner opened in Rangoon on 19 
July), as were the rights of the (very weak) opposition. The new government also 
promised to carry on the bureaucratic reforms initiated under Ne Win. While U Nu 
had his failings, Allen judged, not least a tendency to prosecute action against the 
communists without the requisite vigour, he had returned to office facing a security 
situation more favourable than he had left it in 1958, with a solid parliamentary 
majority, significant personal popularity and a large store of international goodwill. 
All in all, Allen concluded, `the outlook is reasonably bright'. 54 
s' Allen to the Foreign Office, 5 May 1960, F0371/152252/DB1015/30, UKNA. 
54 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 75,19 April 1960, F0371/152252/DB1015/27, UKNA. 
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This optimism did not last long. In June, Allen reported that the government had still 
not settled down to business; what policy thinking was being done was consigned to a 
proliferation of advisory committees, encouraging the kind of `indecision and 
procrastination' that had so bedevilled U Nu's previous administrations. Insurgent 
activity was increasing, including an unusually brutal communist attack in Pakokku 
which left 70 people dead. Meanwhile, political prisoners detained under Ne Win 
were being released and pro-communist activity was on the rise in Rangoon 
University. 55 Splits were also appearing within the Clean AFPFL (renamed the Union 
Party) between long-standing supporters drawn from Burma's peasant organisations 
and newer, better educated-members. In sum, U Nu had `successfully avoided the 
worst of his past mistakes', but had still to understand that `his chief task is to govern 
decisively. A lover of the limelight, he spends far too much of his time sermonising 
and striking attitudes in public when he should be at his desk dealing with the day to 
day flow of government business'. 56 Reading Allen's reports from Rangoon, the head 
of the South-East Asia Department at the Foreign Office, Fred Warner, confessed 
himself full of the `gloomiest forebodings 
... 
I fear that the next time I visit Burma 
there may well be the good old muddle which I knew in 1956 and 1957'. 57 American 
observers too were unimpressed by the conduct of U Nu's second government. 
Although displaying a `surface calm', the US embassy reported, political conditions in 
Rangoon were in fact riven with `considerable dissension, confusion, and 
uncertainty'. 58 
55 Rangoon to the State Department, 30 August 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 147. 
56 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 114,8 June 1960, F0371/152252/DB1015/35, UKNA. 
57 Warner to Allen, 10 May 1960, F0371/152252/DB1015110, UKNA. 
58 'Political Situation in Burma', 12 June 1961,790B. 00/6-1261, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
Concerns about Burma's domestic condition under U Nu's government were matched 
by fresh unease about his dealings with communist China. Barely a week after the 
new government had installed itself, on 15 April 1960, Chou arrived in Rangoon for a 
five-day visit. The trip was largely a public-relations exercise: Chou's public 
statements dwelt at length on the virtues of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co- 
existence and the amity between Burma and China evinced by January's border 
agreement. Chou also participated with gusto in the bouts of water-throwing that 
traditionally marked the Burmese Water Festival with which his visit coincided, 
affording the assorted diplomats present `a close and unique view of the ruler of the 
new Chinese empire looking like a drowned rat'. 59 Frequent contacts continued during 
the year as the two sides settled the details of the border agreement. 60 A treaty finally 
disposing of the dispute was signed in Beijing on 1 October, an occasion marked by a 
100,000-strong rally, and on 24 October the two sides concluded a trade agreement 
providing for the sale of up to 400,000 tons of Burmese rice to China, a significantly 
larger commitment than the 200,000 tons envisaged in the barter deal the two 
countries had signed at the end of 1954.61 
This flurry of diplomatic activity culminated in January 1961, when Chou led a 400- 
strong Chinese delegation to Burma. According to the British report of the visit, the 
Burmese `took infinite pains and spent more money than they could well afford to 
give lustre to this climax'. Estimates put the outlay at around £190,000 
- 
equivalent to 
the country's total health spending the previous year. Public buildings were spruced 
up and roads resurfaced in Rangoon, and `triumphal arches' were erected along the 
59 Allen to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 79,21 April 1960, F0371/152257/DB10310/19, UKNA. 
60 Slater to Home, no. 183,26 September 1960, F0371/152257/DB 10310/3 1, UKNA. 
61 Slater to Home, no. 201,1 November 1960, F0371/152276/DB11310/4, UKNA. 
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city's main streets. To cap things off, Chou was presented with a specially created 
decoration, the Order of the Supreme Holder of the Great Glory of Love. The 
Chinese, the British concluded, `can have been in no doubt about the eagerness of 
their hosts to show and give them the best of everything'. 2 In return, the Burmese 
government received an interest-free loan worth more than $80 million 
- 
by far the 
largest loan China had ever extended to a non-communist country and, according to 
British figures, not far shy of the $96 million in aid the US had disbursed in Burma in 
the ten years to 1960. Such a substantial commitment, judged one British observer, 
`may well prove an important event in the cold war and a significant turning point in 
post war economic developments in Burma'. 3 Burma had taken a `clear step in the 
direction of both economic co-operation with China and acquiescence, if not co- 
operation in, and verbal support for, some of China's more extreme views'. 64 Under U 
Nu, noted Parsons, the US faced `a hard time holding the gains made in US-Burmese 
relations over the past year or so'. 65 
Bill Snow, the new US ambassador in Rangoon, dispatched his assessment of the 
implications of U Nu's China policy in September 1960. While American officials 
were by now resigned to Burma's over-riding need to maintain stable relations with 
its giant neighbour, the steps U Nu had taken since reassuming office seemed 
dangerously excessive. Burma's `all-out rapprochement' with China, Snow judged, 
was a `definite setback' to American interests, requiring a `compensating reaction'. 66 
62 Allen to Home, no. 11,11 January 1961, F0371/159763/10340/5, UKNA. 
63 Minute, 23 January 1961, F0371/159763/DB103110/6, UKNA. 
64 Stewart to Home, 27 January 1961, F0371/159763/DB103110/11, UKNA. 
65 Parsons to Snow, 30 August 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, document 148. 
66 Snow to Parsons, 12 September 1960, ibid., document 151; Snow to Parsons, 30 September 1960, 
ibid., document 153. 
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Nothing the US could do would halt the agreements already made, nor could the US 
hope to `transfer to the Burmese our implacable distrust of, and hostility toward, the 
Chicoms'. Nonetheless, it was open to the US to `work to get matters back in balance 
or better'. This did not mean offering significantly more aid: U Nu had clearly 
signalled his intention to reduce Burma's participation in the highway project first 
proposed by Ne Win, telling American aid officials that his government was not 
prepared to meet any of its costs, and any fresh efforts in that direction were likely to 
prove counter-productive. 67 While further assistance, both economic and military, 
would in time be required if the US was to re-establish its position in Rangoon, `we 
should control the cost, not be panicked into trying to outbid the Russians, finish up 
what we have started, rely on loans instead of grants as much as we can, not get 
involved in long-range projects which turn sour half-way through, and generally be 
friendly but quietly firm'. The Burmese, Snow concluded, `need to know that there 
are outer limits to our patience which it would not be wise for them to test too often, 
and also limits to our financial generosity'. 68 
Snow's analysis was extensive and detailed, covering virtually every aspect of 
America's relationship with Rangoon. Yet it was silent on one of the main issues in 
Burma's relations with the United States and China, namely persistent Burmese 
suspicions of American support for the Kuomintang troops still present in Burma's 
eastern border regions. Following the partial evacuations of 1953 and 1954, the 
military and political threat presented by the KMT appeared to ease as the 4,000- 
5,000 troops who had stayed behind in Burma settled down to life as dacoits and 
67 `Rangoon-Mandalay road', undated, ibid., document 141. 
68 Snow to Parsons, 30 September 1960, ibid., document 153. 
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opium-smugglers. 9 Reports of clandestine Nationalist Chinese and US support for 
these groups continued to circulate; in July 1955, for example, a senior Burmese 
commander told a British embassy official that the KMT was still receiving US-made 
arms from `American interests in Formosa', and claimed that the US military attache 
in Laos was in contact with KMT leaders in Burma `despite his Government's official 
policy of severing all contact'. 70 Nonetheless, while the KMT problem remained 
generally contained, its implications for Washington's relations with Rangoon were 
limited. By 1958, however, increasing tensions in the Taiwan Straits had prompted 
Taipei to expand its contacts and increase its support, leading to a resurgence in KMT 
activity and bringing the issue back to centre stage. 7' Reinforcements were flown to 
northern Burma from Taiwan, and Chiang's eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, took 
personal charge of the operation. 72 
During the previous period of KMT agitation, in the early 1950s, the problem had 
largely been confined to Burma and the Chinese border. This time, however, KMT 
troops appeared to be moving into Laos, where Pathet Lao guerrilla activity had 
begun in summer 1959, giving the issue a new, and potentially dangerous, regional 
dimension. 73 The re-emergence of the KMT, Secretary of State Christian Herter told 
his officials, risked embarrassing the Burmese government, created further problems 
for a Laotian government under communist pressure from the Pathet Lao, posed no 
69 Minute, MacCleary, 17 February 1955, F0371/117038/DB1041/1, UKNA. 
70 Sarell to Tomlinson, 25 July 1955, F0371/117038/DB1041/37, UKNA. 
71 Spinks to Cumming, 19 January 1961, FRUS, vol. 23,1961-1963, p. 84, fn. 2. 
72 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States, 1945- 
1992 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 66. 
73 Herter to Taipei, Vientiane, Rangoon and Bangkok, 28 May 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 15/16, 
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threat to the communist Chinese and was harmful to the interests both of the US and 
Taiwan. Accordingly, Taipei should `discontinue [the] air drops which our reports 
from [the] area indicate have been made on [a] continuing basis in recent months'; 
`cease [the] supply of arms and ammunition to [the] irregulars by other means'; and 
withdraw any Nationalist military personnel operating with the KMT, `leaving local 
units to fend for themselves'. 74 Repeated efforts to bring pressure to bear in Taipei 
were, 
- 
as before, ineffective; the irregulars, Nationalist officials claimed, were 
`voluntary and spontaneous formations of anti-Communist guerrillas' who refused 
repatriation to Taiwan and insisted on remaining where they were. No help was 
reaching them from Taipei, and the Nationalist authorities had no effective control 
over them. 5 According to Drumright, now the US ambassador in Taiwan, Chiang 
`gave every appearance of believing that the irregulars were in the area to stay'. 76 
The Burmese responded to the failure of diplomatic efforts to dislodge the irregulars 
by stepping up military action against them. They also reached agreement with 
Beijing on joint operations, and by the end of 1960 several thousand Chinese 
communist troops were fighting alongside Burmese forces in the east of Kengtung 
state. With Chinese help, Burmese troops recaptured the main KMT base at Keng Lap 
in December 1960, in the process seizing large quantities of US-made arms. 77 
Meanwhile, on 15 February 1961, a Burmese fighter aircraft was shot down in an 
engagement with a Chinese Nationalist plane which the Burmese government claimed 
had been dropping supplies to the KMT contingents in Kengtung. The Burmese pilot 
74 Ibid. 
75 Drumright to the State Department, 20 June 1959, ibid., document 109. 
76 Drumright to the State Department, 4 January 1961,790B. 00/1-461, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
"Denson to Petersen, 24 February 1961, F0371/159763/DB103110/14, UKNA. 
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was killed, prompting anti-US demonstrations in Rangoon on 15 and 21 February. 79 
On 22 February, the Burmese government made a formal complaint about the KMT to 
the United Nations, citing `deliberate and hostile intrusions' into Burmese territory. 79 
The KMT affair, Snow reported, represented `a very serious setback which will affect 
our relations with Burma for a considerable time'. 80 
Chinese communist intervention in Burma, the possibility of subsequent Chinese 
encroachment into Laos in pursuit of KMT fighters there and increasingly damaging 
public allegations of US and Nationalist complicity galvanised State Department 
efforts to resolve the problem. Fresh representations were made in Taipei on 7 
February, and on 22 February, the day the Burmese delivered their complaint to the 
UN, Drumright was told to impress upon Chiang the `utmost seriousness' with which 
Washington viewed the KMT's continued presence in Burma. 81 Officials also began 
discussing the possibility of suspending some aspects of American military aid to 
Taiwan. 82 `We find it incomprehensible', the new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, told 
Drumright, `that [Taiwan] should recklessly create [a] situation which imposes upon 
itself formidable international political burdens at [a] time when it can least afford 
them'. Further similar action `severely limits any effective political help which [the 
US government] might be able [to] render to [Taiwan]'. It was essential, Rusk 
concluded, that the Nationalists `understand that [the US government] is determined 
78 Rangoon to the State Department, 16 February 1961,790B. 00/2-1661, CDF, box 2103, RG59; 
Rangoon to the State Department, 24 February 1961, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
79 Rangoon to the Secretary of State, 1 March 1961,790B. 00(W)/2-2461, CDF, box 2105, RG59, 
USNA. 
80 Rangoon to the Secretary of State, 17 March 1961,790B. 00/3-1761, CDF, box 2103, RG59, USNA. 
81 Rusk to Drumright, 22 February 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, Northeast Asia (Washington DC: 
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82 Rusk to Kennedy, 20 February 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 23, p. 89. 
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to protect its reputation and good faith and will, if necessary, do so at [the] cost of [the 
government of Taiwan]'. 83 This diplomatic pressure finally yielded results at the end 
of February, when the Nationalist government grudgingly agreed to repatriate those 
KMT troops willing to leave, and to end its support for those who stayed behind. 
84 
The evacuations began on 17 March, and by the end of April some 4,000 troops and 
dependants had been transferred to Taiwan. 85 
The operation to extract these troops was arranged very shortly after Kennedy moved 
into the White House in January 1961, suggesting that the change in government in 
Washington was decisive in changing minds in Taipei. Certainly, Rusk - who had 
encountered the KMT problem in its first incarnation while a State Department 
official in Truman's government 
- 
tackled Chiang and his colleagues on their support 
for the irregulars in language considerably more robust than they were accustomed to 
hearing, 86 and hints that some US aid might be reduced suggest that Kennedy and his 
officials were prepared to take politically difficult steps to press their views home. 
There 
-are also - indications that the arrival in power of a new, 
Democratic 
administration made Chiang and his advisors less certain of where they stood in their 
relations with Washington, and hence perhaps more willing to be flexible, at least in 
an area that did not directly touch on Taiwan's security or its international position. 
Although Kennedy did not differ from his predecessor on the fundamental issue, 
83 Rusk to Drumright, 22 February 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, p. 12. 
84 Drumright to the State Department, 25 February 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 23, p. 16. The 
Burmese government were told of Taiwan's decision in early March: Kennedy to U Nu, 6 March 1961, 
FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, p. 98, fn. 3. 
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86 Referring to Rusk's message to Drumright of 22 February, Parsons noted that he could not recall an 
American official ever using such severe language with Nationalist officials. Parsons to Bundy, 23 
February 1961, FR US, 1961-1963, vol. 23, p. 95, fn. 6. 
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namely America's commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese attack, other 
aspects of his policy 
- 
most notably on the vexed question of Chinese representation 
in the United Nations 
- 
were causing distinct unease in Taipei; according to the head 
of the CIA in Taiwan, Ray Cline, the Nationalists were `more disturbed about their 
relation to the US than at any time in the past five years'. The `faintest indication' of 
any change in US attitudes `can seem like a matter of life and death'. 87 Support for 
Taiwan's continued occupation of China's UN seat was beginning to erode with the 
influx of newly independent African states, many of whom were sympathetic to 
Beijing's claims, and a moratorium on discussion of the status of the China seat, 
which had kept the issue off the UN's agenda during the 1950s, was becoming 
increasingly difficult to sustain. 88 With the KMT problem lodged with the United 
Nations at a time when Taiwan's relationship with the organisation was again in 
question, Chiang and his advisors may finally have come round to the view that 
discretion was the better part of valour. 
Kennedy, modernisation and the 1962 coup 
The evacuations of March and April did not in fact end the KMT problem; several 
hundred troops remained behind, and resupply operations apparently resumed in 
1965.89 Nonetheless, the role American diplomacy played in securing the removal of 
several thousand troops was an important expression of US good faith. For Kennedy's 
87 Bundy to Kennedy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 22, p. 89. 
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officials, preoccupied as they were with the damage to US standing that the KMT 
problem was causing, this was valuable in itself. But positive US action in support of 
the Burmese may also have had wider importance as part of Kennedy's general 
interest in improving America's standing among the non-aligned nations of the Third 
World. Before his election, Kennedy had repeatedly criticised Eisenhower's 
preoccupation with the formal and exclusionary politics of alliance-building, and 
berated his failure to engage effectively and imaginatively with non-allied 
governments. In a speech in New York at the end of 1957, for instance, Kennedy 
remarked: 
Much as we see the world as fractured in two, as a dualism between 
the United States and the USSR, the truth is becoming ever enlarged 
that there is no such simple counterpoise any longer 
... 
Neither the 
USA nor the USSR can any longer frame international policies 
oblivious to the existence and temper of other nations 
- 
India, 
China, Egypt, Japan, and a host of uncommitted countries whose 
individual speaking parts may seem very small, if not inarticulate, 
but whose common consciousness will powerfully affect the future 
pattern of world power. 90 
Instead of condemning neutralism as mistaken, even immoral, Kennedy promised a 
new, more sympathetic approach to the needs and concerns of the uncommitted 
world-91 Neutralism, he told an interviewer in December 1959, was `the great trend': 
90 Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at Temple Emmanuel in New York City, 19 November 1957, 
John F. Kennedy Memorial Library, http: //www. jfklibrary. org. 
91 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 36. 
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`We have to live with that and if neutrality is the result of a concentration on internal 
problems, raising the standard of living and so on, particularly in the developing 
countries, I would accept that'. 92 
British observers saw in statements like these an important break with Eisenhower's 
administration. Neutralism, reported Britain's ambassador in Washington, Harold 
Caccia, in July 1961, was now `better understood and regarded'; unlike the previous 
administration, Kennedy did not expect governments in receipt of American economic 
or military aid `to behave like a puppet'. 93 In terms of substance, however, Kennedy's 
position was a less radical development than the rhetoric might have implied. As we 
have seen, senior officials in the Eisenhower government, Dulles included, were 
prepared to concede that a less doctrinaire approach was called for in dealing with 
states - that chose to remain apart from America's alliance relationships, and 
Eisenhower approved some substantial aid packages to neutral governments, 
including Burma's. 
- 
Nor were Kennedy's officials necessarily less sensitive than 
Eisenhower's had been to the political difficulties they faced in their relations with 
non-aligned governments. Rusk's exasperated response to the Belgrade conference of 
non-aligned nations in September 1961 
- 
`it is high time that they decided what side 
of the Cold War they were on' 
- 
would have been applauded by many of the critics 
Eisenhower and Dulles confronted as they sought to frame a more positive policy 
towards the uncommitted world in the mid-1950s. 94 
92 Allen Nevins (ed. ), The Strategy of Peace (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1960), p. 218. 
93 Caccia to Home, no. 132,10 July 1961, F0371/159712/DB 103145/13, UKNA. 
94 Rusk, quoted in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 37. 
There was continuity too in the strategic thinking behind the approaches of the two 
administrations. Eisenhower's more nuanced appreciation of the non-aligned world in 
the mid-1950s had been shaped fundamentally by a belief that the expansion of Soviet 
and Chinese economic and political links with these countries was of direct concern to 
US security, and called for a countervailing response. Eisenhower had told the NSC in 
1955 that the US needed policies that would keep states like India `neutral or at least 
"neutral on our side"'. 95 Eight years later, Kennedy was telling his National Security 
Council much the same thing, arguing that `We cannot permit all those who call 
themselves neutrals to join the Communist bloc. Therefore we must keep our ties to 
... 
neutralists even if we do not like many of the things they do because if we lose 
them, then the balance of power could swing against us'. 96 For Kennedy as for 
Eisenhower, the primary objective of US policy in this area was not to bring 
convinced neutrals into formal alignment with the United States, but to ensure that 
they were secure enough to maintain their neutrality against Soviet or Chinese 
pressure. Arguably, therefore, Kennedy's policies towards the non-aligned world built 
upon and extended decisions taken by his predecessor, rather than striking out in a 
fundamentally different direction. The key difference between them may lie, less in 
the broad lines of Kennedy's thinking or the reasoning that underpinned it, and more 
in the vigour and clarity with which it was pursued. Kennedy's planners had inherited 
the containment framework that had underpinned US strategic thinking since Truman; 
what they were looking for were `more effective ways to implement it'. 
97 
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To help find an answer to this question, Kennedy turned to America's intellectual 
elite, and specifically a group of social scientists based at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT). Since the early 1950s, MIT academics such as Walt Rostow, 
Max Millikan and Lucian Pye had sought to develop an analytical model to explain 
the political, - economic and social changes taking place in the post-colonial states of 
the Third World. These newly independent countries, theorists argued, stood at the 
cusp of a transitional process through which they would in time shed the inhibitions 
and limitations of `traditional' societies 
- 
construed as `inward-looking, inert, passive 
toward nature, superstitious, fearful and economically simple' 
- 
and become `modern' 
- 
`cosmopolitan, mobile, controlling of the environment, secular, welcoming of 
change, and characterized by a complex division of labor'. 98 In other words, the Third 
World was embarking on exactly the same process of change that had transformed 
Europe's simple, static and religiose societies of the Middle Ages into complex 
industrial polities, albeit these changes would now have to be measured in decades, 
rather than centuries. The Third World, Rostow and his colleagues argued, was being 
catapulted into modernity. 99 The trick was in ensuring that as many of these new 
states as possible catapulted themselves into the right brand of modernity, not the 
wrong one. 
98 Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: 
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For American intellectuals, the quintessential example of the modern, sophisticated 
society was, of course, America. At the same time, however, theorists acknowledged 
- 
and explicitly sought to challenge - the alternative model of modernity presented by 
the Soviet Union. '°0 The task, facing the United States, modernisers argued, was to 
manage the processes of change unleashed by decolonisation in such a way that these 
regions `became more like "us" - and less like the Russians or the Chinese'. 
'0' 
Modernisation theory was, in other words, more than just an academic model: like 
Marx before them, Rostow and his colleagues understood that the point was not 
simply understanding change, but seeking ways to influence and direct it. 
The modernisers' solution to this problem was to rethink America's attitude towards 
foreign aid. Under Eisenhower, modernisers argued, aid priorities had been too 
closely tied to narrow conceptions of America's political and strategic objectives, 
when what was needed was a more generous, flexible and sensitive approach. Rather 
than linking assistance to specific short-term aims, the United States should seek to 
promote the development of post-colonial societies in a much broader sense: the aim 
of foreign aid, Rostow and Millikan argued in 1957, was to encourage `the evolution 
of stable, effective, democratic societies abroad which can be relied on not to generate 
conflict because their own national interests parallel ours and because they are 
politically healthy and mature'. 102 Given the right conditions, in other words, 
governments in the Third World would naturally reject communist methods and 
embrace liberal, democratic capitalism. The provision of extensive US assistance 
10° The title of Rostow's key text 
- 
The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 
published in 1960 
- 
points to the intention of modernisation theory to provide a closed and 
intellectually coherent explanation of historical change convincing enough to challenge Marx. 
101 Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, p. 3. 
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would advance America's long-term Cold War objectives by accelerating the 
transition of `traditional' societies towards the kind of modernity represented by the 
United States. 103 Through aid, America would remake the Third World in its own 
image. Thus, just as colonial governments in the nineteenth century had rationalised 
European control of Africa and Asia in terms of a benevolent mission to `educate' and 
`civilise' supposedly `backward' societies, so American social scientists assigned to 
the United States a similar tutelary role in the supposedly `traditional' societies of the 
post-colonial world. 104 
The policy prescriptions Rostow and his colleagues put forward during the 1950s 
were arguably evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, and differed from what had 
gone before more in scale than in substance. As previous chapters have shown, 
economic and technical aid had long been seen as an important tool in American 
efforts to influence political and economic change in the Third World. Likewise, 
Eisenhower and his officials had made very similar arguments in favour of greater 
flexibility and generosity in American aid planning, and had been just as alive as 
Rostow to the impact Soviet ideas of progress were having on Third World leaders. 
Nonetheless, Rostow's thinking had a radical intellectual ring that was deeply 
appealing to Kennedy, an aspiring president looking for ways to challenge an 
incumbent leader he sought to portray as inept and disengaged. '°5 While still a 
103 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, p. 6. 
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congressman, Kennedy used Rostow's work, and much of his language, to support 
calls for more extensive aid to India, and employed him as a speech-writer on the 
campaign trail; once in office, Rostow's ambitious aid proposals provided the 
president with a bold policy programme to set against the humiliation of the Bay of 
Pigs and crises in Congo, Laos, Vietnam and Indonesia. '06 The results were a rapid 
and very significant expansion in US overseas aid. In its first year, Kennedy's 
administration increased economic assistance to developing countries by just shy of 
25%; between 1960 and 1963, aid grew by a third. The ratio of economic to military 
assistance also increased. Meanwhile, parallel administrative changes overhauled and 
streamlined the institutional architecture of US overseas aid. The Peace Corps and 
Food for Peace programmes were set up in early 1961, and in November the various 
aid programmes that had grown up in piecemeal fashion under Eisenhower were 
organised under a new `super-agency', the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). 107 The 1960s, Kennedy told the UN in January 1961, would be the `Decade 
of Development'. 
106 Mark. H. Haefele, `Walt Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action', in David C. 
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Press, 2003), p. 93. According to Nick Cullather ('Development? It's History', p. 641), 
`developmentese became the Kennedy administration's court vernacular'. The influence social 
scientists had on policy-making in Kennedy's Washington was dramatised by the ease with which key 
intellectuals moved in and out of government: Rostow, for example, was Deputy Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, and later chaired the State Department's Policy Planning Council (the 
renamed PPS); Pye, whose work included a study of guerrilla communism in Malaya, taught courses 
on counter-insurgency theory for the State Department, and was an advisor to USAID. Latham, 
Modernization as Ideology, p. 7. 
107 Ibid., p. 81. 
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Burma seemed as good a candidate as any for the kind of ambitious modernisation 
programme Kennedy and his advisors envisaged. 108 Many of the problems besetting 
the so-called transitional societies appeared to be present: a shortage of capital, a lack 
of trained personnel, inadequate social and educational facilities, over-population and 
`grossly imperfect means for mobilizing both human and material resources'. More 
important still, the Burmese appeared beset by the kind of psychological crisis that 
modernisation theorists believed was typical in societies facing rapid change; 
according to Pye, beneath the country's manifest economic, political and social 
weaknesses lurked `a level of psychological problems involving attitudes and 
sentiments which create equal if not more serious difficulties': 
At this level a vicious circle somehow seems to develop in 
transitional societies: fears of failure in the adventure of nation 
building create deep anxieties, which tend to inhibit effective action; 
thus imagined problems become real and fears of failure become the 
realities of failure; and these failures further heighten anxieties. The 
dynamics of such psychological inhibitions to effective action, 
particularly in relation to the politics of modernization, can 
permeate and restrain the entire process of nation building. 109 
108 Millikan and Rostow identified three categories of `transitional state': `potentially democratic 
societies', like Turkey, Brazil and the Philippines; `modernising oligarchies', comprising most post- 
colonial states; and `traditionalist oligarchies', such as Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Cambodia. Although 
the first category was deemed most promising for modernisation, states in the second, presumably 
including Burma, were also potential targets for American economic aid. The third category (the `most 
dangerous') were 'utterly backward'. Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, p. 184. 
1°9 Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962). 
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Gloomy though his analysis was, Pye did not conclude that Burma's apparent physical 
and psychological weaknesses marked it out from the mass of the post-colonial world: 
Burma was not `strikingly unique', and the prospects there were `quite as hopeful as 
those of most transitional societies'. ' 10 
Aid planners began a reassessment of US assistance to Burma at the end of 1960, just 
ahead of Kennedy's arrival in office. There were, officials conceded, a number of 
`warning signs'. As the record since 1950 conclusively showed, `The Burmese are 
among the most difficult of people for foreigners and foreign governments to work 
with', for reasons officials had by now come to know all too well: 
The short interest span of the Burmese, their distrust of one another, 
their sense of insecurity leading to sudden changes of decision, their 
essential satisfaction with the static mode of life which has prevailed 
here for so long, their lack of frankness, their ingrained habit of 
haggling and shopping around, and their dearth of knowledge of or 
experience in modern economics and international politics 
- 
these 
and other characteristics are ever-present. 
These problems did not, however, mean that the Burmese did not merit America's 
`best efforts' to help. Nor for that matter did it mean that the United States was 
necessarily Burma's ideal aid partner; officials conceded that past aid practice had 
tended to overestimate the capacity of Third World states like Burma to absorb the aid 
they were given, while repeated justifications of aid as a necessary means of 
110 Ibid., p. 286. 
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containing communist expansion had encouraged the Burmese tendency to play both 
sides against the middle in order to maximise the assistance they stood to receive. As 
an `old, salty, sceptical race of Asiatics living close to the sharp realities of human and 
physical nature', the Burmese were `apt to misconstrue our unprecedented brand of 
kindness and generosity'. And then, of course, there was the perennial problem of 
Burma's peculiar brand of pendulum-like neutralism. Taken together, aid officials 
concluded, `the moral seems to be: "don't try to cover too much ground too quickly 
with an aid program in Burma, or allow it to become too prominent a feature of the 
landscape; it will almost surely become counter-productive'. Thus, while aid policy 
should aim to generate `a reasonable amount of the impact which a broad, imaginative 
plan can give, we need to keep our eye on the political barometer, and to aim at a 
program having broad public acceptance as well as a full measure of economic 
soundness'. Given the investment already made in the Mandalay highway project, 
officials concluded that America's best chance of success lay in concentrating efforts 
on rehabilitating and expanding Burma's road network, and a three-year aid deal was 
developed worth about $12 million in new funding. "1 
With the evacuation of the KMT early in 1961, and against the background of 
Kennedy's ambitious plans for US assistance in the Third World, the prospects for 
better ties with Burma were probably as propitious as they had ever been. No 
fundamental changes in Burmese attitudes towards the United States were anticipated, 
and officials looked forward to a period of consolidation and continuity; as Snow put, 
`Despite the uncertainties and highly troublesome ups and downs in our relations with 
Burma, we should continue our present and past attitude of patience, calmness and 
III 'Recommendations Re Economic Aid to Burma', 20 December 1960, CDF, Office of Far Eastern 
Operations, Burma Subject Files 1950-1961, box 39, RG469, USNA. 
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receptivity to opportunities for improved relations'. 112 What was needed was a 
`sustained, carefully planned and coordinated effort to strengthen the US position'. 113 
The fact that Rusk had served in Burma during the Second World War, and so had an 
unusually personal interest in the country, may also have augured well for the future; 
in conversation with Caccia in December 1960, for example, he ventured that Burma 
held `something of a special place for him since he had marched over a good part of 
the north of the country during the war'. 114 Whether the two countries were indeed 
about to enter a new phase in their relationship we will, however, never know. Early 
on the morning of 2 March 1962, Ne Win announced that U Nu's government had 
been toppled and that the army was, once again, in control. Unlike 1958, there was no 
exchange of letters and no pretence at constitutional process; this was unambiguously 
a coup. 
Ironically perhaps, given U Nu's long-standing preoccupation with the domestic 
implications of his foreign policy, American and British observers agreed that it was 
his handling of an internal problem 
- 
the unresolved status of Burma's ethnic minority 
groups 
- 
that ultimately caused his downfall. Ethnic unrest was of course nothing new 
in Burma: non-Burman groups such as the Karen, Mon, Pao and Rakhine had been in 
various degrees of revolt since the late 1940s. By the late 1950s, however, the hitherto 
quiescent Shan 
- 
Burma's second-largest minority group after the Karen 
- 
were also 
becoming restive. A Shan nationalist group called the Young Warriors was formed in 
May 1958, and in November 1959 a 1,000-strong Shan force seized Tangyan in the 
112 Snow to the Secretary of State, 23 December 1960, CDF, 611.90B/12-2360, microfilm 1855, roll 
118, RG59, USNA. 
13 Snow to the Secretary of State, 17 March 1961, CDF, 790B. 00/3-1761, RG59, USNA. 
114 Caccia to Hoyer Millar, 30 December 1960, F0371/159671/ZD14/2, UKNA. 
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north of Shan State. Although government troops recaptured the town on 1 December, 
the revolt spread rapidly; hundreds of police, troops and officials were killed, along 
with large numbers of pro-government Shan. "5 There was fighting too in Burma's far 
north, where a Kachin separatist group, the Kachin Independence Organisation, was 
set up in February 1961. Meanwhile, political pressure was increasing in favour of a 
change to the constitution to give minority areas greater power. In June 1961, a 
conference of ethnic minority leaders in Taunggyi, the Shan capital, called for a 
federal constitution, with powers shared equally between the minority states and 
Burman-majority areas; in effect, Burma proper - home to perhaps three-quarters of 
the country's people and most of its productive resources - would become a state on 
the same basis as the minority constituents of the Union. 
Contemporary observers and later writers - and indeed U Nu himself - all agree that 
there was no likelihood of Burma ever adopting a federal constitution along the lines 
the ethnic minority groups were proposing. Nevertheless, military leaders were clear 
that removing the possibility of such a step was the primary aim of their coup. Early 
on the morning of 2 March, Ne Win told the government's Chin Minister that 
federalism was `impossible' and would `destroy the Union' were it tried. 
"6 He made 
a similar point to his old admirer MacDonald when he visited Rangoon in June 
1962.1 17 One of the new regime's first acts was to remove what autonomy the ethnic 
states had possessed by replacing existing governance structures with military 
councils. 118 Yet other motives inevitably suggest themselves, not least the simple 
115 Smith, Burma, p. 191. 
116 Smith, Burma, p. 196. 
117 
`Note on Talks with General Ne Win June 24 1962', F0371/166372/DB1015/73, UKNA. 
118 Christine Fink, Living with Silence: Burma Under Military Rule (London: Zed, 2001), p. 32. 
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desire to regain the political and economic power relinquished in 1960. It is also 
possible that military leaders were uncomfortable with changes within the ruling 
Union Party, where a factional struggle had resolved itself in February 1962 in favour 
of many of the same politicians whom the army had moved against in 1958.119 
Whatever its cause, the change in government had a decisive effect on Burma's 
domestic politics and its foreign relations. Domestically, the regime acted quickly 
against potential sources of dissent. Prominent civilian figures were placed under 
house arrest, including U Nu, the country's chief justice and one-time UN 
ambassador, Myint Thein, and the ABPO leader Thakin Tin. Many more arrests - 
perhaps as many as 4,500 
- 
followed as the regime consolidated its rule. 12° Parliament 
was dissolved and the constitution abolished, and civilian courts were replaced with 
military tribunals. Public demonstrations of opposition were ruthlessly suppressed. In 
July 1962, troops responded to student riots at Rangoon University by firing into the 
crowd; the official death-toll was 16, but eyewitness reports placed it closer to 100, 
with many more injured. 121 The university was closed, and the headquarters of the 
students' union, symbolically important as one of the centres of Burmese nationalism 
during the British period, was razed to the ground. Political parties were abolished and 
replaced by a single organisation, the Burma Socialist Programme Party, and 
prominent newspapers including The Nation were closed down. Even horse racing 
was banned 
- 
an odd move for a government headed by a racing enthusiast - as were 
19 Warner to Allen, 22 March 1962, F0371/166369/DB1015/14, UKNA. 
120 Smith, Burma, p. 204. 
121 Allen to the Foreign Office, no. 213,10 July 1962, F0371/166372/DB1015/74, UKNA. 
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beauty contests, smoking in cinemas and public dance competitions. 122 Clearly, noted 
one British observer, the new regime `intends to exercise rigid control over all aspects 
of communal life'. 1z3 
As we have seen, analysts in Washington and London regarded the greater coercive 
possibilities of military government as one of its more important attributes. In the 
rubric of modernisation theory, military rule promised stability amid the uncertainties 
of rapid social and economic change. Military hierarchies and concepts of 
meritocratic promotion expressed and enabled people's desires for upward mobility, 
and the military's greater openness to technology introduced modern ideas and 
techniques into `backward', hidebound polities. Military rule could also address some 
of the deeper psychological flaws modernisers detected in post-colonial states by 
promoting ideas of a national identity, as opposed to identification with a particular 
caste or ethnicity, and by easing the insecurities and inhibitions inherent in 
communities undergoing transitional change. According to Pye, in a report for the 
Smithsonian Institution in 1961: ` It is possible to conceive of a military establishment 
in an under-developed country as providing a unique, and in some respects 
unequalled, setting for rapidly preparing tradition-oriented and village-bound people 
for participation in modern society'. 124 
In Burma's case, however, the advent of military government in 1962 offered little 
prospect of the kind of Westernised modernising project Pye and his colleagues 
122 Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing, 1989), 
p. 55. 
123 Minute, 11 July 1962, F0371/166372/DB1015/75, UKNA. 
124 Pye, quoted in Gilman, Mandarins of the Future, p. 188. 
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envisaged. The new government's key policy statement 
- 
`The Burmese Way to 
Socialism', announced on 30 April 
- 
was regarded by American officials as both 
'disturbing' and `ambiguous', not least in its rejection of capitalist modes of economic 
organisation and its commitment to the creation of a full-blown socialist economy; 
under Ne Win, concluded one American assessment, the Burmese government `seems 
to be moving with greater determination towards the evolution of a socialist society, 
probably along Marxist-Leninist lines, and a progressive isolation from Western 
intellectual influence'. 125 The Ford, Fulbright and Asia foundations were all ejected, 
and in 1964 the government finally cancelled the Mandalay highway project, 
apparently just before work was due to start. 126 Measures to centralise and nationalise 
the economy saw foreign firms expropriated and joint ventures liquidated, including 
the long-standing joint venture with the BOC, which was wound up in January 1963. 
The regime also moved to restrict the activities of Burma's substantial Indian business 
community, prompting the mass exodus of up to 200,000 Indo-Burmese to India and 
Pakistan. 127 Travel outside of Burma was restricted, and entry into the country was 
limited by tighter visa controls. Foreign journalists and news agencies were expelled, 
foreign diplomats were forced to seek permission to travel outside of Rangoon and 
social contacts between government officials and foreign embassies were 
discouraged. 128 In this way, the enthusiasm for international discourse and diplomacy 
that had been one of the vital hallmarks of U Nu's government was replaced by 
introversion and a studied disregard for the outside world. In the words of one British 
125 'Semi-Annual Politico-Economic Assessment', 4 June 1962, CDF, 790B. 00/6-462, RG59, USNA. 
126 Byroade to the State Department, 18 August 1966, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 27, Mainland Southeast 
Asia; Regional Affairs (Washington DC: USGPO, 2000), p. 244. 
127 Lintner, Outrage, p. 59. 
128 'Burma: Annual Review for 1965', Wakely to Stewart, 14 February 1966, 
F0371/185946/DB 1011/2, UKNA. 
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observer, writing in 1970: ` the Burmese want above all to be left alone, themselves 
regulating their contacts with the outside world at no one's initiative but their own'. 129 
In turn, the political repression and economic stagnation of military rule would go 
largely unnoticed outside Burma until, on 26 August 1988,40 years after her father's 
posthumous victory over the British, Aung San Suu Kyi called on the Burmese people 
to assert their independence once again. 
129 'Burma: Annual Review for 1969', Trafford Smith to Stewart, 27 January 1970, 
FC015/1150/FAB 1/3, UKNA. 
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Conclusion 
The litany of crises that confronted Burma at independence in 1948 was daunting in 
the extreme. The writ of the weak nationalist government barely ran further than the 
suburbs of Rangoon, and at times not even as far as that; beyond the capital, the small 
and ill-equipped army faced an array of communist, religious and ethnic insurgencies. 
The economy had still not recovered from the depredations of war and Japanese 
occupation, and internal communications had virtually collapsed. According to one 
British official, writing in July 1950, `like Dr. Johnson on the dancing dog, the 
wonderful thing is not that the Burmese Government is not functioning well, but that 
it is functioning at all'. ' 
Against this background, aid was an early subject of discussion between the Burmese 
and the British. British military assistance against the insurgency began almost 
immediately after independence and, in response to Burmese requests for financial 
help, Britain and other Commonwealth countries hammered out a loan package worth 
about £6 million. In the immediate term, this aid was intended to bolster the Burmese 
government, tiding it over its financial and military crises in the hope that a more 
secure regime would then emerge capable of holding the line against its communist 
opponents. More broadly, by framing aid in a Commonwealth context British planners 
hoped to give practical effect to some ambitious thinking about the UK's wider 
regional role 
-a role it would now play, not as a colonial power, but via the newly 
expanded Commonwealth. By involving Commonwealth members in assistance to the 
Burmese government, the British sought, both to dramatise the Commonwealth's 
1 Glass, minute, 27 July 1950, F0371/83107/FB1015/35, UKNA. 
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potential as an actor in international affairs, and to give it an early sense of practical 
purpose. 
This was a creative solution to the problem of managing relations with Asia's newly 
independent states. For it to work, of course, Burma had to accept the aid it was 
offered. To British consternation, however, the loan was never used, and the 
agreement under which it was offered was quietly allowed to lapse. While military 
assistance was more straightforward, it too was not trouble-free, despite the 
apparently self-evident need for it. In particular, the Burmese bridled at the presence 
in Rangoon of the British military mission, and in 1954 it was ejected for good. 
Domestic changes partly explain Burma's rejection of British assistance: by the early 
1950s the insurgent threat had begun to recede and the economy was looking up. The 
Burmese also resented British efforts to tie assistance to progress in resolving the 
conflict with the ethnic Karen insurgency. And however beleaguered the government, 
accepting aid from the former colonial power was always going to be politically 
unpalatable. 
Burmese reluctance to accept British help also reflected growing US interest in Burma 
and other South-East Asian countries. By turns chastened and galvanised by the 
Nationalist defeat in China in 1949, Truman's policy planners were beginning to look 
with new eyes on the countries to China's south. Although American officials were 
primarily concerned with Indochina, this new emphasis on South-East Asia had 
region-wide implications, including for Burma. An economic and technical aid 
agreement worth around $10 million was signed with the Burmese government in 
September 1950, and early plans for assistance contemplated an expanded programme 
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amounting to $25 million. The Burmese also hired an American consulting firm to 
help them with their economic planning, and there was talk of appointing an 
American financial expert to advise the central bank. 
The key consideration underpinning America's developing aid programme in Burma 
was, of course, strategic: through economic and technical help and political support, 
the US hoped to maintain an independent, more-or-less non-communist government 
in Rangoon. Like the British, however, American planners required Burmese 
cooperation in their efforts. And, again like the British, they did not in the end get it, 
largely because the Burmese did not share American perceptions about the nature and 
scale of the Chinese threat. Early aid projects were unsuccessful, while the 
government's reluctance to publicise the programme to its people meant that very few 
Burmese understood what it was trying to achieve. Meanwhile, tensions between the 
two governments were rising over covert American support for the KMT along the 
Burma-China border. Partly as a result, the Burmese terminated their aid agreement 
in March 1953, one of the very few countries ever to do so. Although many of these 
Nationalist troops were subsequently withdrawn to Taiwan, the damage to US 
standing was less easily repaired. When the rice market turned against Burma in the 
mid-1950s, and financial disaster loomed once again, the government sought help, not 
from the West, but from the communists, and extensive trade and barter deals were 
concluded with China, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc governments. 
These trade agreements were part of a pattern of Soviet and Chinese diplomatic 
initiatives in the Third World in the mid-1950s. Similar trade and aid deals were 
concluded with India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Cambodia, all accompanied by a flurry 
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of diplomatic activity. To analysts in Washington, accustomed to Stalin's belligerent 
diplomacy, these overtures constituted an important and worrying change in 
communist foreign policy. Planners responded to this new perceived threat with a 
revised statement of national security policy, NSC 5602, in March 1956. Previously, 
officials had sought to draw a distinction between areas core to US interests and non- 
core areas such as South-East Asia. Under the terms of NSC 5602, Soviet intervention 
in the Third World meant that these areas too were now considered of essential 
importance to US interests. For Burma, the main effect of this strategic reappraisal 
was the resumption of American aid, and a fresh set of substantial agreements were 
signed during the latter half of the 1950s, totalling some $100 million. 
In giving aid to Burma, British and American planners shared the same basic 
underlying aim 
- 
keeping the government in power and maintaining its independence 
from the communist bloc. At the same time, however, the two countries conceived of 
their aid in different ways. The British, without the resources of their American 
counterparts, tended to take a pragmatic view of the limits of their assistance, and 
favoured short-term, practical outcomes: the spurned Commonwealth loan, for 
example, was designed explicitly to meet a short-term fiscal problem. American 
planners, by contrast, placed far more faith in the transformative powers of aid, and 
liked to see the aid project in terms of an ambitious programme of development. By 
the late 1950s, this had become entwined with American anti-communism, and 
`modernisation', in the hands of theorists like Rostow, Millikan and Pye, had taken on 
an avowedly ideological character. In the opinion of many Americans, governments in 
the Third World, bedazzled by Sputnik, were showing a dangerous willingness to 
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accept communist models of economic and social change; exporting US capital and 
expertise to countries like Burma was seen as one way of meeting this threat. 
The terms policy-makers used to describe countries like Burma - `developing', 
`under-developed' 
- 
highlight the related point that the capitalist model of change, no 
less than its Marxist competitor, was understood teleologically: countries like Burma 
were engaged in a process of advancement, at the end of which stood the `developed' 
society, with the past participle denoting the idea of completeness. 2 The quintessential 
example of such a society was, of course, the United States. The British noted this 
emphasis at the time, and took a perverse pleasure in contrasting the ambitious plans 
of inexperienced American aid officials with what they confidently believed was their 
more seasoned and pragmatic approach. Much less remarked upon, however, was the 
extent to which both governments based their aid plans on a shared assumption of 
Burmese acquiescence. Both believed that the provision of aid gave them some 
measure of influence over the government in Rangoon - that, in other words, their aid 
had some degree of coercive potential, somehow independent of the intentions or 
interests of the recipient state. 
This thesis has argued that these assumptions of influence were built on doubtful 
foundations. Rather than passive and appropriately grateful recipients of external aid, 
and the policy prescriptions that tended to come with it, the Burmese actively 
manipulated their aid relationships to suit their own ends; put crudely, the competition 
2 The idea of an `under-developed' world, as against the ` developed' nations of the West to which these 
countries were meant to aspire, was inherent in American aid planning from Truman on. See Gilbert 
Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London: Zed, 2002), pp. 
72ff. 
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between the two superpowers enabled the Burmese to play each off against the other 
in a bid to extract the maximum advantage from both. Thus, in line with the 
pendulum-like quality of Burmese neutralism that so irritated American and British 
planners, the country's leaders were prepared to take assistance from whichever side 
was ready to offer it on terms they felt they could accept, effectively alternating 
between Western and communist aid as domestic political and economic 
circumstances dictated. Similar ambivalence marked the Burmese response to the 
development lessons America and the Soviet Union claimed to teach. In principle, the 
notion of uplifting a predominantly rural and agrarian society through the application 
of modem technology was profoundly attractive to Burma's post-independence 
leaders, as it was to governments elsewhere in the Third World. Rightly or wrongly, 
the examples set by modem states did indeed appear to offer a way out of 
backwardness and poverty, a route to the prosperity and social justice independence 
had promised, but not delivered. 3 In practice, however, the appeal of `the modern', 
whether of the Soviet or the American kind, was always ambiguous, and by the early 
1960s it had been rejected altogether as Burma closed itself off from the world. 
Burma is in many ways one of the forgotten countries of the early Asian Cold War. 
There are reasons for this, of course: why bother with a country apparently at the 
margins, when there are much richer seams to mine in Korea, Indochina or Malaya, 
countries where the major outside powers were much more directly and actively 
engaged, and for much longer? One answer, perhaps, is that a focus on these sites of 
major conflict, at the expense of peripheral actors like Burma, may lead to the 
conclusion that 1950s Asia was a less complex place than it really was, and that the 
3 Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 86ff. 
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only perspectives that really mattered were those of Moscow and Washington. 
Burma's responses to the superpower interventions it experienced are a reminder that 
Asia's leaders often had coherent and powerful agendas of their own, driven by a 
national past that privileged independence over alignment, and that saw the Cold War, 
not as some epic global struggle for the soul of. humankind, but as a set of 
international circumstances to be managed and exploited in the service of specific 
national aims. 
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